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Abstract 
 
Post-structuralist IR has often treated foreign policy/security discourses and 
their effects on policy through a “representational model”, i.e. how one dominant 
representation makes possible particular policy outcomes. However, in a 
longitudinal analysis, where the concern with “outcome” is already about 
continuity/change, this model is restricting and must be replaced by a model 
integrating multiple voices and contestations, and looking for non-linear 
mechanisms of long-term constraints. Thus, the purpose of this thesis is, first, to 
develop a theoretical-analytical framework suitable for an explicit interest in 
contestations and tracing constraints; and second, in an illustrative-explorative 
study, to apply such relational-dialogical framework to “war on terror” in the US 
and the UK (2001-2012). Bakhtinian Dialogism occupies an important status in 
the framework; therefore, a broader aim is to demonstrate how a “dialogical 
turn” inspired by the philosophy of Mikhail Bakhtin and his circle would enrich 
debate. Developments of the past decade – increased anti-war critique, change 
of governments in the US and the UK, and protracted withdrawal – provide new 
grounds for a longitudinal inquiry into “war on terror”. Moving beyond the 
question how “war on terror” was initially constructed and legitimised, scholarly 
attention must focus on a longitudinal inquiry into why “war on terror” endured.  
In this respect, the formidable deconstructions of official discourses by anti-war 
critique have received marginal attention in IR. The empirical part explores how 
critical discourses have contested the official narratives; how the latter have 
engaged with them as well as with moderate deliberative critique, and to what 
effect for continuity/change, to understand whether and how successive 
governments in the US and the UK have been discursively constrained (bound) 
in their attempts to change policy. Without claiming to be a comprehensive 
explanation, it locates and interprets patterns and logics within the discursive 
exchanges, delineating potential routes contributing to constraints and hence 
continuation. Thus, on the one hand, destabilising critique was shattering the 
foundations of the official “war on terror” narratives without fully re-inscribing the 
dislocated space with new imaginings, thus inviting official representatives to re-
claim such space. On the other hand, deliberative voices were pushing for the 
realisation of the promises inherent in the official discourse, demanding 
“winning” the (albeit “mistaken”) war, thus inviting for continued engagement.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1. Rationale and Purpose of the Thesis  
In the past few decades, intellectual influences drawn from the structuralist 
speech-act theory of Austin and Searle,1 on the one hand, and post-structuralist 
discourse philosophy, in particular of Foucault, Derrida, Barthes, Kristeva and 
Butler, on the other, have precipitated the “linguistic turn” in the discipline of 
International Relations (IR). As a result, critical studies on security have re-
conceived of foreign/security policy as inextricably linked to discursive 
constructions of identity as difference;2 sovereignty as performativity, where 
‘sovereign nation-states are … subjects in process and …are the ontological 
effects of practices which are performatively enacted’;3 security as a 
performative act;4 and security as a social construction where identity and 
policy, as well as the material and the ideational are conceived to be in a 
mutually constitutive relationship.5 Official security discourses in general, and 
discourses of “war on terror” in particular, have been explored and analysed as 
intimately linked with constructions of state/national identities. Thus, theorising 
the relationship between identity, state and foreign/security policy, Campbell 
has noted that foreign policy is especially apposite to perform the function of 
drawing Self-Other distinctions, as a ‘privileged discourse of danger’6 that 
performatively reproduces the very subject as a sovereign state (e.g. the US); 
while Ashley and Campbell have dubbed foreign policy ‘a specific sort of 
                                                 
1
 See Austin, John, (2nd edition) How to Do Things with Words (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1975); Smith, Barry (ed.), John Searle (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003). 
2
 See Campbell, David, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and Politics of Identity, 
2
nd
 edition (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998a); Iver Neumann, Uses of the 
Other: “The East” in European Identity Formation (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1999); Hansen, Lene, Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War (London 
and New York: Routledge, 2006). 
3
 Weber, Cynthia, ‘Performing Sovereignty’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 27 
(1998), 77-97, p. 78.   
4
 Wæver, Ole, ‘Securitization and Desecuritization’, in Lipschutz, Ronnie D. (ed.), On Security 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, 
Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998). 
5
 Critical Discourse Analysis of Fairclough and others applied to studies on security, e.g. by 
Richard Jackson on “war on terror”. Jackson, Richard, ‘Culture, identity and hegemony: 
Continuity and (the lack of) change in US counterterrorism policy from Bush to Obama’, 
International Politics, 48 (2011), 390–411. 
6
 Campbell, David, ‘Violent Performatives’, in Joseph Lapid and Kratochwil, Fredrich (eds.) The 
Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory (Boulder; London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), 
p. 167.  
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boundary-producing political performance’.7 In addition, Hansen has noted the 
inseparability of foreign policy discourse and national identity.8 On “war on 
terror”, Croft has explored how the US official narrative has drawn on national 
identity narratives, and in turn been reproduced in various cultural and religious 
sites;9 while Jackson has demonstrated how Otherisation built into the US 
official narrative on 9/11 has been built on and also reproduced a certain US 
identity.10 
On the other hand, however, the past decade has seen formidable, if 
often overlooked, deconstructions and destabilisations of official security 
discourses based on Otherisation, or of ‘privileged discourse[s] of danger’,11  by 
voices of anti-war movements, critical media and other agents, specifically 
around “war on terror”. Exemplary are e.g. what some have dubbed 
cumulatively as “war for oil” discourses.12 These, as well as other alternative 
narratives destabilising the official “war on terror” discourses have mostly 
received only marginal attention in IR studies, often in dismissive terms,13 or 
else referred to in order to show how they have been subsumed by the 
hegemonic discourse, thus suggesting that they have not had much effect on 
the policy and practice of “war on terror”.14 Concentrating primarily on 
hegemonic/dominant discourses is a broader tendency in post-structuralist IR 
with regards to foreign/security discourses, and will be discussed later (but see, 
e.g., Campbell himself admitting the limitation of his seminal work to be the 
bracketing off of dominant discourses from discourses of dissent and 
resistance).15 
                                                 
7
 Campbell (1998: 62), quoting Richard Ashley, ‘Foreign Policy as Political Performance’, 
International Studies Notes, 13 (1987), 51. Furthermore, Neumann has argued and 
demonstrated how ordering of the Self (the European self, in his case) has historically been one 
way of organising politics. Thus, drawing on Chantal Mouffe’s elaboration of “politics” as the 
practice seeking to organize human coexistence by establishing a certain order in a 
permanently antagonistic field of “the political”, Neumann concludes his empirical study by 
positing that ‘the ordering of self as “Western” and other as “Eastern” in European identity 
formation is one way of organising European politics’. Neumann (1999: 210).  
8
 Hansen (2006). 
9
 Croft, Stuart, Culture, Crisis and America’s War on Terror (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006). 
10
 Richard Jackson, Writing the War on Terror: Language, Politics and Counter-Terrorism 
(Manchester and NY: Manchester University Press, 2005). 
11
 Campbell (1996: 167).  
12
 Jackson (2005). 
13
 See, e.g. Jackson claiming there has not been much critique. Ibid. 
14
 Ibid. 
15
 Campbell (1998: x-xi). 
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In addition, post-structuralist IR and Security Studies have often treated 
foreign policy/security discourses and their effects on policy and practice 
through what I shall call the “representational model”, i.e. accounts of how one 
dominant representation (of a “threat”, “event”, “problem”) points to a particular 
course of action rather than another (foreign/security policies and practices), 
and thereby how such representations ‘make…possible’16 such policies and 
practices. For instance, as per Campbell, the Bosnia intervention initially did not 
take place because US identity was not articulated in lines of a defence of 
multiculturalism.17 Similarly, the invasion of Kuwait was framed as a violation of 
the norm of sovereignty, thereby making intervention possible.18 Hansen’s more 
recent work on Bosnia, although pointing to a more complex model, and 
acknowledging the limitations of more simple representational models, 
nonetheless retains, even if in a more nuanced form, the basic logic behind 
such accounts.19 Specifically in relation to “war on terror”, a similar argument 
has now become most familiar in academic as well as public critical discourse, 
namely that the securitizing “war” narrative of 9/11 led to, or “made possible”, 
the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, something which an alternative possible 
“crime” narrative could not have done.20 
Indeed, the term “representational model” is an uneasy one, given post-
structuralists’ broader normative-political aim of deconstructing and critiquing 
dominant representations. However, it aims to capture the loosely causal logic 
behind most claims pertaining to the political and policy effects ascribed to 
dominant security representations in such studies.  
The representational model has some merits if employed to explore initial 
legitimation discourses of security policies, e.g. in the immediate post-9/11 
period.21 However, in a longitudinal perspective, i.e. in an analysis concerned 
with the longer life of such discourses and continued (re)legitimations, where 
                                                 
16
 Fierke, K. M., Critical Approaches to International Security (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), 
pp. 68-69. 
17
 Campbell, David, National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity and Justice in Bosnia (University 
of Minneapolis Press, 1998b). 
18
 Campbell (1996). 
19
 See Hansen (2006: 31). 
20
 Fierke (2007: 105). Also, see Jackson (2005).   
21
 But even then, there is a lot of scope for critique. See, e.g., critique by Laffey, who in a 
historical-materialist account primarily interested in the role of sedimented institutions and 
material factors such as oil, shows how such a ‘performative model’ leaves out ‘multiple logics 
that constitute the social’. Laffey, Mark, ‘Locating identity: performativity, foreign policy and state 
action’, Review of International Studies, 26 (2000), 429. 
11 
 
the outcome is already about continuity and/or change, this model is highly 
restricting. Together with the tendency to over-concentrate on the official 
discourses alone and hence overlook or at times outright dismiss the 
significance of discourses of critique and resistance, it risks reducing relational 
and non-linear discursive processes that have led to policy outcomes (continuity 
or change being such outcome) to a linear and synchronic relationship between 
one (characteristically, the dominant) narrative and certain foreign 
policy/security practices. Instead, especially to explore the longer term 
dynamics of a security discourse, we must bring together discourses of official 
representatives and those of dissent and critique into one empirical analysis 
that would explore how a) they have related to one another over the years by 
variously responding to one another and to external developments, and b) how 
they have produced policy and practice outcomes relationally. 
Thus, the broader theoretical interest of this project revolves around an 
attempt to gain a deeper and empirically more supported understanding of the 
role of certain semiotic mechanisms in the explanation of “the longer life of” 
securitization discourses (where the term “securitization” is used in the broader 
sense of on-going security constructions and legitimations of policy).  
 
Indeed, the endurance and the protracted involvement of the US and the UK 
especially in Afghanistan and Iraq, despite the potentially subversive anti-war 
critique that has characterised the political and public landscape in both 
countries over the years, begs the broader question about the causes behind 
such endurance. In other words, moving beyond the question how “war on 
terror” was initially constructed and legitimised through discourse, it is overdue 
that scholarly attention must now focus on a longitudinal inquiry and seek to 
understand why the “war on terror” endured.22  
                                                 
22
 One of the few studies concerned with such endurance is Jeffrey Michaels’ recent study, 
which, however, locates the discussion in the narrow field of Strategic and War Studies; and in 
a typical rational choice and Realist account. Offering a historical account of the evolution, use 
and abuse of a few key terms (e.g. “surge”) used by the US military leadership and 
bureaucracy, politicians and the media, he argues that policy was affected by a certain 
‘entrapment’ into the initially ‘inappropriate’ or misconceived use and subsequent 
institutionalisation of these terms. While the concept of ‘the discourse trap’, or its mechanisms, 
is not theorised and conceptualised in much depth, the author’s account of such ‘entrapment’ 
implicitly qualifies it as a certain dysfunction of realist politics and the disruption of the otherwise 
normal rational choice model. Michaels, Jeffrey, The Discourse Trap and the US Military: From 
the War on Terror to the Surge (New York: Palgrave, MacMillan, 2013), pp. 5-6. Another 
exception is Richard Jackson’s article to be engaged with later. See, Jackson (2011). 
12 
 
The empirical part of this thesis is initially asking such a “why” question 
(which can also be framed as another type of “how” question, i.e. a causal-
constitutive “how” question). However, such a “why” question is highly complex 
and would require a multi-causal analysis for a comprehensive answer: among 
other potential causes for the endurance of “war on terror”, such multi-causal 
analysis, would necessarily include the close scholarly examination of some of 
the claims behind the very same popular anti-war discourses of “war for oil”, 
whereby the reasons for the initiation and therefore continuation of the 
involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq is tightly linked to the material economic 
interests in preserving control over Middle East oil reserves. It would also 
involve examination of the claims about the vested interests of the “military-
industrial complex” benefiting from continued intervention. Just as discursive 
exchanges, detached from materially-embedded reasons for action, cannot fully 
explain the endurance of the “war”, mono-causal materialist explanations would 
be reductionist.  
Integral to any such quest to understand endurance, i.e. continuity or 
lack of change, is the concept of “constraints”. It often implicitly or explicitly 
underlies constructivist/post-structuralist studies inquiring into substantive cases 
of continuity and/or (lack of) change. Relatedly, such studies also make implicit 
claims about certain causal mechanisms underlying processes of constraints.23 
Thus, the very notion of hegemonic discourses itself is about constraints. 
However, the interest in the existing discourse-analytical literature has largely 
been on how hegemonic discourses constrain, i.e. delimit the power of, 
subjugated actors in what is possible to say and do, rather than looking for 
relationally produced and non-linear mechanisms of long-term constraints on 
actors (such as successors in government) who might be politically representing 
an inherited official discourse but striving (rhetorically or through policy action) 
for certain change. As the literature review will show, substantive studies on 
“war on terror” fall short of explicitly conceptualising discursive constraints and 
accounting for them as part of the mechanisms leading to the claimed 
outcomes; and often only allude to the implicit mechanisms of such constraints 
through vague and under-conceptualised metaphors. Examples of the latter are 
                                                 
23
 See, e.g., Jackson (2011). 
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claims about the official discourse turning into ‘self-fulfilling prophecies’;24 
‘push[ing] and pull[ing] everyone toward world constructions that match the 
wordings’;25 or “war on terror” ‘tak[ing] on a life of its own’.26 
Most closely, the issue of constraints and hence of continuity and (lack) 
of change is addressed in Jackson’s more recent piece on “war on terror”,27 
claiming that the Obama administration has been constrained by earlier (Bush) 
discourse. However, as I will demonstrate in the literature review, Jackson 
effectively sees such constraints mainly coming from the political and 
commercial elites deliberately pushing for the continuation of policy to serve 
their material vested interests. Furthermore, Jackson suggests that such 
constraints are present only because the institutionalisation and preservation of 
vested interests is reliant on “threat”, in fact any major threat, and that in case of 
an invention of a new threat to replace “terrorism”, change of policy would be 
possible, without much constraint from the earlier “war on terror” narrative.28 
Thus, in Jackson’s account, the “war on terror” is primarily seen as the effect of 
‘a set of bureaucratic material interests’;29 and in the absence of exploring other 
mechanisms, such material interests must be behind the purported constraints 
and hence the continuity and the lack of change. While adopting the ‘dialectical 
co-constitution of the language and the material practices’,30 this conclusion 
closes off an inquiry into more specific mechanisms and semiotic dynamics 
within the given phenomenon, in particular, by leaving out any potential 
encounters of the hegemonic discourse with the discourses of dissent and 
critique, as well as political deliberation, and their relationally produced potential 
role in the continuity and (lack) of change.     
 
Thus, overall, as the literature review in chapter 2 demonstrates in more detail, 
we may sum up three main areas of limitations in post-positivist discourse-
analytical treatments of the “war on terror” discourse, but also more broadly of 
security discourses in post-structuralist IR: a) the overconcentration on the 
                                                 
24
 Dunmire, Patricia L., Projecting the Future through Political Discourse: The Case of the Bush 
Doctrine (Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamin Publishing Company, 2011), p. 43.  
25
 Luke, Timothy W., ‘Developing a New Speech in Global Security: Exploring the Rhetoric of 
Evil in the Bush Administration Response to 9.11.01’, in Mark J. Lacy and Peter Wilkin (eds.), 
Global Politics in the Information Age (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), p. 25. 
26
 Jackson (2005: 3).  
27
 Jackson (2011). 
28
 Ibid. 
29
 Ibid., 395. 
30
 Ibid., 393.  
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hegemonic/dominant discourses alone, i.e. in relative, if not complete, isolation 
from the competing discourses of dissent and critique, and hence the lack of 
relational longitudinal analysis of “war on terror” discourses and their effects on 
policy continuation or change; b) the limitations of the representational model; 
and c) insufficient conceptualising and empirical tracing of mechanisms of 
“constraints” specifically in the discursive domain of contestations in relation to 
“war on terror”. 
Drawing on these, I will argue that if we are concerned with the 
contestation and struggle present in the political field over constitution of 
dominant security discourses, then the representational model must give 
way/be enhanced by a model that looks at multiple voices and tensions, and at 
potentially less linear mechanisms and outcomes in the longer term, and 
especially after an initial legitimation has been achieved. On the other hand, if 
we are talking about security policies and practices having been ‘made 
possible’31 by certain dominant/hegemonic security narratives, then we are 
effectively dealing with certain implicit causation. I will later argue that a more 
explicit discussion of causation is important because the idea of “cause” is 
already implicit in most post-structuralist or “thick constructivist” empirical 
studies in IR and Security Studies: these inquiries seek to delineate effects, and 
at times mechanisms, of discursive and identity dynamics on foreign/security 
policy, while at the same time the theoretical concept of “causation” is 
eschewed.32 We would benefit from more explicitly admitting to the presence of 
“cause” defined in non-Humean, non-essentialised and non-generalisable 
terms; and exploring causal mechanisms that go beyond how 
hegemonic/dominant security narratives “make possible” certain policies and 
instead look for mechanisms how such policy outcomes become possible non-
linearly, as a result of the agonistic struggles and contestations, no matter how 
unequal, present in the given security realm. This would incorporate discourses 
striving to domination, those variously destabilising them, and how these 
respond to each other and change as a result.  
 
                                                 
31
 Fierke (2007: 105). 
32
 See, e.g., Hansen arguing for ‘the impossibility of causation’, and rejecting the idea of “cause” 
altogether. Hansen (2006).  
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Purpose of the thesis: Drawing on these limitations, the purpose of this thesis 
has been, first, the development of a theoretical and analytical framework that 
would be more suitable for a study explicitly interested in contestations and in 
tracing outcomes (continuity and change being such outcome) relationally (Part 
I of the thesis); and second, applying this framework to conduct an empirical 
study into the long-term evolution of discourses around the “war on terror” in the 
US and the UK in over a decade (2001-2012) (Part II of the thesis). The 
empirical research revolves around a working hypothesis on a possible binding 
effect that has contributed to the protraction and endurance of the “war on 
terror”, to be articulated in a moment. Without claiming to be a comprehensive 
multi-causal explanation for the overall phenomenon of a prolonged “war on 
terror”, the empirical study attempts to locate and interpret some patterns and 
logics within the discursive exchanges and contestations around the “war on 
terror” specifically focusing on tensions between the official narratives and 
narratives of dissent and destabilisation, in order to delineate some potential 
routes contributing to constraints and hence continuation of policy.  
In addition, as it will become clearer in a moment, Bakhtinian Dialogism 
occupies an important status in the development of such framework; therefore, 
another, broader, aim of the thesis is to bring Dialogism, the discourse 
philosophy of Mikhail Bakhtin and his circle, into the theoretical and substantive 
debates on foreign and security discourse in IR and Security Studies, and 
demonstrate how the debate would be enriched by a certain “dialogical turn” in 
theorising and analysing more explicitly discursive contestations and their 
effects on policy and practices of security.  
It must be emphasised, that the theoretical part of this thesis raises and 
touches upon larger and broader range of themes and issues than the empirical 
part has sought or been able to explore and address. Partly, this was due to the 
need to introduce the thought of Bakhtin and his circle in detail, potentially to 
audiences with little familiarity with it;33 and partly because the framework has 
sought to develop insights that would go beyond the empirical focus on “war on 
                                                 
33
 As we shall see, Bakhtinian Dialogism has received only marginal attention in IR, with the 
exception of Guillaume’s work, and still remains an unfamiliar domain to most IR scholars. See 
Guillaume, Xavier (2002), ‘Reflexivity and Subjectivity: A Dialogical Perspective for and on 
International Relations Theory’, Qualitative Social Research, 3, 1-26; as well as Guillaume 
(2011). Also, see Guillaume, Xavier (2010), ‘Bakhtin: From Substance to Process’, in Moore, C. 
and Farrands, C. (eds.) International Relations Theory and Philosophy: Interpretive Dialogues 
(Oxford: Routledge). 
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terror” and could potentially animate discussion about foreign/security 
discourses and practices specifically in Western late-modern contexts in light of 
the emphasis on relationality and dialogicity and of contesting/negotiating 
security.  
 
1.2. The Hypothesis  
Locating the socio-historical situatedness of foreign/security discourses in the 
broader societal tensions and changes of the late modern age, and attempting 
to understand the implications of such late modern field, I variously draw on 
sociological and philosophical insights, especially those offered by Giddens and 
Beck34 in relation to “reflexive modernization” and “risk society”, respectively; as 
well as by Dillon on the politics of security as part of the Western metaphysical 
tradition built on a will to certitude.35 As a result, I will argue that official 
foreign/security policy finds itself torn between the conflicting needs to satisfy 
the will to certitude, and the need to deal with the repercussions of ever more 
complex global uncertainties of the late modern age. As a future-orientated 
discourse of progress – of ‘imagining’36 a collective “future” as progress, as a 
movement in time towards something better, it represents a tension between 
the need to continue projecting the promise of progress of the Enlightenment 
and the assurance of certainty, on the one hand, and the need to engage 
variously with the plurality of other voices destabilising such a project. This 
tension, in turn, reflects a more specific paradox of late modernity in relation to 
security. On the one hand, the state is still bound up in the Modernist promise of 
combating evil and hence strives for maximum monology and singularity for 
state identity based on security narratives; on the other hand, it is in great 
tension with the late modern self-reflexive society, as well as post-modernist 
deconstructive tendencies: it cannot achieve its task without engaging 
with/responding to the heteroglot discursive field characterised by publics that 
                                                 
34
 Anthony Giddens, ‘Risk and Responsibility’, The Modern Law Review, 62 (1999); Beck, 
Ulrich, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity, Mark Ritter (transl.), (Los Angeles, London: 
Sage, 1992); Beck, Ulrich, ‘World risk society as cosmopolitan society? Ecological questions in 
a framework of manufactured uncertainties’, Theory, Culture and Society, 13 (1996), 1-33. 
35
 Dillon, Michael, Politics of Security: Towards a Political Philosophy of Continental Thought 
(Oxford/New York: Routledge, 1996).  
36
 Anderson, Benedict, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread on 
Nationalism, 2
nd
 Edition (London: Verso, 2006), p. 7. 
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are increasingly more critical and self-reflexive,37 as well as more 
deconstructive of discourses of danger built on defilement as the basis for 
national identity. 
These theoretical insights already position us differently when it comes to 
the question of continuity and/or change and the endurance of “war on terror”. 
In other words, I am interested in the latter question within such context of, and 
in relation to, such a potential tension and inherent contradictions of the late 
modern age. This means that we must explore relations and struggles among 
competing agents and how these are resolved if at all, rather than focusing on 
one specific (characteristically the dominant/hegemonic) narrative resulting in a 
particular policy, or the continuation/change thereof.    
 
The developments in the later post-9/11 years – increased anti-war critique both 
domestically and internationally; the change of governments in the US and the 
UK; attempts to tone down rhetoric illustrated by the move to discard the use of 
the term “war on terror”, Obama’s pledge to close the Guantanamo Bay prison; 
and finally protracted execution of withdrawal plans – provide new grounds for 
an inquiry into the discursive and policy dynamics of “war on terror”, in particular 
with regards to the issue of continuity/change. Thus, these developments beg 
for questions such as how the official discourses in both the US and the UK 
have evolved reacting to major challenges, specifically domestic challenges 
offered by critical voices; how they have transformed throughout the years, and 
what implications this has had on policy continuation or change. In terms of the 
protracted rhetoric and policy, they also point to the question: what have the 
mechanisms of constraints, if any, been among various stages of the dominant 
official narratives on the one hand, and between the official narratives and 
narratives of critique variously undermining and destabilising them, on the other. 
One such possible constraint could be coming from the dynamic around 
negotiating national identity as inextricable to negotiating security in the 
contemporary late modern Western liberal-democratic context. More 
specifically, if the official narratives of 9/11 and hence of “war on terror” have 
                                                 
37
 See for example, Beck, on self-critical society; Lash on self-reflexivity of agency, as well as 
Giddens on subjects having learned to think sociologically. Beck (1996); S. Lash, ‘Reflexivity 
and its doubles: structure, aesthetics, community’, in U. Beck, A. Giddens and S. Lash (eds.) 
Reflexive Modernization (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994); and Giddens, Anthony, The 
Consequences of Modernity (Stanford University Press, 1990). 
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been intimately linked to narrating a national Self and (re)producing an official 
version of national identity, then it is only pertinent to ask how the voices of 
dissent and critique have destabilised such identity narratives along with 
deconstructing and destabilising the official narrative giving meaning to 9/11 
and the subsequent raison d’etre behind the policies and practices within the 
remit of “war on terror”. In other words, have the discourses of dissent and 
critique, whether intentionally or as an epiphenomenon, also dismantled and 
subverted dominant national identity narratives in the US and the UK? Have 
these amounted to “dislocations”, i.e. ‘the process by which the contingency of 
discursive structures is made visible…[it] shatters already existing identities and 
literally induces an identity crisis for the subject’?38 If yes, then to what effect: 
how have the official representatives in turn reacted and responded to such 
dismantling and potential dislocations? 
The working and at this stage tentatively articulated hypothesis behind 
this thesis states: 
In contemporary Western democratic states, where state/national identity 
construction, as well as critique and accountability, are inextricable parts 
of negotiating security, official foreign/security discourses closely built on 
and re-constituting national identity narratives, beyond the initial point of 
legitimising policy such as war or intervention (intended effect), in the 
longer term may become discursively and politically binding on the 
initiators and/or their successors (unintended/ epiphenomenal effect), i.e. 
may have the potential effect of constraining change, or protracting policy, 
even in case of an attempted/declared intention to the contrary. 
Applied to the case of “war on terror”, the hypothesis suggests the broader 
research question behind the empirical study: How, i.e. through what socio-
semiotic mechanisms, did the hypothetical binding, if at all, take place in case of 
the US and the UK involvements in “war on terror”? Thus, it asks whether 
successive governments in the US and the UK have been constrained in their 
attempts to change policy direction and the official narratives of security and 
national identity underlying earlier discourses of legitimation; and whether any 
logics and patterns internal to the contestations and importantly encounters with 
                                                 
38
 Howarth, David and Yannis Stavrakakis, ‘Introducing Discourse Theory and Political 
Analysis’, in D. Howarth, A. Noval and Y. Stavrakakis (eds.), Discourse theory and Political 
Analysis: Identities, Hegemonies and Social Change (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2000), p. 13.  
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the destabilising narratives of the critique have had any potential role to play in 
such constraints.  
 
The empirical exploration of this hypothesis, as well as the limitations of the 
existing literature identified above, necessitated a theoretical inquiry into 
enhanced ways of approaching discourses and making a number of theoretical 
and methodological correctives, which eventually pointed to a revised 
framework. Especially, the concern with relationality and contestation, 
presented me with a particular challenge: theoretical and analytical models 
concerned with discourse are largely insufficiently equipped to such a task; or 
where contestations are explicitly theorised at the macro-theoretical level, such 
as in Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory, they are not reflected in a 
subsequent micro-theory of the utterance, and a model where the actual 
application of discourse analysis is conducted by focusing on just such 
relational exchanges specifically when contesting security.  
To address this challenge, on the one hand, I selectively draw on Laclau 
and Mouffe’s discourse theory, and its later re-articulation by David Howarth, 
where contestations are explicitly theorised, and selectively utilise certain 
analytical categories such as “dislocation” and “nodal points”. On the other 
hand, I introduce Dialogism, the highly relational discourse philosophy of the 
20th century Russian thinker Mikhail Bakhtin and his circle, in order to develop 
an explicitly relational theory of the utterance through the “dialogical speech-act” 
which is conceived as inextricable to contestations and social struggles. As a 
result, and by variously drawing on Michael Dillon’s political philosophy on 
security; and on the sociological insights of Ulrich Becks and Anthony Giddens 
on the status of critique in the late modern society, I develop a “relational-
dialogical” framework for specifically analysing foreign/security discourses. 
Thus, the development of such framework became the emergent aim of 
the thesis, along with the aim of enhancing the empirical understanding of the 
continuation of “war on terror”.  
The framework allows going beyond the moment of initial legitimation of 
security in moments of major events and inquiring into the longer dynamics, i.e. 
what happens after such legitimation. But more importantly, it provides 
conceptual tools for  inquiring into how security discourses are contested, 
negotiated and change over time, producing outcomes (including continuity and 
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change) relationally, i.e. out of the tensions and struggles between discourses 
of official representatives, those of deliberation and political oversight, and 
those of public dissent and critique. 
As this requires lengthy exploration and theory development, I will leave 
the exposition of the framework to the chapters that follow in Part I. Here, 
however, a brief introduction about the novelty and usefulness of Bakhtin’s 
thought is due.  
 
1.3. Bakhtin in the New Framework 
There has been considerable interest in the thought of Russian philosopher 
Mikhail Bakhtin and his circle (including Voloshinov and Medvedev),39 and the 
theory of Dialogism in the arts, humanities;40 but only very nascent and at times 
only tangential interest in IR.41 With the exception of Guillaume’s work,42 
Bakhtin and his circle have featured in IR studies very often as little more than a 
footnote, despite their thought having indirectly illuminated some key 
substantive claims and directions (on “identity/alterity” and “intertextuality”; and 
recently “context” in securitization theory). Guillaume, perhaps the first to 
develop a fully Bakhtin-inspired dialogical approach is primarily interested in 
and has explored the usefulness of Dialogism in reconceiving the 
identity/alterity nexus: he has compellingly shown that rather than 
spatial/territorialised and fixed, this nexus must be understood as a process 
which is subject to ‘trans-actions’ among actors representing differing identities. 
                                                 
39
 Several earlier writings initially published under the name of either Medvedev or Voloshinov, 
have subsequently been claimed and recognised, in Russia as well as in the West, as 
belonging to Bakhtin.  The authorship of some work is still disputed by some; however, it is clear 
that all three were a close circle and had developed a similar theoretical approach, elements of 
which reappear and consistently develop in most of the writings. Therefore, the issue of 
authorship will be resolved here in favour of referring to all the works as by Bakhtin, also 
indicating, the published name, where appropriate. 
40
 For a wide-ranging collection of essays, see Michael E. Gardiner (ed.), Mikhail Bakhtin,Vols. I, 
II, III, (London: Sage, 2003). 
41
 Guillaume (2002); Guillaume (2010), Guillaume (2011). To a less extent, see Der Derian, 
James (1993) ‘Fathers (and sons), Mother Courage (and her children), and the Dog (and the 
beef), in Global Voices: Dialogues in International Relations, James Rosenau (ed.) (Westview); 
and Neumann, I. B. (1996) ‘Self and Other in International Relations’, European Journal of 
International Relations, 2(2), 139-74, to be discussed in chapter 2.     
42
 See Der Derian, James, ‘The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche and Baudrillard’, in 
R. Lipschutz (ed.), On Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), pp. 24-45; 
Neumann (1996); James Der Derian and Michael J. Shapiro (eds.), International/Intertextual 
Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics (Lexington Books, 1989); and Balzacq, 
Thierry (ed.), Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve (Routledge, 
2011). 
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He shows how national identities are formed dialogically, in answer to and in 
constant trans-actions with one another (e.g. between Japan and the US).43 
However, the usefulness of Bakhtin for conceptualising a post-Austinean, more 
intersubjective speech-act, and more broadly a discourse theory more suitable 
for a relational discourse analysis concerned with contestations internally, of 
competing representations negotiating a certain identity within a community, 
has largely been missed.  
Through the development of the new framework, I hope to bring 
Bakhtinian Dialogism out of such mostly “footnote” status, and along with 
Guillaume’s work, re-introduce it to IR. I seek to show a) its relevance for re-
conceiving of a more dialogical-relational theory of speech-act/utterance; and 
thereby provide a micro-level theorisation of the speech-act most suited for the 
concern with contestations and relationality; and b) its potential for enriching 
theoretical and empirical discussion in IR on negotiating foreign/security policy, 
through a focus on “answerability”, as well as his concept of the “chronotopic” 
(time-space) narrative representations.   
In Bakhtinian thought, “dialogue” is primarily an ontological category: 
rather than formal systematic integrity as in structuralism, or discontinuity and 
contingency as in Western post-structuralism,44 for Bakhtin the key principle in 
discourse and society is “dialogue”. As a meta-category, or in the broader sense 
of the term as synonymous with the term “relation”, dialogue runs through 
various layers of reality, including between the material/physical and the social, 
thus incorporating the discursive and the non-/extra-discursive; while in the 
narrower sense of the term, dialogue is a philosophically-realist ontology of the 
utterance or speech-act, where utterances must be studied not individually, but 
relationally in a sociologically informed approach. Bakhtin calls such approach 
‘translinguistics’,45 where discourse and its generative causal effects can be 
known only when not losing sight of the social-situatedness of the processes 
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 See, Guillaume (2002); also see Guillaume (2010). 
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 Henceforth, I shall refer to post-structural thought influenced by the Parisian school of post-
structuralist philosophers, particularly, Derrida, Foucault, and Barthes, as “Western post-
structuralists”, in order to distinguish Bakhtin and his circle as thinkers who anticipated some of 
the elements of critique of structuralisms and more broadly positivist science already in the 
1930. However, the term is not used to construct a strict Western/Eastern dichotomy: as we 
shall see later, there are important convergences and influences between the two, but I will 
argue that there are also important differences.     
45
 This is Todorov’s translation of Bakhtin’s Russian choice for ‘metalinguisitica’, in order to 
avoid possible confusion. Tzvetan Todorov, Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogical Principle 
(Manchester University Press, 1984), p. 24. 
22 
 
under inquiry, and only as scrutinised ‘on interindividual territory’, i.e. between 
socially organised individuals.46 The utterance becomes part of the broader 
societal struggles in the given historical epoch, as part of specific behavioural 
genres of communication and their given (and changeable) functions in the 
specific societal struggles. Therefore, what we should be studying is exactly 
such relationality of these interactions.  
As conceived through Bakhtin’s philosophy of the act, and his concept of 
“answerability”, an utterance becomes a “deed” upon the world, an “answer” to 
the world, and takes on the function of resisting, initiating or negotiating change, 
by employing both monologising and dialogising forces, responding to and in 
tensions with others’ such deeds upon the world in an unequal social field of 
contestation. Thus, an utterance is caught up in an agitated field of past, 
present and future (anticipated) utterances, located in the realm of social 
performativity, and registering social differences. 
As we shall see in the overview in chapter 2, Laclau and Mouffe’s 
discourse theory is ‘predicated on the ultimate impossibility of societal closure’, 
which in turn is ‘a condition that makes articulatory practices and political 
agency possible’.47 Even if impossible in ontological terms, for political agents, 
‘the idea of closure and fullness still functions as an (impossible) ideal’.48 This 
idea of impossibility of closure of any discursive structure is compatible with the 
Bakhtinian category of monologising discourse as a constant but never-fully-
achievable attempt to bring the societal field to closure, to circumscribe 
heteroglossia, to singularise meaning. However, through Bakhtin such ideal of 
fixation and closure can never be attempted without a dialogical engagement 
with others’ meanings/utterances, including meanings attempting dislocations to 
be circumscribed and excluded, but also meanings to be positively engaged 
with. For Bakhtin, the agony to act and to mean, which does not necessarily 
lead to antagonisms of opposing projects (of identity through difference), is 
inescapably “answerable” to the other, and even in the most monological 
(hegemonising) practices, compels to construct meanings through and with 
others’ meanings. Such “addressivity/answerability” also suggests that any 
potentially dislocatory practices, such as anti-war discourses, or discourses of 
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 Voloshinov, V. N., Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, L. Matejka and R. Titunik 
(transl.), (Cambridge, MA/London: Harvard University Press, 1986 [1929]), p. 12.  
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 Howarth and Stavrakakis (2000: 15).  
48
 Ibid., 8.  
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radical political critique in various social loci (social movements; alternative 
press, and e-media, etc.), as well as discourses of more moderate political 
critique and deliberations (e.g. in parliaments and other political fora), especially 
in the late modern context, become part of negotiating/contesting security. 
Specifically, translated into the familiar vocabulary of securitization theory, and 
built on the Bakhtinian concept of “answerability” as the premise for any 
utterance, the dialogical-relational model suggests that security performatives or 
speech-acts are not merely “accepted” or “rejected” by audiences,49  but are 
variously responded to, generating a plethora of other performatives, which 
feeds back into the dialogical process, creating new tensions and new 
discursive realities to which the initial security “performer” in turn becomes 
answerable. In this light then, audiences are in turn speakers-performers, and 
vice versa: official representatives become audiences for the multiplicity of 
participants in negotiating foreign/security policy – political peers, dissident 
rivals (social movements, NGOs), agents in the media, intellectuals, etc. This 
suggests that we should explore the multiplicity of security contesting, rather 
than securitizing, speech-acts.  
Hence, any foreign/security policy outcomes (constrained or slowed 
down change being one such outcome), and the mechanism behind such 
outcome, can become known only when the relationality of all these “doings” of 
various performativities is assessed. In a relational and longitudinal focus, 
foreign/security policy argumentation should be seen at a higher level of spatio-
temporal dialogical relationship: thus, hypothetically, the foreign/security 
discourse on “war on terror” involves dialogical relationships and hence possible 
mechanisms running between the official voices and oppositional/alternative 
voices, and the multiple voices in the broader discursive realm (including 
relationships forged through destabilising, deliberative and silencing 
performatives). These span horizontally across space, i.e. across these various 
voices at one temporal point; as well as semiotic relations vertically and 
temporally, i.e. among meanings constructed and disseminated at a present (or 
a given) moment in time and meanings constructed in past utterances.  
Thus, the relational-dialogical framework suggests that foreign/security 
discourse – at any point being at the intersection of conflicting forces and torn 
between the needs of a balancing act, and therefore constantly changing while 
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being constrained – cannot be located and studied in any clear-cut “narrative” or 
representation bracketed off from other competing narratives/representations. 
Moreover, policy cannot be deduced as the result of any straightforwardly 
identifiable narrative or representation that has produced or made possible the 
said policy bracketed off from other competing narratives. 
 
As I will demonstrate throughout chapter 3, Bakhtin’s conception of discourse 
and society is best read as philosophically realist, albeit consonant with some 
key insights and categories advanced by Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory. 
I will show how these two sources of insights are not entirely antithetical and are 
in fact complimentary, especially in relation to Howarth’s newer, most recent re-
development of post-structuralism subscribing to ‘minimal realism’ and ‘radical 
materialism’.50 In this sense, my meta-theoretical approach is that it is possible 
to draw on certain ontological insights on discourse/society from post-
structuralist theories, without remaining indebted to their broader 
epistemological assumptions, while at the same time being philosophically 
realist in my epistemology and in my ontological take on causation and semiotic 
mechanisms.51 
 
1.4. The Scope of the Empirical Research, Chapter Outline and 
Findings 
It must be emphasised that to proceed with the emergent aim to develop such a 
framework, which is laid out in Part I of the thesis, I had to somewhat limit the 
empirical scope of this project. Thus, the empirical study in Part II serves as an 
illustration of how the Bakhtinian-inspired relational-dialogical framework 
developed in Part I may be applied, and aims at elucidating what further 
questions may arise from it, both theoretically, and in terms of the substantive 
understanding of “war on terror”. Hence, the “war on terror” is not taken as a 
case study that claims to produce comprehensive and exhaustive answers to 
the raised empirical issues, and fully defend and account for the hypothesis 
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 Howarth, David, Poststructuralism and After: Structure, Subjectivity and Power (New York: 
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underlying it. Rather, the study is used ‘as a medium for continued theoretical 
and methodological discussions’.52 What I have called the “binding hypothesis” 
only serves as an ongoing working hypothesis through which this illustrative 
analysis can take place, and through which we may ask more and further 
theoretical and substantive questions about the “war on terror” contestations; 
and more generally about contesting “security” and about continuity and 
change. 
Thus, the empirical part of this thesis has a modest goal, and along with 
hoping to shed some new light on understanding some possible dynamics 
behind the continuation of “war on terror”, it mainly aims to generate new 
theoretical as well as empirical questions for this and other cases, without 
claiming to be a comprehensive ‘multi-causal explanation’53 for the overall 
phenomenon of a prolonged “war on terror”.  
With a pre-9/11 background exploration spanning at least a decade, for 
the actual analysis I focus on “war on terror” contestations in the US and the 
UK, roughly from September 2001 to 2012. While some comparative reflection 
becomes possible, this is a parallel, rather than a comparative study on the two 
countries. A comparison in the strictest sense would not have been possible, as 
the contestations and polices in the two countries have been interlinked and at 
times co-dependent. However, a parallel examination allows for a broader 
scope to explore variations.  
In order to be able to explore relationality and trace possible mechanisms 
of binding, I start with mapping the early construction of the official “war on 
terror” narratives in the US and the UK respectively, in the initial years following 
9/11, to serve as a heuristic device, as an initial departure point,54 from where to 
trace and map various supportive and challenging voices. I identify and analyse 
data selected from official public utterances spanning approximately from 11 
September 2001 to end of 2005 (covering the early and early-intermediate 
periods). These are statements, primarily presidential or prime-ministerial 
speeches and other public pronouncements and documents, at important 
historic junctures, and specifically those that have potentially attracted the 
largest audiences (e.g. through prime-time televised presidential addresses). 
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For a full list of selected texts, see Appendix A. I then turn to a systematic 
analysis of destabilising/dislocatory and deliberative critique in the intermediate 
stage, i.e. 2003-2007. The data are drawn from the articulations found in the 
mass media, critical politicians’ speeches, pronouncements and written texts, as 
well as those of anti-war activists. For the selection of texts, I concentrate on 
momentous events, such as the revelations about the Dodgy Iraq Dossier in 
February 2003; Bush-Blair deliberations, and parliamentary debates ahead of 
the Iraq war; intensified mass anti-war demonstrations across the world in 
January to March 2003, etc., as part of the events to which contesting voices 
were reacting and responding. The texts are selected from public 
pronouncements of active or former politicians (including in parliamentary 
debates); the media, and anti-war social movements (for a full list of all selected 
texts in this category, see Appendix B). Furthermore, I turn to locating how 
official discourse has reacted and responded to such destabilising and 
deliberative challenges through restorative performatives, or silencing. These 
are most salient and therefore more observable in actual performative 
exchanges, e.g. parliamentary debates, election campaigns, question and 
answer sessions in press conferences, etc..55 Concentrating on the same 
intermediate period of 2003-2007, I trace and analyse patterns of various ways 
in which the respective governments have responded to destabilising and 
deliberative critique. Finally, to further trace the effects of the dialogical process 
over more specific policy areas of “war on terror” and thus zoom into potentially 
binding mechanisms, I take a closer look at one specific “within-case case”, 
already in the late period (2008-2012), namely the failed case of President 
Obama to fulfil his pledge to close down the Guantánamo Bay prison.  
In relation to this final part of the analysis, it must be noted, that ideally 
such a specific case analysis in the US could have been accompanied by a 
similar case drawn from the UK. A more extensive case study drawn from the 
UK on protracted involvement in Afghanistan is underway and could not be 
accommodated in this thesis: given the space and resource restrictions, as well 
as the fact that this thesis had to conduct an extensive theory development task 
in the first part, I have chosen to limit the analysis of the later stage through a 
“within-case case” only drawn from the US developments. Nonetheless, as 
regards the aim of the empirical part, i.e. the demonstration of the applicability 
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of the dialogical-relational framework, the analysis of the intermediate period in 
both countries provides ample material. On the other hand, while the working 
hypothesis about potential discursive constraints on policy change is more 
salient in the late-period US case study with regards to Obama’s Guantanamo 
pledge, potential evidence to support it is shown to be emerging from the 
analysis of broader contestations over “war on terror” both in the US and the UK 
also in the intermediate period. 
 
The thesis proceeds as follows.  
In Part I, Chapter 2 critically reviews and deconstructs the key themes 
that have emerged in structuralist but mostly post-structuralist discourse 
philosophies and their IR applications; as well as more specifically the 
discourse-analytical literature on “war on terror”.  Building on it then, I defend 
the case for a new discourse-analytical framework for inquiring into security, by 
presenting several interrelated theoretical and analytical puzzles on relationality, 
contestation and performativity. Chapter 3 introduces Bakhtinian Dialogism as a 
philosophically-realist alternative discourse theory, and develops a Bakhtin-
inspired and realist-constructivist vision of a dialogical speech-act. Finally, 
chapter 4 translates such discourse theory into a dialogical-relational 
framework, developed for analysing foreign/security policy and the 
consequences of contesting security Western democratic states, in the age of 
late modernity. 
In Part II, chapter 5 reconstructs the early post-9/11 (2001-2003) official 
narratives in the US and the UK initially bracketed off from competing voices, as 
a departure point upon which the relationality of various competing voices could 
be configured. Chapter 6 traces and identifies major patterns of how the official 
discourse encountered dissenting voices starting from the early period, and 
concentrating on the intermediate period (2003-2007) as the period of 
intensified critique. Chapter 7 explores how both governments, especially in the 
intermediate period of heightened critique ahead of and following the Iraq 
invasion, engaged and responded to various probings about the initial 
justifications to go to war in Iraq, and the accusations of having lied to their 
publics; and demands for explanations for the lack of results they claimed the 
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq would deliver. In doing so, it traces patterns, logics 
and potential outcomes/implications of such relational answerability. Chapter 8 
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turns to the intermediate-to-late period (2007-2012), to examine the “within-case 
case” of Obama’s failed efforts to close down the Guantánamo Bay detention 
centre, to explore whether and how he was constrained by the earlier “war on 
terror” discourse and the present contestations. Finally, Chapter 9 offers 
conclusions, a re-examination of the hypothesis already in light of the empirical 
finings, poses several theoretical and empirical questions arising out of the 
research, and reflections on the broader implications of the research and future 
directions.  
 
The empirical analysis yielded interesting and at times unanticipated findings: 
on the one hand, destabilising critique was shattering the foundations of the 
official narratives and the national identity narratives attached to them, without 
fully re-inscribing the dislocated space with new normative imaginings, thereby 
inviting for official representatives to restore and re-claim such space. This 
failure was all the more paradoxical, given the subversive intent and the broader 
critical-emancipatory quest of “war on terror” critics, especially of anti-war 
movements. The destabilising counter-narrative propositions of various anti-war 
and critical discourses did achieve certain dislocation of the hegemonic “war on 
terror” discourse; but their discursive strategies attempting to “suture” the 
dislocated structure were largely non-conducive to the emergence of a new 
imaginary. On the other hand, events and developments on the ground (e.g. 
failure to find weapons of mass destruction (WMDs)) as well as at home (e.g. 
revelations about the “Dodgy Dossier”), were constantly affecting the dialogical 
space, and through the voices of radical critique but also of moderate or 
deliberative critique, putting pressure on the official narratives. In particular, by 
constantly looking for inherent (in)consistencies and probing the official 
representatives against such developments, deliberative critique was, whether 
intentionally or unintentionally, demanding the realisation of the “promise” 
inherent in the official narrative, demanding “winning” a war that many of them 
had branded as “ill-conceived”, if not outright “illegal and immoral”. Thereby, 
they were inviting for further legitimations for continued engagement, and were 
thus greatly constraining the official representatives, and helping reify the 
dominant discourse. In the case of Obama’s failed efforts to close down the 
Guantánamo Bay detention centre, it was found that his performative attempts 
to project a “new approach” to counter-terrorism and to legitimise his pledge to 
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close the Guantánamo prison contained a certain semiotic dissonance. The 
latter was resulting from the irreconcilable semiotic elements between the 
earlier “terrorism as war” frame upon which Obama was rhetorically but also 
legally still relying, and his performative attempts to project a “new approach” to 
counter-terrorism, including his attempts to re-inscribe “freedom” as “rule of law” 
that must extend to the terror suspects, without much shift/re-inscription of the 
“threat/evil” node. The political and civil society opposition to the closure of the 
prison was quick to appropriate this semiotic dissonance and galvanize further 
anti-closure action, thereby potentially constraining the Obama Administration in 
its liberty to fulfil the promise of closing the prison. 
 
1.5. Intended Contributions 
The thesis hopes to make two main important contributions. First, the proposed 
relational-dialogical framework hopes to animate further debate and thus offer a 
contribution in the field of discourse theory and analysis applied in IR that goes 
beyond tracing the policy effects of the dominant security representations. It 
offers a relational discourse analysis exploring the dialogicity of voices in 
contestation and struggle, rather than analysing the dominant narrative in 
isolation and claiming causal outcomes from it. In order to achieve such 
relational analysis, through the Bakhtinian philosophy of the act and of 
utterance conceived as answerability, the framework offers a re-
conceptualisation of the speech-act and develops a dialogical theory of the 
utterance. Analytically, this allows incorporating the relational analysis of 
multiple “security-contesting” speech-acts, and hence accommodating a much 
broader range of actors, actions and practices,56 than the traditional 
representational model, and studying the effects (including continuation and/or 
change, as well as potential constraints or binding) as arising out of the 
relationality of various narratives and performances produced in various social 
loci – government, oppositional parties, the media, alternative media, and social 
movements.  
                                                 
56
 See these as part of a critical-realist causal complex. Patomaki, Heikki, After International 
Relations: Critical Realism and the (Re)construction of World Politics (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2002). 
30 
 
Second, the empirical analysis hopes to contribute to an enhanced 
understanding of the relational dynamics behind contesting “war on terror” and 
the effects of that on policy continuation/change.  
In addition, my broader aim and hence contribution in this thesis has 
been not only to show how my current inquiry would benefit from a Bakhtinian 
Dialogical vision of discourse, but also through the latter to demonstrate how 
Western discourse-analytical approaches dominating IR studies could find a 
better ally in Bakhtin’s thought, and would benefit from a certain “dialogical 
turn”. I hope my effort, along with Guillaume, re-introducing the thought of 
Bakhtin and his circle directly and hopefully in less mediated fashion will bring 
Bakhtinian Dialogism out of a mostly “footnote”, or intermediated, status it 
currently occupies in IR, and show its relevance for enriching theoretical and 
empirical discussion.  
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PART ONE 
 
 
Chapter 2: From the Linguistic Turn in IR to Discourse-Analytical 
Studies on “War on Terror”: The Case for a New Discourse-
Analytical Framework   
 
2.1. Introduction  
The post-structuralist tradition in IR and Security Studies has concerned itself 
with deconstructing dominant security representations argued to be participating 
in the performative reproduction of the state and the nation.57 In such what 
Laffey calls ‘performative accounts’, ‘[s]tate action,… is accounted for by 
reference to representational practices that must be redeployed in order to 
reproduce and secure a particular mode of subjectivity’.58 In so doing, post-
structuralists’ most prominent endeavour in IR has been to ‘consider the 
manifest political consequences of adopting one mode of representation over 
another’ (emphasis added),59 and how a particular narrative representation of 
identity has “made possible” the legitimation and adoption of one policy over 
another. 
Unavoidably risking some generalisation and simplification, I have called 
this a “representational model”, to reflect the (even if unrecognised) loosely 
causal logic behind most of such accounts, whereby a given dominant 
representation is argued to result in, or ‘make…possible’60 a particular course of 
action (foreign/security policies and practices) rather than another. These 
accounts mostly pose “how-possible” questions, i.e. how (through what 
rhetorical strategies and articulatory practices) certain dominant representations 
are constructed.  They claim that such “how” questions are superior to the 
positivistic “why” questions and distinguish “constitutive logic” from “causal” 
logic.61 However, in asking such “how” questions, many post-structuralist 
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accounts concerned with security and foreign policy, have made claims not just 
about how representations constitute identities, but inextricably how they have 
resulted in policy and action, in other words claims about policy effects, which 
go beyond “how” questions. 
This trend is also broadly manifest in the securitization theory of the 
Copenhagen School,62 which theorises outcomes of security discourses through 
focusing on dominant constructions of threats and how they, if successful with 
audiences, produce the corresponding policy/action of extraordinary measures 
to guarding the referent object of security from the given “threat”.   
Several critics have focused on the limitations of this model. Thus, from a 
historical-materialist perspective, Laffey has critiqued it for reducing multiple 
social logics, including the capitalist logic (of e.g. oil in the Middle East) to mere 
signification.63 More broadly concerned with the ‘“epistemic fallacy” at work in 
the denial of causation in the post-structuralist tradition, Banta has asked: if 
such analysts ‘claim to be interested in showing the impact that certain 
discourses have…[t]hen why not propose discourse as a causal element of the 
social world, however difficult this may be to show?’ (emphasis added).64  
Sympathetic to both of these critiques, my concern is more with the 
tendency of the representational model to make the dominant (official/elite) 
representations the primary focus and to ascribe an effect (a policy outcome) to 
such dominant representations without accounting for the ways how they have 
been challenged and potentially destabilised by competing alternative 
representations. As Laffey notes, in the representational model, subjectivity, 
despite being, contingent in these accounts appears to be ‘endlessly 
reproduced’: indeed, ‘[r]eference to “struggles” and “efforts”… is only a gesture: 
they are neither excavated nor theorize[d]’.65 I will argue later, that this risks 
overlooking effects of security policy and practice, and especially their longer 
term continuity and/or change, which may have been brought about out of 
tensions, and potentially through the non-linear and unintended outcome of the 
relationality and contestation among competing agents and representations. 
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Rather than interested in how a (dominant) representation is reproduced 
and purportedly produces or “makes possible” policy outcomes in itself, I am 
interested in the relationality of social and political attempts of meaning 
production and performativity among various competing agents in such a realm; 
as well as relationality among various meaning systems (or particular 
narratives) temporally (historically over time) and spatially (co-existing and 
contesting at a point in time); and how policy effects are produced out of such 
contestations. Most importantly, I am interested in such relationality in order to 
understand continuation and therefore constraints in the longer term on change 
of security policy/practice not in terms of hegemonic discourses constraining 
change by dint of being hegemonic (as the currently prevalent representational 
model often suggests), but how such constraints arise, once again, non-linearly 
out of contestations and struggles among multiple agents’ performative 
attempts and out of the “encounters” among their conflicting/competing or else 
reinforcing/complementing representations, even if in some instances the effect 
may still be the reinstatement of the dominant discourse.  
 
This chapter has two aims and proceeds in two steps. First, I introduce and 
critically review the legacy of the post-structuralist tradition and its implications 
for studies interested in security/foreign policy, more generally, and on 
discourse-analytical studies of “war on terror”, more specifically. I show how the 
above-mentioned representational model has developed out of themes and 
developments from within the linguistic philosophies of the past century and 
their inherently political intellectual ethos. At the same time, the review is 
necessary in order to introduce themes, specific categories and terminologies 
within the broader debates, which will be necessary in the later engagement in 
the subsequent chapters. Second, based on such critical review, I then present 
a number of theoretical and analytical concerns and puzzles which must be 
addressed and thus build the case for the usefulness of Bakhtinian Dialogism 
and of a new dialogical-relational framework, that hopes to go beyond the 
representational model of analysing security discourses and their impacts on 
policy/practice.  
While the field of themes in post-structuralist thought is vast and there 
are considerable differences among thinkers and scholars variously labelled as 
post-structuralists, I limit the overview of the broader post-structuralist tradition 
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to themes that have more direct implications for critiquing the representational 
model and for defending the case for a dialogical-relational framework: namely, 
the interrelated themes of “relationality”, “contestations” and “performativity”. In 
reviewing these themes, I prepare the ground for identifying certain areas of 
limitations to be addressed later. I engage more closely with Laclau and 
Mouffe’s discourse theory, as this is most explicitly theorising contestations, and 
will have an important status in the development of the framework. 
This critical review then turns to the discourse-analytical studies 
specifically on “war on terror” within the IR discipline more narrowly, but also 
within other disciplines such as linguistic studies. Again, rather than provide 
anything resembling a comprehensive literature review on “war on terror”, this 
review is selective and limited: it reveals and assesses implicit and explicit 
engagement with the interrelated themes of “contestation”; “relationality”, 
“performativity”, and “constraints”.  
Finally, already based on the above overviews, I propose five interrelated 
theoretical and analytical concerns that have animated my project, and through 
them defend the case for a new discourse-analytical framework. This prepares 
the ground for the next two chapters (chapter 3 and chapter 4), where I show 
how a new discourse-analytical framework inspired by my reading of Bakhtinian 
Dialogism and combined with some of the categories drawn from Laclau and 
Mouffe and their reworking by Howarth, offers solutions to some (but not all) of 
these concerns, while the hypothesis and the empirical study explore the 
others. 
Section 2.2 reviews the broader post-structuralist tradition and its 
implications on IR studies on security/foreign policy, whereas section 2.3 offers 
a critical literature review on “war on terror”. Section 2.4 builds the case for the 
new framework; which is followed by a brief conclusion in section 2.5.   
 
2.2. The Philosophical Beginnings and Post-Structuralist IR: Identity, 
Representation and Foreign/Security Policy  
Post-structuralist discourse theories have critically engaged with, while at the 
same time drawn upon, structural linguistics. Structuralism in linguistics, 
inaugurated by the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure, became the driving 
force behind what came to be known as the “linguistic turn” in social sciences 
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during the twentieth century. In Saussure’s synchronic systems of language, 
each linguistic unit (phoneme, word, etc.) is only meaningful in difference to 
another unit in a strictly self-contained system of relations. Thus, a signifier (the 
linguistic sign) and a signified (what it denotes) are fixed only in relation to other 
signifiers and signifieds in a particular language. In this relational and differential 
conception of language, ‘it is the structure itself that determines the significance, 
meaning and function of the individual elements of a system’.66 Language in his 
understanding is a ‘system of differences without positive terms’, where ‘the 
value of each term results solely from the simultaneous presence of the 
others’.67  
  Expanding Saussure’s linguistic theory, various thinkers have ‘assum[ed] 
that there is a clear analogy between language and social relationships’.68 Thus, 
developing a structural analysis of anthropological phenomena, Lévi-Strauss 
claimed that social relations in “primitive” societies can be treated as if they 
were linguistic structures and that it is possible to uncover a generalisable 
underlying structure of relationships for all societies by reaching for ‘correlations 
and equivalences amongst seemingly disparate symbolic phenomena, just as it 
is possible to locate common grammatical structures amongst different 
languages’.69 On the other hand, Lacan claimed that human unconscious is 
‘structured like a language’;70 and that in general, social phenomena can be 
‘understood as self-contained, self-regulated and self-transforming entities, 
[where]…the structure itself … determines the significance, meaning and 
function of the individual elements of a system’.71  
Indeed, as the deconstructive critique of structuralism has noted, such 
classical structuralist models present a number of problems: ‘stressing the way 
social systems determine social meaning, it runs the risk of replacing the 
humanism of existing approaches with a new form of essentialism based on the 
primacy of a static and complete structure’.72 It resembles atomistic 
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structuralism,73 where language is taken to be ‘a product, rather than a process 
of production’.74 In addition, as Howarth further notes, it leaves out the account 
of subjectivity and social agency in bringing about change.75  
The speech-act theory of John Austin,76 further developed by Searle,77 
was one breakthrough from Saussurean structural linguistics in that they 
noticed and theorised a fundamental truth about communication, namely that 
meaning is not located within a closed linguistic system of differences but is in 
fact productive, created via performance of a social act. Austin’s theory was 
greatly influenced by Wittgenstein’s idea of ‘language games’.78 Rather than 
seeking to identify fixed meanings in words, Wittgenstein is focusing on ‘the 
various functions [words] are capable of performing’ (emphasis added).79 In his 
How to Do Things with Words,80Austin takes up this idea of functions to develop 
a theory of performatives: any proposition, along with a locutionary meaning 
(linguistic meaning in the traditional sense), also possesses illocutionary force—
the potential of ‘doing something’ in saying things, and perlocutionary force – 
the effect of the illocution on the audience.81 Searle went beyond Austin’s 
cataloguing stage and provided a theoretical framework which showed how 
language creates institutions and, in his constitutive theory, how utterances 
have word-to-world consequences.82 This becomes possible owing to the 
constitutive rules, which have the basic form ‘X counts as Y in context C’.83 
Thus, Searle’s main hypothesis is that ‘speech-acts are acts characteristically 
performed by uttering expressions in accordance with certain constitutive rules’ 
(emphasis added).84 Characteristically, this conception of speech-acts is highly 
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rule-bound, where the a priori acceptance of certain conditions by a community 
of speakers/society is necessary for the success of a given act.  
These conditions, as well as what Austin had earlier termed as “felicity 
conditions”, are taken as distinguishable in a structure of socio-discursive 
relations, which have already stabilised into institutions: the accepted 
conventions, and not the intentions of the speaker, are the key to making an 
utterance performative.85 However, such structuralist accounts of speech-act 
seem to take a static and synchronic socio-linguistic field as a point of departure 
for analysis, where it is not quite clear how the “rules” themselves are being 
constituted or changed over time, or how speech-acts may have variable 
meanings even within the same institutionalised rule-system. Thus, while 
critically engaging with Saussure, the Austinean/Searlean speech-act theory 
remained within the confines of structuralism.86 
Nonetheless, its applications vary, often entwined with post-structuralist 
influences but retaining the performative logic of speech-act theory. Thus, most 
prominently in IR, the Copenhagen School of securitization theory has drawn 
upon speech-act theory to build a framework based on the idea of performativity 
(i.e. the productive power of the speech-act event bringing about a certain 
reality), at the same time drawing on post-structuralist influences to be engaged 
with later. According to this framework, security is a speech-act: ‘[b]y saying it, 
something is done’.87 Namely, it is an act that elevates a certain issue to the 
level of ‘existential threat’, thereby legitimising extraordinary measures to deal 
with such threat and thus justifying the suspension of normal politics. However, 
the Copenhagen School’s concern with the security as a speech-act has 
developed a limiting ‘default …focus on the political leaders of states and their 
designations of threat’.88 This has been criticised by McDonald,89  but also by 
Hansen who has exposed the ways in which the focus on speech-acts of elites 
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and the powerful has contributed to the silencing of women and those who are 
unable to perform security speech-acts and hence successful securitizations.90  
Furthermore, Copenhagen School’s performative approach has been 
criticised by Balzacq who develops his own more advanced, and philosophically 
realist securitization theory. Balzacq has called the Copenhagen School theory 
the ‘philosophical’ version of securitization theory, which conceives of language 
as having ‘a “social magic” power …[where] the conditions of possibility of 
threats are internal to the act of saying “security”’.91 Balzacq also calls this an 
‘internalist view’, which ‘overstates the intrinsic power of a rule-governed use of 
concepts’.92 He then contrasts this with the more intersubjective ‘externalist’ 
view developed by him as a corrective striving to ‘connect security utterances to 
a context’.93 In addition, others, such as McDonald, have critiqued the 
Copenhagen School by posing a dilemma to choose between ‘either the 
performative effects of the speech-act or the inter-subjective nature of 
security’.94 However, such dilemma assumes that “speech-act” cannot be 
intersubjective, and can only be conceived through the traditional Austinean 
framework and the rigid self-referential application of the Copenhagen School. I 
shall later show that through Bakhtin, we can reconceive a different speech-act.   
In contrast to Austin and Searle, post-structuralists embarked on 
deconstructing Saussure’s thinking based on dichotomies such as signifier vs. 
signified, synchronic language (langue) vs. diachronic language (parole or 
speech), and society vs. individual, embedded in a more general critique of 
binary oppositions in the Western logocentric tradition. Rather than denote a 
certain positive objectivity existing outside the signifier and outside the mind of 
the subject using language as Saussurean linguistics suggested, for Derrida, 
the signified itself is de-centred, and ‘never absolutely present outside a system 
of differences …[which] extends the domain and play of signification 
indefinitely’.95 Thus, critically engaging with Saussure’s principles of language, 
Derrida puts forward a new system of concepts such as the instituted trace or 
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trace structure, différance, iterability.96 Iterability, i.e. the simultaneous 
repeatability and alterability of signs, allows the instituted trace – the constituent 
unit of language, ‘the “minimal remainder” of meaning which enables [signs] to 
be recognized as the “same” signs in different contexts’97 – to produce meaning 
through différance.98 The concept of différance itself accounts for the active 
production of language and discourse, through the process where ‘meaning is 
produced both by the interplay of different traces and by the necessary 
deferment of some possibilities not actualized or signified by the play of 
traces’.99 This conception of discourse points to the ‘historicity and contingency 
of identity formation, as every affirmation of identity is also premised on the 
active deferring of certain possibilities’.100 On the other hand, iterability suggests 
an impossibility of a completely closed system of discourse, as ‘each repetition 
or moment of inscription is necessarily subject to the distorting effects of 
context’.101 This primarily sets Derrida against structuralism.  
Moreover, critiquing Saussure’s objectivism assuming that the sign and 
the human mind are fully constituted entities, Derrida deconstructs Saussurean 
privileging of langue (oral speech) over parole (writing), where speech is 
superior as being closer to the living utterance to human reason, and writing is 
inferior as that which only reproduces, represents and may distort speech. By 
reversing this relationship, Derrida shows how the element in the binary 
designated as “inferior”, i.e. writing, is in fact necessary for speech: ‘if language 
is to work as a system of signs…then the latter must be able to function across 
different contexts…be “cited” or “grafted” into different … [contexts] which 
enables their recognition’.102 But this also means that signs ‘are always marked 
by and vulnerable to the different contexts within which they function…[and] 
thus be altered by their repetition’.103 Hence, the idea of iterability attempts to 
capture ‘the interlinking of identity and difference’ (of the sign), which are in a 
relationship of ‘contingent synthesis’.104   
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Famously, Derrida has been criticised for a “textualization” which is 
‘unable to get hold of the local material density and power of ideas as historical 
actuality’, by Said;105 for reducing ‘discursive practices’ to ‘textual traces’, by 
Foucault;106 for reducing the social and the political to mere texts and 
arguments requiring continuous deconstruction, by Habermas;107 and for 
‘reintroduc[ing] determinism and essentialism’ through a view of language as ‘a 
reified semiotic code’, where ‘meanings arise not from the way that agents use 
words but from the relations of difference among semantic units’.108 Indeed, 
Howarth calls the latter criticism by Bevir as ‘cursory and dismissive’,109 and 
takes great pains to defend and strengthen the post-structuralist position by 
developing his own version of it, through ‘minimal realism’ and ‘radical 
materialism’ as the basis of his ontological and epistemological commitments.110 
I shall return to this at a later point. Nonetheless, Derrida’s deconstruction of 
structuralism remains embedded in the premise that signifiers/meanings and 
hence identities are unavoidably caught up in relations of difference.111  
Within IR, Derrida’s deconstructive approach has had a profound 
resonance and resulted in work exposing the inherent contingency of dominant 
representations, by showing how ‘the poles of oppositions which it privileges 
and the “realities” it thereby makes basic or original can be reversed and 
displaced, thereby producing other “truths”…indicating that these are imposed 
readings that could have been different’.112 Thus, deconstructive studies where 
foreign/security policy is reconceived as inextricably linked to discursive 
constructions of identity as difference, have exposed the relationship between 
the (national/state) Self vis-à-vis the Other (usually constructed as inferior/evil) 
which brings the very identity of the nation/state into existence.113 In turn, 
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identity, rather than pre-social, is always constituted through language, 
therefore is performative, i.e. ‘constituted by the very “expressions” that are said 
to be its results’.114 In addition, Derridean influences have also resulted in work 
deconstructing Realism’s core assumptions based on binaries such as ‘rational 
man and the irrationality of the international’;115 and the deconstruction of the 
binary in Hedley Bull’s thought where the “international order” is dependent on 
the principles of the domestic, in what Edkins and Zehfuss call a ‘domestication 
of the international’.116  
However, while concerned with the intellectual and for them inherently 
political act of such deconstruction and thereby denaturalising and rendering the 
“common-sense” contingent, such studies have often acknowledged but not 
integrated in one model the study of similar deconstructive or critical-
denaturalising performances and practices in alternative dissident/resistance 
discourses immediately participating in the production and contestation of a 
given representation and how these, relationally with the dominant 
representation have produced policy outcomes (with some exception to be 
engaged with in a moment).    
On the other hand, Derridean “infinite play of differences” has prompted 
a certain appropriation of the concept of “intertextuality” initially introduced by 
Julia Kristeva in turn influenced by Bakhtinian Dialogism. As we shall see at a 
later point, normatively they have engaged with the concept “intertextuality” to 
refer to an anti-hegemonic pluralising force that disrupts any singularity and 
must be celebrated akin to deconstruction; whereas analytically, they have used 
the concept to trace associations among distinct discourses. The latter, i.e. 
tracing of associations among distinct discourses (e.g. the discourse of “war” 
and that of “sports”) is the predominant use of “intertextuality” in IR, typified by 
the seminal anthology International/Intertextual Relations, edited by der Derian 
and Shapiro.117 Later in chapter 3, I shall assess what was lost in translation 
and transition when Bakhtinian Dialogism was appropriated into intertextuality in 
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Western post-structuralist thought, as well as how the revised reading of it helps 
us to reconceive of speech-act as dialogical. 
In the securitization theory, the Derridean logic of deconstruction and 
theorising of identity as difference is manifest in the way how the study of 
security becomes the study of the designation of threat.118 As McDonald notes, 
this is based ‘on a commitment to the idea that security is constituted in 
oppositional terms: by designating that which it is not or that from which it needs 
preservation or protection… consistent also with the oppositional conception of 
identity in the securitization framework, wherein who we are is determined by 
the designation of (threatening) others’.119 As he concludes then, the framework 
suggests, that ‘we can learn all we need to know about the construction of 
security through studying the issues that are represented as existential 
threats’.120 
Echoing this, but more generally, the IR application of some of the 
Derridean ideas, specifically the notion of Self/Other in terms of 
identity/difference risks rendering identity and hence security as analysable 
primality in relation to the Other conceived in inferior terms. Specifically in 
relation to foreign/security policy discourses, it has been claimed that since the 
construction of “threat” becomes existentially necessary for the “self” to 
transcend the fear of the certainty of death,121 individuals have given away their 
authority to define threat to the rulers: constructing identity through security 
discourses about a radically threatening “Other” that must be countered for the 
protection of the national self is a function of the state.122 While this role 
becomes institutionalised and defining of the state, – the argument goes – 
practicing “security”, and derivatively narrating “threat”, becomes ‘an ontological 
necessity for the state’,123 since ending the practices of representation through 
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discourses of threat would mean exposing the state’s ‘lack of prediscursive 
foundations’.124 However, based on such theorising of the relationship between 
identity, state and foreign/security policy, these explorations have concerned 
themselves with one predominant role of foreign/security policy discourse – that 
of boundary-making through otherisation. Thus, Campbell has noted that 
foreign policy is especially apposite to perform the function of drawing Self-
Other distinctions, as a ‘privileged discourse of danger for the state that 
participates in an ongoing and more general “evangelism of fear”’.125 Hence, 
Ashley and more famously Campbell have dubbed foreign policy ‘a specific sort 
of boundary-producing political performance’.126 
Thus, these theorisations have mostly been limited to a pre-occupation 
with “otherising” processes in identity construction, i.e. ‘the act by which 
difference is constituted as an inferior other’,127 and consequently to the 
‘boundary-producing’ function of foreign policy.128 While illuminating at the time 
of their emergence,129 now they have become almost a default model when 
analysing identities and conflict through critical approaches and specifically 
through discourse analysis. Ascribing otherising processes to foreign/security 
policy as the condition of possibility for state identity and in turn as its function 
cannot and should not exhaust foreign/security policy discourse analysis for two 
reasons: it is historically/empirically subject to challenge; and it is analytically 
insufficient, especially in case of a relational and longitudinal analysis. Thus, 
‘undivided’ practices and discourses have been side-lined not only by politicians 
throughout history, but also in the past century or so by academics reproducing 
and reinforcing essentialist otherising discourses.130 Even deconstructionist 
post-structuralist academics pre-occupied with the study of foreign/security 
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discourses predominantly based on otherising risk a certain form of 
essentialism and reification.131  
Such pre-occupation is also analytically limiting. Indeed, post-structuralist 
IR itself has been quick to point out the limitations of an analysis of foreign 
policy primarily or solely preoccupied with otherisation. Thus, Neumann has 
warned against monolithic conceptions of the Other as a necessity for foreign 
policy, and noted the risk of reification in such analysis;132 whereas the 
Copenhagen School has drawn attention to more nuanced forms of othering, 
such as the European Other being constituted in relation to its own past, rather 
than to an external enemy Other.133 Nonetheless, these explorations still often 
concentrate on narratives of identity in terms of otherisation. As Guillaume 
highlights, there is a tendency of conceptual and analytical ‘conflation of 
othering…and a larger process linking identity with alterity’.134 He then potently 
demonstrates, that ‘by focusing on a specific mechanism, othering, participating 
in a specific figuration of alterity, generally inversion, this literature has avoided, 
or refused to conceptualize, other mechanisms and figurations’.135  
 Another major philosophical influence in IR and Security Studies is the 
thought of Michel Foucault. For Foucault, the category of discourse refers to 
historically specific systems of meaning, which are intrinsically political concrete 
systems of social relations ansd practices. In his earlier, “archaeological” 
accounts, discourses as autonomous systems of rules constitute objects, 
concepts, subjects and strategies: ‘they are a violence which we do to things, … 
or a practice which we impose on them’.136 Later, in his “genealogical” 
accounts, Foucault settles for a different conception, where ‘discourses are 
tactical elements or blocks operating in the field of force relations’,137 and where 
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‘discourses are the [strategic] means for different forces to advance their 
interests and projects, while also providing points of resistance for counter-
strategies to develop’.138 Here, discourses are understood in relation to broader 
processes of spread of “bio-power” and “the will to truth”.139 
 The latter understanding raises important questions about agency-
structure, about relationality of various subjects, and about the possibility of 
contestations/resistance and transformation. Indeed, if the formation of 
discourses ‘is an act of radical institution which involves the construction of 
antagonisms and the drawing of political frontiers’, then the exercise of power is 
central in the construction of discourses and structuring of the relations between 
different social agents.140 Importantly, in Foucault’s views on the 
power/knowledge nexus, resistance and contestation and the suppression of 
‘subjugated knowledges’ is integral to the emergence of ‘regimes of truth’, 
‘subjugated knowledges’ being ‘a whole set of knowledges that have been 
disqualified as inadequate to their task or insufficiently elaborated: naive 
knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of 
cognition or scientificity’.141 However, Foucault heavily focuses on discourses 
and practices of suppression. Hence, he has been critiqued for reifying power, 
since in his theory, ‘every form of negation or resistance may eventually feed or 
be absorbed by the system of power it contests’.142 
In his later work, and particularly in a later interview, Foucault amends 
his arguably reifying conception of power leaving scope for resistance and 
contestation, by arguing that any exercise of power presupposes resistance: ‘in 
the relations of power, there is necessarily the possibility of resistance, for if 
there were no possibility of resistance – of violent resistance, of escape, of ruse, 
of strategies that reverse the situation – there would be no relations of 
power’.143 In addition, in The History of Sexuality, Foucault reveals a highly non-
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linear relationship between domination, resistance and transformation through 
his critique of the ‘repressive hypothesis’.144 Thus, Foucault shows how forced 
articulations about sexual practices (forced church confessions and later, 
psychoanalytical confessions), which were aimed at controlling populations in 
the Victorian era, eventually resulted in the accumulation of a large body of 
discourse about the very practices to be controlled, and culminated in having 
just the opposite effect of empowering the segments of population to be 
repressed. This may be viewed as an interesting instance of reverse/unintended 
effects of discursive practices, where a form of repression itself has produced a 
new discourse of resistance. Thus, Foucault’s critique of the repressive 
hypothesis points towards a less reified conception of “power” and “domination”. 
Nonetheless, still in the work of Foucault and later scholars drawing on him, and 
on post-structuralist thought more generally, there is a tendency empirically to 
focus predominantly on discourses of subjugation, and draw conclusions about 
their overarching role in reproducing subjectivity and hence in case of security, 
state action and practices; without engaging in a relational understanding of 
various contesting discourses of domination and dissent, and the relationally 
and often non-linearly produced outcomes of such contestations.  
Such Foucauldian influence, coupled with the Derridean deconstructive 
ethos, has created the tendency in post-structuralist IR and Security Studies of 
over-concentrating on discourses of elites/domination, while leaving out the 
study of dissent and political voices contesting and potentially destabilising 
them, and the issue of how these two realms relate to each other. Thus, 
notably, seminal post-structuralist work on security, such as David Campbell’s 
Writing Security, while braking new grounds and offering an undoubtedly 
insightful contribution to our understanding of security discourses and practices, 
is predominantly about how the official and dominant US foreign policy 
discourses and practices have ‘written and re-written’ the dominant identity 
“America”.145 This seminal book, according to the admittance of the author 
himself, focuses only on the official narrative of US foreign policy: 
One …limitation needs to be noted. Any exhaustive account of identity, particularly 
one indebted to Foucault, would require a thorough discussion of the resistance to 
the scripting of identity proffered by those with greater access to social resources. 
Crudely put, one would have to consider the full range of popular resistances to 
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elite practices … I have restricted the argument … to the representational 
practices of those acting in official capacities (emphases added).146         
 
Generally, while some work has juxtaposed the study of dominant discourses or 
‘“truth” about a situation … to events and issues that this “truth” fails to 
acknowledge or address’; and others have focused on “subjugated knowledges” 
to show that alternative accounts are possible and have created conditions of 
resistance to dominant discourses, this has still been done primarily as a 
continuation of the Derridean deconstruction, i.e. in order ‘to render ambiguous 
predominant interpretations of state practices’, or to show how the subjugated 
knowledges have been excluded or silences.147 The trend in IR has largely 
continued;148 with some exceptions to be engaged with in a moment.  
More specifically (but not solely traceable to the Foucauldian influences), 
in securitization theory, Wæver’s argument that ‘security is articulated only from 
a specific place, in an institutional voice, by elites’,149 has been critiqued by 
McDonald for over-concentrating on elite discourses: ‘[s]uch a focus serves to 
marginalize the experiences and articulations of the powerless in global politics, 
presenting them at best as part of an audience that can collectively consent to 
or contest securitizing moves, and at worst as passive recipients of elite 
discourses’.150 In this relation, Hansen has famously criticised the Copenhagen 
School framework for participating in silencing of women and the voiceless 
unable to “speak” security. In addition, McDonald has argued that ‘the focus 
only on dominant voices and their designation of security and threat is 
normatively problematic, contributing to the silencing of marginal voices and 
ignoring the ways in which such actors have attempted precisely to contest 
these security constructions’.151 Indeed, McDonald, just as Hansen, has a 
normative concern by suggesting that ‘the [state/elite] discursive positioning of 
threat…neglects … the question of how particular voices within political 
communities are empowered or marginalized in speaking security’.152 This 
echoes the broader emancipatory commitment of the Welsh school of critical 
security studies, that ‘focusing on the marginalized and “voiceless” points to the 
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ways in which potentially exclusionary, statist and militaristic security discourses 
can be challenged and replaced’.153  
However, beyond such normative-emancipatory quest, contesting 
representations of threat and security, in particular including major voices 
destabilising the official narratives, have rarely been studied for sake of 
understanding their relational dynamic and implications for explaining effects on 
policy. “Relationality” in most post-structuralist accounts is referred to in terms 
of a ‘relational view of identity’, i.e. identity as difference, as ‘always given 
through reference to something it is not’.154 
One exception is Lene Hansen’s Security as Practice, which builds a 
framework through which foreign policy can be studied by ‘examining patterns 
of reproduction and contestation across official discourse, political oppositional 
parties and media discourses, as well as more popular forms of writing’.155 
However, she contends that if a discourse has achieved a ‘hegemonic status’ (a 
decision the researcher must make in advance), then it is acceptable to study 
the hegemonic discourse (which would most probably be the official 
foreign/security policy discourse) in isolation.156 In one of the proposed three 
models, model 2 (model 1 focusing on official discourses), she proposes 
studying parliamentary debates and discourses of political opposition parties 
and the media contesting the official discourse; however, through these, the 
goal is to analyse ‘the hegemony of the official discourse’, i.e. to ‘facilitate the 
analysis of the discursive and political hegemony a governmental position 
enjoys’.157 In addition, while she acknowledges that some extended research 
models (model 3) may choose to study ‘marginal political discourses’, ‘social 
movements’, ‘resistance’ and ‘dissent’;158 she presents this as a choice of an 
analytical model a researcher may make. Hansen’s own case study on Western 
responses to the Bosnian war considers competing representations (the ‘basic 
discourses’ of Bosnian war as “ancient Balkan hatred” vs. as “genocide”) in 
order to understand which one of these representations gained dominance and 
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therefore which policy following from such narratives was eventually adopted by 
the US and the UK in their response to the war.159 
 
 
Partially building on some of the post-structuralist insights, but also critiquing 
them for relativism and for ‘reduc[ing] the whole of social life to discourse’,160 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) has offered influential alternatives. While 
there are various versions of CDA frameworks, the one developed by linguists 
such as Fairclough and his associates is perhaps the most prominent in social 
sciences.161 Ascribing to the critical realist ontology conceiving of the social as 
an open system, they see discourse and its effects as philosophically “real”.162 
They further theorise that ‘[t]he various dimensions and levels of life – including 
physical, chemical, biological, economic, social, psychological, semiological 
(and linguistic) – have their own distinctive structures, which have distinctive 
generative effects on events via their particular mechanisms’.163 However, they 
further note that since ‘[t]he relationships between mechanisms are 
stratified…there are no straightforward ways for science to establish the nature 
of individual mechanisms by analysing events’.164 Embracing Giddens’ theory of 
structuration and drawing on Harvey’s ‘dialectics of discourse’,165 CDA 
envisages a dialectical relationship between ‘semiosis…[and] other (non-
semiotic) elements of social life,…[where] non-semiotic elements are 
“internalised”…in semiosis and vice versa’.166 Discourses and narratives, then, 
have ‘non-discursive effects’, as they help modify the institutional materiality of 
economic, political and other systems.167 Chouliaraki and Fairclough call this 
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approach a ‘constructivist structuralist’ account of the social: it is ‘structuralist in 
that it is oriented to relational systems, which constitute relative permanences 
within practices; … [and it is] constructivist in that it is concerned to explicate 
how these systems are produced and transformed in social action’.168   
Thus, CDA of Fairclough and others has developed a social ontology that 
theoretically builds on a ‘relational logic’ where ‘the social field [is] seen as a 
system of relations’.169 Faiclough dubs this approach as “dialectical-relational”, 
where by “relational” he is drawing analytical attention to the dialectical 
relationship between “semiosis” (his preferred term for “discourse” in the 
broader sense) and ‘[other] elements of the social process’: ‘the nature of this 
relationship varies …[and] requires CDA to be integrated within frameworks for 
transdisciplinary research’.170  
However, another “relationality” in which I am primarily interested within 
this study, i.e. the relationality among various voices and hence contestations, 
is not explicitly theorised and integrated in the framework. Therefore, such CDA 
applications often analyse a limited number of texts isolated from social 
contestations, and often draw broader conclusions from such limited number of 
texts (often representing the dominant discourse). While effects in CDA are 
indeed conceived as relational and dialectical (mainly with regards to the 
ideational-material within the social), competing representations and their 
relationality are often not fully and explicitly integrated into the analysis.171  
 
In the most recent re-articulation of his revised version of post-structuralist 
theory, in Poststructuralism and After, David Howarth makes a robust attempt to 
redevelop key theoretical themes such as agency and structure, power, 
domination and identity, in order to expose a more coherent theory and 
transcend some of the limitations or omissions pointed out by the critics of post-
structuralism.172 He does so primarily by building on Laclau and Mouffe’s 
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conception of discourse and society, which warrants a closer inspection, due to 
its more explicit theorisation of contestations and a relational focus on 
discourse. 
2.2.1. Relationality and Contestation in Laclau and Mouffe’s Discourse Theory 
 
Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory widens the subject matter of discourse 
theory ‘to include all social practices such that discourses and discursive 
practices are synonymous with systems of social relations’.173 Arguing against 
structural approaches seeking to fix the meaning of social processes in a 
system of relations, where the “structural totality” is presented as having an 
essentiality and a positivity of its own, Ernesto Laclau still maintains the 
structuralist insight of the ‘relational character of any identity’, but at the same 
time rejects the ‘fixation of those identities in a system’.174 Hence, in proclaiming 
the impossibility of fixing meaning and, consequently, the ‘impossibility of 
society’, Laclau understands the social as ‘the infinite play of differences’, in 
other words as discourse, where the concept of discourse comes to include 
linguistic, as well as non-linguistic practices.175 
By building on Gramsci’s understanding of “hegemony” as ‘a general 
political logic involving the construction of the new “common sense”…that can 
structure an emergent “historic bloc”’, Laclau and Mouffe deconstruct the 
essentialist assumptions (specifically on class) of Gramscian theory, and offer a 
more radical understanding of hegemony.176 Hence, in Laclau and Mouffe’e 
theory and in the version of discourse theory drawing on them as advanced by 
Howarth, ‘hegemonic practices are an exemplary form of political activity that 
involves the articulation of different identities and subjectivities into a common 
project, while hegemonic formations are the outcomes of these projects’ 
endeavours to create new forms of social order from a variety of dispersed or 
dislocated elements’.177  
Meanings in the theory of Laclau and Mouffe are primarily historical and 
contingent. Moreover, ‘reality’ constituted through such historical meanings is ‘in 
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a perpetual state of flux—of movement, change and instability’.178 Thus, social 
structures are inherently ambiguous, incomplete and contingent, where the 
relations between elements, both in language narrowly defined, and in social 
reality, are historically constructed and not fixed.179 However, importantly, in 
Laclau and Mouffe’s theory, such contingency presupposes and creates 
conditions for a process they term ‘dislocatory’ practices.180 As Howarth and 
Stavrakakis explain, ‘dislocation’ is ‘the process by which the contingency of 
discursive structures is made visible…[it] shatters already existing identities and 
literally induces an identity crisis for the subject’.181 In other words, dislocation 
induces a certain crisis of meaning for the hegemonic structure.  
Furthermore, Laclau emphasises how the ‘lack’ of meaning revealed by 
such dislocation also creates a need for re-articulation: dislocations ‘stimulate 
new discursive constructions, which attempt to suture the dislocated structure’.  
182 Such rearticulations may or may not come to form new hegemonic 
formations. In turn, hegemonic formations are formed around nodal points 
‘underpinning social orders’,183 “nodal points” being privileged discursive 
constructions which ‘partially fix meaning’.184 Nodal points knit together different 
“elements” into what they call a “signifying chain”.185 Thus, for instance, ‘in 
communist ideology… a number of pre-existing and available signifiers 
(‘democracy’, ‘state’, ‘freedom’ and so forth) acquire a new meaning… [D]ue to 
the intervention of… nodal point [“communism”], these elements are 
transformed… Democracy acquires the meaning of ‘real’ democracy, as 
opposed to ‘bourgeois’ democracy, freedom acquires an economic connotation, 
the role and function of the state is transformed’.186 
Laclau also proposes the concept of ‘empty signifiers’187 empty signifiers 
as privileged nodal points over which the discursive struggles and contestations 
revolve: ‘nodal points like ‘God’, ‘Nation’, ‘Party’, or ‘Class’ are not characterised 
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by a supreme density of meaning, but rather by a certain emptying of their 
contents, which facilitates their structural role of unifying a discursive terrain’.188  
In an attempt to understand why certain discourses are more successful 
in hegemonising a field of discursivity than others, Laclau distinguishes between 
myths and social imaginaries.189 Both emerge as a result of a structural 
dislocation; however, with varying results. Thus, myths attempt to suture the 
dislocated space by constructing ‘new spaces of representation’,190 which will 
form ‘a new objectivity by means of the rearticulation of the dislocated 
elements’.191 The function of myths, in turn, through this “new objectivity”, is to 
address a variety of social demands and dislocations. The degree to which the 
latter is accomplished will decide whether a “myth” transforms into an 
“imaginary”: ‘when a myth has proved to be successful in neutralising social 
dislocations and incorporating a great number of social demands, then we can 
say that the myth has been transformed to an imaginary’.192 
 
Thus, it becomes clear that Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of discourse is 
embedded in the idea of social contestations. While in Gramscian theory, 
ideology is a battlefield, where in a ‘struggle for meaning ... one [class] group is 
able to make another group share its specific goals, beliefs or world views to 
create a collective will’;193 in Mouffe’s interpretation of Gramsci, ideological 
struggle is ‘a process of disarticulation-rearticulation... a perpetual process of 
transformation’.194 Hence, in Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory, society is 
characterised by hegemonic struggles and contestation over fixing of 
meanings.195 Moreover, and most importantly for my current review, in Laclau 
and Mouffe’s conception of “hegemony”, dissent and resistance are in fact 
constitutive of/defining of hegemony itself: “hegemony” – rather than 
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constituting the ‘centre of the social and hence its essence’ – is ‘a type of 
political relation… [which] cannot be conceived as an irradiation of effects from 
a privileged point’ (emphasis added).196 Consequently, a practice can be 
defined as hegemonic only when there is the possibility of subversion, of 
‘confrontation with antagonistic articulatory practices’.197 In such a relationship, 
agents, albeit at varying degrees, are engaged in attempts of partial fixation of 
meanings, whether these are part of hegemonic practices, or subversions 
thereof. This point, i.e. hegemony inextricably linked with the possibility of 
subversion, will be important in my later articulation of the need to study 
speech-act and performativity by integrating such relationality between 
hegemonic discourses and discourses of subversion and dissent.  
Laclau and Mouffe develop more explicit categories such as 
“antagonism” and “agonism” to conceptualise modes and outcomes of such 
inherently political relations of contestation. Thus, they explain “antagonism” as 
follows:  ‘the presence of [an] “Other” prevents me from being totally myself … 
Insofar as there is antagonism, I cannot be a full presence for myself. But nor is 
the force that antagonizes me such a presence … antagonism constitutes the 
limits of every objectivity, which is revealed as partial and precarious 
objectification… and [which language] attempt[s] to fix’.198 Thus, antagonisms 
‘constitute the limits of society, the latter’s impossibility of fully constituting 
itself’.199 Nonetheless, the hegemonic practices attempting such fixation 
constitute the field of the political.  
Later, Mouffe introduced the distinction between “antagonism” and 
“agonism”, where ‘[a]ntagonism is struggle between enemies, while agonism is 
struggle between adversaries…[Hence] the aim of democratic politics is to 
transform antagonism into agonism’ (emphases in the original).200 Thus, Mouffe 
contends that ‘far from jeopardizing democracy, agonistic confrontation is in fact 
its very condition of existence’.201 Thus, whereas in case of antagonism the 
focus was on contesting identity caught up in the exclusionary logic of ‘blockage 
of identity’;202 here in case of “agonism” the focus is on a normative political 
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quest of a radical democracy where ‘agonistic pluralism’ is deemed as a 
positive political normative quest.203 
Thus, overall, based on Laclau and Mouffe’s theory, Howarth and his 
colleagues define discourse in their own version of post-structuralism known as 
the Essex School, as follows: 
We take discourse or discourses to refer to systems of meaningful practices that 
form the identities of subjects and object. …Moreover, discourses are contingent 
and historical constructions, which are always vulnerable to those political forces 
excluded in their production, as well as the dislocatory effects of events beyond 
their control’.204 
 
In this conception then, contestations and relationality are indeed at the 
forefront. Nonetheless, as I demonstrate below, such theoretical concern with 
contestations and relationality of discursive processes has received an 
inadequate explicit engagement in IR and particularly in substantive discourse-
analytical studies on security, specifically on “war on terror”.  
I now turn to a brief review of discourse-analytical literature specifically 
on “war on terror” to reveal some limitations; followed by offering a series of 
theoretical puzzles drawn from the theory review above and the literature review 
below, that will help build the case for a new discourse-analytical framework.    
 
2.3. Critical Review of Discourse-Analytical Studies on “War on 
Terror”  
Social-scientific literature on “war on terror” is voluminous. Therefore, rather 
than provide anything resembling a comprehensive literature review, this review 
is selective and limited to those studies which are typically illustrative of the 
major trends on “war on terror” scholarly work, and which are relevant to the 
main theoretical and discourse-analytical concerns raised and addressed in my 
theoretical critique above and in the subsequent chapters of this thesis. In other 
words, I scan the literature to reveal and assess any implicit and explicit 
manifestation of the representational model or any other major trends critiqued 
above in relation to the themes of “contestation”; “relationality”, and 
“performativity”, as well as to look at the notion of “constraints” as prompted by 
my empirical focus built around the binding hypothesis. Therefore, this review is 
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necessarily brief, aiming to be illustrative, rather than a comprehensive account 
of otherwise insightful contributions of the authors mentioned. 
In addressing post-positivist discourse-analytical treatments of the “war 
on terror”, I pinpoint three interrelated areas of limitations. These are broadly, a) 
the limitations of what I have already explored and called the “representational 
model”; subsequently, b) the overconcentration on the hegemonic/dominant 
discourses alone, i.e. in relative if not complete isolation from the competing 
discourses of dissent and critique, and hence the lack of relational longitudinal 
analysis of “war on terror” discourses and their effects on policy continuation or 
change; as well as c) insufficient conceptualising and empirical tracing of 
mechanisms of “constraints” in relation to “war on terror”. I take these in turn, in 
respective subsections. To note, rather than review each author separately and 
comprehensively before turning to the next, I rather engage with the critique 
thematically, and therefore address the authors by continuously returning to 
their work at respective subsections.  
2.3.1. Limitations of the Representational Model in “War on Terror” Literature 
 
As explored above, post-structuralist IR and Security Studies has often treated 
security discourses and their effects through what I have called the 
“representational model”, i.e. accounts of how one dominant representation (of 
a “threat”, “event”, “problem”) is claimed to be resulting in a particular course of 
action rather than another (foreign/security policies and practices), and thereby 
how such representations ‘make…possible’205 such policies and practices. 
Here, I shall briefly review some prominent sources particularly on “war on 
terror” and point to some limitations of this model in understanding the relational 
and longer term dynamic of continuity and change around it. 
Thus, in a review chapter on critical approaches to security, Fierke 
proposes an argument on “war on terror” that has now become most familiar in 
academic as well as public critical discourse, namely that the securitizing “war” 
narrative of 9/11 led to, or “made possible”, the invasions of Afghanistan and 
Iraq,206 something which an alternative possible “crime” narrative could not have 
done. Fierke’s suggestion qualifying the official “9/11” representation as “making 
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[invasion] possible” is broadly representative of most constructivist/post-
structuralist accounts. 
Along these lines, and echoing David Campbell’s seminal title Writing 
Security, Jackson presents an account of “war on terror” in his book Writing the 
War on Terror,207 where language is the main explanation how ‘societies as 
America and Britain…could in the space of less than two years actively 
support…destructive military assaults on two of the world’s poorest 
countries’.208 Just as Campbell choosing to concentrate only on the official 
discourse, Jackson demonstrates how 9/11 was given meaning by being 
described as an “act of war”; and further demonstrates how terrorism being 
rhetorically constructed as posing a catastrophic threat to the American “way of 
life”, ‘a defensive war seems like a purely rational and reasonable response’.209 
Typical of the representational model, this account focuses on otherisation 
processes establishing ‘boundary markers between “them” and “us”’,210 and 
how these allow or “make possible” the given policies. In addition, it is mostly a 
synchronic analysis of the moment of legitimation, rather than what happened in 
the longer term, after such legitimation. 
Similarly, although in a more multifaceted focus, Stuart Croft’s book 
Culture, Crisis and America’s War on Terror explores ‘how constructing 
language in particular ways leads to particular outcomes’.211 Croft sheds new 
light on an important dimension of “war on terror” discourse, by arguing that 
studying representations through official rhetoric alone is not sufficient, and 
representations present in American religious sites and in popular culture must 
equally be part of the analysis, as they, together with the official discourse, have 
co-constituted “war on terror”. Overall, Croft’s is a more layered representational 
model in terms of sources/loci explored, and also in terms of cultural and social 
contextualisation through a historical and genealogical study. Thus, Croft’s 
analysis is especially important in its tracing of the role of “crisis” in the 
American society as the core of the nation’s narrative of birth, at ‘the heart of 
America’s contemporary ‘culture wars’”; as well as the role of “rupture” and “evil” 
in the Evangelical discourse which he argues to have hugely influenced the 
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official rhetoric and its cultural reproductions and amplifications.  Rather than 
merely focusing on otherisation which is ascribed a generally boundary-making 
role through constructions of an “evil Other”, Croft traces the roots of the 
discourses about “end of time” and “evil” in American Evangelism. 
Nonetheless, the account is limited: posing only “how-possible” questions 
– the privileged mode of enquiry for those ascribing to constitutive logic212 – i.e. 
through what rhetorical strategies, etc. certain dominant representations are 
constructed and make policy/practice possible, Croft makes claims which 
require more than “how-possible” questions. Particularly, it is not clear, whether 
the representation is used to legitimate a policy change, or whether it produces, 
i.e. causes the change.  
More explicit about the latter issue is Tim Luke in ‘Developing a New 
Speech for Global Security’,213 by suggesting that political rhetoric ‘extrudes 
elements of “what is” out of what it refers to’. Thus, he explains: ‘speech writing 
often writes what will be… what such changes should be, [and thereby]…often 
cause parallel events and processes to come into effect, which tests, in turn, 
what they should or should not be’ (emphasis added).214 For instance, the 
rhetorical construction of the “axis of evil”, once in place, ‘now requires very 
specific forms of completion, definition, and execution in American policy’.215 In 
Luke’s account, representations are constructs, which when successfully 
entered into a Bourdieuian “habitus”, ‘push and pull everyone towards world 
constructions that match the wordings that have been tested by rhetoric in 
diplomatic discourse’ (emphasis added).216 He further explains that ‘[s]hared 
speech bolsters the symbolic order of society to the extent that its terms are, 
first, systematic and coherent as discursive frameworks, and, second, 
consistent and agreeable with objective conditions in the institutional structures 
of society’.217 It is clear from the above, that Luke’s representational model 
almost explicitly recognises causation and is, even if vaguely, suggestive of 
causal mechanisms. In a global focus, Luke looks at how certain 
representations in “war on terror” discourse – particularly, “terrorists as new kind 
of enemy” and “axis of evil” – bring about a new global politics, ‘[leaving] behind 
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both the Cold War, and the post-Cold War era, and push[ing] ahead into a new 
security environment’ (emphasis added).218 However, this is still a 
representational model suggestive of a linear and self-fulfilling causal effect of 
representations over policy. It concentrates on “how” questions, mostly through 
a focus on otherisation processes; and is only concerned with a synchronic 
analysis of the moment of legitimation, and only the immediate aftermath of 
socialisation and institutionalisation that secures the dominance of the given 
representation, rather than with any long-term dynamics of continuity and 
constraints. 
Another global outlook, this time with a focus on the international 
discourse of terrorism is offered by Eva Herschinger’s Constructing Global 
Enemies.219 With an innovative take on the neo-Gramscian concept of 
“hegemony” inspired by Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory, and a more 
explicit concern with productive power, she traces what she calls ‘productive 
hegemonic strategies’,220 i.e. discursive strategies underlying the ‘production 
and persistence of hegemonic forms of international order’.221 She still aims to 
answer the characteristic “how” question, albeit in a more nuanced and 
theoretically sophisticated manner, where in particular she explores the ways 
‘how a common Other is construed and how a collective Self is established…in 
varying degrees of otherness’.222 In a post-structuralist framework, by ‘denying 
the existence of an extra-discursive realm’, she argues that ‘policies like the 
“war on terror” and the “war on drugs” are based on specific discursive 
representations of the security problem they want to address and on specific 
constructions of identities, of Self and Other’.223 Thus, she concludes, that the 
absence of a legally and globally binding definition of “terrorism” allows the use 
of the label “terrorism” as ‘a permanently available authorization and 
legitimation to attack…[one’s] own occasional enemies’.224       
Another study adopting the representational model is worth mentioning 
due to a new dimension (that of narrative temporality) it adds to the 
understanding of “how” the “war on terror” discourse was constructed and 
                                                 
218
 Ibid., 31.  
219
 Herschinger (2011).  
220
 Ibid.,105. 
221
 Ibid., 6.  
222
 Ibid., 7.  
223
 Ibid., 15.  
224
 Ibid., 135.  
60 
 
gained dominance. Dunmire’s book-length study Projecting the Future through 
Political Discourse225 traces constructions of “future” in the Bush Doctrine, i.e. 
‘how [the “future”] is articulated, projected and made present’ (emphasis 
added).226 Drawing on Critical Discourse Analysis and particularly Fairclough, 
she locates the Bush Doctrine in the context of ‘new imperialism’ and the ‘neo-
liberal political project’ aimed at creating and maintaining a new economic and 
political order.227 This project is enabled by a type of discourse that constitutes 
a certain future and then designates policies that will get us the imagined future, 
while presenting this future as how the world actually is, i.e. as an 
inevitability.228 She notes that “war on terror” discourse is particularly future-
based as it tries to fill in society’s sense of future security undermined by 
terrorism.229  
However, while illuminating of certain narrative-representational 
structures and hence being valuable insights in their own right, the latter 
observations seem to point to a certain effect on outcomes of policy and 
practice by virtue of being ‘endowed with the performative power to bring into 
being the very reality it claims to describe’.230 Despite her careful disclaimer 
against charges of determinism by admitting that ‘a particular image of the 
future…[does not necessarily] lead to its realization’,231 nonetheless  Dunmire’s 
work seems to conceive of the “makes possible” part of the representational 
model, or else the implicit causation, only in terms of rhetoric bringing about a 
‘self-fulfilling prophesy’. Aiming to ‘denaturalize’232 such constructions, she 
again asks the typical “how” question (i.e. through what rhetorical means and 
linguistic tropes), this time with an explicit critical focus on elite manipulation: 
‘how representations of the future that serve particular social and political 
interests are naturalized, rendered as depictions of an unavoidable’.233 Even 
when part of the study examines the Doctrine ‘diachronically, demonstrating the 
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paradigmatic choices and linguistic transformations that occur within and across 
each text’s historical and political contexts’,234 it remains confined to “how” 
questions limited to the rhetorical functions of representations.  
2.3.2. Contestations: Lack of Dissent, and the Absence of Relationality  
 
As already suggested, most literature on “war on terror” is limited to analysing 
the dominant or hegemonic narrative, and lacks a relational dimension to it that 
would analyse alternative representations as part of contestations. In fact, some 
explicitly, and given their critical-emancipatory goal, quite surprisingly, deny the 
existence of any significant dissent or major alternative narratives of 9/11 and 
“war on terror”.  
Thus, Jackson’s above-discussed study mentions ‘contestation’ only in 
the passing, and stresses ‘very little deviation from the central discursive 
formations or the primary narratives’.235 Instead of engaging with any existing 
competing representations of 9/11 and hence challenges to the dominant “war 
on terror” narrative, his reference to ‘contestations’ serves only to highlight how 
the dominant construction ‘negates alternative readings’ (emphasis added).236 
Henceforth, any treatment of alternative narratives, as well as their silencing, is 
limited to assertions such as this: ‘officials have constructed a particular reading 
or interpretation which serves a purposeful political agenda while 
simultaneously closing off other possible readings’.237 Through another loose 
descriptive term, he speaks of ‘muting dissent’,238 but fails conceptualising what 
this muting involves. Moreover, while ‘muting dissent’ assumes there was 
dissent, he does not acknowledge this, and in fact explicitly denies the very 
existence of dissent,239 thereby missing the opportunity to account for their 
interaction with the dominant discourse and understanding how these 
relationally produced outcomes. Interestingly, he then gives an account as to 
how the dominant discourse ‘rectified’ its own ‘internal contradictions’ in order to 
‘maintain coherence’,240 describing this process detached from counter-
discourses and challenges by critics. 
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Croft’s model of crisis cycle allows more scope for treating alternative 
representations: drawing on a crisis model developed by Colin Hay, Croft 
describes how after a crisis event, ‘a decisive intervention’ wins in a ‘discursive 
competition between narratives’ and sets the meta-narrative—the common 
sense.241 In contrast with Jackson, and in a welcomed change, Croft’s Culture, 
Crisis explicitly recognises the presence of ‘widespread…and dramatic’ 
resistance in America, especially in the run up and following the Iraq invasion in 
2003.242 However, even if the author carefully records acts of resistance by anti-
war movements especially in cultural sites through song, novel, film, etc., he 
does not map how the narrative performativity of the alternative discourses 
relationally encountered the dominant narrative. Instead, in a lengthy, even if 
otherwise insightful and valuable description, he puts a heavy emphasis on how 
the dominant narrative continued to be re-reproduced and co-produced by the 
media, popular culture and Evangelical discourses, and how eventually it 
managed to prevail. Thus, his conclusion is that “no war for oil” as the major 
counter-narrative did not succeed in becoming the ‘new decisive intervention’, 
something which the crisis cycle requires for a dominant discourse to subside, 
the reason behind such failure being the deep embeddedness of the dominant 
discourse in social institutions.243  
As Jackson, Croft refers to the existence of dissent only in order to show 
its failure and the continued success of the dominant discourse, rather than how 
dissent was performatively produced and put pressure on the dominant 
discourse, and how in turn the latter had to respond and accommodate 
elements of the critique. He concludes that the anti-war discourse had ‘relatively 
little impact upon the mainstream’;244 and that the “war on terror” continued to 
be re-/co-produced through three channels – party politics during the 2004 
elections, the media and the experts. He metaphorically refers to this phase as 
the ‘[dominant] discourse strik[ing] back’;245 however, the metaphor is not 
conceptualised as a certain mechanism and is at times unclear. While “striking 
back” implies action/process as well as certain relationality, it is not defined or 
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explored as such. Indeed, in a concluding summary of the crisis cycle model, 
Croft refers to a certain ‘adaptation’ which leads to ‘stabilisation’246 of the 
dominant discourse in the subsequent phase of the cycle, after the anti-war 
discourse had failed. However, he does not empirically demonstrate how this 
adaptation occurs relationally with the alternative discourses and major sites of 
critique.  
Similarly, Dunmire’s study concentrates on the dominant constructions of 
the “future” through looking at the Bush doctrine alone. While acknowledging 
‘texts as site of struggle and contestation’,247 and that ‘[e]very text is produced 
out of dialogue’,248 she mentions these as little more than disclaimers, by letting 
the idea of “alternatives” to feature only as something against which the 
dominant discourse is successful. Thus, ‘[d]ominant images are deliberate 
attempts to manage the contestation and struggle that a truly open conception 
of the future entails…they serve to prefigure…the future in such a way as to 
limit and undermine alternative figurations’ (emphasis added).249 Although she 
does make a reference to ‘competing futures’, but only to narrative 
constructions of such “futures” used as a rhetorical trope within the dominant 
narrative, i.e. the presentation of several “futures” in order to persuade the 
audiences why the official “future” is the only tenable and positive one.250 Thus, 
despite references to “contestations”, she presents the dominant representation 
of the “future” in the official discourse as something monolithic and monological. 
 In some relative contrast, a certain relational view involving contestations 
is provided by Hodges’ book The “War on Terror”: Discourse and 
Intertextuality.251 Although still answering a “how” question, i.e. how narratives 
are constructed, he does this longitudinally over a period between 2001 and 
2008, and integrating data from three different domains – presidential 
speeches, media discourse, and focus group interviews with college students. 
Nonetheless, the bulk of the data and analysis is still focused on presidential 
speeches and how these construct the dominant narrative, and although he 
engages with the other two domains, this is done primarily to show how the 
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dominant, i.e. official narrative is ‘recontextualized’ across these settings.252 
While he stresses that recontextualization may include challenges to the 
dominant discourse, the author remains primarily interested in a few isolated 
contesting terms alone, rather than how counter-narratives develop and relate 
to the official narrative and in turn how (with some exception) the official 
narrative responds to these. For instance, he explores how actors use tactics to 
contest the label “war on terror” by ‘mark[ing] the phrase with the adjective so-
called so that it becomes the “so-called war on terror”’, which according to him, 
‘underscore[s] the role of individual agency in resisting the uncritical acceptance 
of contested labels’.253 Hodges refers to ‘counter-narratives’ only in the limited 
sense of Obama’s election discourse of 2008 offering a counter-narrative to 
Bush discourse,254 while ‘subversion’ is conceived only through parody, and that 
again in very limited terms, in relation to a few key phrases.255 While he is right 
that the repeated use of parodic phrases in the media and in the public 
‘seriously challenges the previously established social meanings’,256 such 
analysis of only certain phrases in isolation, and the dominant discourse being 
subverted only through parody, is not sufficient to capture the full scale and 
importance of dissenting voices and the emergent counter-narratives; neither 
how the dominant discourse reacts and responds to such counter-narratives. In 
this relation, i.e. how the dominant discourse responds, Hodges does examine 
an interesting case, that of the competing representations of “Vietnam”, and 
how under pressure from negative associations of the legacy of Vietnam with 
“war on terror”, Bush appropriates the Vietnam analogy by shifting its meaning: 
‘Bush brings Vietnam into the fold of the Narrative in this speech. Rather than a 
separate war viewed as a “quagmire,” Bush’s Vietnam provides lessons on how 
to remain steadfast in an ideological struggle against the modern equivalent of 
the Communists of the Cold War’.257 Nonetheless, this analysis is once again 
limited, as it explores just one example of only one relational performative, 
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namely “appropriation”. Thus, for Hodges, contestation is reduced to mere 
‘recontextualisations’.  
2.3.3. Continuity, (Lack of) Change and Implicit Conceptions of “Constraint” 
 
The concept of discursive constraints is integral to understanding continuity and 
change. It often implicitly underlies constructivist studies inquiring into 
substantive cases of continuity and/or (lack of) change. Relatedly, such studies 
also make implicit claims about certain causal mechanisms underlying 
processes of constraints. Thus, the very notion of hegemonic discourses itself is 
about constraints. However, the interest is mostly on how hegemonic 
discourses constrain, i.e. delimit the power of, subjugated actors in what is 
possible to say and do, rather than looking for more complex, relationally 
produced and non-linear mechanisms of long-term constraints on actors (such 
as successors in government) who might be politically representing an inherited 
official discourse but striving (rhetorically or through policy action) for certain 
change. Substantive studies on “war on terror” fall short of explicitly 
conceptualising discursive constraints and accounting for them as part of the 
mechanisms leading to the claimed outcomes; and often only allude to the 
implicit mechanisms of such constraints through vague and under-
conceptualised metaphors.  
Thus, characteristically, Dunmire speaks of the ‘self-fulfilling prophecies’ 
of projections of the “future”;258 while Luke makes a more explicit proposition: 
‘“[s]peech writing” …produces “speech writs”…[whereas] the speech wrights’ in 
government often work towards rewriting the world to fit their words or fulfil their 
writs’.259 While this purports to account for how speech writing, or official 
security discourse more broadly, aims at ‘drawing and redrawing the 
characteristics of the world’s geopolitical terrain’,260 and how once established 
and integrated into the habitus, such ‘writs’ then ‘push and pull everyone toward 
world constructions that match the wordings’,261 it seems to account for 
constraints as dominance of dominant representations by virtue of their 
dominance. 
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Furthermore, similar to Dunmire’s ‘self-fulfilling prophesy’,262 Jackson in 
Writing the War on Terrorism, speaks of “war on terror” discourse and practice 
in vague and non-analytical terms as having ‘taken on a life of its own’.263 
Noting that ‘any administration would find it extremely difficult to unmake or alter 
[it]’, he predicts that ‘the “war on terrorism” is going to be with us for a long time 
to come’.264 Adopting the ontology inherent in Critical Discourse Analysis in 
general about the mutual constitutiveness ‘between texts and societal 
practices’,265 he falls short of accounting for mechanisms of how continuity 
results, and how, i.e. through what mechanisms, actors (e.g. the US 
administrations that would follow Bush) were constrained by earlier discourse.  
Indeed, in his more recent article,266 Jackson offers such an account 
about the constraining force the earlier dominant discourse and practices had 
over the Obama administration. This view claims that the Obama administration 
has been constrained by earlier (Bush) discourse, where Jackson effectively 
sees such constraints mainly coming from the alleged ‘deliberate’ 
institutionalisation of “war on terror” into the society, economy, as well as in the 
culture and identity.  
Attempting to tease out how Jackson might be conceiving of the 
constraints implicit to his argument, we are effectively left with the political and 
commercial elites deliberately pushing for the continuation of policy to serve 
their material vested interests. Moreover, he stresses that ‘the Bush 
administration in particular was linked by key personnel to oil interests and 
sections of the military-industrial complex’ (emphasis added), and therefore 
concludes, it was unsurprising that the Bush administration would choose to 
reproduce the “war” narrative, in line with the earlier narratives of ‘first war on 
terror’ in the Reagan era.267 Furthermore, Jackson suggests that the above-
mentioned constraints are present only because the institutionalization and 
preservation of vested interests is reliant on ‘threat’, in fact any major threat, 
and that in case of an invention of a new ‘threat’ to replace ‘terrorism’, change 
of policy would be possible, without much constraint from the earlier “war on 
terror” narrative: ‘policy change would not necessarily be impeded by 
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bureaucratic interests, so long as the change involved finding a replacement 
threat to “terrorism”’. Jackson continuously alludes to certain groups, political or 
commercial, with vested interests lobbying for continuation of the war, and the 
now-already common-sense popular cultural perceptions allowing a fertile 
ground for such a practice. Thus, in Jackson’s understanding, material interest 
seems to be the main cause of adoption of narrative, while the persistent 
pursuance of such interest, including by manipulation and coercion, to be the 
main mechanism constraining policy and preventing change.  
 Thus, in this account by Jackson, the “war on terror” is primarily seen as 
the effect of ‘a set of bureaucratic material interests’;268 and in the absence of 
exploring other mechanisms, such material interests in Jackson’s argument 
must be behind the purported constraints and hence the continuity and the lack 
of change. This is due to adopting the analytical safe haven of claiming 
‘dialectical co-constitution of the language and the material practices’,269 which 
closes off an inquiry into more specific mechanisms and semeiotic dynamics 
within the given phenomenon. In particular, this account is, once again, based 
on the official and dominant representation, and does not integrate alternative 
voices, i.e. discourses of dissent and critique.    
 
Overall, this literature review reveals a number of gaps in discourse-analytical 
studies on “war on terror”. Through their otherwise important and insightful 
critique of the positivist and mainstream IR accounts for their failure to trace and 
account for how ideas are formed, transformed and produce power relations, 
thick constructivists and post-structuralists have over-concentrated on such 
“how” questions, i.e. how (through what linguistic and rhetorical means  certain 
representation have been constructed). In doing so, they have often made 
claims that go beyond such how questions and point toward, albeit 
unacknowledged, causal mechanisms. Having eschewed the open acceptance 
and theorising of causal mechanisms, they have tended to describe certain 
outcomes through often under-theorised and vague metaphorical descriptions, 
whereby e.g. dominant “war on terror” representations have “brought about” 
things they purport to describe; “made possible” security policies and practices 
they designate as necessary; or where the “war on terror” has become a “self-
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fulfilling prophecy”. Relatedly, while focusing predominantly on hegemonic or 
dominant discourses produced by political elites, and on how these have been 
reproduced in various sites and become sedimented in various institutions, 
these accounts, perhaps unwittingly but ironically for their otherwise critical 
intent, have often overlooked discourses of dissent and critique and how these 
have variously destabilised the official narratives.  
As we saw, voices of dissent have either remained unaccounted for, or 
wherever they are mentioned, they are meant to show how the official discourse 
kept them in marginalised positions. The latter suggests then, that these voices 
virtually had, or could have had, little if any causal efficacy over outcomes of 
change or constraints thereof.  
It must be noted that voices of dissent in relative isolation have been studied 
in other disciplines and in studies where such discourses are the substantive 
interest, such as studies on social movements, etc.270 However, the concern in 
this critical review was with discourse-analytical work on “war on terror” within 
IR and Security Studies specifically (whether implicitly or explicitly) inquiring into 
the effects of discourse on security policy and practice, and into 
continuity/change or constraints thereof. Therefore, rather than literature where 
discourses of dissent may have be analysed in relative bracketing from the 
official encounters, the focus of the review in this section has been the lack of 
an analytical model and substantive research into “war on terror” that would 
integrate both the official (and potentially hegemonic/dominant) discourses and 
discourses of dissent and critique, and would aim to trace how they encounter 
one another, and how political effects potentially arise out of such contestations. 
 
2.4. Critical Concerns on Contestation, Constraint and Security  
In this section, I briefly propose five interrelated theoretical and analytical 
concerns and puzzles directly deriving from the above overviews, which have 
animated my project. Through them, I defend the case for a new discourse-
analytical framework. I shall later, in the next two chapters, show how a new 
discourse-analytical framework inspired by my reading of Bakhtinian Dialogism 
and combined with some categories from Laclau and Mouffe’s thought, offers 
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solutions to some (but not all) of these concerns; while the hypothesis and the 
empirical study explore the others. 
2.4.1. Contesting Security 
 
As demonstrated in the overview above, although implicit to most of the post-
structuralist thinking, “contestations” have most explicitly been articulated in 
Laclau and Mouffe’s conception of discourse. To remind, in Laclau and Mouffe’s 
conception of “hegemony”, dissent and resistance are defining of hegemony 
itself, as hegemony is said to be present only when there is the possibility of 
subversion, of ‘confrontation with antagonistic articulatory practices’.271  
Ironically, despite similar implicit or explicit claims underlying most post-
structuralist theorising, substantive post-structuralist scholarship specifically in 
IR and Security Studies has been preoccupied primarily with the “hegemonic 
discourses” or discourses of domination isolated from discourses of dissent, 
resistance and critique. As mentioned above, this has been noted by 
Milleken,272 as well as McDonald;273 but, the trend has predominantly continued, 
with some exceptions, such as Hansen’s work engaged with above. With 
regards to “war on terror”, we saw this in the literature review section above.   
However, the challenge is not only to study these discourses of dissent 
and critique in yet another relative bracketing. Nor is it to juxtapose the study of 
the latter with the study of dominant/hegemonic representations to expose the 
latter’s ambiguity or to test their stability. Rather, in view of the critique of the 
representational model, the challenge is to inquire into the relationality among 
performative attempts in the official discourses vis-à-vis those in the discourses 
contesting them, and attempt to understand how the effect or outcomes for 
security policy and practice are produced out of such relationality. Thus, we 
need to inquire into relationally and longitudinally produced outcomes, often 
resulting from unintended causal dynamics. To do this, rather than focus on 
securitizing speech-acts, or else certain dominant security representations, we 
must inquire into multiple, diffused and dialogical security-contesting speech-
acts, producing outcomes relationally. 
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Understanding the relationship between discourses of domination and 
those contesting such discourses is especially pertinent in a late modern 
democratic setting, where it may be argued that political and cultural critique 
and dissent itself has become a civic institution. I return to these themes later in 
chapter 3, where building on Beck’s and Giddens’ sociological theories, and on 
Dillon’s political thought on security, I present the case how analysing 
discourses of dissent and critique must be indispensable from any engagement 
with the official security discourses in the context of the late modern democratic 
scene. 
2.4.2. Reconceiving Speech-Act and Performativity 
 
The very ‘primacy of political concepts and logics such as hegemony, 
antagonisms and dislocation’274 in Laclau and Mouffe’s theory at macro-level 
theorising must, on a micro-theoretical level, necessitate a relational 
understanding of day-to-day discursive exchanges among agents, and a 
corresponding empirical discourse analysis through a focus on contestations. 
To do this, the analysis must ground the actual empirics of the discourse 
analysis on a relational understanding of discourse, while at the micro-analytical 
level, it must develop a particularly relational understanding of the “utterance” or 
the speech-act, upon which techniques of analysis are based. In other words, 
we need a relational discourse analysis that is equipped to look at contestations 
in micro-level analyses of discursive exchanges. 
The question is, how much has the conception of contestations and 
relationally conceived at the level of macro-theory of discourse and society 
been translated into a micro-level conceptualisation of the utterance (or the 
speech-act) as being embedded in such contestations; and then how much has 
this been translated into actual substantive discourse-analytical research 
analysing discursive exchanges? Do we study performativity and their effect on 
policy relationally? A review of the “war on terror” literature and, more broadly, 
IR literature on “writing/speaking” security, including securitization theory, 
showed that this is most often not the case. 
Indeed, to analyse multiplicity of security-contesting, rather than 
securitizing speech-acts or else dominant security representations, in a study 
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going beyond the moment of legitimation, we need a theory of performativity 
that is relational-dialogical, where speaking/doing security is placed in a tense 
environment of contestations. Hence, speech-act itself needs to be re-
conceptualized through a more sociological and non-self-referential 
understanding, transcending the limitations of the ‘philosophical’275 speech-act 
approach in conventional securitization theory. I shall later show how Bakhtin’s 
complex philosophy of discourse, as an alternative theory of speech-act, 
through his philosophy of the act, and concepts “answerability”, “chronotope”, 
and “intertextuality” (the latter revisited as closer to its Bakhtinian origins), helps 
shed new light on the utterance, overcoming some of the limitations of both 
traditional and more sociological securitization theories, on the one hand, and 
becomes compatible with Laclau and Mouffe’s political discourse theory on 
several dimensions, on the other; while at the same time offering a number of 
correctives to post-structuralist theorising. Particularly, through Bakhtin, we are 
able to re-conceive speech-act as dialogical, while theorising performativity in 
terms of constituting reality as only an attempt and process caught up in tense 
relations of contestations and agonistic struggles with other such attempts.  
2.4.3. Discourse as Causal-Constitutive? 
 
As already suggested, the received knowledge in the social sciences 
distinguishes between “causal” and “constitutive” logics, whereby the latter 
‘opposes causal explanations of social phenomena’.276 According to such 
distinction, ‘ideas, rules, norms, discourses, theories...do not “push or pull” but 
rather “make/define/constitute something”’.277 In a dichotomous manner, then, 
post-positivistic discourse analysis is said to be concerned with ‘interpret[ing] 
the meanings and self-understandings of actions, rather than pinpointing their 
causal mechanisms’ (emphases added).278 However, on the other hand, 
inherent to the representational model critiqued above is an even if 
unacknowledged and non-Humean causal logic, about how particular 
representations (of a “threat”, “event”, “problem”) make possible a particular 
course of action rather than another (foreign/security policies and practices).   
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If we are talking about security policies and practices having been ‘made 
possible’279 by certain dominant/hegemonic security narratives, then we are 
effectively dealing with certain implicit causation. It would be beneficial to term 
these accounts explicitly as “causal” so that we could more openly and 
effectively contest and probe their analytical validity and explanatory value. The 
idea of “cause” is already implicit in most post-structuralist studies in IR: these 
inquiries seek to delineate effects, and at times mechanisms, of discursive and 
identity dynamics on foreign/security policy, while at the same time eschewing 
the theoretical concept of “causation”.  
The post-structuralist commitment to a “non-causal” explanation is, 
indeed, linked with their partly political rejection of generalisable explanations 
and fixed narratives of “truth claims”. They conceive of it as antithetical to their 
fundamental ‘commitment to the structural incompletion of all identity, objects 
and systems’,280 and with their emphasis on “contingency” as the defining 
characteristic of any social structure. However, the puzzle here for me is: should 
this commitment to contingency and incompleteness, and non-generalisable 
explanations necessarily preclude us from theorising causation? Why should 
“cause” be the Human cause, or the “transcendental cause”, which Derrida 
rejects as one of the ‘transcendental signifieds’ to be deconstructed together 
with “God”, etc.?281 Some IR post-structuralists have recently made moves 
towards more openly talking about the place of causation in their ontology.282 
Nonetheless, most post-structuralist IR still takes the affirmation of the Humean 
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narrow understanding of “cause” and hence exclusion of “causation” from their 
accounts as one medium of establishing disciplinary allegiances. For example, 
Hansen in her seminal Security as Practice, while taking issue with the simpler 
versions of representational accounts which, according to her, ‘assume a quasi-
causal link between representations and policy’,283 ends up altogether 
eschewing the idea of “causation” as something incompatible with the post-
structuralist understanding of the relationship between identify and policy. Thus, 
implicitly re-affirming “cause” as Humean/positivistic, she thereby differentiates 
her approach from essentialism/positivistic studies, or those engaged in ‘causal 
epistemology’.284      
If we are concerned with the contestation and struggle present in the 
political field over constitution of dominant security discourses, then the 
representational model must give way/be enhanced by a model that looks at 
multiple voices and tensions, and at potentially less linear mechanisms and 
outcomes. To do this, we would benefit from more explicitly admitting to the 
presence of “cause” defined in non-Humean, non-essentialised and non-
generalisable) terms. We should explore causal mechanisms that go beyond 
how hegemonic/dominant security narratives “make possible” certain policies 
and instead look for mechanisms how such policy outcomes become possible 
non-linearly, as a result of the agonistic struggles and contestations, no matter 
how unequal, present in the given security realm. This would incorporate 
discourses striving to domination, those variously destabilising them, and how 
these respond to each other and change as a result. The final outcome is then 
more conceived in terms of the non-linear and often unintended outcomes of 
these tensions. 
2.4.4. Discursive Constraints on Policy Change? 
 
Related to the issue of causation is the concern with “constraints” and their 
effects on policy. As already suggested, the concept of discursive constraints 
implicitly underlies post-structuralist IR studies inquiring into substantive cases 
of continuity and/or (lack of) change. However, most literature is about enabling, 
rather than constraining properties of discourse: thus, the representational 
model, where certain representations are claimed to make possible certain 
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policy outcomes are about such enablement. Indeed, the notion of “hegemony” 
itself is about constraints. In this relation, Chouliaraki and Fairclough see 
constraints in terms of ‘reproductions’;285 and therefore ‘contingency as 
structurally constrained’;286 while Laclau and Mouffe emphasise constraints as a 
function of subject positions. In substantive studies too, the interest is mostly on 
how hegemonic discourses constrain subjugated actors in what is possible to 
say and do, rather than looking for more complex, relationally produced and 
non-linear mechanisms of long-term constraints, where the representatives or 
proponents of the hegemonic discourse (e.g. ruling elite) themselves become 
constrained in relation to policy change as a result of long-term and non-linear 
mechanisms.   
 As the literature review demonstrated, substantive studies in IR, and 
particularly those on “war on terror”, not only fall short of explicitly 
conceptualising discursive constraints and accounting for them as part of the 
mechanisms leading to the claimed outcomes, but often, again, tend to account 
for constraints in linear terms as solely or mostly hegemonic discourses 
constraining subjugated actors. An interest in non-linear constraint where the 
official government policy options become circumscribed due to processes of 
contestation is present in the binding hypothesis underlying the empirical work 
in this thesis. 
2.4.5. Philosophically Realist? 
 
To be able to openly admit, theorise and analyse “causation” as part of our 
concern with discursive struggles and contestation and their effect on security 
policy and practices, is it necessary to have a philosophically realist conception 
of discourse? Indeed, this is a meta-theoretical question, and I shall not try to 
resolve it fully in this thesis (to remind, the purpose of this thesis is not a meta-
theoretical contribution). Nonetheless, I shall show how my reading of Bakhtin’s 
Dialogism is in terms of a philosophically realist conception of discourse, and 
also that, especially given David Howarth’s most recent re-articulation of his 
version of post-structuralism as embedded in “minimal realism”, this move is not 
that antithetical to the main post-structuralist premises (of contingency and non-
fixity) as it may initially appear to be. 
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  Building on Laclau and Mouffe, Howarth articulates a social ontology 
where ‘the subject is thrown into incomplete structures of social relations, which 
are marked by an irreducible negativity that can never be fully displaced or 
transcended’.287 Howarth qualifies this ontology as ‘consistent with a minimal 
realism that acknowledges the existence of the objects and processes that we 
think about, though our practices of reflection are never external to the 
lifeworlds into which we are thrown’.288 In other words, he describes this 
approach as ‘radical materialism, in which our conceptual and discursive forms 
can never exhaust the materiality of objects’ (emphasis added).289  
Hence, in principle this version of post-structuralism is not antithetical to a 
philosophically realist ontology. However, Laclau and Mouffe, as well as 
Howarth draw a different epistemological conclusion from it. Thus, rather than 
contest the fact that physical objects have a “real existence” outside discourse, 
they deny that objects have ‘extra-discursive’ meaning.290 Indeed, they are right 
in claiming that the understanding of everything is achieved through giving 
things meaning via linguistic (written or oral speech) and non-linguistic (e.g. 
images, structuring of public spaces, hierarchies, practices, etc.) means. 
However, from here it cannot logically follow that meaning-seeking and 
meaning-production are all that count in social reality. The ‘materiality of 
objects’ which, as Howarth puts, the discursive can ‘never exhaust’, can exert 
consequences on social realities without them being given meaning, or before 
they have been brought into the realm of the conceptual and the discursive.  On 
the other hand, Howarth’s contention that the discursive can never fully 
“exhaust” the materiality external to mind leads him to the epistemological 
conclusion (and the ‘epistemic fallacy’291) that, therefore, we can never fully 
“know” such external reality. As Banta notes, ‘Epistemological trepidation 
pushes [poststructuralist discourse theory], despite acknowledgement of a real 
world, into anti-realism — defined as acknowledgement of a real and 
knowledge-independent world but rejection of any meaningful independence of 
it from our minds’.292  
                                                 
287
 Howarth (2013: 10), citing Laclau (1990).  
288
 Ibid.  
289
 Ibid.  
290
 Howarth (2000: 104).  
291
 Bhaskar, Roy, A Realist Theory of Science (New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 5. 
292
 Banta (2012: 385). 
76 
 
While it is compelling that we can never fully exhaust reality through giving 
meaning to it, the ontological claim from within Howarth’s “radical materialism” 
or “minimal realism” is undermined if in social-scientific (scholarly) discourse we 
are unable to meaningfully contest its effects and consequences on social and 
political life. In this relation, Wight and Patomaki caution:  
If discourses construct the objects to which the discourses refer, then the 
discourse itself can never be wrong about the existence of its objects, in any 
meaningful or methodologically interesting way. Nor can an alternative discourse 
possibly critique another discourse, since the objects of a given discourse exist if 
the discourse says they exist. External criticism of the existential claims of 
discourses seems impossible.293  
 
Equally, however, we should be cautious of the fallacy of a somewhat opposite 
nature that may limit inquiry. Indeed, as Wight notes, ‘to hold out the prospect of 
social explanation by conceptual and/or semiotic mechanisms does not [or need 
not] represent an attempt to decouple these systems from material factors. 
What it does mean is that conceptual and/or semiotic systems can, potentially 
at least, play a role in social explanation’.294 
Indeed, Howarth’s reservations with regards to critical realism are 
intimately linked with his strong articulation of contingency and incompleteness 
of structures. Thus, while in critical realism, e.g. per Bhaskar, “things” have 
intrinsic properties, Howarth contrasts this with the post-structuralist claim that 
things are contingent, historical and fragile.295 However, why should 
“contingency” be ontologically and analytically counter to the “real”? On the 
other hand, the “real” does not have to mean that all things are external to 
actors’ thoughts and actions. Bhaskar acknowledges this: ‘social structures and 
systems – unlike natural structures – do not exist independently of the activities 
they govern, nor are they simply external to the agents’ conceptions of what 
they are doing; they are woven into the practices, actions and ideas of 
agents’.296 It will later be shown that in Bakhtinian Dialogism, things are indeed 
contingent, historical and fragile; however this does not preclude them from 
being “real”. Indeed, “things”, including “discourses”, do not have intrinsic, fixed 
and essential properties, but they and their effects are no less real.  
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2.5. Conclusion: The Case for a New Discourse-Analytical Framework  
The hypothesis and the related research question posited from the outset of this 
research necessitate analysing contestations and negotiations around the 
foreign/security discourses of “war on terror”, in a quest to trace forces 
constraining change and their mechanisms of actualisation. This pointed me 
toward the need for a discourse theory and analysis that is relational, rather 
than limited to that of a purported hegemonic discourse or else dissident 
discourses in isolation. In addition, the conceptual and empirical concern arising 
from the binding hypothesis necessitates a discourse-theoretical framework that 
can accommodate conceptualising and analysing “causation”. 
The critical overviews in this chapter demonstrated that currently 
dominant discourse-theoretical approaches applied in constructivist and post-
structuralist IR are inadequate for dealing with causal-constitutive “how”, or in 
other words “why” questions that go beyond the moment of legitimation and 
look into longitudinal dynamics of security policy continuation/change and 
therefor constraints. The dominant representational model critiqued herein has 
some merits if employed to explore initial legitimation discourses of security 
policies, e.g. in the immediate post-9/11 period. However, in a longitudinal 
perspective, i.e. in an analysis concerned with the longer life of such discourses 
and continued (re)legitimations, where the outcome is already about continuity 
and/or change, this model is highly restricting. Together with the tendency to 
over-concentrate on the official discourses alone and hence overlook or at times 
outright dismiss the significance of discourses of critique and resistance, it risks 
reducing relational and non-linear discursive processes that have led to policy 
outcomes (continuity or change being such outcome) to a linear and synchronic 
relationship between one (characteristically, the dominant) narrative and certain 
foreign policy/security practices.  
To analyse multiplicity of security-contesting speech-acts, rather than 
securitising speech-acts, in a study that goes beyond the moment of 
securitisation/legitimation and is concerned with unintended longer-term effects 
of performativity on policy, we need a theory of discourse that is relational-
dialogical, able to incorporate contestations, but also philosophically realist in 
order to look for effects of such contestations (in the case of the current 
research, continuity and change) as relationally produced. Thus, especially to 
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explore the longer term dynamics of a security discourse, we must bring 
together discourses of official representatives and those of dissent and critique 
into one empirical analysis that would explore how a) they have related to one 
another over the years by variously responding to one another and to external 
developments, and b) how they have produced policy and practice outcomes 
(i.e. continuity/change) relationally. 
But more specifically, the need for a new framework also arises out of a 
concern to develop a consistent micro-theorising of the utterance where 
speech-act is reconceptualised  as dialogical and relational, born out of and 
responding to an agitated field of struggle, in order to match the macro-
theoretical emphasis on contestations. This is where Bakhtinian Dialogism will 
be shown to be indispensable.  
In the next two chapters, I develop a discourse-theoretical framework to 
respond to these concerns.  
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Chapter 3: Towards a Discourse Theory through Bakhtinian 
Dialogism 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
In search of a discourse philosophy that views discourse as relational, context-
specific, causally efficacious, as well as one which is free from some of the 
limitations of the currently dominant Western post-structuralist discourse 
theories identified above, I turn to the thought of the 20th century Russian 
philosopher Mikhail Bakhtin and his circle which includes Voloshinov and 
Medvedev. 
Bakhtinian Dialogism is a unique theory of language and society, which 
has so far remained at the margins of Western discourse-analytical studies, 
especially within IR. 
There has been considerable recent interest in the thought of Russian 
philosopher Mikhail Bakhtin and his theory of Dialogism in the arts and some 
social sciences;297 but only very nascent and at times only tangential interest in 
IR. Notable exceptions are Guillaume’s application of Bakhtinian thought; where 
he is interested in Bakhtin’s master concept “dialogue” in terms of the 
identity/alterity nexus conceived in processual terms;298 and to a lesser extent, 
der Derian;299 as well as Neumann, who calls the Bakhtinian influence on the 
Western post-structuralist tradition the ‘Eastern excursion’.300 Otherwise, 
Bakhtin has featured in IR studies very often as little more than a footnote, or 
else intermediated through the application of certain thinkers or approaches that 
have in turn drawn on Bakhtin or on people influenced by him. We shall see 
later in chapter 2, how this is the case when it comes to the concept of 
“intertextuality” in IR; but also it has been the case, as Guillaume notes, in 
relation to the huge influence Todorov’s seminal work on “self-other” has had in 
IR, whereas Bakhtin’s thought, who lies at the heart of Todorov’s work, has 
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reached IR only intermediated, through what Guillaume calls, the ‘Todorov 
link’.301 
 Apart from such post-structuralist appropriations or applications mostly 
concerned with identity/difference, the thought of Bakhtin and his circle (which 
also includes Voloshinov), finds a “footnote” appearance in Security Studies in 
Balzacq’s critique and rearticulations of the Copenhagen School’s securitization 
theory. Thus, reconceptualising the “context” of securitization, he makes a mere 
footnote to Bakhtin’s ‘socio-temporal embeddedness of the utterance’ and a 
cursory reference to ‘dialogical struggles’ (Balzacq 2011: 29, 41), while falling 
short of exploring Bakhtin’s thought and incorporating such “struggles” into his 
conceptualization of the “context”.302  
In addition, Bakhtin and Voloshinov receive some, at times again 
intermediated attention in Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) which in turn is 
often applied in IR. Thus, to build a ‘dialectical theory of language’303 as the 
basis for a philosophically realist social ontology, CDA of Chouliaraki and 
Fairclough partly draws on Voloshinov, and on human geographer Harvey’s 
dialectics, which in turn partly draws on Voloshinov.304 On the other hand, CDA 
marries this social ontology with Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL) for their 
method and technique of conducting text analysis; SFL in turn often making 
some references to Bakhtin and Voloshinov.305    
Thus, overall, the thought of Bakhtin and his circle, with the exception of 
Guillaume’s recent work cited above, has occupied little more than a “footnote” 
or an intermediated status in IR, despite their thought having illuminated some 
key substantive claims and directions (on “identity/alterity” and “intertextuality”; 
and recently “context” in securitization theory). The usefulness of Bakhtin for 
conceptualising a post-Austinean, more intersubjective speech-act, and more 
broadly a discourse theory more suitable for a relational discourse analysis 
concerned with contestations, has largely been missed. Therefore, I seek to 
bring Bakhtinian Dialogism out of such “footnote” status, and show a) its 
relevance and potential for re-conceiving of a more dialogical-relational theory 
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of speech-act/utterance; and b) its potential for enriching theoretical and 
empirical discussion in discourse-analytical approaches in IR. 
 
Bakhtin’s employment of the term “dialogue” is different from George Herbert 
Mead’s dialogue306 as ‘similarity of response that allows common play and 
eventually a rule-governed game of self and society’;307 from that of Alfred 
Schutz,308 for whom ‘dialogue works towards commonality and unification of the 
world’,309 or from Jurgen Habermas310 for whom ‘dialogue works towards 
consensus, agreement and the unity of reasoned understanding’.311 In Bakhtin’s 
theory, “dialogue” is primarily an ontological, as well as a normative category: 
the key principle in discourse and society is “dialogue” as a meta-relation, rather 
than formal systematic integrity (structuralism), or discontinuity and contingency 
(Western post-structuralism). In the narrow sense of the term, dialogism means 
that utterances must be studied not individually, but relationally in a 
sociologically informed approach, which Bakhtin calls ‘translinguistics’.312 In a 
broader sense, dialogue is a meta-category, a type of relation that runs through 
various layers of reality, including between the material and the social.  
My reading of Bakhtinian Dialogism, rather than an alternative or “better” 
post-structuralism as posited by some,313 reveals a philosophically realist 
alternative theory of discourse and society, which is nonetheless compatible 
with Laclau and Mouffe’s and Howarth’s explicit theorisation of contestations 
and resistance and inextricable from hegemony. My conception of discourse, 
through my reading of Bakhtin, then, is philosophically realist, albeit consonant 
with many of the Laclau and Mouffean categories. On the one hand, it reflects a 
tension, an uneasy relationship with both; on the other hand, and more 
optimistically, it may be the basis to attempt to bridge them, especially in 
relation to Howarth’s newer, most recent re-development of post-structuralism, 
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subscribing to ‘minimal realism’ and ‘radical materialism’.314 In this sense, my 
meta-theoretical approach is that it is possible to draw on certain ontological 
insights on discourse/society from post-structuralist theories, without remaining 
indebted to their broader epistemological assumptions, while at the same time 
being philosophically realist in my epistemology and in my ontological take on 
causation and semiotic mechanisms. 
Bakhtinian Dialogism offers a theory of discourse and society that, with 
further development/re-working, is better suited for inquiring into political 
argumentation, primarily because it has a relational view of meaning 
(re)production and change, as well as of social interaction and structures. 
Bakhtinian dialogism transcends some of post-structuralism’s weaknesses and 
incompatibilities with a philosophical-realist social ontology. By introducing 
some key categories of Bakhtinian thought, I demonstrate why a philosophically 
realist (rather than an alternative post-structuralist) reading of Bakhtin’s thought 
is closer to the original (less mediated) Bakhtin.  
The aim has not been to conduct a comprehensive reading and all-out 
re-appraisal of Bakhtin’s oeuvre. It is, instead, to extract that which is necessary 
for forming a discourse theory and subsequent analytical approach well-
equipped to accommodate an inquiry into specifically the type of discourses I 
am interested in, namely foreign/security discourses. I conclude that Bakhtin’s 
alternative critique of (Saussurean) structuralism and more broadly of Positivism 
has important parallels with the critical-realist critique of the latter: it is able to 
comprehend an “outside” to discourse through its concepts of dan and zadan;315 
it seeks a relational understanding of a layered world, focusing in the meantime, 
on the relations, rather than the already constituted relata of such world;316 it  
conceives of forces in discourse and society as real mechanisms, and even in a 
critique of Humean causation, attempts an alternative conception of causation.  
Discourse and its generative effects in Bakhtinian thought can be known 
only when not losing sight of the social-situatedness of the processes under 
inquiry. Such social-situatedness is important in reconceiving of speech-act as 
dialogical, which I develop in section 3.3. Through a critique of the most 
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prominent theory of utterance in Western thought and in IR – that of 
Austean/Searlean speech-act theory, I show how the dialogical speech-act is 
diachronic (rather than synchronic and dependent on static structures of 
established conventions), able to break through the very constraints which 
structuralist speech-act theory imposes on it. Through Bakhtin’s concepts of 
addressivity and answerability originating in his philosophy of the act, we are 
able to see that a speech-act, as any social act, is primarily a response to the 
world, and more specifically a response to a multiplicity of other utterances in 
the past, present and future (temporally), and across the spectrum of other 
voices in the society (spatially). 
Such chronotopic (time-space) situatedness of the utterance is further 
explored through intertextuality, in Section 3.4. I explore how Bakhtinian 
dialogism has inspired the concept of “intertextuality” lying at the heart of 
Western post-structuralism; and how heeding to a closer and less mediated 
reading of it will help further develop a theory of the dialogical utterance closer 
to Bakhtin and as an alternative speech-act theory. In particular, I argue that 
intertextuality as understood closer to its roots of Bakhtinian dialogism, rather 
than as often read and (mis)-applied in IR through Western appropriations, is 
the infrastructure for meaning-making, and thus cannot be overlooked in 
discourse analysis. I then engage with some categories from Laclau and 
Mouffe’s theory such as “nodal points”, and also introduce others such as 
“hyperlinks”, and “surplus illocutions”, to help enhance the theory of dialogical 
speech-act and thus further adapt it for analysing foreign policy/security 
contestations.  
 
3.2. Bakhtinian Dialogism as an Opportunity  
Western post-structuralism embarked on a critique of the Saussurean vision for 
its ‘essentialism based on the primacy of a static and complete structure’317 and 
for resembling atomistic structuralism where language is taken to be a product, 
rather than a process of production. However, as already suggested, while 
seeking to transcend such essentialism and theorise contingency and openness 
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of structures, Western post-structuralism has ended up in anti-realism and 
another form of essentialism.318  
In contrast to Western post-structuralist critique of Saussurean 
structuralism, early 20th century Russian philosopher Mikhail Bakhtin offered an 
alternative critique of Saussure, and more broadly of positivism. In 1920s, when 
the consolidation of post-revolutionary Soviet Russia was still to come and 
experimentation with ideas was still permitted, Russian Dialogists, in particular 
Mikhail Bakhtin, embarked on the critique of Saussurean linguistics, well before 
the French philosophical tradition came to the fore, and the term “post-
structuralism” was coined in the West.319 In contrast with Western post-
structuralists, the Bakhtin circle managed to critique the Saussurean essentialist 
and atomistic vision of discourse and society through an entirely different route, 
that of “dialogism”, and without a resort to anti-realism and indeterminism: 
instead, Bakhtin criticises Saussurean structural linguistics for abstracting 
signifiers from social interaction, and consequently brings the social back in as 
the reality of discourse. 
Thus, Bakhtin’s dialogism engages with self/other, individual/society, 
signifier/signified, language/speech, etc., however not to deconstruct and 
subvert them as binary oppositions, neither to resolve them in a Hegelian-
Marxian dialectics of synthesis. Instead, he and his circle seek to understand 
their relations as real and, in a broader project of explaining continuity and 
change in a society, to unpack the social mechanisms in which they are 
implicated. However, such continuity and unity is free from the structuralist 
rigidity and determinism: structures are not closed systems with internal 
relations, but, as we shall see, are open. In addition, they are contingent 
because of plurality of meanings and the dialogical (centrifugal) force in 
discourse that ensures such plurality. 
Bakhtin is able to conceive of meaning as plural, (re)produced and 
changed in an open and changeable system.320 Meanings for Bakhtin are not 
produced through the ‘always-absent differential trace’ that structures the 
Derridean field, but through the social significance of the utterance, ‘as an 
intervention in … [and in] a relation to specific historical and ideological 
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conditions’ (emphasis in the original).321 The historical and the collective are 
implicated in each individual utterance, and therefore the utterance ‘belongs to 
a higher level of structure, than that identified by Saussure’.322  
The work of the Bakhtin circle, written mostly in the Soviet Russia of 
1920-30s, largely predated the emergence of Western post-structuralist theory, 
but received a belated reception in the West. This was due to the fact that some 
of their work went into publication decades after being written due to censorship 
and controversy around them within the Soviet Union, and were translated into 
English with even further delay. Thus, necessarily, they were received and read 
in the West within the context of, and through, continental post-structuralism.323 
Bakhtin was appropriated by Western post-structuralists according to their own 
image.  
Indeed, Dialogism and Western post-structuralism shared common 
antecedents, particularly critical engagement with Saussurean linguistics. 
However, there are fundamental differences that have been lost in various 
Western appropriations of Bakhtin, mostly in claiming him as parallel to Western 
post-structuralism. Fortunately, there is an emerging trend, specifically in literary 
critique and cultural studies, where these misappropriations are revealed and 
critiqued as the legacy of the Western ‘Bakhtin industry’.324 For example Zavala 
finds ‘disturbing appropriations and misreadings’, where Bakhtin is presented as 
a post-modernist theorist of negation, while remaining silent on his thought as 
primarily a social – and we may add – relational, theory of discourse.325  
Bakhtin’s circle charged structuralism for the inability to account for some 
most fundamental aspects of language, namely ‘its active creative capacity and 
the always evaluative nature of meaning’.326 By contrast to Saussure, Bakhtin 
posited that text has meaning only when actualised in a specific utterance, in 
what Bakhtin often calls ‘the living utterance’: ‘verbal interaction is the basic 
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reality of language’.327 Hence, the ontologically real, and therefore the subject of 
analysis must be the interactions of speaking social beings,328 whose 
utterances must be studied not individually, but relationally in a sociologically 
informed approach, which he calls ‘translinguistics’.329  Primarily, this means 
that if ‘signs can arise only on interindividual territory’, i.e. between at least two 
individuals who are ‘organized socially’ (emphases in the original),330 and given 
that speech exchanges ‘operate in extremely close connection with the 
conditions of the social situation in which they occur’, including the historical 
epoch, the social group and the specific behavioural genres of communication 
and their given (and changeable) functions in the specific societal struggles, 
what we should be studying is exactly such sociality of these interactions.  
In advocating ‘a different type of science’ on discourse, Bakhtin draws 
similarities with the natural sciences,331 but also points out the differences by 
bringing into sharp focus the ‘double hermeneutic’332 nature of what he calls 
‘humanistic disciplines’, i.e. the task of social sciences to make sense of how 
social actors make sense of reality: ‘[t]houghts upon thoughts, experience of 
experience, discourse upon discourses, texts bearing upon texts. Therein lies 
the fundamental particularity of our (humanistic) disciplines by opposition to the 
natural sciences, although there, too, there are no absolute or impossible 
boundaries’.333    
Bakhtin’s conception of discourse as relational is predicated on his 
philosophy of self and other: otherness is the very condition of possibility for 
consciousness,334 however not in the sense of otherness as difference, i.e. 
constituted in an internal relation of difference (as in Western post-
structuralism), but otherness as a medium to negotiate the self through a 
synergetic relationship: the “self” is essentially constituted in polyphony, through 
encounters with, and as an answer to, a multitude of other “selves” in the 
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spoken voices of others.335 Inspired by the theories of relativity in physics 
predominant in his time, Bakhtin understands existence as “dialogue”: existence 
is an event, but it is an event that is shared: ‘[b]eing is a simultaneity: it is 
always co-being’;336 and therefore life by its very nature is dialogical. Such 
dialogical relationships are present in exchanges at all levels – between 
organisms in ecosystems, words (and other units) in language, people in 
society,337 as well as between social and material structures. 
Dialogism, then, rejects the atomistic view of semiotic and social 
structures. In his critique of Formalism in literary studies, Bakhtin attacks the 
attempts to ‘try to find the whole in the part: …[to] represent as the structure of 
the whole the structure of the part… isolate[d] abstractly’.338 Instead, he goes on 
to argue, that the structural whole is constituted through relations. In such 
higher level of structure, dialogue-as-a-relation operates not just among social 
agents, and across texts and meanings, but also ‘within a complexly structured 
and layered world’.339 Unlike Western post-structuralists, for whom, ‘the 
relations of difference are purely linguistically derived, and prior to, and 
constitutive of, the relata’,340  in Bakhtin’s conception of language and society, 
we see a ‘structure as social relations’ (rather than ‘structure as relations of 
difference’): ‘relations must be understood as relations linking together not [only] 
social positions and roles, but the various planes of social activity…allow[ing] us 
to concentrate our attention on the important structure (relations) between the 
material and ideational aspects of social life’.341 As one level of such relations 
among two planes (in no way the only two planes in reality), Bakhtin speaks of 
the dialogical sign as the contact point, as the relation that characterises an 
encounter ‘between the [biological] organism and the outside world’.342 
Moreover, ‘consciousness itself can arise and become a viable fact only in the 
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material embodiment of signs’.343 Thus, we may claim that in Bakhtin’s vision, 
the linguistic sign is another form of materiality that is a means to negotiate the 
relationship between the biological organism and the outer world. 
In such relational character of systems of meaning, social processes and 
materiality, Bakhtin [Voloshinov] explores the relationship between material and 
ideological forces, and the inapplicability of narrowly Humean idea of causation 
to envisage such a relationship. Thus, in a critique of Marx’s account of the 
material origins of ideology, and in an attempt to establish the status of 
discourse in the relationship between base and superstructure, writing in 1929, 
he probes:   
If what is meant by causality is mechanical causality (as causality has been and 
still is understood and defined by the positivistic representatives of natural 
scientific thought), then this answer [that the basis causally determines ideology] 
would be essentially incorrect…The range of application for the categories of 
mechanical causality is extremely narrow… As regards the fundamental problems 
of historical materialism and of the study of ideologies altogether, the applicability 
of so inert a category as that of mechanical causality is simply out of the 
question.344 
 
While the status of Marxism in Bakhtin’s thought is disputed, it is clear from this 
engagement, that Bakhtin envisions a more flexible and complex alternative 
understanding of generative causation, running through his work.  
In contrast with the post-structuralist preoccupation with rupture, 
discontinuity and fragmentation, Bakhtin’s conception of discourse and society 
presents to us ‘a complex of continua’, and ‘posits implicitly a unity of process 
and a continuity of effect’.345 Thus, for Bakhtin, ‘[a]ny utterance, no matter how 
weighty and complete in and of itself, is only a moment in the continuous 
process of verbal communication. But that continuous verbal communication is, 
in turn, itself only a moment in the continuous, all-inclusive, generative process 
of a given social collective’.346 Therefore, it is impossible to study utterances 
‘isolated from the historical stream of [other] utterances and social 
processes’.347 Thus, for Bakhtin, in a complex of continua,  
[t]here is the continuum of discursive practices, from those of everyday life to those 
of the formal institutions of societies – church and state, the scientific disciplines 
and sophisticated cultural practices. These occur within the continuum of the 
dialogic process which may be characterized as monologising centripetal 
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microstates within an open centrifugal macrostate. This in turn implies a continuum 
of history.
348
 
          
Such interlocked relations of continua imply a “layered world”, where structures 
are stratified and contexts are interpenetrated.349 Bakhtin’s “dialogism” is a type 
of relation running through all the layers. Informed and inspired by the recent 
advances in sciences of his time, especially of relativity in physics and quantum 
theory, Bakhtin’s layered world comprised ‘the linkage of matter-energy, 
entropy, and information that enchains conceptually the physical, biological and 
cultural spheres’.350 Thus, Bakhtin presents to us primarily as a materialist, who 
sees discourse itself as part of, or another form of, materiality; on the other 
hand discourse is an intervention into other layers of the material world by the 
human subject, who is in a constant dialogical quest to “negotiate” her way 
through such stratified world.  
Meanings in Bakhtinian theory are produced through, and in turn play a 
role in producing, social effects out of the complex relationship between two 
forces operating in discourse – forces of fixation and finalisation, i.e. 
monologising, centripetal forces, and forces of pluralisation, i.e. dialogising, 
centrifugal forces. The monological is a force in discourse, which strives for 
singularity, for a closed system, for an imposed word. In discourse, it is the 
attempted fixation and singularity of meaning, the fixation of signifier and 
signified in an attempt not to allow space to question such transcendental 
signifieds as “God”, “justice”, “law”, “the truth”.351 It is a force, which is 
constantly present, at varying degrees, a force, which creates ‘the authoritative 
word’, including religious, political, moral discourse, as well as the 
acknowledged scientific truth: ‘we encounter it with its authority already fused to 
it... [as] located in a distanced zone... the word of the fathers... already 
acknowledged in the past. It is a prior discourse’.352  
In order to achieve such impact of prior-ness and authority fused with 
political power, and reach us ‘as a compact and indivisible mass’, an 
authoritative discourse is at pains to ‘permit no play with the context framing it, 
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no play with its borders, no gradual and flexible transitions’.353 However, as 
Bakhtin warns us, while monologising forces are constantly present in language 
and in society, there is never a completely monological discourse: dialogical 
forces are constitutive of all discursive interaction. While in the earlier use of the 
term as explained above, dialogicity was the meta-category of Bakhtin’s thought 
denoting a meta-relation present in all discursive and social interaction, here in 
this narrower use of the term, dialogicity denotes centrifugal forces in discourse 
that strive to prevent any closure, any singularity by pluralising and subverting 
such tendencies; but also, where dialogical (relational) dependency of utterance 
upon other utterances becomes a resource for meaning-production. We shall 
later see how even the most monologising authoritative discourse striving for 
hegemony has to rely on the dialogical forces in discourse.         
Therefore, monological/dialogical discourse, just as many of Bakhtin’s 
other concepts appearing in pairs (e.g., ‘self/other’), should not be viewed as 
just another binary opposition, but rather as asymmetric dualism, as a relation. 
Neither should the relationship be taken to be dialectical in the Hegelian 
sense.354 Hence, in the relation between the monological and dialogical forces 
(both ontologically real forces in discourse), “monologue” and singularising 
discourse has a different ontological status from the dialogue: it is never 
complete; it does not exist as a final achievement, but is rather always an 
unrealised attempt.  
As we saw in chapter 2, while Laclau and Mouffe’s theory is ‘predicated 
on the ultimate impossibility of societal closure’, this very same impossibility is 
‘a condition that makes articulatory practices and political agency possible’.355 
Even if impossible in ontological terms, for political agents, ‘the idea of closure 
and fullness still functions as an (impossible) ideal’.356 This idea of impossibility 
of closure of any discursive structure is compatible with the Bakhtinian category 
of monologising discourse as a constant but never-fully-achievable attempt to 
bring the societal field to closure, to circumscribe heteroglossia, to singularise 
                                                 
353
 Ibid., 343. 
354
  Indeed, Hegelian dialectics for Bakhtin is itself a manifestation of monologism, and thus is 
the very opposite of dialogue, with its closure, abstractness, and assurance of history’s 
outcome. Bakhtin warns against such misinterpretation, by mocking the language of Hegelian 
dialectics in a parody of thesis-antithesis-synthesis: ‘[d]ialectics was born of dialogue so as to 
return again to dialogue on a higher level’, quoted in Pechey, Graham, ‘Boundaries versus 
Binaries: Bakhtin In/Against the History of Ideas’, in Gardiner (2003: 245).  Also see Morson 
(2003: 225).   
355
 Howarth and Stavrakakis (2000: 15).  
356
 Ibid., p. 8.  
91 
 
meaning. However, the corrective through Bakhtin is that such ideal of fixation 
and closure can never be attempted without a dialogical engagement with 
others’ meanings/utterances, including meanings to be circumscribed and 
excluded but also meanings to be positively engaged with.  
The pluralising effect of dialogical forces preventing any closure of the 
discursive field is explored by Bakhtin through the practice of carnival and the 
idea of the “carnivalesque”. The ancient practice of carnival has acted against 
the official ideologies and discourses of religion and state power by temporarily 
suspending, if not reversing, the existing social hierarchies of the time and 
celebrating the unofficial dimensions of social life.357 In fact, it has been noticed 
that Bakhtin’s own work ‘championing the heteroglossia (many-voicedness) of 
the “folk” against the imposed authority of monoglossia’ was itself a disguised 
criticism of the ruthless state centralisation of Stalinist Russia.358 This function, 
which Bakhtin calls the ‘carnivalesque’, beyond the medieval carnival proper, 
has evolved in the modern polyphenic novel. The latter (for Bakhtin epitomised 
by Dostoyevsky’s novels) allows for no individual discourse standing objectively 
above any other: it represents in a condensed form the multiplicity of societal 
voices and tensions, each voice responding to and calling to the others.359 
Bakhtin’s theory of the novel is not about the novel as a literary form: the novel 
happens to be one instantiation where dialogicity and “carnival” find most salient 
expression in the historical period and in the societies he was interested in. His 
concern was, rather, in the function of the novel, the function of ‘carnival 
displacement’.360 This ‘carnivalesque’ function was performed by the carnival 
proper in the public squares and the markets of medieval Europe; then by the 
novel through the ‘private spaces of its readers’, during the Enlightenment; and 
finally has been dispersed into a fragmented variety of leftist cultural forms in 
the informational and post-industrial age,361 as well as in the actions and 
discourses of social/dissident movements.  
Through his interest in the novel as a socio-anthropological 
phenomenon, Bakhtin conceives of plurality and hence openness of meaning 
systems and of structures as inescapable: forces of fixation and finalisation are 
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constantly in a complex relationship with the reality of openness. This allows 
Bakhtin to conceive of the contingency and plurality of meaning; however, 
unlike Derrida or Laclau and Mouffe, Bakhtin does not take such plurality and 
openness to mean ‘indeterminacy’ and hence ‘impossibility’ of meaning, and of 
society. Unlike deconstruction, Bakhtin sees the carnival not as an infinite anti-
hegemonic quest in itself, but rather as ‘an affirmation of the possibility of 
alternative relations’.362 By locating plurality and openness in the “real” of the 
relationality of society, imagining emancipation becomes possible, precisely 
because of the ‘unfinalisability’ of meaning and openness of social structures. 
Hence, as Rutland notes, whereas Western post-modernism ‘reveals an 
apparent hollowness of the present… Bakhtinianism finds not hollowness, but 
inexhaustible plenitude, endless possibility, an open program’.363  
In such a conception of structure, contingency and openness are in a 
complex relationship with systematicity: society and history are being shaped 
and changed by both centrifugal and centripetal forces. Thus, openness of 
systems represents possibilities for change and freedom: ‘[n]othing conclusive 
has yet taken place in the world, the ultimate word of the world and about the 
world has not yet been spoken, the world is open and free, everything is still in 
the future and will always be in the future’.364 The carnival is a ‘feast of time, the 
feast of becoming, change and renewal’.365 As Zavala notes, carnival spirit 
introduces relativity and ambiguity, in order to  
suspend social hierarchies and values, thus generating new viewpoints, open 
towards the “different” with respect to official codification…Bakhtin’s positive and 
progressive carnival familiarization would be difficult to reconcile with subversion 
and dissent without a future collective project, or with an “estrangement” of a 
dominant and totalizing style.366 
 
Thus, through carnival and dialogising, Bakhtin means the possibility of 
transforming society not merely through deconstruction, but through opening 
the space for imagining new alternatives, which in turn will inescapably mean 
new monologising. In contrast with Derridean deconstruction, where ‘all traces 
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of meaning lead to paradox, absence and doubt’,367 carnivalesque 
heteroglossia is located in the realm of social performance, and registers real 
social differences, taking on the function of resisting or negotiating change in an 
unequal field of power and access.368 In turn, and crucially, “power” for Bakhtin 
is not reified: ‘it is a matter of ratios of dominance and resistance, of monologic 
contest and resolution within the encompassing ongoing dialogic process, 
situated within and between subjects, individual and collective’.369 Hence, the 
Bakhtinian theory is able to conceive of discourse as transformative, as part of 
counter-hegemonic struggles filled with possibility of alternatives.  
 As part of such struggles, attempts to closure are never just antagonistic 
and exclusionary. As we saw earlier, in Laclau and Mouffe’s theory, there is a 
primary “lack”, which antagonistic (opposed) political projects seek to fill through 
‘hegemonic practices’ attempting ‘to construct and stabilise the nodal points that 
form the basis of concrete social orders by articulating as many available 
elements – floating signifiers – as possible’.370 In contrast, for Bakhtin, it is not a 
lack but a presence of multitude of dialogical relations, where the agony to act 
and to mean does not necessarily lead to antagonisms of opposing projects (of 
identity through difference), but where the inescapable 
“addressivity/answerability” to the other – even in the most monological 
(hegemonising) practices – compels to construct meanings through and with 
others’ meanings. Relatedly, “exclusion” central in post-structuralist thought is 
seen in a different light. As we saw earlier, in the Laclau and Mouffean 
conception, the ‘intrinsically political’ is conceived through ‘the construction of 
antagonisms and the drawing of political frontiers between “insiders” and 
“outsiders”’, where contestations and relationality among agents and meanings 
is conceived primarily in terms of exclusions, i.e. exclusionary relations. In 
Bakhtinian theory, relationality and contestation is not conceived solely in terms 
of exclusions, because of the dialogical nature of meaning production: fixation 
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or singularity of meaning is only an attempt (as it indeed is in post-structuralist 
accounts), but it unavoidably has to be conducted via others’ meanings. 
This emphasis on attempt caught up in a struggle is crucial in relation to 
conceptualising an alternative – dialogical – understanding of speech-act, and 
hence performativity, to which I now turn. 
    
3.3. Introducing the Dialogical Speech-act 
Language is not a neutral medium that passes freely and easily into 
the private property of the speaker’s intentions: it is populated – 
overpopulated – with the intentions of others. Expropriating it, forcing it 
to submit to one’s own intentions and accents, is a difficult and 
complicated process.371 
 
To take us a step closer to having a discourse-analytical framework best suited 
for inquiring into political argumentation and in particular security discourses 
and their effects on policy, we need to zoom into and get closer to the 
utterance, to understand how it operates and produces effects. For this 
purpose, I turn to critiquing the most prominent theory of utterance in Western 
thought and in IR – that of Austinean/Searlean speech-act theory. Through such 
a critique, I reconceive of speech-act as dialogical in the Bakhtinian sense. 
Although not termed as such, Bakhtin’s coherent and complex philosophy of 
language is itself a theory of speech-act, or of alternative performativity. 
Speech-act theory critiqued and re-conceived though Bakhtinian Dialogism 
becomes the basis for my vision of approaching political argumentation. 
 
To remind, as we have seen in the overview of chapter 2, Austin’s speech-act 
theory372 develops a theory of performatives, where any proposition, along with 
a locutionary meaning (linguistic meaning in the traditional sense), also 
possesses illocutionary force—the potential of ‘doing something’ in saying 
things, and perlocutionary force – the effect of the illocution on the audience.373 
Initially, Austin had distinguished between performatives and constatives, the 
former denoting doing things in saying something (e.g. marrying someone by 
uttering the words “I hereby declare you man and wife” by a priest in a church), 
and the latter to denote utterances that do not immediately perform such social 
                                                 
371
 Bakhtin (1981: 293-94). 
372
 See Austin (1975). 
373
 Ibid. 
95 
 
functions. 374 However, later he admitted that all utterances in real speech are 
performative. Austin’s famous example is as follows: by uttering “There is a bull 
in the field” in a certain situation, the speaker performs the illocutionary act of 
“warning” someone in the field, rather than describing a scene. The 
perlocutionary intent of this utterance would be “persuading the person in the 
field to leave”. If the utterance is taken by the audience as the illocution 
suggests, i.e. as a warning, then the illocutionary act is said to have been 
‘felicitous’, i.e. successful, while if the speaker achieves in actuality preventing 
the audience from entering the field, then the perlocutionary act has been 
successful, as well.375 
Searle went beyond Austin’s cataloguing stage and provided a 
theoretical framework which showed how language creates institutions and, in 
his constitutive theory, how utterances have word-to-world consequences.376 In 
this highly rule-bound conception, ‘speech-acts are acts characteristically 
performed by uttering expressions in accordance with certain constitutive rules’ 
(emphasis added).377 Thus, the a priori acceptance of certain conditions by a 
community of speakers/society is necessary for the success of a given act, in a 
structure of socio-discursive relations that have already stabilised into 
institutions.  
In the Austinean-Searlean speech-act, the accepted conventions, and 
not the intentions of the speaker, are the key to making an utterance 
performative: if the conventions are not present, the intentions of the speaker 
will not succeed, and vice versa – if the conventions are there, the performative 
act will be successful, regardless of the intentions. However, such structuralist 
accounts of speech-act seem to take a static and synchronic socio-linguistic 
field as a point of departure for analysis. Importantly, they build on a conception 
of structure as internal relations.378 It is not quite clear how the “rules” 
themselves are being constituted or change over time, or how speech-acts may 
have variable meanings even within the same institutionalised rule-system. Nor 
is it clear how the dynamics of the relationship between speaker and receiver 
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evolves, and importantly how power relations created through the constitutive 
rules may produce undesirable/unintended results.   
By contrast, Bakhtin’s dialogical conception of language and society and 
his concepts such as answerability/addressivity and the chronotope, as well as 
the concept of intertextuality (not a term used by Bakhtin, but revisited and re-
read as closer to its Bakhtinian origins) help shed new light on the utterance 
and allow reconceiving speech-act theory. According to Bakhtin, the nature of 
discourse cannot yield itself to sufficient investigation/understanding through the 
structuralist approach. As already mentioned above, he maintains that text has 
meaning only when actualised in what Bakhtin variously refers to as ‘utterance’, 
‘living utterance’, ‘speech performance’, or simply as the ‘word’.379 However, 
unlike Austin, Bakhtin does not see such a performance of speech as the result 
of established social conventions in a closed system of relations, neither in the 
‘readability’ of written text beyond the sender’s initial intentionality in infinite 
possibilities as per Derrida.380 Bakhtin himself acknowledges the possibility of 
the production of unanticipated meanings, and that the same text may actualise 
different meanings given specific contexts and life situations.381 However, as we 
shall see in a moment, he demonstrates this through an analysis of the 
mechanisms at work primarily between socially organised intending beings. 
To understand this, it is important to understand his concept of 
addressivity/answerability.382 This concept reveals how Bakhtin’s philosophy of 
the utterance is predicated primarily on his philosophy of the act, which 
emerges in one of his early writings, Towards a Philosophy of the Act,383 written 
in 1919-21, and continues developing throughout his oeuvre. The latter will help 
us pay closer attention to, and conceptualise the “act” part of the “speech-act”, 
before we can turn to understanding the utterance or speech.  
Thus, according to Bakhtin’s vision, any act, including a linguistic act, or 
a speech-act one performs constitutes an answer to the world. It is worth 
quoting Bakhtin at length:  
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Life can be consciously comprehended only in concrete answerability… only as an 
ongoing event and not as Being qua given…. 
The world in which an act or deed actually proceeds, in which it is actually 
accomplished, is a unitary and unique world, that is experienced concretely: it is a 
world that is seen, heard, touched and thought, a world permeated in its entirety 
with the emotional-volitional tones of the affirmed validity of values. The unitary 
uniqueness of this world (its emotional-volitional, heavy, compellent uniqueness, 
and not its uniqueness with respect to content/sense) is guaranteed for actuality by 
the acknowledgement of my unique participation in that world, by my non-alibi in it. 
…my participation transforms every manifestation of myself (feeling, desire, mood, 
thought) into my own actively answerable deed.         
This world is given to me, from my unique place in Being…For my participative, 
act-performing consciousness, this world, as an architectonic whole, is arranged 
around me as around that sole centre from which my deed issues or comes forth: I 
come upon this world, inasmuch as I come forth or issue from within myself in my 
performed act or deed of seeing, of thinking, of practical doing (emphases in the 
original).384 
  
Thus, Being, or existence, is given to a human subject as an insurgence of 
messages to which one must respond by making sense, by producing meaning 
and by acting.385 This, i.e. always responding to the world, is the inescapable 
state of the human condition, as only by responding to the world can one give 
meaning to his/her existence; in other words, one has “no alibi in existence”. 
This response is in the form of another utterance as deed, another act such as 
an artistic representation,386 and so on. Bakhtin notes, that even inertia, or 
inaction, is a form of response.387    
Consequently, as Voloshinov [Bakhtin] notes, ‘any utterance, as act or 
deed upon this world, makes response to something and is calculated to be 
responded to in turn. It is but one link in a continuous chain of speech 
performances’.388 Thus, not only speech is a form of act, but also making 
meaning out of it and crucially answering it is another act; and these are in 
inseparable relationship. However, such addressivity is not a totally structured 
response to stimuli in a set of pre-determined/pre-accepted signs and their 
meanings. Neither is it a volatile act, where meanings of statements and social 
actions and situations are floating in virtually infinite possibilities. Rather, 
addressivity/answerability means that any utterance as an act is directed 
(addressed) towards a specific listener, potentially in a novel (rule-breaking) 
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way and therefore anticipates a certain future answer, but also that any 
utterance is “answerable” to a variety of other utterances (potential and actual) 
circulating in the society at large spatially, as well as uttered in the past and 
possible in the future, temporally.  
In Bakhtin’s own formulation, ‘every word is directed toward an answer 
and cannot escape the profound influence of the answering word that it 
anticipates’.389 This, as Bakhtin suggests repeatedly, is an active and intentional 
act of the speaker. Thus, he continues:  
The word in living conversation is directly, blatantly, oriented toward a future 
answer-word: it provokes an answer, anticipates it and structures itself in the 
answer’s direction. Forming itself in an atmosphere of the already spoken, the 
word is at the same time determined by that which has not yet been said but 
which is needed and in fact anticipated by the answering word. Such is the 
situation of any living dialogue (emphasis added).390 
  
Importantly, in such addressivity, the social as the “real” of the interaction is at 
the forefront: ‘[t]he word is oriented towards an addressee, towards who that 
addressee might be…There can be no such thing as an abstract addressee… 
Even though we sometimes have pretentions to experiencing and saying things 
urbi et orbi, actually, of course, we envision this “world at large” through the 
prism of the concrete social milieu surrounding us’ (emphases in the original).391 
Hence, an utterance is never a completely free act of choice: rather, ‘every 
aspect of it is a give-and-take between the local need of a particular speaker to 
communicate a specific meaning, and the global requirements of language as a 
generalizing system’.392 Therefore, not only an intentional speaker is negotiating 
her way through the world that pre-dates her and is given to her by using 
sedimented structures of language as well as previous utterances, but also 
negotiates with such sedimented structures of language to make it serve the 
given social purpose to mean and the personal purpose of the subject to 
respond to the world, hence potentially to aim to change it along the way. 
In turn, such a conception of speech as an act upon the world is closely 
related to Bakhtin’s distinction between дан (“dan”, i.e. the given) and задан 
(“zadan”, i.e. the created or conceived);393 and sheds new light on the 
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controversial problematic of the status of the discursive vis-à-vis non-/extra-
discursive. Unlike the neo-Kantian insistence that ‘[t]he world is not given, but 
conceived’, Bakhtin does not accept extreme idealism.394 For Bakhtin, we 
encounter the world of givens upon which we act with a string of responsive 
acts: the zadan then becomes our response to the dan. As we shall see in the 
next chapter, this is consonant with Archer’s morphogenetic approach to agent 
and structure, where the two are temporally separable: material and social 
realities to which we respond pre-date us, are prior to us as individual actors.395  
At this point it already becomes clear that Bakhtin is able to comprehend 
an “outside” to discourse as well as temporal separability, i.e. an autonomous 
materiality that is given to us and upon which we act, and a social reality as an 
amalgam of multitude of others’ responses to the world, including those already 
stratified into institutions and power structures, which again presents to us as 
given before we have initiated a responsive act upon it.  Moreover, via Bakhtin’s 
philosophy of the act and dialogism, and consistent with critical realism, we are 
able to conceive of practices as ‘those actions and social relations in the 
transitive realm of a particular object which are, themselves, partly determined 
by but not reducible to, the structures and mechanisms’.396  
Within such a philosophy of existence, where what we may call “drive to 
mean and to act upon the world” is actualised only through and in relation to a 
multiplicity of others with no alibi in Being, any event, including a speech event, 
comes to be a constant exchange. As Holquist, a prominent Bakhtin critic, 
explains,  
Before it means any specific thing, an utterance expresses the general condition of 
each speaker’s addressivity, the situation of not only being preceded by a 
language system that is “always already there”, but preceded as well by all 
existence, making it necessary for me to answer for the particular place I 
occupy….An utterance… is a broader phenomenon. It takes place between 
speakers, and is therefore drenched in social factors.397 
  
As a result of such ‘in-between-ness’,398 then, meaning becomes the effect of 
the relationship among utterances in a chain of responsiveness.399 Thus, 
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discourse, which is the cumulative of such actualised meanings, can only be 
understood as an interactive communication, as relationships. 
In this light then, we can make a distinction between two interrelated 
levels of dialogicity immediately participating in the speech-act: a) dialogical 
relations among speaking actors horizontally (i.e. across space) as well as 
vertically (i.e., across time, through engagement with actors in the past, as well 
as anticipated actors in the future), and b) dialogical relations among various 
semiotic units, once again horizontally and vertically.  
In such relationship, the speech-act context, then, is not just the 
immediate setting and the social/institutional positionality of speakers. The 
context is also constituted by past utterances – upon which the utterance can 
but rely to produce desired meaning, to which it is also answerable, and by 
which it can be constrained – as well as, crucially, by future possible/anticipated 
utterances. Thus, Bakhtin explains: ‘[t]he word, directed toward its object, enters 
a dialogically agitated and tension-filled environment of alien words, value 
judgements and accents, weaves in and out of complex interrelationships, 
merges with some, recoils from others, intersects with yet a third group’.400  
While the significance of this temporal situatedness of utterances in a 
chain of past, present and future utterances will be further explored through 
Bakhtin’s concept of chronotope (time-space) in a moment, it must be noted 
here that such responsive utterance has important implications for re-evaluating 
“intentions” in relation to speech-act. I already established that in a dialogical 
vision, a speech-act can actualise only through a relationship between at least 
two social beings, between a self and an other in a responsive interaction and in 
actual socially organised situations. Let us break down this relationship in a 
simplified model – the relationship between two social beings, but having in 
mind the broader societal communicative process.  
Several issues arise. First is the status of the speaker, particularly in 
relation to the intentions as a performer of the speech-act. In relation to 
intentions, in his dialogical vision, Bakhtin posits: ‘[t]he word in language is half 
someone else’s. It becomes “one’s own” only when the speaker populates it 
with his own intentions...Prior to this moment of appropriation, the word... [only] 
exists in other people’s mouths, in other people’s contexts, serving other 
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people’s intentions’.401 Thus, in Bakhtin’s understanding, it is not the fixed 
conventions, but instead the intentions of the speaker that are the key to making 
an utterance performative. Even when it is Derrida’s written text that has the 
‘breaking force’ to mean something in the ‘absence of the sender’, i.e. 
irrespective of the sender’s initial (and perhaps long-forgotten) intentions,402 still 
this text for Bakhtin is caught up in the dialogicity of the ‘living utterance’, where 
it is still the intentions of the given receiver (who is always simultaneously also 
speaker) that appropriate the text by responding to/addressing the present 
social needs, in turn in order to produce a certain effect and response. Thus, 
Bakhtin suggests that the speaker – having an intention to “mean”, an intention 
to produce effect and invite a response through utilising others’ word, through 
populating them with his/her own intentions – is endowed with agency. This is 
an essential part of any conscious utterance. By appropriating others’ speech, 
the speaker is able to at least attempt to change the context of the given 
speech, as well as relatively fixed conventions guiding the given exchange. 
Let us now turn to the second side in the complex relationship between 
the speaker and the listener. For Bakhtin, the listener of a particular utterance 
participates in the meaning creation, and thus possesses agency of his/her 
own. However, this participation is neither merely through the act of deciphering 
the constative signifiance of the utterance against the backdrop of a mastered 
linguistic system (as per Saussurean linguistics), nor simply through the 
decoding of the performative meaning (or the illocution) in the system of 
established social conventions (as per Austin and Searle). Rather, the listener 
engages in an inherently dialogical interactive relationship with the speaker and 
the speaker’s utterance, which may potentially change the very conventions and 
create new meanings together with the speaker. As Voloshinov [Bakhtin] notes, 
the attempts of an active listener at understanding an utterance amount ‘not... to 
recognising the form used, but rather to understanding it in a particular, 
concrete context..., i.e. it amounts to understanding its novelty and not to 
recognising its identity’ (emphasis added).403 Acknowledging this and being able 
to trace this is important in understanding change over time brought about by 
discursive exchanges.  
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Hence, crucially, in dialogism, intentions do not refer to a direct 
correlation between an inner plan and an outer act oriented towards a specific 
goal. Nonetheless, ‘while full adequacy is unattainable, it is always present as 
that which is to be achieved’.404 Since all acts are connected to the acts of the 
others, intentions are always caught up in tensions in an agitated field of 
struggle: thus, for Bakhtin, the utterance ‘is populated – overpopulated – with 
the intentions of others. Expropriating it, forcing it to submit to one’s own 
intentions and accents, is a difficult and complicated process’.405 Hence, in 
Dialogism, intentions are ‘positional and interlocative’,406 i.e. intentions are 
always positioned in relation to others’ intentions in the same space, as well as 
positioned in time, and in tension with own and others’ – actual or anticipated – 
intentions in the past, as well as the future. 
Thus, Bakhtin’s vision affirms the production of new/changed 
conventions/contexts and hence meanings as the result of an active 
involvement of the interlocutors. Indeed, the speakers cannot fully anticipate 
how and where the utterance spoken by them will end up in the process, but 
certainly, they do pursue their own intentions of meaning production. Similarly, 
the receivers of the utterance cannot by themselves, detached from the dialogic 
process of discourse within the society at large, create new meanings or 
conventions for such meanings, but they certainly do actively participate in their 
own process of understanding and through it, of meaning creation. This is 
where – in the borderline between interlocutors, and in the process of delivering 
and understanding – change of meaning becomes possible. Bakhtin explains: 
‘an active understanding, one that assimilates the word under consideration into 
a new conceptual system, that of the one striving to understand, establishes a 
series of complex interrelationships, consonances and dissonances with the 
word and enriches it with new elements’.407 Moreover, the speaker in fact relies 
on such perceptive adaptability for the realisation of meaning; such active 
understanding is often actively sought by the speaker in the first place – in 
virtually all discourse except for the most monological, and fully authoritative 
(and for Bakhtin, utopian) one. For, even in the attempted singularising 
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monological discourse, the speaker needs to get the message through by 
engaging with the ‘world of the listener’:  
It is precisely such an understanding that the speaker counts on. Therefore, his 
orientation toward the listener is an orientation toward a specific conceptual 
horizon, toward the specific world of the listener; it introduces totally new 
elements [from the listener’s world] into his discourse...; he enters into dialogical 
relationship with certain aspects of this system. The speaker breaks through the 
alien conceptual horizon of the listener, constructs his own utterance on alien 
territory, against his, the listener’s apperceptive background.408 
     
Here, understanding Bakhtin’s other, intimately linked, concept of chronotope is 
important. Chronotope (from the Greek χρόνος - time and τόπος - space) – a 
term borrowed by Bakhtin from the advances in physics in his time – is the 
spatio-temporal matrix in which an utterance operates. Since Being in Dialogism 
is conceived as co-being,409 and a human being as a project (act-deed, referring 
to the deed of always having to make a judgement and acting to respond to the 
world), then the place of a human being, the act, as well as the utterance in 
such existence, is best understood not only in space, but also in time.410 
However, chronotope does not refer merely to space and time, but rather to 
time-space, where time is the fourth dimension of space, and where time can 
only be known and perceived by the acting social being through enacting or 
giving meaning to a change in space. In this relation, chronotope is never 
merely temporal and spatial, but also axiological, as it always has value 
attached to it: it is always constituted coupled with a value,411 since enacting 
change is always normative.  
Conversely, an act, including a speech-act, can be known and evaluated 
by the change that it enacts, or attempts to enact, in such a time-space. This is 
doubly important for our understanding of the speech-act: a) an utterance is 
itself an attempt to bring about change of some sorts in the given time-space, in 
the given world of ‘actual chronotopes of our world’,412 i.e. the matrix of space 
and the historical time where the relatively fixed social institutions, and 
structures pre-dating the actor are located; but also b) an utterance itself forms 
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and communicates/negotiates representations, which have their own ‘created 
chronotopes’ (emphasis in original).413  
Bakhtin thus regarded the utterance as a ‘mediating marker with whose 
help the root meanings of spatial categories are carried over into temporal 
relationships’.414 Bakhtin explores the concept of chronotope through his 
categorisation of different literary genres in different epochs. Exploring this at 
some length is important, since literary genres for Bakhtin had important social 
functions and the prevalence of each in a society at a certain historical period 
was symptomatic of broader social relations.  
Thus, he posits that the structure of the Greek Romance exhibits a 
chronotope of ‘random contingency’,415 where ‘events have no 
consequences…initiative everywhere belongs exclusively to chance…[and 
where] an individual can be nothing other than completely passive, completely 
unchanging’ (emphasis in original).416 In other words, the characters have no 
agency of their own, and there is no causation. In addition, there is a ‘technical, 
abstract connection between space and time [due to] the reversibility of 
moments in a temporal sequence, and due to interchangeability in space’ 
(emphasis in original).417 In this chronotope, moving through time is like moving 
through space.   
A different chronotope is found in another ancient genre, the ‘adventure 
novel of the everyday life’ (ancient mysteries, folk-tales, and now still present in 
contemporary ‘literature proper’), which explores metamorphosis and 
transformation, especially human transformation, and identity: ‘[m]etamorphosis 
serves as the basis for a method of portraying the whole of an individual’s life in 
its more important moments of crisis: for showing how an individual becomes 
other than what he was’.418  This is done through images of crisis and rebirth. It 
does not depict events in the ‘biographical time’, but ‘only the exceptional, 
utterly unusual moments of a man’s life…[which] shape the definitive image of 
the man, his essence, as well as the nature of his entire subsequent life’ 
(emphases in the original).419 Here the primary initiative belongs to the hero, 
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and the course of an individual’s life is fused with his/her actual spatial course 
or road, to become the ‘path of his life’.420 
The third type of chronotope Bakhtin examines is that of the ancient 
biography and autobiography. Read out and discussed in public squares of 
Ancient Greece (the agora), rather than shared as literary texts, the important 
thing about these was ‘not only, and not so much, their internal chronotope (that 
is the time-space of their represented life) as it [was] rather and pre-eminently, 
that exterior real-life chronotope in which the representation of one’s own or 
someone else’s life is realized’.421 The public square itself, where these texts 
were heard, perceived and responded to, constitutes the real-life chronotope. 
As Bakhtin explains: 
[T]he square in earlier (ancient) times itself constituted a state (and more – it 
constituted the entire state apparatus, with all its official organs), it was the highest 
court, the whole of science, the whole of art, the entire people participated in it. It 
was a remarkable chronotope, in which all the most elevated categories from that 
of the state to that of revealed truth, were realized concretely and truly incarnated, 
made visible and given a face. And in this concrete and as it were all-
encompassing chronotope, the laying bare and examination of a citizen’s whole life 
was accomplished, and received its public and civic stamp of approval.422 
            
Thus, the public square was the public site, where all the different voices in 
society mixed and clashed, and where meanings, representations and 
evaluations were being negotiated in a highly answerable dialogicity. In our 
time, the ancient more material space of the agora may be said to have 
expanded to become the abstracted space of the public domain fragmented in 
multiple physical sites such as the parliamentary and other political forums, the 
internet, printed and broadcast mass media, as well as the artistic and literary 
space, including the alternative spaces for marginalised voices. In this broader 
use of “chronotope”, following Bakhtin, I will mean a time-space matrix of 
broader ‘all-encompassing’ public contestations, located horizontally, i.e. at the 
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present, as well as importantly (and something which cannot be overstated), 
vertically, i.e. in the past and future.  
Thus, we may say, that in a double-hermeneutic analysis, chronotope as 
a category can be used at two levels. On one level, it is a hermeneutical device 
(for the author/speaker) structuring a representation and a narrative and hence 
an analytical tool (for the student of these narratives) to unpack such a 
structuring. I shall call these narrative chronotope, i.e. “stories” about time-
space relations present in any narrative. The representational (i.e. narrative) 
chronotopes become an essential part of any narrative. Indeed, any story, 
including a political legitimation “story” about a crisis and required action 
narrates a certain chronotope condensing the time-space relationship of main 
agents and events. The differing properties of competing chronotopes can be 
revealing of how these representations interact with, and aim to enact on, the 
actual time-space in which they are being performed or (re)circulated. 
 On the other level, the chronotope is ‘a means for studying the relation 
between any text and its times, and thus as a fundamental tool for a broader 
social and historical analysis’.423 I will call this usage real-life chronotope, to 
refer to the fact how any utterance, including the utterances forming the 
narrative chronotopes, are thrown into time-space relationships with other 
utterances from the past and future, as well as spatially at present, and 
therefore, thrown into an agitated field of struggle, answerability and dialogue. 
The latter becomes clearer when exploring how Bakhtinian Dialogism has been 
appropriated into the concept of “intertextuality” in Western Post-structural 
thinking: exploring this concept closer to its Bakhtinian origin will help further 
develop a theory of dialogical utterance closer as an alternative speech-act 
theory.   
 
3.4. Intertextuality and Speech-Act 
The living utterance, having taken meaning and shape at a particular historical 
moment in a socially specific environment, cannot fail to brush up against 
thousands of living dialogic threads, woven by socio-ideological consciousness 
around the given object of an utterance, it cannot fail to become an active 
participant in social dialogue. After all, an utterance arises out of this dialogue 
as a continuation of it and as a rejoinder to it.424 
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In the Western post-structuralist tradition, the concept of “intertextuality” can be 
traced to Julia Kristeva, a Parisian school post-structuralist philosopher and 
psychoanalyst, who introduced Bakhtin’s thought to the West in 1960s-70s and 
who inaugurated the term “intertextuality”.  To further evaluate the dialogical 
speech-act as an alternative to existing speech-act theories, it is necessary to 
explore the concept of intertextuality as promoted by Kristeva, and advanced by 
Barthes and others. First, I briefly assess what was lost in translation and 
transition when dialogism was at times reduced into intertextuality in Western 
post-structuralist thought, as well as how the revised reading of it helps us to 
reconceive of speech-act as dialogical. Intertextuality, away from the reading 
and applications in some IR literature drawing on Western appropriations of the 
concept, and read closer to its roots of Bakhtinian dialogism, must be 
understood as the very infrastructure for meaning-making. Departing from such 
an understanding, and to help enhance the theory of dialogical speech-act, I 
then introduce the new categories of “hypertextuality”, and “surplus illocutions”, 
as well as reflect on how Laclau and Mouffe’s category of “nodal points”, as well 
as conception “agonism” and “antagonism” complement and enhance the 
dialogical theory of the utterance, compatible with a contestation-based macro-
theory of discourse.  
 
Julia Kristeva, of the Parisian Tel Quel group of post-structuralists, most known 
for her pshycho-linguistic theory, introduced Bakhtin’s theory to the Western 
theoretical discourse. Kristeva’s reading of Bakhtin is in the following quote:  
[A]ny text is constructed as a mosaic of quotations; any text is the absorption and 
transformation of another… The word as minimal textual unit thus turns out to 
occupy the status of mediator, linking structural models to cultural (historical) 
environment, as well as that of regulator, controlling mutations from diachronic to 
synchrony, i.e. to literary structure. The word is spatialized: through the very notion 
of status, it functions in three dimensions (subjects-addressee-context) as a set of 
dialogical, semic elements or as a set of ambivalent elements.425 
 
Just as Bakhtin defines the status of an utterance horizontally, as well as 
vertically, for Kristeva intertextuality must be understood at two dimensions: 
horizontally, it is the three-way relationship between speaker-audience-context, 
and at the same time, vertically, it is the complex web of relations a given text 
establishes with other texts, whether through explicit references, or implicit links 
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and associations. Both of these types of relation take place within the 
Bakhtinian “real-life” chronotope, i.e. time-space nexus. An intertext, then, is a 
sphere where meaning is derived through a complex interrelationship between 
texts. Hence, indeed, it may be said that there is no text without other texts, and 
no theory of textuality without a theory of intertextuality.426  
This must be read closer to Bakhtin, as emphasising a relational vision of 
meaning production, rather than one where meaning becomes the reader’s 
free-play. However, in a very Barthesian style of the “death of the author”, 
Kriesteva has often been interpreted as saying that there is no end to the text’s 
signifiance, the latter being mere product of each particular reading, and hence, 
no clear ‘inside’ and ‘outside’.427  
Barthes has taken up the concept of intertextuality (albeit without much 
acknowledgement of Bakhtin) often in ways that are at odds with the original 
Bakhtinian philosophy. As already shown, Bakhtinian plurality of meaning is not 
identical with the infinite play of signifiers and disruption and discontinuity, as 
Barthes’ dramatic ‘death of the author’428 and the promotion of the reader to the 
forefront of analysis suggests.429 In Barthes’ ‘theory of reading’,430 the reader is 
the creator of text and the ‘inter-text is just that: the impossibility of life outside 
the infinite text’.431 Barthes, indeed, is right on the account of noticing the link 
with already existent meanings: ‘the text….is a multidimensional space in which 
a variety of writings, none of them original, blend and clash’.432 However, at 
odds with the original Bakhtin, he goes on to claim that the author has the sole 
role of a compiler of pre-existing possibilities, to be given meaning to in various 
ways by the reader, rather than being the controller of how these meanings can 
be created.433  
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As a result of such appropriations, eventually, from a Bakhtinian social 
dialogism, we end up in a Barthesian and Derridean “intertextuality” reduced to 
‘a play of signifiers … [which] distupt[s] and infinitely defer[s] the meaning of 
each signifier’.434 While for Barthes and Derrida, meaning occurs because of the 
play of signifiers, for Bakhtin, as we have seen, meaning is produced due to the 
historically situated and socially organised actors engaging in meaning 
production in order to respond to the world – through utilising prior meanings to 
serve such purpose, to negotiate their way in the material and social world of 
their own time. Thus, through the Western appropriation of Bakhtin, the social 
situatedness of the Bakhtinian dialogic utterance has been lost in 
translation/transition. Preoccupied with deconstruction, Barthes and others 
have, as Orr puts it, fixated on the ‘all-inclusive middle of the intertextuality’,435 
i.e. on the written and (often literary) text and the infinitely open reading 
experience of it, losing sight of the Bakhtinian “living utterance”, the real-life 
speech-act and its consequences.436 What we must bring back to focus then is 
the “inter-” of intertextuality, i.e. the social relationality of discourse.437 Important 
for us here is how problematic the implications of the current Western post-
structuralist use and reproductions of “intertextuality” can be: on the one hand, it 
is used to refer to a de-centring, anti-hegemonic pluralising force that disrupts 
any singularity and must be celebrated akin to deconstruction; on the other, it is 
an analytical device that traces associations among texts in infinite possibilities 
but in a closed system of linguistic relations.                    
The implications of appropriating Bakhtinian Dialogism into post-
structuralist “intertextuality” are important in their IR applications. Just as 
Kristeva was the medium via whom Bakhtin entered Parisian and then Western 
intellectual discourse, Barthes was the medium to introduce intertextuality to 
Anglo-American scholarship.438 It was largely from Barthes that intertextuality 
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reached the social sciences, notably through the oft-quoted line ‘intertextuality is 
a “mosaic of quotations”’439 – often leading to overgeneralised and imprecise 
reappraisal of Kristeva and of Bakhtin. Still further distancing seems to have 
resulted from yet one more level of mediation, when the concept has reached 
the discipline of International Relations, mostly influenced by the works of 
Barthes.440  
One of the first major contributions applying intertextuality was the 
collection of essays entitled International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern 
Readings of World Politics, edited by der Derian and Shapiro.441 Another, more 
recent, application of intertextuality is the study of the official discourse around 
the Bosnian War by Lene Hansen.442 These applications have produced some 
compelling analyses and valuable results on important IR topics in their own 
right, and it is not the place here to offer a substantial critique of these works. 
However, it is important to engage with their at times reductionist use of 
“intertextuality”. Thus, some of these works only loosely utilise the concepts of 
dialogue and intertextuality, at times at the expense of conceptual reduction, 
while others make use of the two concepts as intermediated by other authors 
and conflated with other concepts. As a result, some of them leave out an 
exploration of these concepts as originally developed by Bakhtin. Thus, e.g. 
Shapiro uses the concept to enhance the post-structuralist practice of modelling 
the world as language in a ‘structure as relations of difference’ model,443 and 
hence looks at “international relations” (the practice) as a text. This for Shapiro 
means that we must ‘inquire into the style of its scripting, to reveal the way it 
has been mediated by historically specific scripts governing the interpretations 
through which it has emerged’.444 What he does then is a sketch of broad 
‘Postmodern readings of world politics’ in the spirit of the Derridean 
deconstruction: intertextuality is defined more broadly, in an almost Derridean 
sense of everything being textual. This type of appropriation of intertextuality, 
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i.e. slippage into Derridean deconstruction is present in a number of other 
contributions,445 where Bakhtin’s original vision of dialogism is lost. 
In another essay, Shapiro represents another trend characteristic of 
Western post-structuralist IR appropriations of the concept of intertextuality: he 
looks at the relations between the discourse of war on the one hand, and that of 
sports on the other, and ends up with the ‘sport’ metaphor in war and security 
policy as pointing to an analogous thinking.446 This is, in fact, Kristeva’s 
‘permutation of one signifying system into another’ taken to the minimum, i.e. 
just between two distinct discourses. A similar appropriating “intertextuality” as 
merely the interpenetration of two distinct discourses or themes is also present 
in Bradley Klein’s essay on the relation between pornography and the discourse 
of war,447 where he traces how pornographic discourse, specifically 
phallocentrism, becomes a sort of military strategy.448 Similarly, Der Derian 
focuses on the intertext between spy literature and academic discourse in IR;449 
while Lene Hansen’s analysis of the foreign policy discourse around the 
Bosnian conflict applies the concept of intertextuality primarily between the 
genres of official foreign policy statements on the one hand, and other genres 
on the other, and focuses on identifying implicit or explicit ‘references’ policy 
makers make to other text, such as travel writing and memoirs.450 In addition, in 
Hansen’s intertextual analysis, it is the researcher who decides what other text 
the official text is referring to, through genealogical analysis or tracing of 
associations.451    
Thus, in these appropriations, “intertextuality” (and by extension the 
original Bakhtinian “dialogue”) has been taken to mean influences between two 
or more distinguishable discourses/genres, or else associated with other 
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concepts such as deconstruction. Instead, intertextuality conceived closer to 
Bakhtinian dialogism is neither association between clearly distinguishable 
thematic discourses, nor deconstructive practice of infinite fragmentation. 
Rather, it is a complex web of relations among various utterances, both across 
space and across time. It is part of answerability inherent in the performative 
act, always referring to another’s speech. If the Bakhtinian chronotope is 
brought back into a conception of intertextuality, then what had become a 
synchronic play of signifiers in Western “intertextuality” will give way to a 
diachronic vision,452 where the Bakhtinian emphasis on social communication is 
reinstated at the same time. Here we would once again be able to conceive of 
utterance as an act, as acting upon the world, or as a way of what I had called 
earlier, negotiating with the world. This would mean that the outsidedness of the 
text is acknowledged; the world cannot simply be modelled on language; and 
structures, however contingent, cease to be systems of closed relations. 
Moreover, closer to Bakhtin, intertextuality may be argued to be the very 
infrastructure of meaning making, rather than a certain property of some texts; 
the infrastructure through which both dialogical and monological forces may be 
manifested. Even the most authoritative discourse, in its drive for singularity and 
elimination of otherness (i.e. other voices in the society), ironically, has to bring 
in heteroglot voices of others (from the society’s present and past) into the 
discourse to construct a narrative. Hence, monologising has to be done by 
relying on dialogical principles, and exercising intertextuality. Intertextuality 
closer to its Bakhtinian roots is the ontological property of all discursive 
communication.  
Intertextuality closer to Bakhtin presents to us as intimately linked with 
the mechanisms of human cognition. This is clearly demonstrated in the 
contemporary concept and practice of electronic hyperlinks. Thus, it has been 
acknowledged that Bakhtin’s conception of discourse has anticipated the 
electronic hypertext known to us today.453 More broadly, parallels between the 
internet and the concept of ‘intertextuality as tissue of texts’ have been noted 
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(and most often credited to Barthes).454 However, such discussions are 
overwhelmed with the idea that the internet and more specifically the hypertext 
or electronic hypertextual books have de-centred the text, and hence 
overthrown monopoly on meaning and power: by subverting the hierarchical 
status of the main and secondary texts and hence the authoritative order of 
reading, they allow for multiple entry points for the reader, as well as multiple 
and heterogeneous reading routes to take at one’s choice.455 The 
omnipresence of electronic hypertexts in our days, and the fact that any text 
(through blocks of texts acting as links that can be activated by the reader) can 
potentially be linked to any other text in the ‘docuverse’456 has been claimed to 
be the very incarnation and confirmation of post-modern theories, i.e. what 
Barthes and Derrida had been at pains to demonstrate,457 and as epitomising 
Barthes’ ‘writerly’ text.458 The post-modernist fascination with the concept has 
focused around the supposedly anti-hegemonising potential of such reader 
practice and information exchange that results in infinite fragmentation and 
pluralisation of meaning preventing any closure. As a result, the hypertext has 
been claimed to be more ‘democratic’, than conventional information 
exchange.459 However, the fascination with the purported anti-hegemonising 
potential of hypertext ignores the fact that it can also increase singularisation of 
meaning.  
Indeed, as we have seen, any monologising/singularising authoritative 
discourse has to rely on intertextual means of meaning production. To 
understand this, we must view hypertextuality not as a unique characteristic of 
the post-modern text revealed by modern technologies, but as a principle of 
human cognition in general. The human mind works ‘by association’: having 
one idea ‘in its grasp, …[the mind] snaps instantly to the next that is suggested 
by the association of thoughts, in accordance with some intricate web of trails 
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carried by the cells of the brain’.460 The development of the IT technologies has 
in fact followed the properties of human cognition. The text is always virtual in 
the sense of being connected to a web of other texts: the mind follows a similar 
process as that physically allowed by a hyperlinked text.461 Moreover, we have 
seen through Bakhtinian addressivity and chronotope, that meaning is produced 
only in relations among socially situated “living utterances”; i.e. utterances as 
deeds, as response to, and addressing and anticipating, other utterances in the 
past, present and future. Thus, utterance is inherently intertextual, the threads 
through which it is “woven” being the intertextual links it establishes with other 
utterances through intentions of the speaker and/or the interpretations of the 
listener.  
This brings us back to the issue of the interrelationship between the 
speaker and listener, and the issue of intentionality. What makes the utterance 
intertextual is not only the speaker’s intentions when ‘appropriating’ the word of 
‘an other’,462 but also other people’s intentions, and hence potential meanings, 
past and present, being transposed through such appropriations. Thus, the 
utterance being inherently dialogical/intertextual and chronotopic, operates 
through the activation of latent or more salient, potential or actual links and 
associations with other utterances, in other similar or dissimilar social situations, 
with other peoples’ intentions, speaking to other people’s ‘inner world’,463 
appropriating them or making them serve the given utterance’s present purpose 
to respond to and negotiate with the world. Hence, rather than confirming 
Barthesian ‘death of the author’ and his version of intertextuality (i.e. as property 
of the ‘writerly text’), the success of the hyperlinked electronic media confirms 
Bakhtinian dialogism as the meta-principle for all communication.  
In such connectivity of texts and utterances, two additional (secondary) 
categories, namely “nodal points” and what I call “surplus illocutions”, are 
useful, especially for my empirical analysis. Indeed, potentially any word, or else 
any utterance, and even whole segments of texts can act as hyperlinks, i.e. 
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activate dialogical associations with other texts, other utterances. However, in 
any narrative discourse such as political communicative discourse, some such 
words or segments of texts are intentionally invoked by the speaker to achieve 
certain illocutionary and perlocutionary effect, organised around the intended 
chronotope of the given narrative.  
Being indispensable to the narrative’s broader intended speech-act 
effect, some such signifiers become identifiable nodes upon which the narrative 
structurally hinges. In Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory, ‘“hegemonic 
formations” or certain stabilised systems of meaning are formed around nodal 
points, underpinning social orders’,464 ‘nodal points’ being privileged discursive 
constructions which ‘partially fix meaning’.465 For instance, in communist 
ideology, ‘a number of pre-existing and available signifiers…acquire a new 
meaning…Democracy [becomes] “real” democracy, as opposed to “bourgeois” 
democracy, freedom acquires an economic connotation…In other words, their 
meaning is partially fixed by reference to the nodal point “communism”’.466 The 
concept of ‘empty signifiers’ proposed by Laclau467 is often used by Laclau and 
Mouffe interchangeably with ‘nodal points’:468 a political discourse strives for the 
(im)possible ideal of bringing the social field to closure through empty signifiers 
that function as nodal points, where the emptiness of the nodal point is the 
condition of possibility for hegemonic success.469 With all their emptied content, 
nodal points such as “God”, “Nation”, “Party”, or “Class”, in this view, are 
capable of concealing ambiguities by fixing floating signifiers, and thus unify a 
discursive terrain.470 Indeed, certain signifiers become the loci of political 
contestation and competing attempts of fixation and suture and in this sense are 
empty of closed and essentially fixed meanings and thereby do not point to 
singular signifieds. Nonetheless, through the dialogical speech-act conception, 
each actual individual articulation, each speech-act around a nodal point cannot 
be “empty” at least if we think of the articulation as a deed with an illocutionary 
and perlocutionary intention.  
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It may be argued that empty signifiers would achieve partial fixation 
precisely because they, e.g. “communism” in Soviet ideological discourse, are 
(to borrow a term from a translated Bakhtin) ‘overpopulated’ with signification, 
are a sort of a conglomerate of meanings/narratives clustered together 
condensing a certain narrative chronotope of the ideology, as well as 
relationally interacting with the real time-space of the given utterance. In other 
words, “communism” served as a specific (for the time of initiation, a novel) 
meeting point between various narratives (such as those of “democracy”, 
“state”, “freedom”) intertextuality forging different relationships in the Soviet 
ideological discourse, than they would in other discourses. As Kristeva notes in 
relation to her notion of intertextuality, ‘every text is from the outset under the 
jurisdiction of other discourses which impose a universe on it’.471 In this sense, 
then, in order to realise such “jurisdiction” and transform the perception of 
existing narratives, the nodal points themselves need to be carriers of a wealth 
of semantic possibilities representative of the given discursive formation, in 
order to be able to project specified meanings onto the surrounding signifiers in 
the existing narratives that they seek to re-define and re-cluster/reorganise into 
new intertextual relationships and thus make them part of the given narrative.  
Thus, I will use the category of “nodal points” as borrowed from Laclau 
and Mouffe’s discourse theory, i.e. as privileged signifiers which ‘partially fix 
meaning’;472 however, modified through Dialogism and my conception of the 
dialogical speech-act. Thus, nodal points are certain master signifiers – the 
main organising nodes of a narrative – overpopulated with signification, serving 
as a specific meeting point between various other narratives in space and time, 
via the active (re)production of intertextual relations in intentional performative 
actions. Among them, master nodal points will be used to denote those key 
signifiers upon which the whole edifice of the given discourse structurally 
hinges. Master nodal points condense certain semantic fixations representative 
of the given discursive formation, and thus project specified meanings onto the 
surrounding signifiers in the existing narratives that they seek to re-define and 
re-cluster/reorganise into new intertextual relationships. 
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While some of these intertextual links would be intentionally produced to 
re-enforce the position of the nodal points, and activated through mental 
processes similar to hyperlinks in electronic media, many other spatial and 
temporal intertextual links would be activated by the receivers themselves not 
quite in the ways intended by the speaker of the given narrative, but activated 
by the listener as their particular “answer” to the narrative in relation to their own 
inner world and their perception of the time-space they are located in.  To put 
this in the speech-act framework, some of these plural links are necessarily 
activated by intention of the speaker to perform the desired speech-act laden 
with a specific illocutionary meaning, and possibly achieve the desired 
perlocution. But many other such potential intertextual links may unintentionally 
be released by the speaker through the speech-act as surplus illocutionary 
force, which may be activated by certain groups of receivers. Such surplus (or 
unintended) illocutionary force may potentially create possibilities for unintended 
perlocutions, when various groups in the audience act upon the discourse in 
varying ways.  
Thus, to allow for a better vocabulary for theorising the dialogical speech-
act, as well as for the empirical analysis, I will use the term “surplus illocutions” 
to denote those hyperlinked associations of meaning activated by the listener 
that had in all likelihood not been intended or anticipated by the performer of the 
utterance, and that are used by the audience to navigate through a different 
semiotic route than suggested by the narrative.  
This brings us back to the significance of specifically technological 
electronic hypertexts and the internet in general. These have certainly also 
brought in a qualitative change that cannot be underestimated in relation to 
political discourses. Thus, they have not only expedited advanced reading and 
writing modes, but have also changed the way politicians construct speeches 
and official narratives, in some important way transforming the profession of the 
speech-writer or political spin-doctor, who has to locate the given official text in 
the metatext of the electronic media, anticipating an ever-increasing number of 
responses. In addition, hypertexts have also changed the way we respond to 
those narratives – through probing, checking, challenging, trivializing, often 
twisting, (mis)quoting, and (mis)appropriating, or else reinforcing, etc. Due to 
such intertextual nature of meaning production, and the discourse escaping 
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intentionality through surplus illocutions, unintended consequences and 
emergent/generative causation becomes possible. 
As we shall see in the next chapter on specifically foreign/security 
discourses, the dialogical nature of discourse, in the socio-political context of 
late-modern democracies, rather than merely pluralise or fragment in order to 
subvert hierarchies (as per the post-modernist preoccupation), produces 
contradictory effects: increased reflexivity and hence increased critique, 
probing, and dissent to hegemonising narratives; but also increased 
monologisation and silencing of such dissent, increased possibilities for 
responding to destabilising voices and restoring undermined narratives; as well 
as increased possibilities for non-linear constraints on official discourses. 
 
3.5. Conclusions: Performativity and Contestation through the 
Dialogical Speech-Act 
In their project of critiquing structuralist thought, Western post-structuralist 
discourse theories have landed in a sort of ‘anti-realism’ and ‘indeterminate 
determinism’,473 and while critiquing essentialism, have risked submitting to 
another form of essentialism. My aim in this chapter has been to introduce 
Bakhtinian Dialogism freed from its Western re-appropriations and as a 
philosophically-realist alternative discourse theory, and with some revisions and 
additions, to develop a Bakhtin-inspired and realist-constructivist vision of a 
dialogical speech-act, as an alternative to the traditional Austinean speech-act 
theory.  
Thus, the Bakhtinian dialogical utterance is different from the 
Austinean/Searlean speech-act in important ways, but so it is from Western 
post-structuralist understandings: it presents itself in all its dialogical complexity, 
where interlocutors are endowed with agency; where their interactive 
relationship results in the utterance as a deed, as active, and as productive. The 
latter is always an attempt to respond to and to resolve a situation. It is an 
attempt to bring a social situation embedded in a particular historical time-space 
to ‘an evaluative conclusion (for the moment at least) or extends action into the 
future’, but where also utterance is itself a situation.474 In any discourse other 
than purely authorial and authoritarian one taken to the extreme (which, as per 
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Bakhtin, is utopian), speech-act is in an unavoidable, inescapable relationship 
to an other, to an outside, to another context.475 Here the utterance, depending 
on its social situatedness, may perform functions including those of breaking 
through the very constraints which structuralist speech-act theory names as 
conventions and as conditions of possibility for the successful (“felicitous” 
speech-act). In the dialogically-enhanced conception of speech-act, the 
Austinean “illocution” as the intended doing-in-saying is re-conceived as only an 
ideal, an individual attempt: it is never fully achieved without an agonistic 
struggle, a tension, or a ‘resistance put up by language against intention’.476 
Relatedly, meaning is produced relationally, only when entered into a complex 
“dialogical” relationship with other utterances, and may and does potentially 
transcend individual intentionality. Different from Austin’s speech-act, Bakhtin’s 
notion of the dialogical utterance is highly relational: it is a social act which is a 
response to the reality of the world and to the reality of multiplicity of other 
utterances within which it is embedded, spatially and temporally. Only in such a 
relationship to other utterances does speech-act become possible; or to borrow 
Skinner’s helpful postulate that speech-act is ‘a fact about language’.477  
Thus, in a Bakhtinian-inspired speech-act theory, “agony”, i.e. agonistic 
struggle for meaning is not necessarily and solely antagonistic and 
exclusionary: it is agonistic (but not always antagonistic) engagement with the 
other agents involved, to be able to mean, to fix meaning, through (rather than 
at the expense of the exclusion of) the other agents. While, as we saw above, 
for Mouffe, “agonism” is a normative concept, for Bakhtin, agonistic relations are 
part of the ontology of the utterance, of a performative act where the 
illocutionary move, i.e. to do something in saying something, as well as the 
perlocution, doing something by saying something, is caught up in an agitated 
field of others’ such attempts to do things through the utterance. Through 
Bakhtin then, performativity, the basis of discourse-analytical work specifically 
on security in IR and Security Studies, must be reconceived as an attempt in an 
agonistic struggle to constitute something, often with and through others’ such 
attempts, rather than the outcome of such constitution, through the exclusion of 
others. 
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Relatedly and more broadly, though Bakhtin, we are able to re-evaluate 
the problematics of agency, the act, and performativity in the post-structuralist 
approaches reviewed in chapter 2. Thus, Laclau’s conception of political 
subjectivity is ‘concern[ed] with the way in which social actors act… [and how] 
the actions of subjects emerge because of the contingency of those discursive 
structures through which a subject obtains its identity’.478 Here, the field of 
identity is always already antagonised; and since structures are always 
contingent, they are always subject to dislocation.479 In relation to agency, for 
Laclau and Mouffe, ‘it is the “failure” of the structure [after dislocation]… that 
“compels” the subject to act, to assert anew its subjectivity’.480 For Bakhtin, 
however, the subject has “no alibi” from acting,481 i.e. it is constantly 
“compelled” to act. Any monological engagement and dialogising attempt is an 
act, but so is conforming or inertia.482 The difference is important in terms of the 
potential for relationally produce political outcomes.  
This is important especially when reconceiving of “speech-act”, as it 
allows redefining individual speech-acts as exercise of agency; while 
performativity as an attempt that is always in tensions and struggles with others’ 
such attempts. Thus, Howarth notes that post-structuralists conceptualise 
agency as ‘the (differentially distributed) capacity [of actors] to make a 
difference in the world’, however, ‘without [these actors] knowing quite what 
[they] are doing’.483 Similarly, Foucault has argued that actors ‘don’t know what 
they do does’.484 However, then Howarth contrasts this with the critical-realist 
understanding, where, more specifically in Bhaskar’s transformational model of 
human agency, ‘human beings have consciousness, intentionality and 
rationality’.485 While the overall conceptions of agency in each are different, 
these two particular observations are not incompatible or mutually exclusive. 
Through his philosophy of the act and the concept of “answerability”, Bakhtin 
allows us to conceive of the individual agents in terms intentionality; whereas 
the collective outcomes in terms of unintended consequences.  
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To have a relational speech act theory, we need to integrate the two 
levels, i.e. conceive of the speech-act as closer to the individual intentionality, 
while of the collective performative effects, in terms of often unintended and 
non-linear consequences.  
Related to this is the issue of agency more broadly. Post-structuralists 
emphasise the ‘pre-existence of a discursive structure into which human beings 
are thrown into’.486 Broadly, this is consonant with Bakhtinian Dialogism. 
However, post-structuralism draws attention to this in order to show how human 
beings ‘become subjects’: ‘the subject is effectively “decentred”, as it is attached 
to a set of significant differences that position it in certain ways…the subject is 
marked by “the other”…[It] is effectively divided from itself, as it is mediated and 
forced to communicate by a signifying system over which it does not exert full 
control’.487 While the subject is still thrown into a discursive structure that 
predates it and over which it cannot exert full control, the focus, through 
Bakhtin’s philosophy of the act, and his concept of “answerability”, is on how, in 
an agonistic struggle, the agent intervenes and responds to what they are 
thrown into. While not fully antithetical to Howarth’s and Laclau and Mouffe’s 
conception, this explicit focus allows for a more agency-oriented approach, 
where agents are making intentional attempts, and allows for more focus on the 
struggles and contestations which in themselves must be about such intentional 
attempts. Hence, such emphasis is more suitable for a concern with 
contestations, and for a relational speech-act conception. 
 
More specifically in relation to the application of the Austinean speech-act 
theory in securitisation theory, the dialogical conception of speech-act alleviates 
some of the issues raised by critics. Thus, it allows for a more sociological and 
less self-referential understanding of the utterance and its effects, thus 
transcending what Balzacq has called the ‘philosophical’ (or internalist) version 
of speech-act approach prevalent in conventional (Copenhagen School) 
securitisation theory. As we saw earlier, the latter has been critiqued for 
ascribing a ‘social magic’ power to language, bringing into life the very threats 
the security speech-act names.488 Reconceived through Dialogism, we avoid 
                                                 
486
 Ibid., 158; 183. 
487
 Ibid., 159. 
488
 Balzacq (2011: 1).  
122 
 
the unnecessary dilemma to choose between ‘either the performative effects of 
the speech-act or the inter-subjective nature of security’,489 since such dilemma 
assumes that “speech-act” cannot be intersubjective: through Bakhtin, we have 
speech-act that is always intersubjective. Similarly, the dialogical vision narrows 
the unnecessary “internalist”/“externalist” divide between the different versions 
of speech-act approaches, whereby the ‘externalist view’ proposed by Balzacq 
is a corrective that ‘connect[s] security utterances to a context’.490 In the 
dialogical speech-act theory, an utterance is always performed, becomes 
meaningful and causally efficacious within a highly relational, tension-filled and 
agitated context of doings and answerability, and as the basic ontological 
realism of Bakhtinian philosophy suggests, always in relation to the external 
reality of other people’s intentions and utterance, other people’s doings and 
“deeds upon the world”, and deeply situated in the socio-political structures and 
institutions, as well as affected by and affecting material developments. Thus, 
the dialogical speech-act vision also allows acknowledging and bringing into the 
picture multiple audiences who are also simultaneously participating in the 
dialogical process and are therefore also speakers.  
While it is true, that the Austinean speech-act theory has emerged from 
structural linguistics, if reworked through Mikhail Bakhtin’s Dialogism and 
intertextuality as closer to Bakhtin, it can transcend both structuralist and 
Western post-structuralist limitations and offer better insight into the dynamics 
of discourse. Bakhtin’s dialogical conception of language and society and his 
concepts such as the chronotope, and answerability/addressivity helped shed 
new light on the dialogical speech-act. Speech-act as re-conceived in light of 
Bakhtinian philosophy, as well as the broader discourse-theoretical framework 
advanced in this chapter becomes the basis for my vision of approaching 
political argumentation, and in the next chapter will be shown to be 
indispensable particularly for understanding foreign policy/security discourses.  
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Chapter 4: A Dialogical-Relational Framework for Analysing 
Foreign/Security Discourse  
 
4.1. Introduction 
Building on the discussion in the previous chapters, this chapter concerns itself 
with the more immediate question of how contemporary Western 
foreign/security policy discourse must be conceived and studied. In particular, 
having in mind the contention made earlier that we must be attentive to the 
process and the relational dynamics of negotiating foreign policy/security, rather 
than the purportedly dominant representation alone, here I attempt to translate 
the dialogical conception of discourse and society – inspired by Bakhtinian 
thought into a discourse-analytical approach specifically developed for 
understanding foreign/security policy processes. It re-evaluates how specifically 
foreign/security discourses must be studied in a relational analysis interested in 
understanding unintended consequences of dialogical interactions and 
particularly the mechanisms of constraints in the broader dynamics of continuity 
and change.  
It must be reminded that just as in case of the critical review in chapter 2, 
and the introduction of the Bakhtinian thought and the development of the 
dialogical speech-act in chapter 3, the development of the framework in this 
chapter takes a broader aim and touches upon more theoretical and analytical 
issues than the empirical research in Part II of this thesis has aimed or been 
able to address or apply in a more limited illustrative study.  
I start by arguing for the usefulness of ‘temporal separability’ between 
agent and structure drawn from Archer’s morphogenetic approach,491 when 
tackling the thorny question of the relationship between the discursive and the 
non-/extra-discursive realms: consonant with Archer’s approach, the Bakhtinian 
conception of utterance and philosophy of the act envisages a prior-ness of 
structures upon which any actor’s “deed upon the world” unfolds. I then propose 
the category of “supra-discursive” as the realm of social and semiotic structures 
which have previously been constituted but at a given point in time pre-date 
particular agents. Temporal separability between the discursive and non-/supra-
discursive, as well as between agent and structure, helps enhance the 
understanding how actors engage in dialogical encounters not only by 
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responding to each other’s utterances synchronically, but also importantly by 
responding to non-/supra-discursive events and developments surrounding the 
issue of concern and others’ responses to these, diachronically. Thus, even if 
cumulatively contingent, open and changeable, to each individual actor caught 
up in contestation, whether in government or broader society, the supra-
discursive realm appears prior to their “deed” upon the world, i.e. to their 
answerability at each point in time.  
I then explore the socio-historical context in which foreign/security 
discourses of Western democracies operate by drawing on philosophical 
insights and revisiting them through Bakhtinian conceptions of discourse and 
society. I do this here, before the empirical study for two reasons. On the one 
hand, a certain prior knowledge of the context is unavoidable for any empirical 
work doing discourse analysis: the researcher may have certain prior 
ontological assumptions implicit to his/her interpretation of various articulations, 
and making these explicit is an imperative for a critical analyst. On the other 
hand, a certain understanding of the broader social context is an imperative due 
to the very nature of the Bakhtinian-inspired dialogical speech-act. As we have 
seen, the dialogical utterance is borne out of, and operates within, a certain 
socio-historical context. Moreover, in this conception, a speaker, or more 
generally an actor, is constantly negotiating her way through a world that pre-
dates her, including through sedimented social structures, as well as the 
material world; but also is negotiating with such sedimented structures and 
material world as part of her “deed upon the world”, i.e. as a response to the 
world. Therefore, for a researcher to be able to interpret utterances and how 
they relate to one another in a highly answerable environment, certain, even if 
tentative, understanding of the broader context is unavoidable.  
I locate the socio-historical situatedness of foreign/security discourses in 
the broader societal tensions and changes of the late modern age, and attempt 
to understand the implications of such late modern field by locating the 
contemporary social functions of foreign/security discourse, i.e. the roles played 
by the process of negotiating foreign/security policy through discourses that, 
rather than merely communicative or deliberative, reflect the conditions under 
which society and politics become organised, reproduced and transformed.  
The adjective “late modern” (rather than “post-modern”) is used to refer 
broadly to the age of post-industrial economy and its implications including 
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advances in technology, information revolution, and importantly greater 
reflexivity, whereby ‘social practices are constantly examined and reformed in 
the light of incoming information about those very practices, thus constitutively 
altering their character’.492 Instead, the adjective “post-modern” more narrowly 
refers to the cultural, political and intellectual tendencies within the age of late 
modernity that adopt, or else indirectly lead to, fragmentation and 
deconstruction of metanarratives and practices, as a form of critique or as part 
of the answerability, i.e. the Bakhtinian “deed upon the world”.  
Foreign/security policy discourse may be seen as a future-orientated 
discourse of progress – of ‘imagining’493 a collective “future” as progress, as a 
movement in time towards something better – caught up in the legacy of the 
Enlightenment drive for “mastery of nature”, and the late modern ‘risk 
society’s’494 preoccupation with control and safety. To develop these themes, I 
variously draw on sociological insights, especially those offered by Giddens and 
Becks in relation to “reflexive modernization” and “risk society”, respectively; as 
well as by Dillon on the politics of security as part of the Western metaphysical 
tradition built on a will to certitude.495 In particular, official foreign/security policy 
discourse finds itself torn between the conflicting needs to satisfy the will to 
certitude, and the need to deal with the repercussions of ever more complex 
global uncertainties of the late modern age. Further reflecting on Giddens’ 
“reflexive modernization”, and in light of Bakhtinian Dialogism, I emphasise the 
imperative to study official discourses relationally, as inextricably linked with 
voices of fragmentation, destabilisation, deconstruction, or else alternative 
reconstructive discourses offering certitude and control. 
The latter proposition is intimately linked with the need to reconceptualise 
the status of audiences and speakers. In contrast with securitisation theory 
interested in the “success” and “failure” of a securitising move and therefore of 
the “receptiveness” of audiences to such moves, I show that in the dialogical-
relational model, the conventional speaker-audience distinction collapses, as 
audience is in turn speaker-performer, and vice versa. This is so because, 
utterances being ‘positional and interlocative’,496 performances are not merely 
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“accepted” or “rejected”, but are variously responded to. These responses 
generate a plethora of other performances, which feed back into the dialogical 
process.  
In a further step, I search for certain indexical indicators through which 
relationality among voices and continuity/change can be traced, and propose 
these to be the interaction of competing narrative-normative chronotopes; and 
the relationship among three types of relational performances: destabilising 
performances, deliberative performances, and silencing performances. As 
representational time-space matrices of narratives, narrative-normative 
chronotopes in foreign/security discourses mark representations of continuity, 
rupture, and aspirations for the future of an “imagined” nation, as well as that of 
an “imagined” world. Therefore, foreign/security articulations must be studied in 
a web of exchanges where convergent or divergent multiple chronotopes are 
represented and negotiated among various actors. Also, the differing properties 
of such chronotopes can be revealing of how these representations interact 
with, and aim to enact on, the actual time-space in which they are being 
performed or (re)circulated. On the other hand, the analytical attention to what I 
call “relational performances” aims to understand the positionality of utterances 
in relation to or effected by other utterances’ positional force. Such positionality 
also reflects how discursive power circulates in a field of contestation, the focus 
being on how power is exercised upon someone else’s utterance.  
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 explores the context and 
implications of the late modern age and how this can be theorised in a 
framework specifically concerned with foreign/security discourses. The 
implications of this theorisation for the empirical study are reflected upon in 
section 4.3; whereas the concluding section 4.4 makes some further inferences 
from the overall chapter. 
 
4.2. Dialogical-Relational Framework for Foreign/Security Discourse  
Foreign/security policy discourse may be seen as a specific “genre” in the 
Bakhtinian sense of the term. Utterances gain meaning only as exchanges 
realised through “genres”: while utterances may be individual, genres for 
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Bakhtin are collective and historical and hence a higher level of structure.497  
Thus, rather than merely defined by style and form, a genre, e.g. the genre of 
the novel for Bakhtin, was an anthropological-historical phenomenon. In the 
Bakhtinian sense of the term then, a certain genre is borne out of the social and 
performs certain social tasks, and importantly, is (re)constituted in active and 
constant social struggles of the given time (recall the discussion of “real-life 
chronotope” in chapter 3). Moreover, genres are also society’s modes and 
milieu of conceptualising time and space in specific ways; therefore each genre 
has its own (narrative) chronotope.498  
In this section, I argue that when studying foreign/security discourse as a 
genre, we must consider: 
1) The relationship of the discursive to the non-discursive and supra-
discursive, more specifically understanding the dependence and 
responsiveness of foreign/security discourses to constantly changing 
daily realities (to the “real-life chronotope”), i.e. events happening in the 
world, and to the multiplicity of others’ responses to these events. 
2) The discursive and supra-discursive realms with implications for the 
historically and culturally specific social functions of foreign/security 
discourses (such as identity construction through “imagining the nation”, 
and interlinked with this, the construction of the narrative (and normative) 
chronotope, borne out of the socio-historical situatedness of 
foreign/security discourses); 
3) The distinctiveness of actors (audiences-speakers) at home and abroad 
in the given socio-historical context, and their implications for the 
dialogical process. 
Each following subsection takes these issues in turn.   
4.2.1. Temporal Separability, and the Discursive vis-à-vis the Non-/Supra-
Discursive   
 
It was pointed out above, that in the dialogical conception of speech-act and 
more broadly in light of the Bakhtinian philosophy of the act, a speaker, or more 
generally an actor, is constantly negotiating her way through a world that pre-
dates her, including through sedimented social structures, as well as the 
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material world; but also is negotiating with such sedimented structures and 
material world as part of her “deed upon the world”, i.e. as a response to the 
world, and hence potentially aims to change it along the way. Such Bakhtinian 
vision resonates with and proposes a similar understanding as Margaret 
Archer’s morphogenetic approach to the agent and structure problematic.499 
Thus, in Archer’s vision too, agent and structure are temporally separable: 
‘structure necessarily pre-dates the action(s) leading to its reproduction and 
transformation’.500 By introducing the dimension of “time” into the picture, she 
critiques Giddens’ structurationist resolution to the agent/structure problem, 
whereby there is duality and mutual constitutiveness of structure and agency.501 
Archer shows that structuration theory ‘resists untying structure and action, 
excepts by the bracketing exercise…[and therefore] cannot recognize that 
structure and agency work on different time intervals’.502 
Archer finds that endorsing “mutual constitutiveness” of agent and 
structure ‘preclude examination of their interplay, of the effects of one upon the 
other’.503 In contrast, by introducing the dimension of “time” into the picture, 
Archer shows how the morphogenetic approach allows conceptualising and 
analysing ‘the interplay between structure and agency over time and space’ 
(emphases added).504 She views structural properties that pre-date a certain 
actor/action as ‘emergent or aggregate consequences of past actions…[which] 
exert a causal influence upon subsequent interactions…by shaping the 
situations in which later “generations” of actors find themselves’.505 As she 
warns, then, ‘temporal separability is never to challenge the activity-
dependence of structures’;506 it is rather to challenge how we view the 
sequencing of such activity and how much, therefore, we are ready to 
acknowledge the possibility of untangling the causal relationship and 
understanding potential mechanisms behind such relationship.   
A similar resolution assuming a mutual constitutiveness, or rather, 
inseparability between the discursive and the non-/extra-discursive realms is 
one of the common approaches in discourse analysis. Thus, the school of 
                                                 
499
 Archer (1995). 
500
 Ibid., 15. 
501
 See especially Archer (1995: 33-135). 
502
 Ibid., 89.  
503
 Ibid., 14. 
504
 Ibid., 15.  
505
 Ibid., 90. 
506
 Ibid., 66.  
129 
 
Critical Discourse Analysis, embracing Giddens’ theory of structuration and 
drawing on Harvey’s ‘dialectics of discourse’,507 where the relationship between 
discursive and non-discursive elements of social life has a cyclical character, 
envisages a dialectical relationship between ‘semiosis…[and] other (non-
semiotic) elements of social life,…[where] non-semiotic elements are 
“internalised”…in semiosis and vice versa’.508 Discourses and narratives, then, 
have ‘non-discursive effects’, as they help modify the institutional materiality of 
economic, political and other systems. 509 Thus, in this conception of discourse, 
while the social is not reduced to discourse, it is still ‘co-constituted’ by 
discourses (narratives, imaginaries).510  
However, by declaring the discursive and the non-discursive as “mutually 
constitutive”, processes and outcomes that are not or cannot be explained, run 
the risk of being explained away by the conceptual safe haven of “mutual 
constitutiveness”. Thus, importantly for our discussion, in trying to assert a non-
causal relationship between identity and foreign policy, Hansen notes, that ‘[i]t 
is...impossible to define identity as a variable that is causally separate from 
foreign policy or to measure its explanatory value in competition with non-
discursive material factors’.511 While she apparently uses the terms “variable”, 
“causally” and “measurable” in the narrow positivist sense and therefore 
comfortably rejects them, through it an important disservice is done to 
understanding the relationship between identity and other (including material, 
but also other sedimented social) factors affecting foreign policy outcomes. A 
rejection of a causal link between identity and foreign policy by Hansen, as well 
as by other post-structuralists, is predicated on the logic that there is no identity 
prior to foreign policy,512 as ‘they are simultaneously (discursive) foundation and 
product’.513 However, this contention leaves out of the picture the temporal 
distribution of foreign policy discourse and the role of actors, in this case, official 
foreign policy makers, who once in office, are faced with the reality of the 
identity of the given nation, including already dominant otherisation narratives 
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(as a sedimented discursive/ideational structure). The latter have indeed been 
previously discursively created also, but not only, via previous official foreign 
policy-making and performance. However, these identities are prior in time to 
the particular agents’ being granted authority to influence them, or in the 
Bakhtinian idiom, to “act upon the world”, whether by changing or re-producing 
them. 
Thus, to avoid the limitations of the “mutual constitutiveness” approach, 
we must acknowledge the usefulness of the temporal separability for the 
problematic of the discursive vis-à-vis non-/extra-discursive, as better suited for 
understanding the relationship between actors negotiating foreign/security 
policy and policy outcomes, and hence mechanisms of continuity or change. 
Such approach does not challenge the previous discursive constitutiveness of 
structures, but acknowledges that to actors these present as pre-dating their 
response, their act, or their “deed upon the world”.  
By introducing the dimension of “time”, for the purposes of the current 
framework and for analytical clarity, I adopt the following conceptualisation. 
First, the discursive encompasses the narrower semiotic relations of meanings 
and of actors at a present moment in time, or at a moment isolated for analysis. 
Second, although the material is not restricted to brute facts alone,514 the non-
discursive is conceived as comprising the brute material facts, such as 
geography, natural disasters, absence or presence of natural resources, etc. 
Calling these “non-discursive” does not mean they cannot or are not variously 
and contradictorily given meaning by social actors: it rather means that they 
exist independently of these meanings at any given moment;515 and these 
meanings given to them are not the only way through which brute facts can 
“matter”.516 Finally, the term supra-discursive is used to denote the multiplicity of 
social and semiotic structures, which in the given temporal point in time of 
analysis have already been reified or are already emerging. This does not mean 
that they themselves have not previously been constituted through socio-
discursive interactions: it rather means that they are already “out there” and 
have acquired a certain “materiality” of their own, and thus at the given moment 
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in time pre-date the actors involved, as well as the actions in the narrower 
discursive negotiation over an issue. Hence, I make the choice of the prefix 
“supra”, rather than “extra”, to denote dependence of this realm on the 
discursive, however also to denote a prior emergence in relation to the present 
moment and hence a different status for the narrowly discursive processes, as 
well as for the analysis of these processes. For instance, the institution of the 
state, the capitalist world economy, international institutions, etc., as well as 
parliamentary democracy as an institution allowing deliberations over security in 
certain way rather than other, would all fall into this category. So would semiotic 
structures, such as presently dominant national identity narratives, global norm 
discourses, or past and often already historicised narratives of previous 
foreign/security policies, e.g. over the East-West Cold War rivalry, against which 
a current discursive contestation over, e.g., Russia-the West relations may take 
place today. In other words, current actors encounter the prior-ness of these 
(both social and semiotic) structures.  
4.2.2. Foreign/Security Policy in the Age of Late Modernity 
 
To understand the supra-discursive field, where the discursive contestations 
over foreign/security policies take place, involves exploring its socio-historical 
context. Even if cumulatively contingent, open and changeable, to each 
individual actor caught up in contestation, whether in government or broader 
society, the supra-discursive realm appears prior to their “deed” upon the world, 
i.e. to their answerability at each point in time. The emphasis on the socio-
historical context and the “priorness” of material, social and semiotic structures 
for actors is importantly related to the Bakhtinian emphasis on the social 
situatedness of the living utterance, i.e. in the contention that any utterance 
gains meaning and may be causally efficacious only relationally with other 
utterances and importantly only as a moment in the broader societal and social 
dynamics and epochal changes. In this light then, for us the socio-historical 
situatedness means the implications of the present age and the broader societal 
tensions and changes of the age on foreign/security discourses in Western 
democracies. Thus, we will see that the reality of late modernity, the historically 
congealed forms of “imagining” nationhood and statehood have such priorness, 
and even if constituted through discourse, are out there to be dealt with by 
actors variously contesting foreign/security policy.  
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As we saw in the critical review in chapter 2, implicitly ascribing a certain 
social functionality to foreign/security policy discourses, indeed, runs through 
the work of post-structuralist IR concerned with national security and identity 
building. Most prominently, Ashley and more famously Campbell have dubbed 
foreign policy ‘a specific sort of boundary-producing political performance’.517 
However, as we saw, these theorisations have mostly been limited to a pre-
occupation with “otherising” processes in identity construction, i.e. ‘the act by 
which difference is constituted as an inferior other’,518 and consequently to the 
‘boundary-producing’ function of foreign policy.519  
The social functions of foreign/security policy discourse are not, and 
analytically cannot be reduced to identity construction through mere otherising 
practices, although otherising discourses may indeed form an important part of 
such identity construction in the given cultural and political context of late 
modern foreign/security policy. Rather, the latter should be considered within 
the broader socio-political context shaping contemporary Western 
foreign/security discourse and policy. 
Drawing on recent sociological and philosophical insights, I propose a 
tentative insight to be further explored through the empirical study: 
foreign/security policy discourse in late modern Western societies may be seen 
as a predominantly future-orientated discourse of progress. Indeed, the legacy 
of the Enlightenment age lives on in foreign/security discourses in the form of 
“imagining”520 a collective “future” as progress, as a movement in time towards 
something better, thus promising rational planning, managing and controlling 
this future. On the one hand, this may be seen as the late modern extension of 
Enlightenment’s drive for “mastery of nature”, aimed ‘at liberating men from fear 
and establishing their sovereignty’.521 On the other hand, it may be seen as part 
of late modern ‘risk society’s’522 preoccupation with control and safety. As 
Giddens explains, Ulrich Beck’s concept of “risk society” describes ‘a society 
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where we increasingly live on a high technological frontier which absolutely no 
one completely understands and which generates a diversity of possible 
futures’. 523 He goes on to explain the origin of the term “risk”, with important 
implications:  
Life in the Middle Ages was hazardous; but there was no notion of risk and there 
doesn’t seem in fact to be a notion of risk in any traditional culture. The reason for 
this is that dangers are experienced as given. Either they come from God, or they 
come simply from a world which one takes for granted. The idea of risk is bound 
up with the aspiration to control and particularly with the idea of controlling the 
future…The idea of “risk society” might suggest a world which has become more 
hazardous, but this is not necessarily so. Rather, it is a society increasingly 
preoccupied with the future (and also with safety), which generates the notion of 
risk…The word refers to a world which we are both exploring and seeking to 
normalise and control (emphases added).524 
 
By extension, contemporary Western liberal democracies’ promise of planning, 
managing and controlling the national “future” through foreign/security policy is 
dependent on, and responding to, the primal angst of death, more generally, 
and the “risk society’s” fear of immediate, perceived or real, risks to their 
livelihoods and to their unhindered participation in the late modern system, 
more specifically.525 Examples of inducing such fear are terrorism, immigration, 
obstruction to flow of resources, such as oil/gas, etc. 
Giddens, drawing on Beck, further distinguishes between ‘external risk’ 
and ‘manufactured risk’.526 External risks, prevalent in the industrial (early 
modern) age, ‘happen[ed] regularly enough and often enough in a whole 
population of people to be broadly predictable, and so insurable’ – through the 
private insurance company, or through public insurance by the welfare state.527 
By contrast, what Giddens calls ‘manufactured risk’ (the term not used to 
indicate fabrication or falseness) ‘is risk created by the very progression of 
human development, especially by the progression of science and 
technology’.528 He further explains: ‘[m]anufactured risk refers to new risk 
environments for which history provides us with very little previous experience. 
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We often don’t really know what the risks are, let alone how to calculate them 
accurately in terms of probability tables’.529 
In this regard, foreign/security policy may be seen as caught up in an 
anxiety to (re)claim the role of providing insurance – as an extension of the 
industrial welfare state – from global uncertainties often narrated as “external 
risks”, 530 when the reality of “manufactured risks” is constantly undermining the 
claim to such capacity of the state. For foreign/security policy, “manufactured 
risks” would importantly also include risks coming from global events and 
situations potentially caused or exacerbated by the previous foreign/security 
policies of the very same state under scrutiny. For example, at the moment of 
writing (June 2014), the British officials and public are debating whether the 
recent military success of ISIS, an al-Qaeda affiliated force, in taking control of 
large parts of Iraq, and the subsequent civil war have been causally related to 
the 2003 UK and US war in Iraq. Stances and reactions in this debate 
interestingly illustrate both the anxiety and the lack of capacity of the state to 
provide any insurance against such risk. Thus, presented with the 
unpredictability of the further development of an event and the incalculability of 
its effects, the official stance may distance itself by presenting the risk as 
“external” (e.g. by distancing itself from culpability), and give assurances of 
manageability and control when confronted with the reverberations of the given 
event for national “interest” or “responsibility”.531   
This may be seen as the manifestation of the intrinsic dependability of 
“security” to “knowledge” and “certitude”, or as Dillon puts it, ‘the alliance of 
security and knowledge, so characteristic of modern (inter)national politics’.532 
Drawing on Nietzsche and the ‘connection between the will to know and the will 
                                                 
529
 Ibid.  
530
 Indeed, opposite trends can be discerned also in the official discourses of the past few years: 
especially in financial crisis and post-crisis years, there is increasingly more representation of 
“global uncertainty” and therefore of “unpredictability”. Nonetheless, these are sparingly 
juxtaposed with the still dominant discourses of control, solution and promises of progress. In 
another study, it would be interesting to compare and trace how discourses of “certainty and 
control” configure with discourses of “uncertainty and unpredictability”. 
531
 Thus, former PM Tony Blair’s stance has been unequivocal denial of any causal link of the 
events to the Iraq invasion of 2003, while the current UK government response has been the 
possibility of sending “counter-terrorism expertise” to the region. See Tony Blair, ‘Iraq, Syria and 
the Middle East’ (The Office of Tony Blair, 14 Jun 2014), at 
http://www.tonyblairoffice.org/news/entry/iraq-syria-and-the-middle-east-an-essay-by-tony-
blair/); Patrick Wintour, ‘UK May Help Iraq Government with Counter-terrorism Expertise -- 
Hague’, The Guardian (14 June 2014), at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/16/uk-
counter-terrorism-expertise-iraq-government-william-hague). 
532
 Dillon (1996: 17).   
135 
 
to secure’, Dillon draws our attention to, and problematises, ‘security as 
knowledge (certainty); security’s reliance upon knowledge (surveillance); 
security’s astonishing production of knowledge in response to its will to know 
(calculability); and the claim of knowledge which gives security its licence to 
render all aspects of life transparent’ (totality)’.533 More broadly, Dillon links 
modern security to the tradition of Western metaphysical thought of looking for 
certitude and securing “truth” itself, and the late modern technologised tradition 
of turning “truth” into “correctness” and continuing to provide for “certitude” by 
making everything calculable. In simple terms, this is the dominant mode of 
doing politics.534 However, this official anxiety to practice and satisfy/provide for 
what may be called the “will to certitude” is taking place at the backdrop of ever-
expanding manufactured risks which ‘create few direct lines…, only a plurality of 
“future scenarios”’.535  
In this relation, the function of the official foreign/security discourse and 
policy is also the containment/disciplining of this plurality of possible future 
scenarios derived from complexity and contingency, whilst it provides for 
certitude, predictability and manageability. More broadly then, foreign/security 
discourse is the organised social practice of selectively circumscribing 
uncertainly.536 Just as the function of the ego is to misrecognise ‘the 
impossibility of fullness [through] the illusion of closure’,537 the function of the 
modern state is ‘to exterminate ambivalence: ‘to define precisely – and to 
eliminate everything that could not or would not be precisely defined’.538  
Such discourse of progress and promise of a better future, in the 
contemporary West, especially the US and the UK, is best manifested in the 
liberal promise of containing “evil”, and of a democratised and hence more 
peaceful world, resting on an almost blind ‘faith in technology’, as well as faith in 
expert knowledge, that promises ‘technical fixes’539 for every problem. Thus, 
what Campbell refers to as the ‘responsibility for combating evil’ and the 
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subsequent temptation of otherising540 may be seen as only part of the much 
larger ‘modernist requirements of order and stability’.541 Also, as a manifestation 
of the will to certitude, it indicates what Giddens would have referred to as the 
as-yet-unrealised possibility of opening up to a new form of politics that would 
admit the limitations of addressing contemporary global (mostly, manufactured) 
risks through the limited prism of external risk and linear (old) modernisation.542 
Foreign/security policy discourse is best placed to tell stories of 
emancipation543 and progress to national collectives: while such stories are 
constituted through multiple channels, including art, literature, film, the 
academia, economic practices, etc., foreign/security policy discourse is in a 
special position to offer official and unified stories of imagining of the nation by 
locating the latter temporally and spatially in the global arena. Moreover, an 
official discourse requiring closure and singularity in order to circumscribe the 
uncertainty of a complex world and provide certitude and assurance for external 
and manufactured risks, the neo-liberal story of “promise” of a fix for every 
problem and of universal progress can be argued to be the meta-narrative 
foundation for a contemporary Western democratic foreign/security policy. 
However, the implications of what Giddens calls ‘reflexive modernization’ 
are especially important for a relational and dialogical approach. Thus,  
[R]eflexive modernisation implies coming to terms with the limits and contradictions 
of the modern order. These are obvious in new domains of politics associated with 
various sorts of social movements… Second-phase modernisation - modernisation 
as reflexive modernisation - …offers many possibilities for positive political 
engagement…. [if] brought more directly [i.e. through party politics] into the political 
arena’.544 
 
Therefore, we must also consider processes opposite to, and undermining, the 
official foreign/security policy tendency to satisfy the will to certitude, or else 
attempting alternative ways of satisfying such certitude. Thus, while ‘the 
prophets of neo-liberalism [have been]… ‘rejoic[ing] in the security and progress 
promised by the age of Enlightenment’,545 intellectuals, cultural and literary 
figures, as well as civil activists have been expressing discontent and disbelief 
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towards the Enlightenment meta-narrative, as well as pessimism as to how 
much disaster and problems caused by the drive for progress can be fixed by 
the same technological advances that have caused them. In this light, then, as 
well as in light of the above critique of the post-structuralist pre-occupation with 
otherising, indispensable from analysing the heteroglot field of negotiating 
foreign policy and security, a study of foreign/security policy discourse must be 
attentive not only to conflicting alternative otherisations  and less-/non-
otherising voices, but also importantly to voices that are critiquing and 
deconstructing the very otherising  narratives, as well as more broadly the 
dominant practices of satisfying certitude through claiming control and 
manageability.  
In these opposite trends, we are witnessing Bakhtinian centripetal and 
centrifugal (monological and dialogical) forces at play. On the one hand, we 
have the continual and persistent hegemonisation of the neo-liberal narrative of 
promise, facilitated by modern advances, including through what has been 
termed as ‘imagology’,546 as well as through an ‘aestheticisation of politics’.547 
On the other hand, however, images and information are now ‘deterritorialised’ 
due to the proliferation and diversification of their producers.548 The latter has 
been recognised as having created a ‘system leakage’,549 and an ‘excess of 
information’: ‘[e]xcess in both the sense that information society circulates 
excessive images, information and ideas (pictures of torture in Abu Graib, 
beheadings on the internet,…[etc.]) but also excess in terms of the 
images/information/capital that exceed the ability of the organs of the state to 
control and manage’.550 This excess, as Lacy notes, ‘leads to strategies of re-
territorialisation to attempt to contain [it], ... strategies that attempt to (re)code 
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contemporary economic and military developments as the route to freedom and 
enlightenment (emphases added).551 
In this light then, the official foreign/security discourse of a contemporary 
liberal-democratic state may be seen as representing a tension between the 
need to continue projecting the promise of progress of the Enlightenment and 
the assurance of certainty, on the one hand, and the need to engage variously 
with the plurality of other voices, on the other. The latter may be voices 
destabilizing such a project, or variously expressing discontent/disbelief meant 
to altogether abandon any metanarrative of progress, or else to offer alternative 
solutions to the task of re-territorialisation. In other words, on the one hand, the 
official narrative is attempting to re-territorialise and recode this excess 
(including but not only, into simple monologising formulae such as “us/them, 
either/or”); and on the other hand, such re-territorialisation or recoding cannot 
be tenable without dialogically being answerable to and addressing the 
multiplicity of other voices.  
This tension, in turn, reflects a more specific paradox of late modernity in 
relation to security. On the one hand, the state is still bound up in the Modernist 
promise of combating evil and hence strives for maximum monology and 
singularity for state identity based on security narratives; on the other hand, it is 
in great tension with the late modern self-reflexive society, as well as post-
modernist deconstructive tendencies: it cannot achieve its task without 
engaging with/responding to the heteroglot discursive field characterised by 
publics that are increasingly more critical and self-reflexive,552 as well as more 
deconstructive of discourses of danger built on defilement as the basis for 
national identity.    
Understanding such late modern heteroglot discursive field, in light of 
Giddens’ “reflexive modernization” requires also acknowledging the effect of 
second-order discursive-interpretive practices – including the practice of social 
scientists, as well as of public intellectuals more broadly – on first-order 
practices of social actors.553 Thus, Giddens has noted: ‘[t]he discourse of 
sociology, and the concepts, theories and findings of the other social sciences 
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continually “circulate in and out” of what it is that they are about. In so doing, 
they reflexively restructure their subject matter which itself has learned to think 
sociologically’ (emphasis added).554 In a more Bakhtinian vision, we may say 
that these concepts, theories and findings enter into a dialogical relationship 
with the voices competing in the political field, i.e. enter into, and potentially 
affect, the agora, the public sphere. One striking example is illuminating: 
symbolized by major texts, for example, Edward Said’s ground-breaking 
Orientalism, 555 the critique of otherisation, has become an unavoidable part of 
contesting security. Indeed, often the first task of a critical voice in a Western 
society has become to demystify self-other dichotomies, and deconstruct 
binaries, to which the official representative is answerable in a more complex 
relationship. Thus, intellectual practices deconstructing otherising have not only 
made simple official re-territorialisations more difficult, but have penetrated and 
changed the dialogical sphere of contesting foreign policy and security.  
Furthermore, foreign/security discourse is unavoidably built on and 
performs the task of contesting, (re)producing or transforming major global 
normative structures, negotiating global norms -- “imagining” global politics in 
dialogue and tension with home and global others’ foreign/security discourses 
and practices, thus attempting to organise international politics through 
structuring global interaction. For example, and primarily, at a time when the 
status of states is more forcefully being challenged by social actors such as 
transnational social movements, as well as importantly by the very same social 
scientists and intellectuals claiming such change, foreign/security policy 
discourse is the primary site where resisting change by reinstating and 
asserting “sovereignty” as the organising institution of the international takes 
place. In order to sustain itself, the historically specific institution of 
sovereignty556 needs to be constantly performed, and as Campbell has noted, 
primarily through foreign/security policy discourses and practices.557 However, 
importantly and once again, this is done through resisting opposite forces, and 
in dialogue with other such foreign/security discourses on the global arena. In 
other words, again, this is not, and cannot, be a monological endeavour, as the 
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official discourse has to engage, and in the Mouffean sense, is in agonism with 
pluralising, fragmenting and alternative voices within the society and globally – 
whether through accommodation, intertextual readjustment, silencing, or some 
other form of engagement.  
In light of the above discussion, then, and in light of the critique of the 
representational model in chapter 2, it must be acknowledged that – at any 
point being at the intersection of conflicting forces and torn between the needs 
of a balancing act, and therefore constantly changing while being constrained – 
foreign/security discourse cannot be located and studied in any clear-cut 
“narrative” fixed in time, and moreover, policy cannot be deduced as the result 
of any straightforwardly identifiable narrative or representation that has in a 
linear manner produced or made possible the said policy. However, before I 
further discuss the implications of the above discussion for empirical work, I 
now briefly turn to conceptualising audiences in the above-presented context of 
late modernity and in light of Bakhtinian answerability.   
4.2.3. Answerability and Audiences-Turned-Speakers  
 
The attention to socio-historical situatedness of foreign/security policy discourse 
necessitates revisiting the concept of audiences and their place in negotiating 
security. Indeed, knowledge society, excess of information, as well as the 
tensions and conflicting forces discussed above constitute the audiences of 
foreign/security discourse, and define the heteroglot field where voices 
competing for primacy in negotiating security interact, clash, challenge, 
accommodate or silence one another. Not engaging with this would undermine 
the understanding of the dialogicity of foreign/security policy, and its 
implications for policy continuity or change.  
Distinct from the conceptualisations of audiences offered by 
securitization theory and some of their advanced/later re-articulations, as well 
as their critique, I will argue that the distinction between speaker (security actor) 
and audience (receiver) often collapses, and needs a re-evaluation, in light of 
the dialogical-relational model advanced above. I will also argue that in the 
presence of multiplicity of “audiences” – home/international, various segments 
within these – the Copenhagen School adoption of Austinean speech-act theory 
is not adequate, as no foreign/security speech-act can have one illocutionary 
force or one unified and pre-defined audience. (To remind, by foreign/security 
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speech-act I do not mean one specific and all-defining speech-act of 
securitisation that brings about a threat: instead, potentially any articulation in 
the dialogical process of negotiating security is a speech-act).    
In his evaluation of securitization theories, Balzacq notes different 
conceptions of audiences in what he distinguishes as the ‘philosophical’ vs. 
‘sociological’ securitization theories.558 Thus, while in the philosophical view, the 
audience is ‘a formal – given – category, which is often poised in a receptive 
mode’, in the sociological view, it ‘is not necessarily a fully constituted 
entity…but an emergent category’.559 Thus, critiquing the philosophical view, a 
number of scholars have argued for ‘disaggregating the audience, as different 
audiences are receptive to different kinds of arguments, and have distinct types 
of power’,560 as well as for recognising the diversity of audiences (popular, elite, 
technocratic and scientific) and hence the ‘variability of securitizing moves’.561 
Nonetheless, these critics still see the audiences as (even if varied) receivers, 
rather than part of a relational interaction, even when calling for an 
intersubjective view.562 The reason for this is that their primary aim in exploring 
audiences is to establish whether the ‘securitizing move’ has been a success or 
a failure, whether it has been ‘accepted or rejected’.563 To recall the conception 
of the dialogical speech-act advanced in chapter 2, intentions are always caught 
up in tensions in an agitated field of struggle: they are ‘positional and 
interlocative’,564 i.e. always positioned in relation to others’ intentions in the 
same space, as well as positioned in time, and in tension with own and others’ – 
actual or anticipated – intentions in the past, as well as the future. Hence, in the 
dialogical-relational model interested in various speech-acts, rather than 
particular securitizing moves, performances are not merely “accepted” or 
“rejected” by audiences, but are variously responded to, generating a plethora 
of other performances, other speech-acts. The latter feed back into the 
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dialogical process, creating new tensions and new discursive realities, to which 
the initial security “performer” in turn becomes answerable and is forced to 
respond.  In this light then, the conventional speaker-audience distinction 
collapses, as audience is in turn speaker-performer, and vice versa. 
Indeed, my interest is not in individual securitizing moves and their 
“success/failure” at a point in time, but rather in the processes of 
foreign/security discourses and their dynamics over time. Also, to reiterate, my 
primary concern and theoretical and empirical interest is not in the point of 
emergence of a (purportedly) dominant discourse, but rather in what comes 
after such emergence. Rather than “success/failure”, what I am interested in is 
the outcome of further discursive interactions around a certain discursive 
formation, as well as continuity/change, slowed down/constrained change being 
such outcome. I purport, that such outcomes are not necessarily linearly 
dependent on one specific and intentional act or “move”, but rather emerge as 
an unintended and often unanticipated consequence of dialogical contestations. 
Hence, I am interested in audiences in order to better understand the dialogical 
process, and its implications for constraints, continuity and change. 
Considering the above, I understand audiences and their relational role 
in the speech performances of foreign/security discourse as follows. In light of 
the dialogical speech-act and Bakhtinian answerability, we must acknowledge 
multiple segments of audiences intended by one and the same utterance, as 
well as those not intended/anticipated by the utterer. This is particularly salient 
in case of official foreign policy discourse: given the spread of communication 
technologies and almost unrestricted access to publicly available information, 
utterances may disseminate into the discursive domain without the initiators 
being in immediate control as to what specific audience they reach and what 
illocution they transmit. Recalling the discussion of hypertextuality of  
contemporary communication in chapter 2, it may be argued that a 
foreign/security performance – by official articulators as well as various 
audience-speakers – is potentially linked up to the ‘docuverse’565 of today’s 
information sphere, producing a non-linear foreign/security policy text, i.e. 
having multiple entry points and multiple routes of activation/progression. By 
“docuverse”, I mean a hyperlinked semiotic sphere not necessarily technically 
located in the internet. 
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The foreign/security policy utterance, being inescapably hypertextually 
linked to the “docuverse” of other utterances, increases the possibility for 
scrutiny, critique and probing of foreign/security claims by various audience-
speakers. This potentially makes the locating of an official utterance in the 
metatext of the public domain, and making responsive performances answering 
past and future related utterances the imperative of the profession of official 
foreign/security speech writers and key official foreign/security policy 
interlocutors. In turn, it hypothetically increases the multiplicity of tasks and 
intended illocutions simultaneously attached to certain foreign policy speeches, 
statements, and other public texts. 
In these dialogical relations, multiplicity of foreign/security policy speakers-
audiences and audiences-speakers variously participate – political peers (in 
parliament within own party and across parties; in government, etc.); dissident 
rivals (social movements, NGOs); agents in the media (including in the 
mainstream, and traditional forms, as well as the alternative e-media, such as 
blogs, etc.); intellectuals (including through both narrowly scholarly work, as well 
as through public-intellectual involvement); as well as various segments in the 
broader public distinguished by class, race/origin, religion, etc., through lay 
rationalisations. Even when methodologically it is near-impossible to trace every 
utterance in this web of responsive exchanges and locate their specific multiple 
intended and unintended illocutions, the utterances they might be answering to, 
and eventually the effects of these on policy outcomes, we must acknowledge 
and be attentive to the reality of audiences-turned-into-speakers, i.e. the 
relational character of performativity and the resultant non-linear and complex 
routes that produce outcomes out of dialogic relations. 
Furthermore, recalling Bakhtinian philosophy of the act and answerability, 
actors not only respond to each other’s utterances in a synchronic and static 
closed field, but also crucially respond to changing non-discursive and supra-
discursive realities and others’ responses to these, in a diachronic open system. 
Following a conceptual distinction already made in chapter 2 between “real-life 
chronotope” and “narrative (representational) chronotope”, here we must 
consider the dependence and responsiveness of foreign/security discourses to 
constantly changing daily realities, i.e. to the events happening in the world, and 
to the multiplicity of others’ responses to these events. Indeed, foreign/security 
policy discourse constantly “encounters” and is put pressure on/challenged, or 
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else facilitated by, the changing daily realities, including those potentially 
produced or facilitated as a result of the implementation of the earlier policies 
legitimised through the given narrative. These events and developments, as 
they enter the public domain through the news, alternative discourses, etc., 
need to be engaged with, responded to, incorporated in the official and 
alternative narratives, or the narratives may need to be amended. For instance, 
we must consider how the revelations about prisoner tortures in Abu Ghraib and 
Guantánamo, or how material changes and developments on the ground in 
Afghanistan and Iraq have affected the course of the contestation and 
deliberations at home. Considering this will help better capture the relationship 
of the discursive to the non-discursive and supra-discursive, as it seeks to 
understand how foreign/security discourses respond to events, as well as 
others’ interpretations of those events, happening in real time, and how the real-
life chronotope acts as a constant challenge to the narrative (representational) 
chronotope embedded in the discourse, where the nation’s identity – past, 
present, and future – is inscribed. 
 
4.3. Analytical Tools for the Dialogical-Relational Model 
In order to apply the above theoretical framework and its implications for data 
selection to an empirical study interested in a dialogical-relational analysis, we 
need a certain discourse-analytical model specifically for this project to guide 
through a study that relationally traces how narrative structures interact and 
change. For this purpose, I look for certain indexical indicators through which 
relationality among voices and continuity/change can be traced. Thus, this 
section turns to the question of identifying heuristic models for an empirical 
analysis to help us trace the dialogical interactions of all these voices in the 
socio-historical context laid out above, and thus deduce longer term patterns 
and mechanisms. These are proposed to be a) interaction of competing 
narrative-normative chronotopes; and b) the relationship among relational 
performatives such as destabilising performative, deliberative performatives, 
and silencing performatives, the latter not being an exhaustive list. I will take 
these in turn. 
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4.3.1. Narrative-Normative Chronotopes 
 
As already suggested, contemporary Western foreign/security policy discourses 
are constituted through conceptions and transmissions of social temporality. In 
order to trace such temporalities in the official narratives, as well as, relationally, 
in the alternative/counter-narratives, and come closer to locating the 
implications of such relational temporalities on contesting security, I adopt and 
develop the Bakhtinian concept of the chronotope, which has already been 
discussed at length in chapter 3 as part of conceptualising dialogical speech-
act, as well as referred to above in this chapter in relation to “real-life 
chronotope”. To remind, in chapter 3 I proposed, that the Bakhtinian category of 
“chronotope” can be used at two levels: as a hermeneutical device tracing the 
structuring of a representation and a narrative, on the one hand, and as ‘a 
means for studying the relation between any text and its times’,566 i.e. the “real-
life chronotope”, on the other. I referred to the latter in the previous section; 
whereas here I am concerned with assessing how the former, i.e. the narrative 
(representational) chronotope may be a useful analytical tool for unpacking 
narrative structures in a dialogical analysis.  
Just as for Bakhtin chronotopes structure representations and are ‘the 
organizing centers for the fundamental narrative events of the novel’,567 the 
significance of narrative chronotopes in foreign/security discourses is that they 
mark representations of continuity, rupture, and aspirations for the future of an 
“imagined” nation as well as that of an “imagined” world.   
Indeed, the theme of temporality is integral to discussions of identity. As 
Onuf reminds, ‘[t]he speaking self is a fully social self only as a storied self’: 
telling is the means to compensate for the experience of memories often being 
fragmented, inconsistent and distorted, a means to bring order ‘by forming 
encounters into episodes, and the sequence of events into a plot – a sequence 
of relations’.568 Story-telling is a means to bring order ‘by forming encounters 
into episodes, and the sequence of events into a plot – a sequence of 
relations’, and a means to manage memory through the ‘construction of a 
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coherent past and the projection of a plausible future’.569 In a similar vein, 
social psychologists remind that for collectives, ‘historical imagination does not 
just stretch backwards to the past, but also forwards to the future’.570 In other 
words, individuals in a community constructed as a nation imagine themselves 
through a narrative where they are moving together in time. This, according to 
Anderson, allows them to satisfy their concern with immortality: we are linked 
to people (i.e. “heroes”) who died before us, therefore share their glory; and we 
will be part of those generations to come after us, thereby ensuring our 
immortality.571 
Exploring this gaze backwards as well as forwards in the continuum of 
time may be illuminating in understanding the dialogically constructed national 
identity through official foreign/security policy discourse. However, in light of 
the discussion in the previous section, I am not merely interested in this 
temporal construction of social time as it may supposedly be found in an official 
or dominant narrative monologically produced, coherent and fixed in time; but 
rather in how, relationally, various temporalities and “imaginings” of national 
“pasts”, “presents” and “futures” relate, respond to and change or constrain one 
another over time. Moreover, I am interested in how narrative chronotopes 
project and contest “imaginings” of global politics and global “futures” and 
hence the nation’s place in it, through normative/axiological constructions. 
It may be suggested that the tension between monologising and 
dialogising forces is present in the chronotopicity of foreign/security policy 
discourse: on the one hand, by tradition and genre, foreign/security policy 
articulations gravitate towards a chronotope similar to one identified by Bakhtin 
in the epic genre, that of the ‘absolute past’.572  Even in a democratic society, 
official foreign policy discourse may be said to have the monologising 
characteristics of the authoritative discourse described by Bakhtin, namely the 
‘epic style’.573 In a constant quest for simplification and certitude, official foreign 
policy discourse requires consistent monologising, often through the creation 
and re-creation of the authoritative voice of the “father”, of a certain stability of 
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meaning, of certain permanence, which strives to acquire a dominant status.574 
Thus, Bakhtin describes:  
The world of the epic is the national heroic past: it is a world of “beginnings” and 
“peak times” in the national history… a world of “firsts” and “bests”… the 
represented world… stands on an utterly different and inaccessible time-and-value 
plane, separated by epic distance. The space between them is filled with national 
tradition…The absolute past is a specifically evaluating (hierarchical) category. In 
the epic world view, “beginning”, “first”, “founder”, “ancestor”, “that which occurred 
earlier” and so forth are not merely temporal categories but valorized temporal 
categories, and valorized to an extreme degree (emphasis in the original).575 
  
However, this monologising chronotope, potentially in varying degrees present 
in different foreign/security discourses, is in great tension with dialogising forces 
– other chronotopes, such as the transformational one, where multiple routes to 
transformation are competing. In these, the “future” may be represented as a 
transcendence of the “past”, or the epic “past” itself is re-interpreted/re-coded 
through new events in the present, constantly open to challenge and 
subversion. Even when re-inscribing the “epic” chronotope, interlocutors 
participating in negotiating foreign/security policy are bound up in this web of 
competing alternative chronotopes and have to dialogically engage with them. 
Moreover, they are under pressure from the developments/changes in the non-
discursive and supra-discursive realms to which they have to respond.  
Thus, foreign/security policy discourse is a field where the epic identity of 
the nation – represented as remaining the same in spite of challenges and 
threats to its existence – encounters constant challenges and pressures from 
present-time normative structures, heteroglot voices of the internal others, as 
well as external developments that demand narrative adjustments or 
reinterpretations, and material (and often urgent) responses. Hence, they may 
selectively and opportunistically employ the “transformational” chronotope, 
where the nation transforms into a “better” version of itself, whether by a re-
evaluation of the “past” (e.g. the US discourse is often organised around re-
evaluating and challenging each other on grounds of whose interpretation of the 
Founding Fathers’ texts is more accurate and hence guiding), or by a rejection 
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of a certain historical moment in the “past” (as contemporary Germany with 
regards to its Nazi past).   
Thus, foreign policy discourse is necessarily located at the intersection of 
the epic past of the forefathers in building identity, as well as the world of the 
present, and the projection of competing “futures”. Moreover, it is necessarily 
axiologically charged and hence normative, since time-space representations 
cannot escape being value-laden. Thus, narrative “pasts” are often marked with 
great degree of emotional charge, and “futures” are marked by normative 
promises and prescriptions, whereas the “present” may be said to be 
representing the modernist ideal situation of knowledge, evaluation and 
control/action. Furthermore, relating this to the socio-historical situatedness of 
foreign/security discourses of contemporary Western democracies, and the 
implications of the late modern society discussed above, we may suggest that 
such discourse is always torn between the need for certainty and future-
orientedness (with a strong element of a promise of “managing” and 
“controlling” the “future”, even in times of great uncertainly), and therefore, 
projecting a linear sense of time-space of “progress”, on the one hand, and the 
need to be answerable to destabilising and deconstructive voices (who inhabit 
starkly different chronotopes, or shatter the sense of chronotope itself), on the 
other.  
Such narrative chronotopes must be seen as embedded in the 
Bakhtinian agonistic environment of tension and struggle, and in the Laclau and 
Mouffean vision of agents’ constant attempts towards fixation of meaning and 
suture of the social field through constructions of “myths” and “imaginaries”, 
despite the ontological impossibility of final fixation and closure. Hence, 
chronotope may be said to be a medium – one of the semiotic/symbolic means 
of sense making – for myths, where myths seek to ‘repair the dislocations…’,576 
and construct new imaginaries that would hegemonise the field of contestation.  
Hence, a framework seeking to understand the relationality of various 
competing constructions of identity set in narratives of national beginning, and 
aspirations, incorporates the study of these competing chronotopes and how 
they put pressure on, respond to and change or constrain one another over 
time. On the other hand, it would involve tracing how the multiplicity of voices 
react to the developments and changes in the non-supra-discursive realm 
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through reproductions and/or modifications of various narrative chronotopes, 
and how they project possible “futures” as a way of negotiating their way 
through the material changes, and through the competing interpretations of 
those changes.  
Indeed, the real-life chronotope acts as a constant challenge to the 
representational narrative chronotope embedded in the discourse, where the 
nation’s identity – “past”, “present”, and “future” – is inscribed. The present of 
the real-life chronotope is a challenge to the “past” and importantly the “future” 
of the nation. Hence, in order to evaluate how narrative-normative chronotopes 
compete and affect actual policies and their continuation or change, and thus 
enact material consequences, we must be attentive to how these narrative-
normative chronotopes respond to external material changes, as well as how 
they project possible “futures” as a way of response, as a way of negotiating 
their way through the material changes and the competing interpretations of 
those changes.   
4.3.2. Relational Performatives   
 
Narratives, and therefore narrative-normative chronotopes, are constructed and 
reproduced, as well as challenged through specific speech-acts – a multiplicity 
of competing and responding performative acts. While all performatives acquire 
meaning relationally, here I introduce the  category “relational performatives” to 
indicate analytical attention to the broader positionality of the utterance in 
relation to, in response to, in reaction to, or else effected by, other utterances’ 
positional force. Such positionality also reflects how discursive power circulates 
in a field of contestation: to extend the Austinean idiom, here the focus is not 
only on “how to do things with words”, i.e. how to do something in or by saying 
something, but rather on “how to do things to others’ words”, i.e. what power is 
exercised upon someone else’s utterance.  
For the narrower purpose of the empirical part of this project, I isolate and in the 
empirical work will be tracing the following main relational performative 
processes: destabilising performatives, deliberative performatives, and silencing 
performatives. However, it must be noted, that this is not an exhaustive list of all 
potential types of relational performatives participating in contesting security; 
but rather reflects a specific narrower focus for this particular research 
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interested in how official narratives of “war on terror” striving for hegemony have 
been variously engaged with by competing voices.  
As the transitive verb form in each of these terms prompts, each of these 
is a form of performative that is relationally dependent on other, often starkly 
different or resisting performatives; as well as strives for, or at least has the 
potential to, exercise power and enact change in the relational field.577 
Therefore, I have been attentive to how much effort destabilising performatives 
have made to fill in the semiotic space opened up as a result of a dislocatory 
practice with new narrative constructions, particularly with new narrative-
normative chronotopes of alternative national imaginings.  
As pointed out in the theoretical discussion above, while Laclau and 
Mouffean categories such as “dislocation”, “myth” and “imaginary” provide the 
macro-conceptualisation of the broader logics of potential contestation over 
security, speech-act reconceived through Dialogism, and therefore the 
emergent category of “relational performatives”, serves as the micro-
conceptualisation of specific exchanges of competing articulations to be 
studied.   
4.3.2.1.  Destabilising vis-à-vis Deliberative Performances 
 
Destabilising performatives attempt to fundamentally subvert another 
performative, or more broadly a narrative, by putting pressure on the core 
macro-propositions578 such narrative explicitly or implicitly relies on, and 
potentially dislodging the main nodal points on which the targeted narrative is 
built. This can be done by mere deconstructive performances, “deconstruction” 
being narrowly conceived as the Derridean exposure of the instability of a 
narrative by laying bare its reliance on the hierarchy of binary oppositions (for 
example, critique preoccupied with demystifying the Other a foreign/security 
policy discourse might be reliant on). However, apart from, and also beyond 
such deconstruction, to assess the potential effects of destabilising 
performances in a dialogical field, it is useful to turn to Ernesto Laclau’s concept 
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of ‘dislocation’,579 as it is closely related to social and political processes. To 
remind, for Laclau, dislocation is ‘the process by which the contingency of 
discursive structures is made visible’,580 through ‘decentr[ing]’ them and 
potentially ‘induc[ing] an identity crisis for the subject’.581 Employing this insight 
in light of my dialogical-relational approach, I conceive of destabilising 
performances as performative acts that by their intent, or else, by their effect, 
decentre the key nodal points upon which the related narrative hinges, 
shattering the narrative-normative chronotope of a foreign/security discourse.  
 However, beyond deconstruction, as we have seen, dislocation 
presupposes an opened-up space that needs to be replaced by a competing 
new discourse. Thus, Laclau emphases that the denaturalisation of certain 
meanings brought by dislocation also creates a need for re-articulation: 
dislocations ‘stimulate new discursive constructions, which attempt to suture the 
dislocated structure’. 582 Therefore, while assessing a destabilising performance 
in the empirical analysis, we must be attentive to how much effort there was to 
fill in the semiotic space opened up as a result of a dislocatory practice with new 
narrative constructions; in other words, whether and to what effect counter-
/alternative narratives of foreign/security policy have attempted their own 
“suture” of the discursive space, as well as allowed for alternative and 
competing such attempts. 
 Furthermore, in the attempt to understand why certain discourses are 
more successful in hegemonising a discursive field than others, Laclau 
distinguishes between myths and social imaginaries.583 Both emerge as a result 
of a structural dislocation; however, with varying results.  Thus, myths attempt 
to suture the dislocated space by constructing ‘new spaces of 
representation’,584 which will form ‘a new objectivity by means of the 
rearticulation of the dislocated elements’.585 The function of myths, in turn, 
through this “new objectivity”, is to address a variety of social demands and 
dislocations. The degree to which the latter is accomplished will decide whether 
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a “myth” transforms into an “imaginary”:586 ‘when a myth has proved to be 
successful in neutralising social dislocations and incorporating a great number 
of social demands, then we can say that the myth has been transformed to an 
imaginary’.587 In this light, we must be open to the possibility of an assessment 
as to whether and to what extent a potential alternative myth has transformed 
into a new imaginary through the replacement or transformation of the dominant 
narrative chronotope with a new normative chronotopicity and imaginary for the 
nation and the state. 
 
In contrast to destabilising performatives, what I call deliberative performatives 
probe and put pressure on others’ performatives – and by extension, on another 
narrative – predominantly not by an attempted subversion or dislocation. While 
in Aristotelian rhetoric, the term “deliberative” denotes a performance aiming to 
persuade an audience to take or not take an action,588 here I use it to describe 
performances that challenge the official and dominant narrative, only by partly 
refuting the earlier deliberative efforts behind the latter, and/or by demanding 
the fulfilment of the “promises” inherent in earlier persuasive deliberative 
performances that have been at the basis of earlier legitimation. Unlike 
destabilising performances, deliberative performances largely operate from 
within the same or similar paradigm upon which the target narrative is built, and 
therefore, do not attempt to dislodge its key nodal points, but rather probe and 
demand accountability for their re-substantiation. Importantly, such 
performances occur not only in narrowly political argumentation, such as in 
parliamentary or election debates, but may be part of broader discursive 
contestations, such as exchanges in the mass media, discourses of civil groups, 
public-intellectual as well as narrowly academic discourse. However, the 
analytical attention must be not merely on a purported reproduction and 
reification of the dominant discourse through performances that operate from 
within the dominant paradigm, but on how they otherwise relate to/act upon/put 
pressure on the dominant narrative, how they relate to destabilising 
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performances, and how they are in turn being responded to by the 
representatives of the target narrative. Thus, we must seek to trace how these 
deliberative probings effect responsive performances from the target 
interlocutors of the dominant discourse, but also how these configure with 
destabilising performances and in turn with the responsive reactions induced by 
both.  
4.3.2.2.  Silencing Performances 
 
One such responsive reaction induced by destabilising or deliberative 
performances may be silencing performances. In a relational and process-
oriented conceptualisation, I conceive of silencing as dialogical performativity: 
this conceptualisation seeks to understand specifically active discursive 
silencing, i.e. silencing through utterance. If we are to understand how speech 
renders others’ speech less meaningful, and in turn how speech is uttered but 
fails to perform the functions it intends to, then we must tackle not only an 
ontology of how meaning, and with it social action, is made through speech-act, 
but also how such meaning is un-made, and consequently social action made to 
fail, through a speech-act. A dialogically enhanced conception of speech-act 
reconceived through Mikhail Bakhtin’s Dialogism, combined with a critical 
examination of Langton and Hornsby’s ‘illocutionary silencing’ argument (to be 
discussed in a moment), will allow for theorising discursive silencing. 
To recall, for Bakhtin, utterance is always performed ‘in a linguistic 
environment saturated with, and overlaid by, the intentions of others…., 
struggling to achieve its intention amidst a throng of other alien words’.589 
Therefore, I re-conceived of the Austinean “illocution” (as the intended doing-in-
saying) only as an ideal, an individual attempt: it is never fully achieved without 
an agonistic struggle, a tension, or a ‘resistance put up by language against 
intention’.590 Relatedly, as we have seen, meaning is produced relationally, only 
when entered into a complex “dialogical” relationship with other utterances, and 
relies on intertextuality for meaning production. 
In such an agonistic but at the same time intertextual conception of 
speech-act then, speech may be uttered but be rendered silent, i.e. failing to 
perform its intended/attempted illocution; and conversely speech may be 
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uttered intentionally to render others’ speech silent, as well as indirectly, beyond 
intentionality, result in such silencing. In other words, silencing as a dialogical 
speech-act is a particular attempt of rendering others’ performative attempts of 
meaning-fixation unsuccessful, of curtailment of others’ performative power. 
This preliminary definition of silencing must be combined with a particular 
treatment of silencing, often dubbed as ‘illocutionary silencing’ advanced in 
legal philosophy,591 whereby not only an illocutionary act may be silenced, i.e. 
not be allowed to communicate an intended meaning and hence perform the 
intended action, but also an illocutionary act may serve to silence, by creating 
conditions under which someone else’s speech ‘misfires’ as a result of 
‘illocutionary disablement’.592 Silencing then could be said to be present when 
actors – whether intentionally or cumulatively in effect – interfere into the 
process of meaning making/dissemination and perception between certain 
speakers and their audiences.  
However, such a conceptualisation must be taken a step further: if 
speech-acts as dialogical in settings interesting to us are performed through 
activation of certain intertextuality and narrative building in an active 
interrelationship with various public audiences-speakers as well as competing 
public actors, then illocutionary silencing must be conceived as the active 
performative disablement of some such performative capacities, whereby some 
attempts of intertextually producing security meanings and narratives are 
undermined, by attempting to render these attempted meanings muted or non-
perceivable for the intended audiences, as a result of what may be called an 
intertextual disablement. Thus, “non-recognition” in this case is aimed to be 
achieved through the performative constitution of specific conditions under 
which others’ illocutionary force – meaning production through activation of 
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certain intertextuality, rather than other – is meant to be muted for potential 
politically significant audiences. More active modes of silencing occur when 
counter-arguments are being performatively deprived of their illocutionary power 
by demoralising them, reducing their legitimacy through, for instance, actively 
linking certain views and positions to “disloyalty to the nation”, “cowardice”, 
“being soft on terrorists”, etc. In this relation, silencing may be seen as the 
performative attempt of exclusion from negotiating foreign/security policy, by a 
certain internal otherisation creating “us”/“them” boundaries within the society.   
However, again, what is important is not silencing practices in isolation, 
but rather their relationality with other performative practices, such as 
destabilising and deliberative performances. 
  
4.4. Methodological Implications for the Empirical Study 
As the critical overview in chapter 2 demonstrated, inherent to the predominant 
representational model of studying foreign/security policy was a certain 
methodological choice involving the researcher identifying a certain 
representation (of a an event, threat, etc.) and variously tracing them in the 
official discourse and their reproductions in order to point to a certain policy 
option arising from such representations. This assumes that the researcher 
must make a certain “knowledge” decision in advance, or what Hansen calls, 
identify ‘basic discourses’ to be traced. In her case on Bosnia, she identifies the 
two main competing representations as being “Balkans discourse” vs. the 
“genocide discourse”, before embarking on a study to trace how they competing 
in corresponding policy discourses, as well as how they are intertextually built 
on previous texts such as travel writing. For instance, if I was to follow such a 
research methodology in my case on “war on terror”, I would have identified the 
“Vietnam” representation in the Bush discourse and perhaps an antithetical one, 
then trace them in actual593 speech. Such a methodology assumes and in turn 
establishes a certain ontology whereby it is certain identifiable images (for 
Hansen, preferably a smaller number) around specific themes that compete or 
contest, rather than agents competing by mobilising a variety of images and 
representations. It also rests a lot of interpretive responsibility on the researcher 
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to locate these and make decisions about which ones are key to a certain 
contestation.  
 Instead, as set out in theoretical discussion and the framework laid out 
above, being interested in various “doings” and performative attempts 
contesting security, I refrain from structuring the study around themes or 
representations, but rather around questioning my date on what one 
performative act is doing to another relationally and dialogically, variously 
mobilising representations and narrative constrcutions.    
Hence, in light of the discussion on the socio-political context of late 
modernity, and the dialogical-relational framework, in the empirical part, I ask of 
the data a set of questions. These should not be confused with research 
questions:594 they serve to help tease out patterns, in order to answer the 
broader research questions.  
1) How and to what extent have official foreign/security narratives strived to 
circumscribe uncertainty and deliver fixity and the promise of “security”?  
2) How and to what effect have the official narratives been challenged? In 
turn how and to what extent have they dialogically engaged with, been 
destabilised, have accommodated, or changed as a result of such 
critique?  
3) Have the destabilising voices themselves strived for and constructed 
alternative singularising narratives taking on the task of circumscribing 
uncertainly and effecting closure and unity of purpose necessary for 
“imaged communities”; and if yes, in what relationship with official voices; 
and to what effect? If not, then have they attempted to subvert the very 
paradigm of security built on fixity and certainty?   
4) How have these contesting voices responded to each other (the 
discursive realm), as well as to the developments and changes in the 
supra-discursive and non-discursive realms (e.g. on-the-ground 
developments also produced by the very policies and security practices)?     
Considering the dynamic and reciprocal, rather than static and univocal, 
relationship between speaker-turned-audience and audience-turned-speaker, 
the process of negotiations and deliberations are traced in parliaments through 
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party-political contestations, key government statements and the reactions 
around them in parliament, and in the mass media, as well as in the discourses 
of various civil groups such as anti-war social movements, etc. In other words, 
returning to Bakhtin, we must look at the “public square” of today, the 
metaphorical agora, i.e. the public space where multiplicity of voices collide and 
interact. In this regard, especially dissident/anti-war deconstructions and other 
sources of attempted destabilisations are inexorably part of the analysis. Such 
concern is not merely an attention to the broader context, but is indispensable 
to understanding and evaluating the official discourse: evaluating the key 
speech-act illocutions present in such discourse would be impossible, if this 
multiplicity of voices and their dialogical interaction was not the basis for the 
selection as well as the analysis of articulations. 
The dialogical approach necessitates several methodological choices not 
only in the stage of analysing, but also in that of selecting data. Randomised 
data selection will not do, as it will be against the very rationale of dialogism. 
Rather, the latter necessitates a special selective approach sensitive to and 
following the ontological claims about answerability and intertextuality, where, 
rather than following a clear-cut protocol of selection followed by analysis, initial 
selection is constantly replenished by further selections that are necessitated by 
the analysis itself. Thus, this may be simplified into several steps:  
1) Selecting of “basic texts”, i.e. public utterances disseminated at key 
historical junctures before and after a major development;595 
2) Through an initial analysis of these basic texts, identifying what past texts 
and broader discourses they might be referring to and intertextually 
building on (retrospective dialogicity), and therefore make a selection of 
those texts; 
3) Locating what these basic texts might be dialogically responding to, e.g. 
to others’ performative utterances in the present and immediate past, as 
well as to external events and developments and others’ performative 
responses to these (spatial dialogicity); and 
4) Locating what these basic texts are anticipating, and consequently 
responding to pre-emptively (prospective dialogicity); and finally e) re-
analysing the process as a dialogical interaction, even when there is no 
direct physical and explicit exchange among the actors and texts. 
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The indexical indicators identified above then help relationally trace how 
narrative structures interact and change. Thus, first, the narrative-normative 
chronotope in competing narratives is identified through asking questions about 
the modality of articulations (i.e. constructions syntactically based on 
“ought”/“must”/“should” or otherwise referencing obligation and responsibility, 
especially when these are interlinked with constructions of national and global 
identities, and the identities of certain referent objects (such as “terrorists”, “the 
Iraqi people/women”, etc.). These constructions are by definition future-
oriented, and their “futureness” is an analytical focus, in attempting to map 
competing national and/or global “imaginings”. Often the representations of 
such competing “futures” will only be intertextually activated through hyperlinks 
to the historical past. 
In relation to relational performances, my primary focus is identifying and 
coding certain speech-acts in texts, rather than certain themes and 
representations: I identify and qualitatively code596 speech-acts not merely 
according to “what they are doing in saying something” (e.g. “justifying an 
intervention”), but also and importantly according to what they are doing to 
other’s capacity to do things with words. In other words, based on the discursive 
dynamics, the interlocutors’ relative social positionality, as well as the broader 
developments of the moment, I attempt to deduce what the speakers are doing 
with what they are saying in a dialogical exchange, e.g. shifting meanings, 
neutralising, creating new descriptions, challenging, accommodating, etc.; 
whether they are e.g. answering criticism A voiced by the alternative voice B in 
a recent context of C (e.g. after the development D), or delimiting/killing off B’s 
illocutionary potential’, i.e. attempting to silence). Identifying these positional-
relational performances – rather than merely the themes, or what a speech-act 
is doing by constructing a certain representation – is imperative, if we are to 
understand each utterance’s role in the argumentation process. 
To achieve this, the coding of each relational speech-act is done putting 
it into its socio-historical context: each speech/statement is located broadly in 
the political and cultural context in which it was written and distributed, and 
more specifically in the context of the surrounding events, place, time, setting, 
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situated activities,597 as well as other argumentation around it (both supportive 
and challenging). Following this logic, the textual units ascribed a speech-act 
function and coded vary. Thus, first, I view the whole of a formal utterance 
event, for example the full text of a speech/statement, or a press release, in its 
entirety, as performing a speech-act by its very distribution, in full. Second, the 
constitutive elements of each such full text, such as sentences, or even parts of 
sentences, are in turn coded as speech-acts, if any such intentionality is 
located, as actions in response to specific events/developments/utterances, and 
in turn producing/creating new contexts themselves for further utterances. Thus, 
each foreign/security policy public text, as well as its constitutive parts is seen 
as potentially performative, and is analysed in an attempt to understand what 
functions it is trying to perform, and how this relates to the bigger realm of the 
contestation. Moreover, the same textual unit is coded having multiple potential 
illocutions, e.g. one as silencing, and another one as narrative weaving/re-
affirming, or else another one as dislocating while at the same time potentially 
constructing a new imaginary. Finally, in addition to these intended illocutions, a 
certain speech-act, as suggested, once released into the discursive domain, will 
carry with it potential unintended or surplus illocutionary force. These are 
identified and coded, based on reactive utterances in answer to such speech-
acts.  
In a traditional speech-act analysis, more complicated would have been 
the issue of locating perlocutions, i.e. the meanings as actually perceived by 
audiences and acted upon as a result of a successful illocution. 
Epistemologically, perlocutions cannot possibly become fully known from 
discourse analysis alone, and would best be coupled with surveys on public 
perceptions (the broader audiences) as well as agents more immediately 
politically participating in negotiating foreign/security policy (speakers-turned-
audiences and audiences-turned-speakers, in e.g. parliamentary debates, 
election campaigns, exchanges with dissident social movements and other civil 
society groups).598 However, given that the focus here in this study is primarily 
on relational performatives, there are cues present which would serve as basis 
to reliably derive the perlocutions of such performatives; for instance those 
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coming from the very reactions of certain civil society groups through the 
construction of their discourse, as well as through their actions (e.g. protests), if 
any, in response to certain official utterances, as well as in the very responses 
of competing political agents answering, e.g., potentially destabilising or 
dislocatory, or else deliberative performances. These, at times integrated with 
existing polls and surveys, are sufficient grounds to locate the perlocutions of, if 
not every single speech-act, then at least of those that have had highest public 
salience and reverberation.  
To locate silencing practices, the focus is on certain speech-acts which, 
by their very illocution, acquire a certain defining semantic status within the 
official narrative and thus close off possibilities for alternatives; or speech-acts 
with illocutions which directly attempt to rid the alternative voices of their 
illocutionary power by reducing their credibility or discrediting their rational or 
moral position/starting point. 
 
I attempt to trace possible mechanisms of binding by following a certain model 
as an initial guide (modified and readjusted in the course of the study). Thus, I 
start with mapping the early construction of the official “war on terror” narratives 
in the US and the UK respectively, in the initial years following 9/11. This is not 
a representational analysis that claims an explanation or an explication by 
tracing how a specific narrative representation “made possible” a certain policy 
(see the critical literature review in chapter one). Instead, as a heuristic device, 
it serves an initial departure point, from where various supportive and 
alternative/challenging voices are traced and their dialogical relations outlined. 
To locate and re-construct the narrative-normative chronotopes inherent in the 
US and UK official discourses of “war on terror” in the first few years after 9/11, I 
identify and analyse data selected from official public utterances spanning 
approximately from 11 September 2001 to end of 2005 (covering the early, and 
early-intermediate periods). These are statements, speeches and other texts 
produced at public appearances, primarily by the president/prime-minister, but 
also by other high ranking officials at important historic junctures, and 
specifically those that have potentially attracted the largest audiences (e.g. 
through prime-time televised presidential addresses). For a full list of selected 
texts, see Appendix A. 
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I then turn to a systematic analysis of destabilising/dislocatory and 
deliberative critique in the “intermediate stage”, i.e. 2003-2007. The data are 
drawn from the articulations found in the mass media, critical politicians’ 
speeches, pronouncements and written texts, as well as those of anti-war 
activists. For selection of texts, I concentrate on momentous events, such as 
the revelations about the Dodgy Iraq Dossier in February 2003; Bush-Blair 
deliberations, and parliamentary debates ahead of the Iraq war; intensified 
mass anti-war demonstrations across the world in January to March 2003, etc., 
as part of the non-discursive and supra-discursive events to which the 
contesting voices must respond. They also become moments which show how 
the real-life chronotope becomes a challenge to the representational, i.e. 
narrative-normative chronotope. The texts are selected from public 
pronouncements of active or former politicians; the media, and social 
movements such as anti-war movements, or civic groups. For more detail, see 
chapter five and for a full list of all texts in this category, see Appendix B. 
Furthermore, I turn to locating how official discourse has reacted and 
responded to such destabilising and deliberative challenges through restorative 
performances, or silencing. These are most salient and therefore more 
observable in actual performative exchanges involving settings, where several 
discursive practices react and respond each other, e.g. parliamentary debates, 
election campaigns, question and answer sessions in press conferences, etc.599 
Concentrating on the same intermediate period of 2003-2007, I trace how 
destabilising and deliberative critique have differently invited, or helped create 
discursive space for, restorative performances by the proponents of the official 
“war on terror” narrative; and to analyse patterns of the various ways the 
respective governments have responded to such critique; taking a closer look at 
specifically silencing practices as part of such restoratives. To trace how and to 
what effect contesting narrative-normative chronotopes relate and respond to 
one another, I attempt to locate the axiological modality of utterances (e.g. what 
“ought/should/must be done” in relation to an event or development, pointing to 
responsibilities and promises), as well as explicit or implicit references to the 
past and constructions of the “future”.  
Finally, to further trace the effects of the dialogical process over more 
specific policy areas of “war on terror”, I take a closer look at a specific “within-
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case case”, already in the late period (2008-2012), namely the case of 
President Obama’s failure to close down the Guantánamo Bay prison. Indeed, 
ideally such a specific case analysis in the US could have been accompanied 
by a similar case drawn from the UK. However, given the space and resource 
restrictions, as well as the fact that this thesis had to conduct an extensive 
theory development task in the first part, I have chosen to limit the analysis of 
the later stage through a “within-case case” only drawn from the US 
developments. Nonetheless, as regards the aim of the empirical part, i.e. the 
demonstration of the applicability of the dialogical-relational framework, the 
analysis of the intermediate period in both countries provides ample material. 
On the other hand, while the working hypothesis about potential discursive 
constraints on policy change is more salient in the late-period US case study 
with regards to Obama’s Guantanamo pledge, potential evidence to support it is 
shown to be emerging from the analysis of broader contestations over “war on 
terror” both in the US and the UK also in the intermediate period. 
 
4.5. Conclusion 
I started this chapter by arguing in favour of a ‘temporal separability’ of agent 
and structure,600 and relatedly a distinction between the discursive, the non-
discursive and the supra-discursive realms. The supra-discursive encompasses 
social and semiotic structures, which in the given temporal point in time are 
already emerging or else have already been reified or sedimented into 
institutions, and therefore at the given moment in time pre-date the actors 
involved, as well as the actions in the narrower discursive negotiation over an 
issue.  
I then situating foreign/security discourses of Western democratic states 
in the supra-discursive field of late modernity with important implications for 
identifying the social functions of such discourses; for reconceiving of actors 
(audiences-speakers) in a dialogical exchange; and for theorising binding. As 
the world becomes more complex and unpredictable in the late modern age, 
Western ‘risk societies’ become ‘increasingly preoccupied with the future (and 
with safety)’,601 seeking to control contingency: the promise of planning, 
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managing and controlling the national “future” through foreign/security policy 
becomes dependent on, and responding to, not just the primal angst of death 
more generally, but “risk society’s” fear of immediate, perceived or real risks to 
their livelihoods and to their unhindered participation in the late modern system, 
more specifically. Here we witness an official anxiety to (re)claim the role of 
providing insurance from global “external risks”, when the reality of 
“manufactured risks” is constantly undermining the claim to such capacity of the 
state. This anxiety to practice and satisfy the “will to certitude” necessitates the 
containment/disciplining of the plurality of possible future scenarios resultant 
from ever expanding manufactured risks, thus making circumscribing 
uncertainly the broader function of foreign/security discourse. Thus, I suggested 
that foreign/security policy discourse is a future-oriented discourse of control 
and progress caught up in the paradox of reconciling the will to certitude with 
the repercussions of ever more complex global uncertainties of the late modern 
age. 
Against this backdrop, I then considered the implications of Giddens’ 
‘reflexive modernization’. The official foreign/security discourse represents a 
tension between the need to continue projecting the promise of progress and 
certitude of the Enlightenment, and the need to engage variously with the 
plurality of other voices destabilizing such a project, or variously expressing 
discontent or disbelief: in the information age and age of reflexive society, it 
simply cannot achieve its task without engaging with/responding, and in 
Bakhtinian terms being answerable to, the heteroglot discursive field comprised 
of the voices of social movements, alternative media, academic and public 
intellectuals, as well as voices of those more immediately in the narrower 
political field. Consequently, the study of foreign/security discourse has no 
choice but to engage closely and relationally with these voices indispensable to 
the dialogic process of negotiating foreign policy and security.  
The relational character of and tensions in this heteroglot field also made 
a re-conceptualisation of “audiences” an imperative. Rather than mere (even if 
inter-subjectively conceived) “receivers”, in the dialogical view, audiences turn 
into speakers and vice versa, since performances are variously responded to, 
generating a plethora of other performances. Furthermore, considering the 
presence of multiple segments of audiences intended by one and the same 
utterance, as well as those not intended/anticipated by the utterer, and given 
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the spread of communication technologies and almost unrestricted access to 
publicly available information, the foreign/security policy utterance becomes 
inescapably hypertextually linked to the “docuverse” of other utterances. I 
suggested that this increases the possibility for scrutiny, critique and probing of 
foreign/security claims by various audience-speakers, which in turn makes 
responsive performances answering such critique and probing, as well as 
responding to changing non-discursive and supra-discursive realities and 
others’ responses to these an imperative for foreign/security policy interlocutor. 
Furthermore, in order to understand how such interactions and 
contestations – of actors and narratives – causally produce outcomes, we must 
seek to integrate this with an analysis of a) major challenges to key narratives 
and performative moves, importantly including the destabilising performances to 
the dominant foreign/security policy narratives, as well as the performative 
demands for accountability in case of the official narrative; and b) the conditions 
of possibility presented by the supra-discursive realm – i.e. institutions and 
channels through which major challenges and negotiations can be performed – 
as well as the effects of the developments emanating from the non-discursive 
field on the dynamics of contestations at home.  Only having treated all this as 
an interdependent reality can we hope to come close to understanding causal 
effects of foreign/security discourse on policy and continuation and/or change 
thereof. This is sought through the proposed analytical tools, namely competing 
narrative-normative chronotopes, and relational performatives such as 
destabilising, deliberative and silencing performatives, tracing the diversity and 
tensions in the field of negotiating foreign/security policy. Any outcome 
(constrained or slowed-down change being one such outcome), and the 
mechanism behind such outcome, can only be known, when the relationality of 
all these “doings” of positional performatives is assessed through an empirical 
study, to which I now turn in Part two of this thesis. 
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PART TWO 
 
Chapter 5: Pre-9/11 Discursive Foundations, and the Chronotopicity 
of Early Post-9/11 Official “War on Terror” Discourses in the US and 
the UK  
 
5.1. Introduction 
The present chapter primarily concerns itself with the task of locating and re-
constructing the narrative-normative chronotopes inherent in the US and UK 
official discourses of “war on terror” in the first few years after 9/11 (roughly 
2001-2005).  This is the first step in the empirical analysis, which, following the 
dialogical-relational framework developed in Part One, locates competing 
narrative-normative chronotopes; and relational performatives, as indexical 
indicators through which relationality among voices and mechanisms of 
continuity/change can be traced at a later stage. While relational performatives 
will be analysed at length in the subsequent two chapters, this chapter focuses 
on the narrative structures of the official discourses only, temporarily bracketing 
off other voices, largely as a heuristic exercise which can serve as a departure 
point, a platform, upon which the relationality of various competing voices can 
later be configured. It also demonstrates how actors attempt to construct a 
desired closure and singularity through the official foreign/security narrative and 
thus monologise the field; and brings out any major similarities and differences 
between the US and the UK discourses.  
 Each of these official narratives is, indeed, deeply embedded in cultural-
historical pre-conditions in each of the countries, in other words in the social 
and semiotic structures pre-dating agents, to which they must respond. 
Therefore, in order to be able to perform such an exercise of reconstructing the 
chronotopic structure of the official “war on terror” narratives, a certain 
genealogical inquiry602 tracing the pre-9/11 preconditions of these discourses is 
imperative. Hence, the purpose of this chapter is two-fold: first, on the one 
hand, to trace the pre-9/11 foundations of the Bush doctrine of “pre-
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emption/prevention”, rhetorically presented as “recast” by the events of 9/11; 
and on the other hand, to explore how the Blair Doctrine of International 
Community adopted in 1999 shaped and constrained the post-9/11 Blair 
discourse on “war on terror”; and second, to analyse and map the narrative-
normative chronotopes inherent in the discourses of Bush and Blair, 
respectively, already in the post-9/11 period.  
The first of these tasks is performed in lieu of a conventional historical 
review. The omission of the history of the “war on terror” itself is justified by it 
being a recent development extensively covered in academic and non-
academic literature, as well as by the intent to avoid repetition: some key 
developments are discussed later, along with the data analysis itself.  
With regards to the US official discourse, I trace the transition from the 
discourse of “containment” with regards to Iraq dominant in 1990s, to one of 
“intervention” and unilateral “pre-emption/prevention”, which became the 
cornerstone of the Bush Doctrine after 9/11. Contrary to mainstream analysis, 
as well as the stance of the official narrative itself, through the analysis of 
primary sources, I show, that the post-9/11 US national security policy and 
discourse, rather than “recast” by 9/11, were in fact building on the security 
discourses of the post-Cold War period emerging in 1990s. In addition, I 
contend that instead of being a case of “obfuscation” of the pre-9/11 intertextual 
links of the “war on terror” discourse,603 at least for some segment of audience, 
the discourse in fact relied on the very activation of the intertextual links with the 
older discourses. In contrast, the Blair discourse constructed a less ruptured 
narrative, and relied on explicit intertextual links with the New Labour discourse 
of late 1990s. I demonstrate how the legitimation of Britain’s involvement in the 
“war on terror” intertextually relied on such pre-9/11 discourse, and how 
eventually the promise of “internationalism/multilateralism” morphed into a 
discourse that supported its opposite – unilateral intervention, along with the 
US, into Iraq.  
In tracing the spatio-temporal semiotic structure of the official narratives, 
I identify the Chronotope of Cyclical Triumph prevalent in the US official post-
9/11 narrative.  In contrast, in the UK, the prevalent chronotope is that of Agent 
of Change. While Cyclical Triumph constructs a “future” for America, which is 
the return of the ideal “past”, where absolute “triumph” over a transcendental, 
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teleological and un-caused “evil” is written as a historical fact in the future (i.e. 
assured, certain and unavoidable); through the Chronotope of Agent of Change 
Britain’s “future” is depicted as dependent on the agency of the nation in the 
“present” to make a choice of identity and a global role. This role – intertextually 
linked with Churchill’s  metaphor of Britain as a “bridge”, and Blair’s Britain 
playing a ‘pivotal role’ in ‘re-ordering’ the world – is that of a moral and 
pragmatic leader for transforming national and global politics that adapts to the 
changing realities of globalisation; “evil” being partly caused by such changing 
realities. Thus, the chronotope is transformative, both for the nation and the 
international community, rather than cyclical.    
Section 5.2 explores the pre-9/11 political and discursive foundations of 
the Bush and Blair discourses on “war on terror”; while section 5.3 investigates 
the narrative-normative chronotopes of the early post-9/11 official discourses on 
“war on terror” in the US and the UK.  
 
5.2. The Pre-9/11 Discursive Foundations of “War on Terror” and 
“Rupture” vis-à-vis “Continuity” in Early Post-9/11 Narratives  
There is a great temptation, or even a genre-specific requirement, to start 
accounts of the “war on terror” with a specific temporal point, that of 9/11, and to 
portray it as a moment of rupture from which a crisis and subsequent reactions 
have followed. This form of writing is found in most mainstream coverage 
(whether academic or non-academic),
604
 as well as in some otherwise critical 
accounts.605 It replicates, and at the same time stabilises, the writing of “war on 
terror” in the official discourse following the attacks, where 9/11 appears in 
‘temporal discontinuity’606 with any previous American/Western actions and 
global developments that have led to the build-up of the events on 9/11. 
Moreover, such writing of 9/11 presents the decisions around “war on terror”, as 
well as the adoption/revision of home institutions and regulations to sustain it, 
as necessitated and hence as “recast” by 9/11. 
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 In this section, I trace the discursive foundations of the “war on terror” 
official narrative in the per-9/11 foreign policy developments in the US and the 
UK. Towards this end, rather than offering a historical overview of the period 
under investigation, namely the post-9/11 decade, I, rather, offer a pre-historical 
overview of some of the political developments and discursive trends that 
comprised some of the conditions of possibility for the post-9/11 foreign policy 
official discourses in the US and the UK. These are covered in subsections 
5.2.1 and 5.2.1, respectively.  
5.2.1. The Early Discursive Foundations of the Bush Doctrine 
 
The Bush Doctrine is often presented by mainstream analysis, as well as by the 
official narrative, as having been “shaped” by 9/11.607 Instead of a conventional 
historical review, in this section I trace the pre-9/11 foundations of the US “war 
on terror” discourse, by demonstrating the contrary, along with authors such as 
Ketter and Mitchell,608 Dunmire,609 and Lazar and Lazar.610 Through some 
primary sources, I trace the foundations, or at least the conditions of possibility 
of the Bush Doctrine and the subsequent “war on terror” discourse to the post-
Cold War period in 1990s.  
The links between the Bush Doctrine and the early post-Cold war 
discourse can be traced back to early 1990s. Thus, in 1992, the so-called 
Wolfowitz Doctrine, i.e. the draft of the Defense Planning Guidance for 1994–99 
by U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Paul Wolfowitz, leaked into the 
New York Times.611 According to the newspaper, the document built the case 
for a one-superpower world order, where the United States ‘must sufficiently 
account for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them 
from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political 
and economic order’.612 The draft document suggested, that the US strategy 
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‘must now refocus on precluding the emergence of any potential global 
competitor’.613 In addition, it entitled the US the right to use unilateral pre-
emptive military force to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, in countries including Iraq and North Korea.614 The New York Times 
went on to comment that the draft was ‘conspicuously devoid of references to 
collective action through the United Nations, which provided the mandate for the 
allied assault on Iraqi forces in Kuwait and which may soon be asked to provide 
a new mandate to force President Saddam Hussein to comply with his cease-
fire obligations’, and dubbed it as ‘the clearest rejection to date of collective 
internationalism’.615  
The draft’s originality was never substantiated by the Pentagon at the 
time,616 but even the final document released about a month later, which 
according to some had been revised and amended in response to the public 
controversy sparked by the leak, preserved  the main tenets, particularly, that 
‘the U.S. must retain ability to defend critical interests unilaterally’.617 
Later, the authors of those guidelines, Paul Wolfowitz and Dick Cheney, 
became the founders of what was to become the neo-conservative think-tank 
Project for a New American Century (PNAC) and throughout the 90s, during the 
Democrat Clinton presidency, continuously influenced policy and strategy. 
Thus, in late 1990s, PNAC significantly influenced the growing view in the US 
that the Iraqi regime cannot be contained any longer. In January 1998, a Letter 
to President Clinton on Iraq signed by Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz and 
other neoconservatives was sent to President Clinton, pointing to the erosion of 
the policy of containment and the continuing danger posed by Saddam Hussein. 
The suggested solution was a new strategy aimed ‘at the removal of Saddam 
Hussein’s regime from power’.618 In the meantime, to make such an aim 
practicable, the letter pressed for a clear doctrinal shift in US global policy away 
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from institutionalism and collective defence, to unilateral action: ‘[w]e believe the 
U.S. has the authority under existing UN resolutions to take the necessary 
steps, including military steps, to protect our vital interests in the Gulf. In any 
case, American policy cannot continue to be crippled by a misguided insistence 
on unanimity in the UN Security Council’ (emphasis added).619 In February 
1998, a larger group of Neoconservatives led by Rumsfeld and Walfowitz 
addressed another letter to President Clinton. Once again warning, that 
sanctions were insufficient in dealing with Saddam, this letter called instead for 
a ‘broad-based insurrection’ to be led by the Iraqi National Congress.620  
In response to the first letter, Clinton appeared to be reluctant to openly 
communicate any clear-cut doctrinal shift and in the State of the Union Address, 
at least declaratively, remained within the framework of multilateralism and 
acting with the United Nations. However, at a closer look, he did suggest the 
need ‘to write international rules of the road for the 21st century protecting those 
who join the family of nations and isolating those who do not’.621 Part of this 
(re)writing, as I will demonstrate, was the doctrinal shift to unilateralism and 
“pre-emption”/“prevention”. Importantly, he also speaks of the need to ‘combat 
an unholy axis of new threats from terrorists, international criminals and drug 
traffickers’,622 and already the links between terrorists and WMDs, as well as 
terrorists and Saddam, start taking root.  
Indeed, this address could be seen as a partial but nonetheless 
important submission to the Neoconservatives’ demands; perhaps an intended 
performative act preparing the discursive grounds for a possible toppling of 
Saddam. However, Clinton’s response to the second Open letter was more 
concrete action – signing of the Iraqi Liberation Act of 1998 passed by the 
Congress, calling for a regime change in Iraq: ‘[i]t should be the policy of the 
United States to support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam 
Hussein from power in Iraq and to promote the emergence of a democratic 
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government to replace that regime’ (emphasis added).623 Indeed, the Act 
suggested assistance to ‘Iraqi democratic opposition organizations’624 to 
promote internally generated, rather than externally and militarily imposed 
regime change. However, given Clinton Administration’s endorsement of 
Operation Desert Fox only a month later, this difference may have escaped 
broader public, as “regime change” as a legitimate foreign policy aim was 
already discursively taking root.  
Moreover, and importantly, the fact that the Act was later to be cited in 
the October 2002 Iraq Resolution authorising military force, and also referred to 
many times by President Bush, shows that the performative resonance created 
around the Act was being used as an intertextual resource activating earlier 
performative acts to further legitimise and normalise military intervention. This 
contention is contrary to e.g. Dunmire’s analysis, who argues that the post-9/11 
official “war on terror” discourse took all pains to obfuscate any links with pre-
9/11 security discourse and policy.625  While she carefully records and analyses 
such links between the post-Cold War US security discourse and the post/9-11 
security strategy, and defines them as ‘intertextual links’, she then goes on to 
argue and demonstrate how these links were ‘hidden’ from the public through 
the construction of the post-9/11 “rupture” narrative, whereby “threats” to the 
US, and therefore strategy were recast by 9/11. Along with Keller and Mitchel, 
she contends that such obfuscation helped create ‘mass amnesia’ about the 
origins of the post-9/11 security strategy.626 However, such a take on 
“intertextuality” is conceptually confusing. If we are to remain faithful to its 
Bakhtinian origins in Dialogism: intertextuality works through (re)activation of 
meanings spatially and temporally; it is the very infrastructure for meaning 
making, and therefore cannot be “hidden”.627 Conceptually then, if the 
genealogical foundations of the post/9/11 discourses were being concealed 
through the “war on terror” narrative, the links then did not constitute 
“intertextuality”. However, this is not a purely conceptual issue, or one of 
terminology: rather than evidence of “obfuscating” the pre-9/11 foundations of 
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the “war on terror” narrative, the “rupture” narrative was indicative of the need to 
appeal variously to different segments of audiences. This will become clearer in 
a moment.     
Returning to Clinton’s discourse, before a full-fledged normalisation of 
“preemption” could take place, the official discourse had to remain partly within 
the confines of the then dominant and ontologically prior narrative (that of 
“containment” with regards to Iraq), and to a certain extent be “answerable” to 
the internal rationale of that narrative. Thus, e.g. despite being a full-fledged 
invasion striking not only facilities allegedly linked to the production and storage 
of weapons, but also government command-and-control facilities, Operation 
Desert Fox, ‘was only advertised as helping “degrade” Iraq’s WMD 
capabilities...[and] largely justified in terms of reinforcing the policy of 
containment’.628 This was not surprising: given that the discourse of pre-
emption/prevention was still nascent and in-the-making, the official rhetoric 
remained within the still-dominant discourse of the time, namely that of 
‘containment’; hence, the policy had to be justified via this particular narrative.  
Nonetheless, the neoconservative campaign to topple Saddam in late 
1990s was having a strong influence on public opinion: reportedly, before the 
Operation Desert Fox, 70% (against 25%) of the American population 
supported the idea that force must be used to topple Saddam, rather than 
continue to act within the UN framework.629 Indeed, such public opinion 
statistics in itself is no empirical ground to conclude that this was the effect of 
the above-described discursive processes. However, this might be evidence of 
leading Neoconservatives’ influence on foreign policy, and Clinton’s 
performative moves in the State of the Union and later: the proposition that 
“containment was not working”, as well as the nascent discursive constructions 
of the links “Saddam-terrorism” and “Saddam-WMDs”, were already taking hold 
in the public.  
Most importantly, it may be argued that the efforts to forge such links, as 
well as the legitimation of unilateral efforts to topple the Iraqi regime were 
present in the pre-9/11 period of George W. Bush’s discourse, namely during 
his election campaign and the period immediately after his coming to power in 
2000. This view is contrary to most accounts holding that ‘[n]either Iraq nor 
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terrorism were [sic.] in the 2000 presidential campaign’.630 Moreover, it is 
against interpretations such as ‘[e]verything George W. Bush and Dick Cheney 
said during the campaign indicated that they thought Bill Clinton had used the 
military too much in his foreign policy, not too little. They outlined a stance of 
maintaining the policy of containment while being more selective about the use 
of force’.631 Similarly, it is opposite prevailing views that ‘Bush presidency 
settled in its first year into what began to look like a new isolationism’.632 
Indeed, at a pre-election debate with Democratic candidate Al Gore, 
Bush states: ‘I would be very careful about using our troops as nation builders. I 
believe the role of the military is to fight and win war...I believe we are 
overextended in too many places’.633 However, to interpret a statement such as 
this one as a call for less use of force is misleading, since it retrospectively and 
intertextually gains a new illocution, in the face of another more direct Bush 
statement at the next debate: ‘I don’t think our troops ought to be used for 
what’s called nation-building. I think our troops ought to be used to help 
overthrow a dictator...when it’s in our best interests’ (emphasis added).634   
Moreover, in a June 2001 Testimony to the Senate detailing the 
discussions underway towards the upcoming Quadrennial Defense Review, 
Defence Secretary Rumsfeld warned: ‘[a] policy of intentional vulnerability by 
the Western nations could give rogue states the power to hold our people 
hostage to nuclear blackmail – in an effort to prevent us from projecting force to 
stop aggression’ (emphasis added).635 This speech-act seems to be aimed at 
silencing internationalism/multilateralism promoting discourses, whether 
potential or actual, arguing against the pre-emption/prevention doctrine. The 
phrase ‘a policy of intentional vulnerability’ is an allusion to such advocates, 
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while ‘projecting force to stop aggression’ is clearly a euphemism for unilateral 
preventative military action.   
One further statement demonstrating the early construction of the 
discursive grounds for the doctrinal shift to a pre-emptive/preventative strategy 
follows: ‘[s]o if we are to extend this period of peace and prosperity, we need to 
prepare now for the new and different threats we will face in the decades ahead 
– not wait until they fully emerge’ (emphasis added).636 Finally, after several 
statements (re)constructing the threats from rogue states able to use WMDs 
against America, as well as alluding to Iraq as potentially one of them, Rumsfeld 
concludes: ‘[t]he U.S. must be able to impose terms on an adversary that 
assure regional peace and stability – including, if necessary, the occupation of 
an adversary’s territory and change of its regime....[and] decisively defeat an 
adversary at the time, place and manner of our choosing’.637  
Strikingly, all of the above pre-9/11 propositions in Rumsfeld’s 
Testimony, if only with slight re-formulations, entered the Quadrennial Security 
Review (QSR) adopted on 30 September 2001, as well as the National Security 
Strategy (NSS) issued by President Bush in September 2002,638 both often 
presented in literature, as well as by officials themselves, as having been 
“recast” by the 9/11 events. Thus, far from being recast by 9/11, the main tenets 
of these strategic documents had already been largely formulated before 9/11.   
Moreover, it is not accidental, that Rumsfeld’s above proposition about 
“acting before threats fully emerge”, in strikingly similar syntax and vocabulary, 
but more importantly in similar illocution, is repeated in these documents, and is 
continuously echoed in George W. Bush’s key speeches legitimising the Iraq 
war. Thus, in his Axis of Evil speech in January 2002, one more time linking the 
possibility of WMDs passing onto terrorists by Iraq, Bush invokes the same 
premise of “not-wait-until-threats-fully-emerge”, in other words the pre-
emption/prevention doctrine: ‘I will not wait on events, while dangers gather. I 
will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer”.639 Similarly, the same year 
at the West Point graduation speech, Bush declares: ‘[w]e cannot defend 
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America and our friends by hoping for the best....If we wait for threats to fully 
materialize, we will have waited too long’.640 And in his perhaps most popular 
line, in a 7 October 2002 speech, Bush urges: ‘America must not ignore the 
threat gathering against us. Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for 
the final proof – the smoking gun – that could come in the form of a mushroom 
cloud’.641 If Dunmire’s above-mentioned thesis were correct, namely if any links 
with the earlier security discourse were being discursively obfuscated and 
concealed in the post-9/11 “rupture” narrative, then these propositions and 
constructions would not have found their place in the post-9/11 speeches and 
documents, often appearing verbatim, or in strikingly similar locutions.  
The apparent paradox, however, can be resolved if we recall the plurality 
of audiences an official security discourse addresses and dialogically engages 
with, as discussed in chapter 3. Thus, in the post-9/11 environment, the Bush 
Administration, was appealing to at least two segments of the American 
audiences: a) the Conservative political elite and broader Conservative publics, 
who – either having been involved in decision-making or having been politically 
active – were expecting a certain continuity and consistency with the emergent 
post-Cold war security discourse of pre-emption/prevention; and b) those 
segments of the audiences who either had previously contested that earlier 
emergent discourse, or else had been politically less active and would have little 
memory of these earlier constructions. Drawing on earlier policy documents and 
speeches and encouraging activation of intertextual links with the newly 
emergent post-Cold War discourse of “pre-emption/prevention” was addressed 
to the former, i.e. served the need to meet the expectations of the conservative 
elite and publics who had internalised the newly emergent post-Cold war 
security discourse; whereas the “rupture” narrative was addressed to the latter, 
i.e. served the need to legitimate the new security doctrine among these latter 
segments – through silencing dissent and through creating a powerful crisis 
narrative for the broader public. Bush’s plea to his colleagues to construct the 
2002 National Security Strategy ‘in plain English, not in academic 
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jargon,…[which] the boys in Lubbock ought to be able to read’,642 demonstrates 
such specific targeting of the conservative segments in audiences for the 
“rupture” narrative officially sealed in the Strategy document.    
Indeed, in contrast, for the broader public especially in the US, the 
presence of such earlier constructions was being mostly overwritten by the 
official post-9/11 constructions of a narrative claiming the preemption approach 
to be a “shift” of doctrine that happened due to 9/11, and as Leon Fuerth, 
national security adviser to Vice President Al Gore, commented, would become 
‘a demarcation point as stark as B.C. and A.D in U.S. foreign policy’.643 Indeed, 
in the 9/11 environment of an “unprecedented crisis”,644 it was rhetorically much 
more effective, for securitization purposes, to construct a “rupture” narrative 
whereby the “threats” and therefore strategy were claimed to have been “recast” 
by 9/11, thus necessitating exceptional measures. 
Indeed, the pre- and post-9/11 discursive dynamics that produced the US 
official “war on terror” narrative must be read in the broader context of tensions 
and debates about America’s role in the world and foreign policy since the end 
of World War II. On the one hand, as Tucker argues, there has been a tension 
between the roles of “an Empire” and “a Republic”;645 and on the other hand, 
there has been a tension between realist and liberal foreign policy schools of 
thought among practitioners.646 Through a liberal-internationalist post-war 
policy, America had become an “empire” creating and maintaining the 
international order through its key institution-building role.647 In this context, the 
neo-conservative pressures on the Clinton Administration and subsequently on 
Bush Junior may be seen as part of the anxiety to reclaim such imperial role. In 
the context of the intervention in the Frist Gulf War, Bush Senior had proclaimed 
America’s post-Cold War role to be that of ‘forg[ing] for ourselves and for future 
generations a new world order’,648 ‘where diverse nations are drawn together in 
common cause, to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind: peace and 
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security, freedom and the rule of law’ (emphasis added).649 Thereby, he had 
answered the question ‘Do we want to remain a superpower?’ with ‘a 
resounding “yes”’;650 and if Tucker’s definition of “empire” (‘hav[ing] as its 
purpose the creation and maintenance of [international] order’651) is correct, he 
had also confirmed America’s continued imperial ambition.     
In this light then, when in the aftermath of 9/11, President Bush 
proclaimed his two of the most (in)famous phrases ‘you are either with us or 
against us’, and ‘Axis of Evil’, rather than constructing a rupture narrative, he 
was in fact drawing on continuities and relying on the activation of intertextual 
links with the pre-9/11 debates and official articulations around national identity 
and foreign policy, at least for an important segment of American and global 
audiences. Thus, ‘you are either with us or against us’ gained a new 
significance as the “logical” continuation of the American post-World War II 
‘empire by invitation’652 and post-Cold War promise of “a new world order”; 
whereas “Axis of Evil” drew clear parallels with the Cold War era 
characterisation of the Soviet bloc as the “evil empire”, thereby affirming 
America’s “right” to define the contours of the global security field.              
 
5.2.2. The Blair Doctrine, and its post-9/11 Revisions 
   
While the British post-9/11 official discourse had many parallels with the US, it 
constructed a less starkly ruptured narrative, and one with more explicit 
intertextual links with the earlier New Labour discourse. Along with the narrative 
of “evil” and the articulation of a “new security environment” brought about by 
9/11 echoing the Bush’s narrative, in Britain, Blair’s government took pains to 
emphasise continuity with the promised principles of 
“internationalism/multilateralism”, “ethical policy” and “new interventionism” set 
out in the pre-9/11 New Labour discourse. This sub-section traces the dynamics 
how the legitimation of Britain’s involvement in the “war on terror” intertextually 
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relied on such pre-9/11 discourse, and also how eventually the promise of 
“internationalism/multilateralism” would morph into a discourse that supported 
its opposite – unilateral intervention, along with the US, into Iraq.  
 
Yet in the 1997 Election Manifesto, within the framework of its “new approach” 
to foreign policy, New Labour had promised ‘embracing the interdependence of 
the modern world, working towards multilateral rather than unilateral solutions to 
international problems’,653 as well as making ‘the protection and promotion of 
human rights a central part of...[UK] foreign policy’.654 This was further 
developed in Robin Cook’s Mission Statement as Foreign Secretary, after 
Labour electoral victory:  
Britain also has a national interest in the promotion of our values and confidence in 
our identity. That is why the fourth goal of our foreign policy is to secure the 
respect of other nations for Britain’s contribution to keeping the peace of the world 
and promoting democracy around the world. ...Our foreign policy must have an 
ethical dimension and must support the demands of other peoples for the 
democratic rights on which we insist for ourselves (emphases added).655 
Here, the much lauded New Labour’s “ethical dimension” in foreign policy was 
already defined in terms of an obligation, a specific obligation to support 
democratisation, which in turn promised ‘to secure the respect of other nations’. 
Furthermore, Cook once again reinstated that ‘[t]he Labour Government will put 
human rights at the heart of our foreign policy’.656 
The latter commitment was formalised on April 22 1999, in the midst of 
the Kosovo war, when already Prime Minister Tony Blair justified intervention by 
the international community in the affairs of other nations. This was done partly 
in the logic of what was to become the “Responsibility to Protect” principle and 
partly in the rationale of self-interest newly-defined. Thus, in his speech ‘The 
Doctrine of International Community’, Blair stressed that ‘[a]cts of genocide can 
never be a purely internal matter’, while holding that ‘[m]any of our domestic 
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problems are caused on the other side of the world...Conflict in the Balkans 
causes more refugees in Germany and here in the US’. 657 
By the end of the Kosovo conflict, “intervention” was affirmed with more 
confidence than ever as ‘the morally right thing to do’658 for the UK, and as a 
newly-emerging principle and obligation for the international community at large, 
whereby the principle of national sovereignty would not be privileged and would 
be forfeited, if the given state had abused their own people. Nonetheless, in 
contrast to the trends in the US, in the UK the Blair Doctrine retained a strong 
commitment to internationalism, and “intervention” as a foreign policy principle 
was generally deemed as a multilateral, rather than a unilateral endeavour: 
‘[a]ny new rules [of when to intervene] however will only work if we have 
reformed international institutions with which to apply them’.659 
Indeed, the Blair doctrine must be viewed within the broader context of 
the on-going debates about Britain’s post-imperial role in the world and hence of 
national identity since the end of World War II; particularly in the context of the 
contestation over the competing discourses of “exceptionalism” and “decline”.660 
While the narrative of “decline” is about Britain’s loss of great-power status, 
epitomised by US Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s 1962 remark that ‘Great 
Britain has lost an empire and has not yet found a role’,661 the narrative of 
“exceptionalism” is traceable to Winston Churchill’s 1948 symbolic image of 
Britain being exceptionally and uniquely positioned at the heart of the ‘three 
circles’ of  ‘the British Commonwealth and Empire,…the English-speaking world 
…[and] United Europe’. 662 Britain, in this image, has ‘the opportunity of joining 
them all [three circles] together’.663 Importantly, as part of this “exceptionalism”, 
Churchill also advanced the idea that Britain must define its quest in such 
uniting mission looking beyond immediate self-interest and have a benevolent 
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contribution in the world,664 and that Britain ‘hold[s] the key to opening a safe 
and happy future to humanity’.665 In this context then, Blair’s embracing of a 
new assertive role in the world was a manifestation of the broader post-war 
British ‘reluctance to relinquish some elements of great-power status’.666 
In setting out his doctrine of “exceptionalism”, Blair assigned Britain the 
privileged role of a “bridge” between the US and Europe, with a heavy emphasis 
on the US-UK special relationship: ‘[o]ur aim should be to deepen our 
relationship with the US at all levels. We are the bridge between the US and 
Europe. Let us use it. When Britain and America work together on the 
international scene, there is little we can’t achieve’.667 British and American 
“exceptionalisms” were thus interlinked, and Britain’s mission to be a ‘force for 
good in the world’ proclaimed by Cook was to be accomplished in close 
partnership with the US. Moreover, Blair declared an end to a long search for 
identity and role, and assigned a ‘pivotal power’ role to the UK, which could 
make a vital difference in world affairs:  
I believe that search can now end. We have got over our Imperial past – and the 
withdrawal symptoms. No longer do we want to be taken seriously just for our 
history, but for what we are and what we will become. We have a new role. Not to 
look back and try to re-create ourselves as the pre-eminent superpower of 1900, 
nor to pretend to be the Greeks to the Americans’ Romans. It is to use the 
strengths of our history to build our future not as a super power but as a pivotal 
power, as a power that is at the crux of the alliances and international politics 
which shape the world and its future. Engaged, open, dynamic, a partner and, 
where possible, a leader in ideas and in influence, that is where Britain must be. 
But – and here is the choice – if we want this role, we have to reject creeping 
isolationism and an outdated view that a nation is only “independent” if it stands 
aloof (emphases added).668 
 
Thus, on the one hand placing the UK within Churchill’s “three circles”, at the 
same time Blair reinforced the special role secured for the US in Britain’s 
relations. Not only Britain’s interests and goals were ‘viewed…through a 
transatlantic lens’,669 but also, as the last lines in the quote demonstrate, 
Britain’s “exceptionalism” was deemed operable only with the US. 
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After 9/11, when the UK participation in the Afghanistan war was given a high 
moral purpose from the outset, and when the protection of the innocent was 
emphasised as a key theme in preparations for a “just war” fought for British 
values, the narrative was easy to construct and take hold in the public, as most 
of the underlying premises were echoing the discourse around the Blair 
Doctrine in the pre-9/11 years. While the US legal justification for the Operation 
Enduring Freedom revolved around the UN Charter premise of self-defence,670 
the Blair government largely reached out to the British public a) by numerous 
references to “morality” and the ‘absolute determination to see justice done’,671 
not least because of an obligation to defend “British values”; b) by strong 
emphasis on the “humanitarian side” of the war, e.g. through references to the 
‘humanitarian coalition to help the people of Afghanistan’;672 as well as c) 
repeated reminders of the war being waged by a ‘coalition of nations’ supporting 
the US and the UK: ‘[w]hat we have encountered is an unprecedented level of 
solidarity and commitment to work together against terrorism. This is a 
commitment that spans all continents, cultures and religions...We have already 
made good progress in taking forward an international agenda...We act with 
world opinion behind us’.673 
All of these performative acts, for their illocutionary success, required 
and in fact were relying on the semiotic repository introduced via the Blair 
Doctrine before 9/11, and were now satisfying the main premises of the 
Doctrine. The last of these, i.e. the emphasis on a “coalition of nations”, even if 
partly, was satisfying the “internationalism/multilateralism” principle, giving the 
impression of an internationalist foreign policy.674   
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However, more controversial was the legality of the Iraq war, over which 
an intensive multilateralism-vs.-unilateralism debate emerged in the UK. In the 
midst of hugely divided public opinion and mass outcries against a possible 
British involvement, the Blair Government went to great length using every 
possible influence and channel to take the war through the UN-approved route 
and to persuade the US to follow suit.  Thus, as some analysts acknowledge,  
British pressure played a key role in reinforcing the views of the “doves” within 
the [Bush] Administration – views that held sway throughout 2002 and eventually 
triggered the passing of UNSCR 1441…[and] the UK Government left no stone 
unturned in its public campaign to build support – both domestically and globally 
– for a new UN resolution demanding the immediate and untrammelled return of 
a strengthened weapons inspectorate to Iraq.675 
 
This anxiety to achieve multilateralism can be explained, at least partly, by the 
constraints emanating from the narrative of the New Labour foreign policy that 
emerged in late 1990s, and the need to remain discursively “answerable” to one 
of its main tenets, that of “internationalism”. However, in parallel, the British 
official narrative was constructing Saddam’s regime as continuously 
undermining the UN credibility by non-compliance, and hence as a threat to the 
very principle of internationalism. This construction (coupled with the “strong 
evidence-based” construction of the regime as a direct security threat to the 
Western world via the September Iraq Dossier676) already contained the 
semiotic possibilities allowing a break-away from the constraints of the de facto 
enactment of the principle of “internationalism/multilateralism”, without having to 
abandon it as a New Labour ideal. In the early months of 2003, Blair 
government was already moving away from pressures on a renewed 
inspectorate and making the case for a threat or use of military force: 
If we fail to back our words with deeds, we follow one of the most catastrophic 
precedents in history. … If the Security Council were to demonstrate that it was 
incapable of tackling the new threats of weapons of mass destruction and 
terrorism, it would risk doing as much damage to the UN as that suffered by the 
League of Nations when it failed to face up to the challenges of the 1930s.677 
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While the principle of “internationalism/multilateralism” was being morphed, the 
“pre-emption/prevention” basis for British involvement in the Iraq war was much 
easier to harmonise with and make appear as naturally flowing from the earlier 
narrative of the Blair Doctrine, namely the narrative of an “ethical” foreign policy 
of obligation of “doing good in the world”. Thus, in his speech of March 2002 at 
the Foreign Policy Centre, British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw called for a 
‘diplomacy of foresight’,678 firmly putting this in the context of New Labour’s 
foreign policy vision already affirmed in 1999, where ‘values and interests 
merge... the spread of our values makes us safer’.679 Now the pursuance of “our 
values” abroad extends to treating their violations (such as human rights 
abuses) as an early warning for ‘future troubles’:680 therefore, ‘[w]e have to have 
the vision to act before threats arise’.681 In addition, the latter statement 
especially echoes the illocution, if not the exact syntax, of many a Bush 
statement about “not-waiting-until-threats-fully-arise”, which themselves in turn 
reverberate the pre-9/11 neo-Conservative discourses of pre-emption. 
Hence, it may be claimed that the early New Labour discourse of 
“intervention” had created the preconditions for the official narrative of the 2003 
Iraq war legitimising military intervention without the approval of the UN, despite 
the controversies and hugely divided public opinion.  
Overall, in the UK, there was less of a “rupture” narrative, and more an 
endeavour to demonstrate continuity with the pre-9/11 Blair Doctrine of ethical 
foreign policy and of multinational involvement including through intervention. 
For perlocutionary success, Blair’s post-9/11 discourse intertextually relied on 
speech-acts that bore resonance to already familiar concepts and propositions. 
As discursive constructions such as those around “obligation to intervene”, and 
“moral duty to help democratise” enter the broader public domain, over time 
they may lose their semiotic link to source/authorship and even initial context, 
but retain resonance or at least familiarity for most people in the discursive field. 
 
Despite the explored differences in the two countries, the discourse of 
“intervention” – more pre-emptive and unilateral in one case, and more 
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multilateral in the other – had started taking root and entering the dialogical 
semiotic field well before 9/11, both in the US and the UK, and became 
important points of dialogicity both for the official discourses and the discourses 
of dissent in the post-9/11 period. Before exploring this dialogical field of 
contestation in the proceeding chapters, I now turn to a schematic mapping of 
the official “war on terror” discourses in the US and the UK in the early post-
9/11 period, roughly between 2001 and 2005.   
 
5.3. Weaving the Official “War on Terror” Narrative: Narrative-
Normative Chronotopes 
In chapter 4, I identified narrative-normative chronotopes to be one of the 
indexical indicators of relationality among voices. To remind, Bakhtinian 
chronotope is the time-space matrix upon which a narrative is structured and 
towards which all other elements of the narrative gravitate.682 To recall, the 
significance of narrative chronotopes in foreign/security discourses is that they 
mark representations of continuity, rupture, and aspirations for the future of an 
“imagined” nation, as well as that of an “imagined” global politics. Hence, the 
narrative chronotope of the foreign/security discourse is necessarily normative-
axiological. Re-constructing the narrative-normative chronotope of the early 
official “war on terror” discourses in the US and the UK helps unpack the 
narrative structure of these discourses, not only allowing a certain level of 
comparison between the two, but also, in the subsequent chapters, allowing 
tracing changing characteristics of the respective narratives in the later stages, 
as well as mapping the dialogical interactions among various competing voices.   
The discussion in this section is not a representational analysis that 
claims an explanation or an explication logically following from the dominant 
representation, i.e. tracing how a specific narrative representation “made 
possible” a certain policy. Indeed, as posited earlier, the analysis of the 
representational chronotopes of each narrative does not, in and of itself, 
constitute an explanation of policy, or of continuity or change thereof: the latter 
result only from the relations between the opposite forces and powers inherent 
in the multiple voices and in the balancing act of the official representatives. 
Neither does this section offer a comprehensive account of all the themes and 
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rhetorical strategies inherent in these early official narratives. Instead, 
necessarily simplified, it serves as a heuristic device and an analytical departure 
point to start a dialogical analysis of various voices and trace how these relate 
and produce effect.  
The data are selected from official public utterances on “war on terror” 
spanning approximately from 11 September 2001 to end of 2005, represented 
by statements, speeches and other texts produced at public appearances, 
primarily by the president/prime-minister, but also by other high ranking officials. 
This is the period, when the “war on terror” discourse gains a dominant status 
within a short span of time following 9/11, as well as when the official narrative, 
following substantial challenges, re-enforces itself, approximately from the run-
up to the Iraq war at the end of 2002 and the reactions to the immediate 
aftermath of the invasion, till about the end 2005. I have selected official 
articulations at important historic junctures, and specifically those that have 
potentially attracted the largest audiences (e.g. through prime-time televised 
presidential addresses), and have had the most reverberation.683  
 
Both in the US and the UK, the weaving of the official narrative of “war on terror” 
started only hours after the 9/11 strikes. Thus, in President Bush’s Remarks at 
Barksdale Air Force Base, with the very opening lines, the 9/11 attacks were 
framed as an attack ‘on freedom’, and the fight that was unavoidably to ensue 
was firmly placed to be a fight to regain this freedom: 
Freedom itself was attacked this morning by a faceless coward. And freedom will 
be defended (emphases added).684   
In Britain, in solidarity with the US, Prime Minister Tony Blair, cancelled his 
scheduled speech at the Trade Union Conference, and instead announced: 
This mass terrorism is the new evil in our world today. It is perpetrated by fanatics 
who are utterly indifferent to the sanctity of human life and we, the democracies of 
this world, are going to have to come together to fight it together and eradicate this 
evil completely from our world (emphases added).685  
In the meantime, especially in the US, the construction of a causation-free 
narrative of terrorism quickly followed. On the one hand, terrorism was 
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presented as an ultimate “evil” that was in a temporal continuity with other 
challenges in the American past: in fact, the terrorists were ‘the heirs of all the 
murderous ideologies of the 20th century...fascism, Nazism, and 
totalitarianism’;686 and therefore, the continuation of the “evil” America had been 
destined to fight in the past. On the other hand, and by contrast, the 9/11 events 
were constructed as being in a temporal discontinuity with the American foreign 
policies and its involvements specifically in the Middle East. As a result, ‘9/11 
quickly took on an exceptional ahistoricity’.687 
In these brief openings, we already witness two important structural 
aspects of the official narratives in each country: a) the positioning of the 
signifiers “freedom” and “evil” as the two key nodal points, or what I will call 
“master nodal points”; and b) the construction of the chronotopic building block 
of “future” as part of the narrative-normative chronotope of the foreign/security 
discourse. 
I identify “evil” and “freedom” as the two structuring master nodal points, 
based on two criteria. First, these are signifiers with the highest possible level of 
abstraction: “evil” is a higher abstraction than “terrorism”, since not only the 
latter can be derived from the former, but also a host of other signifiers can be 
organised around the former. Thus, for example, not only “terrorism”, but also 
“states that harbour terrorists”, as well as “anyone against us”, including, by 
extension, the “unpatriotic”/“un-American” critics of the official stance, can be 
constructed reliant on meanings projected from the master nodal point “evil”. In 
case of “freedom”, such derivative nodal points would be “[our] civilization”, 
“what we stand for” (i.e. “our values”), “our global mission”, “better life for 
women in Afghanistan/Iraq”, etc. Second, these are signifiers that have been 
fixed in the official discourse as essentially non-contestable, unquestionable, 
naturalised realities in relation to which the speaker occupies the highest moral 
ground, and in relation to which every other signifier in the narrative must be re-
cast. Hence they are the semiotic focal points – the ultimate fixation points – 
upon which the monologising attempts are made, or towards which striving of 
closure is oriented, and in relation to which normative signifiers such as 
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“responsibility”, “interests”, “morality” etc. become fixed. Therefore, “freedom” 
and “evil” are abstractions that have to be engaged with and hence extend to 
the counter-narratives and discourses of dissent in a dialogical interaction; not 
least as points of subversion, of questioning the “unquestionable” and of re-
populating them with new signification. It is not surprising then, that suppression 
of dissent and silencing of critique, as the subsequent chapters will show, have 
been performed via discursive techniques reliant on these particular nodal 
points.688  
The two master nodal points of “evil” and “freedom”, in isolation, offer 
only a spatial indexing of semiotic relations in the narrative, and therefore do not 
yet reveal the full structure and particularly the normative-axiological properties 
of the narratives: the latter are unpacked only when combined with the analysis 
of the temporality of the narrative, and combined in a complete time-space 
matrix. Thus, I identify chronotopic building blocks, i.e. narrative propositions 
pertaining to the temporalities running through the narrative-normative 
chronotope: “past” (e.g., references to “our historical past”), “present” (e.g., 
“who we are/where we stand today and what we must do today”), and “future” 
(the imagined state of the nation in a constructed future). Moreover, entwined in 
these temporal propositions are propositions telling about outcomes, e.g. stories 
of “triumph” or “failure”, which may be constructed in all three temporal points 
and at their intersection. The normativity of the narrative chronotope is teased 
out of the relationship among the three chronotopic building blocks and the 
outcome constructions.  
I now turn to more closely exploring the two different chronotopes within 
the early official “war on terror” narratives of the US and the UK, respectively.  
5.3.1. Imagining the Nation: “Cyclical Triumph” vis-à-vis “Agent of Change” 
 
Simultaneous with framing 9/11 as an attack on America and as ‘despicable 
acts of war’, and with performative unifying of America as ‘one Nation under 
God’ fighting against “evil”, in the days and weeks following 9/11, President 
Bush went on to present the audiences with a subjunctive “future” for the nation 
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imagined through a “triumph” of “freedom”, which in turn would ensure a 
successful realisation of American identity. Thus, most references to the 
nation’s “future” were accompanied with reassurance of “triumph”. The following 
are only a few out of numerous examples:  
This battle will take time and resolve, but make no mistake about it, we will win 
(emphasis added).689 
This will be a monumental struggle of good versus evil, but good will prevail 
(emphasis added). 690 
Tonight we are a country awakened to danger and called to defend freedom. Our 
grief has turned to anger, and anger to resolution. Whether we bring our enemies 
to justice, or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done (emphasis 
added).691  
Here we witness an assurance of history’s repetitive course in favour of 
America’s triumph, which is indicative of what I will call the Chronotope of 
Cyclical Triumph. This chronotope prevalent in the American official narrative 
emerges more clearly already in the other, most important public appearance 
on the day of 9/11, the Presidential Address to the Nation.692 In this speech, 
where the label “war against terrorism” is heard for the first time in this context, 
President Bush performs several, simultaneous and often overlapping, speech-
acts. Cumulatively, these construct a certain temporality for the national identity 
rationale. Thus, through this speech, Bush performs the following: 
a) Announces “freedom” itself to be ‘under attack’ where “freedom” is the 
master nodal point organising the derivative nodes “our nation”, “our way 
of life”, “our mission in the world”, etc. “Freedom” thus becomes the 
condition of possibility for the nation who is ontologically dependent on it; 
b) Historicises the situation: ‘America has stood down enemies before...’, 
which bears the illocution that “the American nation has prevailed and 
triumphed in the past”; 
c) Constructs a “present”, where despite the catastrophe, America is still 
triumphant, even in the immediate present, even amidst disaster: ‘These 
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acts of mass murder were intended to frighten our nation into chaos and 
retreat. But they have failed. Our country is strong’; 
d) Constructs a “future” with a high degree of certitude, where “freedom” 
prevails again, and where winning the “war against terrorism” is an 
unmistakable certainty: ‘And no one will keep that light [of freedom] from 
shining’ as ‘we stand together to win the war against terrorism’.693 
This speech is illustrative of the broader structural peculiarities, namely the 
relationships among the chronotopic building blocks “past”, “present” and 
“future”, where imagining the “future” of the nation is dependent on the nodal 
point “freedom” and the macro-narrative building block “triumph”. 
In cases of both the US and the UK, the analysis shows that most of the 
performative constructions of “future” are co-occurring with the constructions of 
“triumph” as the necessary condition for the national identity. However, this 
trend is more salient in case of the US: the narrative, having been reliant for its 
resources on references to the historical (mostly triumphant) “past” of the 
nation, now links the successful realisation of the identity with the coming-into-
life of a very specific and exclusionary type of “future”. In this “future”, “triumph” 
over the specifically articulated threat becomes a necessity for the nation to 
imagine itself, i.e. becomes an ontological necessity for the “we” identity. 
Furthermore, in case of the US, “evil” in the “past” and the “present” is 
constructed as absolute, teleological and non-causal (i.e. unrelated to US past 
or present actions); and therefore, “triumph” in the “past” and in the “future” is 
pictured as absolute and teleological. Below are three more excerpts from 
Bush’s speeches, the first of which most starkly illustrates the teleological 
conception of “evil” and past and future “triumphs”:  
We’re confident... that history has an author who fills time and eternity with his 
purpose. We know that evil is real, but good will prevail against it.694    
The advance of human freedom -- the great achievement of our time, and the 
great hope of every time -- now depends on us. Our nation, this generation will lift 
a dark threat of violence from our people and our future. We will rally the world to 
this cause by our efforts, by our courage. We will not tire, we will not falter, and we 
will not fail.695 
Fancying these [democratic] ideals is the mission that created our nation. It is the 
honorable achievement of our fathers. Now it is the urgent requirement of our 
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nation’s security...the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of 
democratic movements ...with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world...We 
go forward with complete confidence in the eventual triumph of freedom (all 
emphases added).696 
   
The trend of absolutism and certainty of “triumph” evolves, and faced with 
increasingly more challenging counter-narratives, its rhetorical means diversify. 
Thus, for instance, while in most cases, a construction of “evil” is followed by a 
construction of “triumph” in the “future”, especially in later years, the order is 
sometimes reversed: a past historical event involving a major threat is narrated 
as a triumph, and followed by the construction of the present threat in a 
temporal continuum. This, too, demonstrates the cyclical rationale of the 
chronotope. Here is an illustrative example from Bush’s second inaugural 
address: 
For half a century, America defended our own freedom by standing watch on 
distant borders. After the shipwreck of communism came years of relative quiet, 
years of repose, years of sabbatical. And then there came a day of fire.697 
 
While there is no direct construction of the triumphant “future” as yet, such 
ordering has the powerful illocution of “this evil is as certain to be triumphed 
over as the one in the past”, thus making it a historical fact in the future.  
Increasingly, the “future” is also constructed via what might be called a 
negative imagining, i.e. the invocation of a “failure” in ‘our fight for freedom’ – 
and therefore failure in the realisation of the national identity – if certain course 
of action is not adopted today, in the “present”. An early example is found in 
Bush’s First UN speech:  
We act to defend ourselves...and deliver our children from a future of fear ....Upon 
these commitments depend all peace and progress...the cost of inaction is far 
greater. The only alternative to victory is a nightmare world where every city is a 
potential killing field (emphasis added).698 
 
Here, a subjunctive future is first constructed via negative imagining of a plight 
(‘future of fear’, ‘nightmare world’) that is deemed undesirable, and is 
juxtaposed with the construction of a “triumph” in the “future”, if the suggested 
actions are taken in the “present”. Notably, Bush used such a construction to 
rationalise his now notorious choice in perhaps the most (in)famous of his 
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statements, namely the 2002 State of the Union, dubbed the “Axis of Evil” 
speech: 
States like these [North Korea, Iran, Iraq], and their terrorist allies, constitute an 
axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of 
mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could 
provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They 
could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these 
cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic (emphases added).699 
 
Moreover, it appears that this type of negative imaginings is used more often 
when the stakes of the intended legitimation and possibility for critique are 
higher. Thus, a case in point is Bush’s 7 October 2002 Cincinnati speech, 
where, ahead of the crucial Congressional vote on the resolution granting 
authority to go to war, Bush comprehensively builds the case for Iraq. This 
speech is densely built on such constructions of negative imagining, which are 
then refuted by an invocation of a positive imagining. Thus, the two become 
structurally dependent: 
[§1] Failure to act would embolden other tyrants, allow terrorists access to new 
weapons and new resources, and make blackmail a permanent feature of world 
events. The United Nations would betray the purpose of its founding, and prove 
irrelevant to the problems of our time. And through its inaction, the United States 
would resign itself to a future of fear.  
[§2] That is not the America I know. That is not the America I serve. We refuse to 
live in fear. [Applause] ...Now, as before, we will secure our nation, protect our 
freedom, and help others to find freedom of their own (emphases added).700 
Achieved via what I call “if”-conditionality statements, this subjunctive “failure” in 
the “future” has the function of reinforcing the impossibility of imagining the 
American identity in any alternative circumstances. “If”-conditionality statements 
are certain type of warnings, based on a false dichotomy, one option of which 
leads to a definite, a priori constructed “failure” that must be avoided at all costs. 
In case of Bush’s narrative, such subjunctive future presents a bleak prospect, 
“in case if we do not take action”, i.e. if Americans do not adopt the one and 
only suggested route of action to counter the “threat” of terrorism: their very 
identity as a “free” nation will be in jeopardy. Moreover, §2 in the above quote is 
starkly illustrative of the Chronotope of Cyclical Triumph: especially through the 
speech-act ‘This is not the America I know’, intertextually linked and hence 
encouraged to be read with the previous and proceeding statements on past 
and therefore future historic triumphs, America is static, has transcendental 
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identity, and hence the certitude of cyclical return.701 Figure 1 illustrates the 
Chronotope of Cyclical Triumph prevalent in the US official narrative.  
 Interestingly, negative imaginings of the “future” accompanying a 
reaffirmation of “triumph” as the only alternative occur more often from late 2002 
onwards, and amount to a more salient trend from late 2003 to 2005. This is the 
same period when increased pressure is put on the official narrative in both the 
British and American societies, due to the controversy around the Iraq invasion, 
as well as due to meanings emanating from external sources such as the bin 
Laden videos and the reports on rising death tolls. The latter were putting 
pressure on even otherwise supportive news outlets to ‘deviat[e] from the 
supportive mode of coverage and generat[e] a challenge to the coalition 
perspective’.702 
 
Figure 1: The Chronotope of Cyclical Triumph in US official narrative  
It will be argued later, that this was not a coincidental trend: the representatives 
of the official narrative were forced to engage in indirect performative actions 
silencing alternative voices, simultaneous with (re)constructing and reinforcing 
their narrative.  
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In the UK, from the very beginning, the modality of the imperative to go to war, 
and relatedly the chronotopicity of the narrative, was different to that of the US:  
...and we, the democracies of this world, are going to have to come together to 
fight it [terrorism] together and eradicate this evil completely from our world 
(emphasis added).703 
  
Here, in contrast with Bush’s assured modality of ‘we will’/ ‘we must’, Blair starts 
in a ‘we are going to have to’ modality, and constructs the British involvement in 
the “war on terror” more as a moral choice,704 a responsibility, from which “we” 
could have refrained, but which “we” are obliged to take up, given who “we” are 
– a freedom-loving nation who also strives to be a leader of the ‘democracies of 
the world’ and an agent of change in the international society. In contrast with 
the American Chronotope of Cyclical Triumph, I will call this Agent of Change 
Chronotope. In this chronotope of the British narrative, there is less certainty 
about the natural and repetitive flow of history, and “triumph” is more conditional 
upon “our efforts” to unite in a multilateral endeavour. Moreover, whereas in 
case of the US, the responsibility to combat “evil” is transcendental, perpetual 
and the outcome repetitive; in case of the UK, the responsibility is borne out of 
global changes and is dependent on the UK choice to take on a pivotal role in 
the world, to perform the chosen path of an agent of change: it is a 
responsibility to “international society” deemed as a multilateral project, where 
interests and values must merge. Indeed, this is consistent with Blair’s 1999 
Doctrine of International Community, the image of Britain as a “bridge” joining 
the Churchillian “three circles” and as a “source for good”. Blair further states: 
They [families of the British victims of 9/11] don’t want revenge. They want 
something better in memory of their loved ones.... [they want] lasting good: 
destruction of the machinery of terrorism wherever it is found; hope amongst all 
nations of a new beginning where we seek to resolve differences in a calm and 
ordered way; greater understanding between nations and between faiths; and 
above all justice and prosperity for the poor and dispossessed, so that people 
everywhere can see the chance of a better future through the hard work and 
creative power of the free citizen, not the violence and savagery of the fanatic 
(emphasis added).705 
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These lines are constructing a certain “future” of the British nation that is closely 
linked with “change” and a better “future” for the international society at large. 
While “evil” (‘savagery of fanatics’) is still constructed in a non-causal fashion, 
the “future” – of the international society and of Britain as a leading nation in it – 
is conceived not in the absolute terms of triumph over a teleological “evil”, but 
with a heavy emphasis on the mode of fighting that “evil” – a multilateral 
dialogue among nations that would ‘resolve differences in a calm and ordered 
way’ and achieve ‘greater understanding between nations and between 
faiths’.706 Thus, the speech aims at constructing not merely an image of a united 
nation, but a united international society within which Britain is a pivotal 
participant, echoing the “pivotal role” narrative of British identity affirmed 
through the Blair Doctrine, discussed earlier.  
Nonetheless, with all the differences with the US, Blair, too, goes on to 
construct a “future” of the nation that is dependent on “triumph”, in other words 
where the nation cannot imagine itself without such specifically defined and 
fixed “triumph”. Thus, illustrious are the following excerpts from Blair’s Texas 
speech of April, 2002:707 
[§1] Britain is immensely proud of the part our forces have played [in recent 
interventions] and with the results. 
[§2]… My basic argument is that in today’s interdependent world, we need an 
integrated approach, a doctrine of international community as I put it before, based 
on the values we believe in… When we defend our countries as you [the 
Americans] did after September 11, we aren’t just defending territory. We are 
defending what our nations believe in: freedom, democracy, justice, tolerance and 
respect towards others.  
[§3]… That is the only route I know to a stable world based on prosperity and 
justice for all, where freedom liberates the lives of every citizen in every corner of 
the globe. 
[§4]…We will get there (emphases added).708 
  
These statements – scattered throughout the speech but subtly interlinked – 
construct a very specific type of British national identity, one that fights for 
“freedom” to triumph over threats to “freedom” anywhere in the world, but also 
one who does so as an “agent of change” in a new age, where Britain is actively 
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involved as a ‘force for good’ (note the intertextual activation of the Kosovo 
intervention narrative in §1). The identity is dependent on such “triumph” to 
realise its “agent of change” role. The last line closing the speech, ‘We will get 
there’, albeit not in the battle-cry style of Bush’s ‘we will prevail’, is nonetheless  
part of a construction of a triumphant “future” for the nation through designating 
a certain “future” as the only route for the realisation of the nation’s identity the 
way it had been fixed. Moreover, as already illustrated, in Britain’s case these 
constructions are often linked to, or themselves constitute, “future” of the 
international society, rather than immediately that of Britain. 
Similar to the American discourse, the British official discourse is 
characterised by intense If-conditionality constructions based on negative 
imaginings of the “future”. However, these are less densely embedded in the 
overall structure of speeches; and they often construct the “future” of the 
“international society”, or the “future” of other (in this case, Iraqi) people, rather 
than immediately that of Britain. In addition, the negative imagining is often not 
accompanied by a positive alternative of a “triumph”. Thus, Tony Blair in his 
monthly press conference in January 2003 states:  
[§1] [M]y fear is that we wake up one day and we find either that one of these 
dictatorial states has used weapons of mass destruction - and Iraq has done so in 
the past - and we get sucked into a conflict, with all the devastation that would 
cause; or alternatively these weapons, which are being traded right round the world 
at the moment, fall into the hands of these terrorist groups, these fanatics who will 
stop at absolutely nothing to cause death and destruction on a mass scale. 
[§2]…Now I simply say to you, it is a matter of time unless we act and take a stand 
before terrorism and weapons of mass destruction come together, and I regard 
them as two sides of the same coin (emphasis added).709  
Note how, in contrast to the US narrative, through §2, Blair more subtly urges 
the audience to make their own “choice” to be “agents of change” in history to 
avert the depicted dire future plight. In later chapters, it is demonstrated how, 
characteristically, many of these negative imaginings are built dialogically on 
utilising actual, or anticipated, critique and counter-narratives, to render the 
latter as the route to “failure”.  
 Similar to the American discourse, in the early British discourse, the 
“past” is mostly portrayed as a source of pride in combating past evils such as 
fascism and communism and as testimony for future victory over the new evil of 
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terrorism. However, in contrast with the US, here the “past” is not always one-
dimensional: rarely but nonetheless visibly, the “past” is also a source of failure 
and faltering of Western values and principles, and therefore calls for change. 
Thus, Jack Straw, addressing The Foreign Policy Centre at the launch of the 
Report ‘Re-Ordering the World’,710 recalled: 
In the 1980s, many in the West, guided by the principle that “my enemy’s enemy is 
my friend”, saw Saddam as a useful ally against the threat of revolutionary 
radicalism from Iran under the Ayatollahs.  
The abuse of human rights in Iraq told a different story. …It would be too easy for 
us to say today what our predecessors should have done to spare us these 
problems…The far harder challenge for us is to face the difficult choices before us 
now, stand up to bullies like Saddam, and not leave these problems to the next 
generation to sort out (emphases added).711  
Here not only the “past” is a source of regret and remorse, but also “evil” is not 
totally causally de-linked from past Western actions. 
Moreover, in the British discourse, future “triumph” is conceived not in terms 
of securing the return of what “we” already had, i.e. “freedom” and “security” 
and “triumph” of “our [transcendental] values”, but creating a “future” both for 
the nation and the international society which is newly conceived, and which 
requires reforming and transforming the “present”. Thus, speaking in Glasgow 
at the time of unprecedented anti-war rallies in London and around the world 
ahead of the Iraq invasion, Blair gives a clear illustration of such transformative 
character of the narrative-normative chronotope inherent in the British 
discourses: 
We will never retreat into isolationism that would leave Britain weak, marginalised, 
ridiculed. This is a time when our character is being tested. Our conviction shows 
us the way. Social justice; solidarity; opportunity for all. The belief that we are a 
community of people, and a community of nations. Stronger together achieving 
more together than we can alone. British values. Labour values. Values worth 
fighting for. Values to inspire our journey of change. Values to sustain us for the 
great challenges ahead. Values to drive us as we create the Britain that we 
promised and the Britain that today our world needs (emphases added).712 
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Figure 2: The Chronotope of Agent of Change prevalent in the British official narrative 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the Agent of Change chronotope present in the British official 
narrative. I will illustrate the characteristics of the chronotope presented in the 
figure above, by quoting at length from Blair’s contribution to the report ‘Re-
Ordering the World’, publish by The Foreign Policy Centre, a think-tank founded 
in 1998 under Blair’s patronage. The presented excepts are representative of 
the constructions reoccurring in Blair’s discourse elsewhere in more public 
settings, and are chosen due to their condensed and summative form: 
[§1] Such military and security action [as the success in Afghanistan] needs to be 
backed with political change that tackles the conditions under which terrorism and 
international organised crime flourish or are tolerated. The dragon’s teeth are 
planted in the fertile soil of wrongs unrighted, of disputes left to fester for years or 
even decades, of failed states, of poverty and deprivation. 
 
[§2] In today’s interdependent world, there can be no secure future for any of us 
unless we manage globalisation with greater justice…We are all internationalists 
now. And so, against the background of military action and fast-moving events, a 
broader shift is emerging. The power of community is reasserting itself. And this 
must be the greater memorial to the dead of September 11 – not simply the 
punishment of those responsible, but a new international mood of hope and 
understanding, and above all, justice and prosperity for the poor and 
dispossessed. 
 
[§3] I believe we will succeed only if we start to develop a doctrine of international 
community based on the principle of enlightened self-interest – on the recognition 
that self-interest and our mutual interests are today inextricably woven together. 
 
[§4] It is a recognition which will transform domestic as well as international 
politics, because globalisation shrinks the distance between domestic and 
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international issues. …To spread them and to make the whole world more stable, 
we need a new international framework to agree and enforce international rules. In 
the wake of World War II, we developed an impressive series of international 
institutions to cope with the strains of rebuilding a devastated world: Bretton 
Woods, the United Nations, NATO, and the EU. To survive and remain useful 
today, they will have to adapt. 
 
[§5] I realise why people protest against globalisation. It is easy to feel powerless, 
overwhelmed, as if we were pushed to and fro by forces far beyond our control. 
But whether we like it or not, globalisation is a fact…The issue is not how to stop 
globalisation. That is in any case futile: as the Chinese proverb has it, “no hand 
can block out the sun”. The issue is rather how we use the power of community to 
bring the benefits of globalisation to all (emphasis added).713 
 
Thus, except §1 illustrates how “evil” in the British discourse, rather than an 
absolute teleological repetitive phenomenon, is causally linked to instability and 
imbalances brought about by past and present politics in the age of 
globalisation. Therefore, to fight it, we need to ‘manage’ the effects of 
globalisation itself for the greater good and justice (excerpt §2). This 
“managing”, in turn, is only deemed feasible through a new ‘internationalist’ 
global politics (excerpts §2 and §3); one which is ready to adapt to new realities 
(both nationally and through global institutions) and thus transform itself 
(excerpt §4). 
Indeed, Bair’s discourse is firmly embedded in his pre-9/11 discourse of 
the International Community, in turn conceived in the context of “globalisation”, 
“new era”, and the imperative of a “new ethical politics for Britain”. In this 
context, in the above contribution to the pamphlet ‘Re-Ordering the World’, as in 
his other statements, it is interesting to observe that “globalisation” is conceived 
as a phenomenon as natural as ‘the sun’ itself, which cannot be averted or 
rejected (excerpt §5). Nonetheless, in a modernist ethos, its power can be 
harnessed like a natural force, for the benefit of humankind. 
 
Table 2 below illustrates the two different chronotopes present in the US and the 
UK official narratives, in a more summative and comparative manner. 
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 US: Cyclical Triumph UK: Agent of Change 
“Past” Triumphs: Repetitive -Triumphs – only recent: World Wars; Cold War; as 
international player (e.g. Kosovo); Imperial past toned 
down 
-Failures/faltering: e.g. Saddam as an ally in the 1980s 
“Present” -“Evil” covalent with “past” “evils” 
-Challenge of “evil” only one stage in the 
cycle of triumphs 
-We are the same -- perpetually 
triumphant 
- The present challenges are due to changed 
circumstances (globalization, interdependence)  
- Challenges to our allies and international society; 
-We are faced with an obligation and moral choice to 
be triumphant again: We and the world must change to 
adapt 
“Future” -Assured return of triumph: triumph – a 
historical fact in the future 
-Freedom will prevail; we will prevail 
 -Triumph less given: we will triumph if we wish to stay 
“agents of change”  
Axiology Teleological—divine righteousness  Pragmatic/progressive and integral – i.e. integrating 
value and interests, including interests of others 
 
Table 2: Comparative Summary of the US Chronotope of Cyclical Triumph vis-à-vis the British 
Chronotope of Agent of Change.   
Indeed, the British Chronotope of Agent of Change cannot be viewed totally 
isolated from the US chronotope, on the one hand due to speakers attempting 
to preserve certain consistency and harmony with the latter, as well as the 
intertextual links the audiences must have drawn (whether intended by the 
speakers or not) between the British and American narratives, in the context of 
the “special relationship” and US-UK allied effort. Indeed, the texts reveal a 
certain level of tension present within the British official narrative: for instance, 
its constructions “evil” and “freedom” often resonate with the absolute and 
teleological constructions present in the American narrative, while at the same 
time being temporally arranged in a manner that reveals a starkly different 
axiological direction for the nation and the world. In this regard, the British 
chronotope reveals a higher level of complexity, which must be borne in mind 
when analysing the contestation of competing voices, especially major critique 
and challenges to the official narrative.   
     
5.4. Conclusion 
This first empirical chapter had two primary goals: contextualising the post-9/11 
official “war on terror” discourses by locating them within, and tracing their 
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origins with, the pre-9/11 security discourses of “intervention” and “pre-
emption/prevention” emerging in the US and the UK in 1990s; as well as 
reconstructing the main structural characteristics of the official post-9/11 
narratives in each country by teasing out the respective narrative-normative 
chronotopes.   
 The contextualisation revealed that a discourse of legitimate 
“intervention” – more pre-emptive and unilateral in the US and more multilateral 
in the UK, was emerging in both countries already in the post-Cold War period 
in 1990s. However, in the US, the post-9/11 official discourse constructed an 
emphatically ruptured narrative rhetorically delinking the emergent Bush 
Doctrine from pre-9/11 policies and discourses. This rupture narrative was, 
perhaps, intended for the broader publics, resonating with culturally embedded 
Evangelical discourses of “rupture”, and “second coming”.714 On the other hand, 
the discourse relied on the intertextual reading of its main tenets as a 
continuation of emergent discourses of intervention influencing policy by the 
Clinton Administration and reflected, albeit in nascent form, Bush’s pre-9-11 
discourses of election campaign and early presidency. In contrast, the UK 
narrative was less ruptured, and more explicitly endeavouring to invite an 
intertextual reading through the lens of the New Labour discourse of late 1990s, 
particularly emphasising continuity with the Blair Doctrine of International 
Community. 
Then, I turned to a systematic investigation of the structure of early post-
9/11 discourses. While in both countries, I deduced the spatial structuring of the 
narratives around the master nodal points of “evil/threat” and “freedom”, the 
temporality and with it the full time-space matrix of the narratives was possible 
to deduce only through a chronotopic analysis. To remind, in the Bakhtinian 
“chronotope”, time can only be perceived through giving meaning to a change in 
space. In this regard, by tracing how constructions of “evil” and “freedom” were 
spatially organised in each of the narratives and how “change” was inflicted 
upon them in the “past”, “present”, and “future”, it became possible to locate 
how each of the nations was imagined. Thus, the American official discourse 
presented the audiences with a Chronotope of Cyclical Triumph, where the 
“present” was only one stage in the cycle of triumphs; “evil” was covalent with 
“evils” in the “past”, America was the same – perpetually triumphant; while the 
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“future” was presented as the certain return of triumph, as historical fact in the 
“future”, where “freedom” prevails and therefore “we” prevail. “Freedom” in turn 
was constructed as an absolute value in jeopardy due to absolute, teleological 
and un-caused “evil”. In contrast, in the British Chronotope of Agent of Change, 
the “past” was also a source of faltering; present challenges brought about by 
the “evil” of terrorism were threatening not merely the nation but importantly the 
international society; “evil” itself was partly due to changing circumstances 
(globalisation, interdependence); thereby requiring amendment of national and 
global norms, practices and institutions. Britain was imagined as having a 
pivotal role in making such change possible – a moral obligation and moral 
choice to be triumphant again. Thus, while the normative-axiological vector of 
the American chronotope is cyclical, teleological and therefore self-righteous, 
that of the British chronotope is transformative (for national and global politics), 
reliant on a choice to embrace a new role and identity for Britain (“we will 
triumph if we wish to stay agents of change”), and therefore allows more scope 
for the collective agency of the nation in determining the course of history in the 
future. 
Indeed, these are only representational chronotopes, i.e. they only show 
how time-space, and therefore normativity, was organized in the official 
representations of 9/11 and subsequently of “war on terror”. They do not 
necessarily show whether and to what extent the chronotopes were actually 
internalised by audiences, neither how policy was actually enacted. Rather, they 
represent the attempted monological closure through constructing an absolute 
‘prior discourse’715 in a narrative of national imagining, which will gain any 
explanatory significance only when analysed dialogically, in relation with 
competing voices. Indeed, to recall the discussion in chapters 3 and 4, the 
representational chronotope must be juxtaposed with what Bakhtin called the 
“real-life” chronotope – the multiplicity of voices competing in the modern day 
“agora”. Moreover, the real-life chronotope would also involve daily changes 
and developments – be these on the ground where the given policies were 
enacted (e.g. increased casualties in Afghanistan, Iraq; failure of nation-
building; killing of bin Laden, etc.), or political-economic developments at home 
(elections, financial crisis, etc.). While exploring the former, i.e. contestations 
among various voices at home, we must be alert to and integrate the latter, i.e. 
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actual material and social changes that constantly affect and change the 
contestation, in order to observe how the narrative representational chronotope 
encounters the “real-life” chronotope. Tracing such encounters becomes 
possible through the analysis of competing voices, more particularly voices of 
dissent and major critique putting pressure on the official discourse, and the 
latter’s response to such pressures, to which I now turn in the next two 
chapters.   
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Chapter 6: Challenges to the Dominant Discourse, and the Making 
and Un-making of National Identity 
 
 
6.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I reconstructed the main structural characteristics of the 
official post-9/11 narratives in the US and the UK, by teasing out the respective 
narrative-normative chronotope of Cyclical Triumph in the US, and that of Agent 
of Change in the UK. For heuristic purposes, I bracketed this discussion off from 
the dialogicity of competing voices. In order to start mapping such dialogicity in 
this and the next chapter, this chapter now turns to employing the second 
analytical tool identified in chapter 4 as part of the devices for a relational model 
of analysis, namely relational performatives. To remind, rather than concerned 
with the restricted illocutionary force of an utterance as traditionally conceived in 
speech-act theory, the term “relational performatives” draws analytical attention 
to the much broader positionality of the utterance in relation to other utterances’ 
positional force. This means that the focus is not only on “how to do things with 
words” (the traditional Austinean idiom), but rather on “how to do things to 
others’ words”, i.e. what power is exercised upon someone else’s utterance. 
Hence, in order to allow me to assess the longer-term effects of the 
interactions of the official voices with those of dissent in the later chapters, the 
aim of this chapter is to identify major patterns of how dissenting voices have 
variously challenged and undermined the official narrative structure presented 
in the previous chapter, and specifically how the narrative-normative 
chronotopes of the alternative voices have encountered the official chronotopes, 
dislocated and, if at all, replaced such chronotopes by imagining “the nation” 
and “security” anew. Such dislocations have been achieved through relational 
performatives as conceptualised above. Therefore, analytically, the discussion 
in this chapter revolves, and is structurally organised, around two distinct 
categories of critique observable in “war on terror” contestations, namely 
destabilising vis-à-vis deliberative critique: whereas destabilising critique 
attempts to fundamentally subvert the official “war on terror” narrative, by 
dislodging its master nodal points and the chronotopic building blocks; 
deliberative critique challenges the dominant narrative only by partly refuting the 
earlier deliberative efforts behind the latter, and/or by demanding the fulfilment 
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of the promises inherent in the official narrative. However, empirically and as to 
its theoretical implications, the chapter is interested in two interrelated 
questions: first, how and to what effect critique “speaks to”, i.e. enters into a 
dialogical encounter with, the official narratives, be it through questioning, or 
else unwittingly reproducing, the premises of such narratives; and second, by 
variously dislocating the official narrative, including importantly, the official 
narrative-normative chronotope, whether and to what extent critiquing voices fill 
in/re-inscribe, or attempt their own ‘suture’716 of the opened-up space, i.e. 
whether they replace the dislocated narrative by a new narrative-normative 
chronotope able to image “the nation” and “security” in new ways.  
The chapter starts with a context-setting overview of the discourses of early 
dissent. It delineates major trends produced by dissenting voices emergent in 
the very early stage of the post-9/11 period, namely form September 2001 to 
roughly the end of 2002. The aim of this brief overview section is to prepare the 
context for a systematic analysis of counter-narratives in the “intermediate 
stage”, i.e. 2003-2007, by showing that challenges to the official “war on terror” 
discourse were present already in the immediate post-9/11 periods, roughly the 
first two years after 9/11, and to deduce broader trends of counter-discourses 
already nascent in this stage. Thus, the discourse of early dissent was largely 
structured around revelatory articulations, exposing the constructed nature of 
“evil/threat”; the purported real motives of Bush and Blair policies, namely oil 
control in the Middle East, and/or the Western military-industrial complex. This 
was done by reference to past historical facts and present realities that had 
been silenced in the public domain. As a result, the chronotopic integrity of the 
official narratives was being disturbed: rather than a source of pride and moral 
triumphs, the “past” was a source of shame; whereas the “future”, rather than a 
triumph of “freedom” and “justice for all”, was a looming disaster for “freedom” 
and for global justice, if the present policies were not averted.   
 Having established the context of nascent trends, I then turn to the core 
of the discussion, i.e. present findings of the analysis of a corpus of primary 
source data, drawn from the articulations found in the mass media, critical 
politicians’ speeches, pronouncements and written texts, as well as those of 
anti-war activists, in the intermediate period.  
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The analysis yields interesting and at times unanticipated findings. Thus, 
a consistent trend develops in case of deliberative critique, largely practiced by 
acting politicians and moderately critical mainstream media: their propositions 
hinge on the same master nodal points as the narrative being critiqued, i.e. the 
official narrative, despite expressing discontent with the initial conditions of 
legitimation, e.g. the legal basis of the Iraq war, or with the progress of the war. 
In addition, such deliberative critique consistently demands for “success” and 
“victory” for a war that had paradoxically, in many of their own articulations, 
been branded as “ill-conceived”, if not outright “illegal and immoral”.  
In contrast, destabilising counter-narratives undermine the macro-
propositions of the official narratives by dislodging the master nodal points of 
“evil” and “freedom”, upon which the official narrative was hinging. Thus, often 
the very nodal signification of “evil” is being displaced by constructions of a 
different “threat” to “our freedom”, i.e. the threat of being undermined as a 
“nation”, if “we” go to war without limits and if “we” continue to practice 
repression. In the US, the Bush administration itself, by its policies that are 
“unjust, immoral and illegitimate”, becomes a “threat” to the realisation of the 
American identity anchored on “freedom”.  
In addition, and most importantly, destabilising counter-narratives represent 
a major challenge to the narrative-normative chronotope of the official 
narratives, namely of the Chronotope of Cyclical Triumph in the US, and the 
Chronotope of Agent of Change in the UK. Simultaneous with undermining the 
official legitimation of the war, they also destabilise the national identity 
narrative built into the dominant security narrative, specifically by dislodging the 
national “past”, “present” and “future”, and the outcome signifiers “success” and 
“triumph”. Characteristically, the “future” is constructed in negative terms of 
“failure”, constituting subversion without the construction of an alternative 
positive “we” identity. In such destabilising critique, the “virtuous past” of the 
official chronotopes is dislodged and replaced with an alternative shameful 
“past”, where Britain and America are depicted as historically having been 
indifferent to loss of human life, oppression, and other nations’ democratic 
aspirations, and where they have been motivated by hubris and material self-
interest. I demonstrate that such articulations constructing a negatively 
imagined “past” without offering an alternative, positively imagined “past” and 
“future”, end up producing a deficient chronotope inducing a deficit of “future”.  
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Section 6.2 presents an overview of the early dissent in the immediate post-
9/11 environment. Sections 6.3 and 6.4, the core of this chapter, present the 
findings of the systematic data analysis of critique in the intermediate period, 
namely roughly 2003-2007. Section 6.3 concerns itself with distinguishing two 
main types of critique – destabilising and deliberative counter-narratives – and 
examines the major mays through which they undermine and/or reproduce the 
official narrative; whereas section 6.4 more specifically concerns itself with 
examining how these critical voices affect the narrative-normative chronotope of 
the official discourse, and whether and how they replace the latter with an 
alternative chronotope and hence alternative ways of imagining “security” for 
the nation. The concluding section reflects on the implications of the revealed 
trends for the broader contestations.        
  
6.2. Early Dissent: Emergent Trends in the Immediate Aftermath of 
9/11 
As early as on the day of the 9/11 attacks, narratives potentially undermining of 
the official line of explanation for the events were offered to the public by certain 
mass media, pundits, well-known political commentators, as well as public 
intellectuals. Key literature on the “war on terror” discourse contends that in 
these early days, ‘alternative and critical voices…[were] rarely heard in the 
political arena in America’.717 Moreover, it gives accounts of the role of the 
media as something uniform and unanimously reproducing the official narrative. 
This generalised treatment overlooks alternative narratives that found their 
place in the media more so in the UK, but also and importantly in the US, 
including in some otherwise “mainstream” media. Indeed, it is important to note 
the disproportionately larger space government-supporting news coverage and 
analysis occupied, at the expense of critical stories.718 Nevertheless, these 
figures in themselves do not justify treating the media as uniformly government-
supporting. The analysis of whatever little criticism or dissent there was in the 
alternative/leftist media, as well as in some otherwise mainstream media, 
together with dissent among discourses of public intellectuals and anti-war 
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movements disseminated by other means, is important: these critical/alternative 
discourses have not only played a significant role in the very way the 
hegemonic narrative has formed, as well as changed over the years, but also 
have an important relevance to the formation of later dissent especially ahead 
of the Iraq war in 2003, which is more acknowledged by commentators and 
scholars.  
This section has only a limited purpose. It aims to show that challenges 
to the official “war on terror” discourse were emerging already in the immediate 
post-9/11 periods – the first two years after 9/11, which I will refer to as the 
“early stage”; and to deduce broad trends of counter-discourses already 
nascent in this stage, and thus prepare the context for a more systematic 
analysis of counter-narratives in the “intermediate stage”, i.e. 2003-2007. To 
map this early period of dissent, I have traced early counter-narratives and 
deduced major trends in early dissent through an analysis of over 30 texts 
critical of “war on terror” written and disseminated by prominent American and 
British journalists, political commentator, public speakers, as well as public 
intellectuals variously disseminated through national newspapers, and/or as 
book chapters in critical anthologies; in addition to texts by key public 
intellectuals such as Slavoj Žižek, Noam Chomsky; as well as salient 
articulations by anti-war social movements, such as ANSWER in the US, and 
Stop the War Coalition in the UK, and civil groups such as 9/11 Families for 
Peaceful Tomorrows.  
Some of these critical texts are compiled in Beyond September 11, An 
Anthology of Dissent, edited by Phil Scraton,719 where the contributions are 
authored by prominent commentators and public intellectuals such as Noam 
Chomsky, Robert Fisk, John Pigler and Naomi Klein, among others. Many of 
the contributions had originally been published in national media and alternative 
e-sources.720 These texts were authored by well-known critics and published in 
nation-wide media of broad readership, as well as re-produced through re-
printing in other media, especially in the internet, some of them multiple times in 
various blogs and leftist websites. To remind, the purpose of this particular 
section is limited, namely only to provide a broad sketch of the dissenting 
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narratives in the very early period immediately after 9/11, and to prepare the 
context for a more systematic analysis of dissent and critique in the later 
periods, in the next two sections.     
 
To start with, early dissent in general was characterised by a revelatory ethos.  
Thus, only weeks after 9/11, John Pigler, a well-known broadcaster and writer, 
undermines the official discourse by mostly pointing to forgotten or ignored facts 
destabilising of the main propositions structuring the official narrative – how 
Colin Powell had been touring and preparing for the war in Afghanistan even 
before 9/11; how the link between 9/11 and Iraq had been deliberately forged – 
and constructs an alternative identity of the “West” that is practicing a 
“geopolitical fascism” and where the concepts of “failed states”, “rogue states” 
and “humanitarian intervention” are concocted by ‘factory scholars’ to serve the 
dominant power. 721  
The exposure/revelation-style narrative continues, when The Guardian 
columnist Madeleine Bunting undermines the British official discourse, by 
presenting the war in Afghanistan as ‘one of the biggest humanitarian disasters 
in recent decades’; and by announcing Blair’s promised ‘three-pronged strategy 
– the military, the diplomatic and the humanitarian’ to be a ‘sham’.722 She further 
predicts ‘the looming US involvement in other counties, particularly in Iraq.723  
In addition, Phil Scraton directly points to the ‘constructed’ nature of both 
the threat and the claimed ‘moral’ response. Thus, he states: ‘constructing and 
popularising a “war on terror”, derived in defining, then occupying the moral high 
ground [by Blair], misrepresented the complexity of competing interests and 
material struggles’.724 More strikingly, Pilger entirely subverts the cause-and-
effect offered in the official discourses by stating that ‘“liberal realism”...[has] 
misrepresented imperialism as “crisis management”, rather than the cause of 
the crisis’.725  
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Moreover, for the philosophically advanced audiences, philosopher and 
public intellectual Slavoj Žižek embarked on not only destabilising key nodal 
points in the official narrative, but also on an all-rounded de-construction of its 
main propositions.726 Thus, he effectively deconstructed what I have 
categorised as the master nodal points of “evil” and “freedom” upon which the 
official narrative-normative chronotope of “war on terror” was hinging: ‘all the 
main terms we use to designate the present conflict – “war on terrorism”, 
“democracy and freedom”, “human rights”, and so on – are false terms, 
mystifying our perception of the situation instead of allowing us to think it’.727 As 
a result, Žižek calls on everyone to think beyond simple binary oppositions of 
Self and Other.   
As part of such expository, historicising as well as de-mystifying/de-
constructive functions, others too, attempted to destabilise the key nodal points 
on which the official narrative was structurally hinging. Thus, e.g. in relation to 
Bush’s initiatives of aid to Afghanistan in form of airdrops of food packs, Bunting 
observes: ‘[i]t may reassure the American people of their noble fight, but the 
reality of this grubby, vengeful war is beginning to become apparent’.728 This 
performative action puts pressure on and attempts to disqualify the signifier 
“noble fight”, which is a derivative of the master nodal point “freedom” in the 
official narrative. 
In a similar vein, Paul Foot destabilises the nodal point “democracy”, 
another key derivative of the master nodal point “freedom” in the official 
narrative. Thus, lamenting the lack of any substantive parliamentary debate 
over the war in Afghanistan, he portrays the British House of Commons as ‘a 
pathetic apology for parliamentary democracy’.729 The informed audience, 
indeed, reads this critique in dialogue with (i.e. intertextually linked with) and as 
an answer to Blair’s rhetoric of the time, where Britain has the moral mission of 
giving people around the world ‘the chance for a better future....as free 
citizens’730 to enjoy the democratic freedoms “we” enjoy at home. In such a 
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reading then, the structuring nodal point of “freedom” in the official narrative is 
undermined. 
Perhaps most importantly, some of these critical voices urged audiences 
to consider how different modes of explanations for the causes of 9/11 would 
have bearing on the chosen course of action as a response. Thus, directly 
undermining the official narrative that had left no space for alternatives to war, 
Paul Foot pointed to some suggestions of alternative policies that would, 
according to him, rectify consequences of the Western actions over decades: 
‘Stop subsidizing the government of Israel. Stop appeasing the war criminal 
Sharon...Stop bombing Iraq...Stop cuddling up to feudal and sexist 
dictatorships... stop siding with the rich of the world against the poor’.731 These 
alternative calls for action aimed to delegitimise the official response, namely 
that of “war on terror”.   
 Similar calls were emanating also from the placards and speeches of the 
anti-war movement protesters, both in the US and the UK. Here, the new 
electronic technologies had provided the activists with a powerful tool to 
trespass the channels of traditional mass media and directly disseminate their 
own, alternative narratives, and reach broader audiences.732 Converging around 
the common cause of ‘stop the war’,733 they variously attempted to destabilise 
the official narrative. Thus, in the US, the Act Now to Stop War and End Racism 
(ANSWER) Coalition, an umbrella organisation comprised of anti-globalisation 
and anti-war movements formed in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, demanded 
that ‘the U.S. government should share responsibility for pursuing imperialist 
policies that helped create the historical conditions within which these attacks 
were inspired, planned, and carried out’.734 They claimed that ‘the people in the 
United States were subject to a carefully orchestrated round the clock campaign 
to create a war fever’;735 and in the first major post-9/11 demonstration held in 
Washington on 29 September 2001, chanted: ‘Destroy imperialism, not 
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Afghanistan’, and ‘War is not the answer, Islam is not the problem’.736 Similar 
discourse emanated from the Stop the War Coalition in the UK. 
Finally, challenges to the official discourse also came from some civil 
groups, most notably individuals and groups of families of the victims of 9/11 
against a “war” response to the tragedy. In such oppositional discourse, the 
manipulative side of government policy was being depicted. Thus, writing to 
Bush days after the bombings in Afghanistan had begun, one family states: ‘[i]t 
makes us feel our government is using our son’s memory for justification to 
cause suffering for other sons and parents in other lands’.737 Other letters to 
newspapers and public statements followed, culminating in a trip by several of 
the family members to Kabul to see at first hand and communicate to the people 
at home the sheer volume of civilian casualties. The resultant counter-narrative 
denied ‘that war and violence [were] effective in achieving the supposed goal of 
making Americans safe,...that the victims of violence or terrorism want or 
require revenge to right their wrongs...[and] that Americans are somehow more 
worthy than other human beings’.738 Discursively, these messages had a 
powerful additional destabilising potential, due to the source of the challenge 
being the very same subjects on whose name the war had been justified – the 
victims/their families, and derivatively “our nation” at large. As anti-war family 
members of the victims later organised themselves into social groups and 
movements (such as the 9/11 Families for Peaceful Tomorrows), such 
destabilising efforts became more tangible.  
While examples are numerous, the ones given suffice to illustrate the 
emerging distinct pattern: in this early period, the dissent to the official 
discourse on 9/11 and the “war on terror” was largely structured around 
performative actions that were revelatory in nature, exposing the constructed 
nature of the threat and the ensuing justifications. This was being achieved by 
laying bare past historical facts and present realities that had been silenced or 
left ignored in the public domain. These performative efforts’ overarching 
speech-act intention was that of unmasking/exposing the purported real 
motivations behind the given foreign policies, where the official threat 
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construction and policy justifications were presented as having an instrumental 
purpose – to serve oil control in the Middle East, and/or the Western military-
industrial complex. Most of these efforts also exposed and recognised a causal 
link between the US/UK past actions in the world and 9/11, as well as warned 
about more resentment and fanaticism to come as a result of the “war on 
terror”.  
As a result, the chronotopic integrity of the official narratives was disturbed: 
the “past” was not any more a source of mere pride and moral victories, but 
rather a locus of shame, as the cause of present grievances; whereas the 
“future” was not that of a triumph of “freedom” and a place of justice for all, but 
rather a looming disaster for “freedom” and for global justice, if the present 
policies were not averted. In addition, some of these narratives effectively 
undermined the highly dichotomised official narratives, by deconstructing key 
binaries such as Self and Other. Through such destabilising discourse, the 
narratives of early dissent also attempted to put pressure on and subvert key 
nodal points upon which the edifice of the official narrative was hinging. As the 
next section demonstrates, this latter trend was to become increasingly more 
significant for the overall discursive dynamics in the years to come.  
I now turn to a systematic analysis and appraisal of the different types of 
counter-narratives in the mid- to late post-9/11 period in the next two sections. 
While this section was about the emergent stage and surveyed only very early 
dissent in big brush strokes, the next two sections are about more stabilising 
discourses of dissent, which the official narrative was increasingly unable to 
escape and had to be answerable to. Also, while this section was just on 
dissenting media and civil society; challenges to the official narrative, especially 
in the mid- to later stage, increasingly came also from within the political circles, 
including oppositional parties and from within the ruling parties. 
 
6.3. Destabilising vis-à-vis Deliberative Performatives     
By mid-2003, the initial official enthusiasm caused by rapid military success in 
Iraq quickly waning, amidst mounting criticism both in the US and the UK about 
the justifications to go to war, as a result of the lack of any evidence of weapons 
of mass destruction found on the ground. This was compounded by rising 
military death tolls, decreased international readiness to commit troops to post-
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war reconstruction, reports about public resistance against the “liberators” in 
Iraq, and growing public fears at home that this might turn into another Vietnam 
as a result of a lingering war, growing casualties and no clear exit strategy.739 
Criticism further intensified as in October 2003 the interim Iraq Survey 
Group report suggested that ‘[d]espite evidence of Saddam’s continued 
ambition to acquire nuclear weapons, to date we have not uncovered evidence 
that Iraq undertook significant post-1998 steps to actually build nuclear 
weapons or produce fissile material’,740 neither did they find stocks of any other 
types of WMDs. Indeed, Kay warned that these were not final findings;741 
nonetheless public discontent was growing, as the critical press was breeding 
suspicions that no such weapons had existed prior to the invasion. In the UK, 
the public outcry grew even bigger, over the scandal around the BBC’s claim 
that the Blair Government had ‘sexed up’ the September 2002 dossier, and over 
the subsequent Hutton inquiry. The situation grew more problematic, when the 
final Iraq Survey Group report of September 2004 confirmed that in the pre-war 
period ‘[d]istant technical analysts mistakenly identified evidence and drew 
incorrect conclusions’, although it did also emphasise the problem that 
‘observers may have [had] evidence before them and not recognize[d] it 
because of unfamiliarity with the subject’.742 
Thus, overall, the circulation of counter-narratives or practices 
challenging the dominant narrative of “war on terror” significantly intensified and 
expanded in both the US and the UK, ahead of the Iraq war, namely towards 
the end of 2002; and reached several momentous peaks, among others, 
following revelations about the Dodgy Iraq Dossier in February 2003;743 Hans 
Blix’s January 2003 report to the UN, which found no “smoking gun” in Iraq744 
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and a further report in February giving a more encouraging account of progress 
in Iraq than expected;745 Bush-Blair deliberations, and parliamentary debates 
ahead of the Iraq war; intensified mass anti-war demonstrations across the 
world in January to March 2003;746 revelations of prisoner abuses inside the 
US-run Abu Ghraib prison in April 2004; Iraq Survey Groups’ Report finding no 
evidence of WMDs, published in September 2004;747 mounting evidence of  
possible misuse of intelligence data for legitimation of war, following the leaking 
of the Downing Street Memo in the media in May 2005; increased wider 
discontent in the Muslim world, as well as among the “Coalition of the Willing” 
countries starting to disengage from 2006 onwards; and political and public 
reactions to early 2007 troop surge in Iraq (announced by Bush in January 
2007).748 
These events and developments are part of what I had referred to as the 
“real-life chronotope” per Bakhtin: these are the non-discursive and supra-
discursive events to which the contesting voices must respond in the sense of 
the Bakhtinian “deed upon the world”. They also become moments which show 
how the real-life chronotope becomes a challenge to the representational, i.e. 
narrative-normative chronotope. The period encompassing these events, i.e. 
roughly 2002 to 2007, is the approximate time-period to concentrate on in this 
section, while the mentioned events are the moments of intensified critique I 
zoom into and make selection of texts from. It must be noted, that despite each 
of these events having originated in either the US or the UK, they all 
reverberated across the Atlantic and attracted mass coverage and reaction in 
both societies. However, the selection is not limited to these events: important 
dates in the political calendar, such as annual State of the Union speeches; 
salient political events, such as resignations in the context of the “war on terror” 
(e.g., Clare Short in May 2003, in the UK); the US Presidential election 
                                                 
745
 See Hans Brix, Executive Chairman, UNMOVIC, ‘Briefing of the Security Council’ (14 
February 2003), at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB80/wmd30.htm, accessed 
11/10/2012. 
746
 The demonstrations reached their peak on the 15
th
 February, 2003, when a coordinated 
action across the globe brought more than four million people to the streets of major capitals, 
including up to two million in London.   
747
 ‘Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s Weapons’ (Iraq Survey 
Group Final Report) (30 September 2004), at https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-
reports-1/iraq_wmd_2004/index.html, accessed 10/10/2012.   
748
 George W. Bush, ‘President’s Address to the Nation’, Washington, D. C. (January 10, 2007), 
at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/01/20070110-7.html, 
accessed 04/02/2013.  
215 
 
campaign of 2004; as well as the release of key strategic documents or 
statements (such as the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, in the US in 
November 2005) all constitute important moments of interest for selection and 
analysis, as moments of increased public saliency of contestations over the 
issue and of possibility for change. 
Challenges to the official discourse of “war on terror” in the US and the 
UK came from three main sources: political circles (including active or former 
politicians); the media (both traditional mass media, and new media such as e-
magazines and blogs), and social movements. Indeed, each of these sources 
required selection appropriate for the type. Thus, the selection of texts 
representing the discourse of politicians and former government/military officials 
was based on salient public appearances; notably outspoken critique including 
in the media, and/or texts accompanying politically significant actions, such as 
e.g. resignations, or collective political actions such as letters/appeals, as well 
as articulations voiced during parliamentary debates or question and answer 
(Q&A) sessions ahead of, during or after a momentous event. The media texts 
were selected based on the most salient coverage around the time of the major 
turning points identified in the introduction above. In the UK, I have selected 
texts from major national newspapers such as The Independent, The Guardian, 
The Telegraph, to cover the mainstream range of the political spectrum; The 
Mirror because of its overt anti-war stance taken during the major 
demonstrations of February 2003;749 as well as radical alternative media such 
as the pacifist magazine Peace News. In the US, printed press has fewer 
readerships, and there is no national newspaper.750 However, I have looked at 
The Los Angeles Times, New York Times, and Washington Post, as the most 
widely circulated mainstream newspapers; as well as the radical alternative e-
publications Counterpunch.org, and AntiWar.com. The rationale behind the 
shortlisting of the media sources has been to cover both mainstream and 
alternative, especially radical/leftist publications and e-sources. In case of 
mainstream media, I concentrate on editorial and opinion articles, rather than 
those reporting news. Given the sheer volume of potential coverage of issues 
related to “war on terror” in these publications, the data collection and analysis, 
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even within the shortlisted sources, could not have been a comprehensive and 
detailed endeavour: that would have constituted a project of media research in 
its own right. Instead, I have zoomed into periods of the momentous events 
identified above, and made only a limited selection of texts, which on and 
around the dates of those events, represent publicly salient critical voices.       
Furthermore, I have looked at major anti-war movements’ discourses, 
particularly those of Stop the War Coalition (StWC) in the UK, and Act Now to 
Stop War and End Racism (ANSWER), in the US. These are umbrella 
organizations for anti-war movements aiming at global reach through organising 
of the biggest anti-war demonstrations in history of the UK and the US, 
respectively. In case of StWC, I have looked at the collection of speeches, 
images and articulations produced during and after the demonstrations by key 
activists and their supporters, collected and documented by the leaders of the 
organisation in the book Stop the War: The Story of Britain’s Biggest Mass 
Movement.751 In case of ANSWER, I look at their key mission statements and 
public appeals found in their websites and elsewhere.752 
Texts from the various sources identified above display a large variation of style 
and purpose, depending on the subject positions occupied by the speakers, as 
well as differing communication targets and resources at hand. However, a 
certain pattern emerges. Thus, what I have called destabilising performatives in 
the theoretical discussion in chapter 3, are indispensable to destabilising 
counter-narratives (I will also refer to these broadly as “destabilising critique”). 
These are attempts to fundamentally subvert the official “war on terror” 
narrative, by putting pressure on and potentially dislodging the master nodal 
points and the chronotopic building blocks on which the official narrative is built, 
as identified in the previous chapter. For instance, the “no war for oil” 
narrative753 is largely comprised of such counter-propositions effectively 
dislocating the official narrative that “we are at war to protect our nation from 
WMDs and to liberate the Iraqi people”, by replacing it with the narrative that 
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“this is a manipulative selfish war for oil”. In this relation, we must again recall 
the discussion of Laclau’s concept of ‘dislocation’.754 In the dialogical-relational 
model, dislocatory performatives are performative acts that, by their intent, or 
else, by their effect, decentre the key nodal points upon which the related 
narrative hinges, disturbing the narrative-normative chronotope of a 
foreign/security discourse. We shall later see what potential effects such 
dislocation may have.  
In contrast, deliberative performatives, indispensable to deliberative 
counter-narratives (or what I also refer to as “deliberative critique”), are not 
predominantly subversive of the dominant narrative. To remind, deliberative 
performatives challenge the dominant narrative only by partly refuting the earlier 
deliberative efforts behind the latter, and/or by demanding the realisation of the 
promises indispensable to the earlier persuasive deliberative performatives.  
It must be noted, that these relatively distinct types of counter-
propositions can variously configure in a given narrative or pronouncement. 
Indeed, a lot of critique was destabilising when it came to specifically the Iraq 
war, but more deliberative in relation to the broader “war on terror” narrative. In 
fact, how these configure and which type tends to dominate within a given 
source, will be important when looking at their effects in the longer term.  
6.3.1. Destabilising “Evil” and “Freedom” 
 
In May 2005, a July 2002 Downing Street Memo (the so-called “smoking gun 
memo”) from a secret meeting of British government officials and intelligence 
leaked into the The Sunday Times, and revealed that ‘the intelligence and facts 
were being fixed [by the U.S.] around the policy’755 of removing Saddam 
Hussein from power. In the US, this sparked a number of efforts at various 
levels to impeach Bush on the grounds of having lied to the Congress when 
acquiring authorisation for war. Thus, on 5 May, Congressman John Conyers 
and 88 other Democrats from the House of Representatives sent a letter to 
President Bush demanding an explanation: the revelations in the memo, they 
demanded, ‘raise troubling new questions regarding the legal justifications for 
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the war as well as the integrity of your own Administration’.756 Facing White 
House silence, Conyers and others launched a major campaign collecting 
signatures from the public demanding a reply to the letter. Sen. Conyers’ 
discursive effort in the initial letter could have potentially been subversive of the 
official Iraq war narrative. However, it avoided direct destabilising of the main 
nodal points of the official narrative, or dispositioning it with an alternative one. 
Perhaps therefore, although the letter became one of the main conduits for 
public demand for accountability from Bush, it largely failed to build a powerful 
alternative discourse. 
 A discursively more powerful call for impeachment came from Paul Craig 
Roberts, former editor and columnist of the Wall Street Journal, and a former 
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury in the Reagan Administration – a former 
Conservative turned to radical politics – whose ruthless criticism of the war in 
Iraq reverberated through the reproduction of his numerous articles in many 
alternative media. His propositions echo similar counter-narratives circulating in 
the public domain, especially in the critical e-sources such as Counterpunch.org 
and AntiWar.com, and in this sense may be said to be representative (a 
snapshot) of this broader picture.  
In his first in the series of “impeachment” articles entitled ‘America’s 
Reputation in Tatters’, Roberts states: 
George W. Bush and his gang of neocon warmongers have destroyed America’s 
reputation. It is likely to stay destroyed, because at this point the only way to 
restore America’s reputation would be to impeach and convict President Bush 
for intentionally deceiving Congress and the American people in order to start a 
war of aggression against a country that posed no threat to the US. America can 
redeem itself only by holding Bush accountable (emphases added).
757
 
 
This passage not only destabilises the macro-proposition of the official 
narrative, namely that “Iraq posed a major threat”, but also in contrast to the 
previous example, does this by disturbing the key nodal point on which the 
official narrative was hinging, that of “evil”. Thus, the very nodal signification of 
“threat” is being displaced by an invocation of a different “American people”: 
while in the Bush narrative, “the American people” required the “mission to 
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spread democracy and liberate the Iraqi people” for the successful realisation of 
its identity, even if that meant going to war in a foreign country, Robert’s 
counter-narrative proposition alludes to an “American people” which does not 
and must not go to war ‘against a country that pose[d] no [immediate/physical] 
threat’ to it.758 Thus, the nodal point “the American people” is being re-populated 
with new intertextuality, around which the discourses of “honesty/moral 
disposition”, “democratic accountability”, “non-aggression towards other 
nations” and even “reputation/image” are being re-clustered, thereby muting the 
discourses of “democratisation” and “liberation” as alternative intertextuality 
increasingly activated by the Bush rhetoric during the same period.  
Similar constructions are found also in other counter-narrative 
articulations. Thus, in June 2002, the ‘Statement of Conscience’ of the anti-war 
movement Not in Our Names, states:  
Let it not be said that people in the United States did nothing when their 
government declared a war without limit and instituted stark new measures of 
repression. ...we call on all Americans to resist the war and repression that has 
been loosed on the world by the Bush administration. It is unjust, immoral, and 
illegitimate (emphases added).759 
Here, the nodal point “our nation” expressed in the references ‘the people in the 
United States’ and ‘all Americans’ is still anchored on the master nodal point 
“freedom”; however, a “freedom” that is facing a different “threat/evil” – that of  
being undermined if “we” ‘go to war without limit’ and if “we” continue to practice 
‘repression’. Moreover, the Bush administration itself becomes a “threat” to the 
realisation of the American identity anchored on “freedom”, by his policies that 
are ‘unjust, immoral and illegitimate’.760 
Thus, not only the “American people” is being re-constituted, but also the 
nodal point “evil” the way it had been fixed by the Bush narrative is being 
dislodged, interfered by new significations given to the temporality of the 
nation’s identity. As demonstrated earlier, the “future” of the nation in Bush’s 
narrative was constructed as densely interlinked with the condition of “triumph” 
over the “threat” of terrorism, a condition without which the nation would 
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effectively fail ‘to prevail’.761 In contrast, Robert’s destabilising counter-narrative 
passage quoted above dislodges the chronotope of the Bush narrative, 
constructing a different successful “future” for the “nation” – a future where the 
nation would fulfil its identity, only if the people took action to ‘redeem’ America 
now in the present. In this new “if”-conditionality of identity, the negative 
imagining, i.e. the non-fulfilment of the condition leaves the nation in a 
demeaning prospect, which gives a modified signification to the nodal point 
“threat”.  
 In a less extreme manner, in the UK, in the run up to the Iraq war and 
amidst increasing criticism, many individual politicians, as well as some mass 
media outlets, expressed views, where the master nodal points of the British 
official narrative were being put pressure on. Thus, in her resignation statement 
to the Parliament, former Secretary for International Development Clare Short 
states: 
I believe it is duty of all responsible political leaders ...to focus on reuniting the 
international community in order to support the people of Iraq in rebuilding their 
country, to re-establish the authority of the UN and to heal the bitter divisions that 
preceded the war. I am sorry to say that the UK Government is not doing this. It is 
supporting the US in trying to bully the Security Council into a resolution that gives 
the coalition the power to establish an Iraqi Government and control the use of oil 
for reconstruction with only a minor role for the UN (emphasis added).762 
 
This speech-act not only supports the key proposition behind the counter-
narrative “war for oil”, but also destabilises the proposition integral to the British 
official narrative that the UN route had been favoured.  
In the same lines of the debate over multilateralism vs. unilateralism 
dominant in the UK at the time, Robin Cook explains his resignation763 on the 
eve of the parliamentary debate and vote on Iraq: after spotting several logical 
and factual inconsistencies in the official UK and US narratives, he states: 
[O]ur credibility [is not] helped by the appearance that our partners in Washington 
are less interested in disarmament than they are in regime change in Iraq. That 
explains why any evidence that inspections may be showing progress is greeted in 
Washington not with satisfaction but with consternation: it reduces the case for war 
(emphases added).764 
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This proposition destabilises the master nodal point “threat”, by suggesting that 
the US and Britain were pursuing a war for material or hubris-driven purposes, 
rather than one against “a clear and present danger”.  
Some of the key debates and critique in the UK at the run-up to the war in 
Iraq are encapsulated in a Guardian editorial ‘Speak for the Nation’, written on 
the eve of Prime Minister Blair’s crucial visit to Washington, where, it was 
believed, the final decision on Iraq was to be made.765 Commenting on Blair’s 
visit, the piece states: 
This crisis is not primarily about Iraqi weapons of mass death…It is not primarily 
about fighting terrorism, despite the alleged links between Iraq and al-Qaida. But 
terrorists, our far deadlier foe, will doubtless make of it a new casus belli. For some 
sceptics, it is about oil, about dreams of American empire and a remade Middle 
East of Pentagon protectorates…This war is not primarily about democracy or 
freedom, much as the Iraqi people deserve both. And it will most certainly not 
deliver justice for all. It is, fundamentally, about the wilful exercise of unrestrained 
global power, unfazed by considerations of international law, the principles of 
collective UN security, and the consequences for every man (emphasis added).766 
 
This passage encapsulates many layers of critique present in the UK at the 
time: unilateralism vs. multilateralism; though not directly ascribing to the “war 
for oil” narrative, it demystifies the official narrative and exposes the government 
as willing to wage a war driven by hubris, thereby undermining both the nodal 
point of “threat”, as well as that of “freedom”, and instead, alludes to a new 
“threat” posed by ‘unrestrained global power’.  
At times, a destabilising counter-narrative may diametrically reverse the 
official threat narrative. Thus, in his article ‘What is Bush’s Agenda in Iraq?’ Paul 
Roberts boldly claims: 
His [Bush’s] PATRIOT Act alone has done more damage to Americans’ freedom 
than Osama bin Laden (emphases added).767 
 
In this complete displacement of Bush’s narrative, the reversal of causal 
relationships constructs a new threat narrative: here, the PATRIOT Act is the 
“threat” to “American values and way of life” and hence to “American people’s” 
identity, rather than the medium to protect it from the “threat” emanating from 
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terrorism. An example of a much more extreme and dramatic subversion is in 
Roberts’ following statement: 
Many readers write to me that Bush and his neocon crazies are Israel’s patsies. An 
equally good case can be made that Bush and his crazy neocons are Osama bin 
Laden’s agents.768 
 
However, interestingly, as we shall see in the next chapter, such almost 
preposterous-sounding subversions, as well as the diametrical reversal of the 
official narrative, may result in much less “answerability” and hence less 
dialogical engagement by proponents of the official narrative. This may 
especially be true of the discourses of radical and extravagant style, as indeed, 
most of Paul Robert’s critique is, apparent in titles/statements such as ‘Get 
Ready for WWIII’,769 ‘the Bush administration will bring about Armageddon’,770 
and more recently, ‘Is the War on Terror a Hoax?’771, and ‘You are Voting for 
Your Own Extinction’.772 By their mere extremeness, these counter-narrative 
propositions may often undermine their own credibility.  
6.3.2. Deliberating on a “Mistaken” War 
In contrast to the above examples, Nancy Pelosi, Majority Leader (D-CA) of the 
House of Representatives at the time, delivered a speech on the House floor in 
June 2005, which was more representative of what I have classified as 
deliberative counter-narrative propositions. The speech ‘This War in Iraq Is a 
Grotesque Mistake’773 was in support of her proposed amendment to the 
defence appropriations bill, requiring the President to submit a report to 
Congress detailing a strategy for success in Iraq and timetables for withdrawal. 
The highlight of the speech, also one which became a headline catchphrase 
and was most reproduced in the mass media, was: 
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This is a war that each passing day confirms what I have said before and I will say 
again. This war in Iraq is a grotesque mistake; it is not making America safer, and 
the American people know it (emphases added).774 
This might appear to be a destabilising counter-narrative proposition for the Iraq 
war narrative. However, it fails to follow up the undermining of the official 
narrative and fails to construct a narrative as to why the war has been a 
“mistake” and why America is in more danger, except for pointing to an 
increased danger to the troops on the ground due to an unsuccessful mission. 
Moreover, in a hyperlinked field of past and present performances, at least to 
some of the audiences, and especially given the commentary and analyses in 
the media, this speech must have invoked (intertextually activated) Pelosi’s 
other famous speech – one delivered on 2 October 2002, calling for a No vote 
to resolution 45 authorizing military force against Iraq.775 Back then, she built a 
typical deliberative counter-narrative, based on macro-propositions drawn from 
the official “war on terror” narrative. Thus, she re-affirmed: 
The clear and present danger that our country faces is terrorism.....For the past 13 
months, we have stood shoulder-to-shoulder with President Bush to remove the 
threat of terrorism posed by Al Qaeda. Our work is not done. Osama Bin Laden, 
Mullah Omar and other Al Qaeda terrorist leaders have not been accounted for. 
We have unfinished business....in the war on terrorism (emphases added).776 
  
These statements reinstate and fortify the nodal points “threat”, “terrorism” and 
“our nation” in the same way as these had been fixed in the dominant official 
narrative. They do not suggest any, even intertextually probable, activation of 
alternative/modified significations to these nodal points, let alone directly 
destabilise them. More specifically, in relation to going into Iraq itself, Pelosi 
affirms, and again re-articulates the threat construction of the official narrative, 
despite being against the war. Moreover, despite the highlight statement of the 
speech claiming that the war had been ‘a grotesque mistake’ and despite her 
2002 protest against the war, Pelosi, in a logically fallacious manner, goes on to 
demand that ‘we must have been better prepared for the war’:  
When we went into this war, it was a war of choice, a pre-emptive war....in a war of 
choice, you have an increased responsibility to be prepared and to have a plan for 
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what happens, in this case, after the fall of Baghdad. We were not prepared with 
such a plan.777 
Furthermore, broadly typical of the trend, Pelosi, in an expressly critical 
articulation countering the given policy, still builds on constructions of the 
“future” the way it had been fixed by the dominant narrative, and thus 
unwittingly presses for the fulfilment of the promises built into the official 
narrative. Thus, Pelosi states: 
Mr. Murtha, leading the House Democrats on this issue said, “We must energize. 
We must turn on the lights. We must have reconstruction in Iraq”. And because of 
the lack of planning, the reconstruction is taking much longer, is much more costly, 
and security is making it almost impossible. You can’t go forward with the social 
services unless you have a secure Iraq, and you can’t have it be secure and bring 
our troops home unless you turn over that security responsibility to the Iraqis.778  
She goes on to demand a timetable for withdrawal from a ‘mistaken’ war, but at 
the same time, constructs a specific “future”, where the promises of “security” 
and “freedom” for the Iraqis – and by extension for the Americans – inherent in 
the official narrative must be fulfilled before the withdrawal can be deemed 
legitimate, and thereby reaffirms the official chronotope. 
 Similarly, in her ‘Letter to Constituents on Iraq Policy’ disseminated 
ahead of President Bush’s speech and release of the National Strategy for 
Victory in Iraq, Senator Hilary Clinton states: 
[§1] In October 2002, I voted for the resolution to authorize the Administration to 
use force in Iraq. I voted for it on the basis of the evidence presented by the 
Administration, assurances they gave that they would first seek to resolve the 
issue of weapons of mass destruction peacefully through United Nations 
sponsored inspections…Their assurances turned out to be empty ones… And the 
“evidence” of weapons of mass destruction and links to al Qaeda turned out to be 
false. 
 
[§2] ...It is time for the President to stop serving up platitudes and present us with a 
plan for finishing this war with success and honor – not a rigid timetable that 
terrorists can exploit, but a public plan for winning and concluding the war.  
 
[§3]…America has a big job to do now. We must set reasonable goals to finish 
what we started and successfully turn over Iraqi security to Iraqis…We must repair 
the damage done to our reputation…And we must continue to fight terrorism 
wherever it exists…We have to continue the fight against terrorism and make sure 
we apply America’s best values and effective strategies in making our world and 
country a better and safer place. We have to do what is right and smart in the war 
against terrorists and pursuit of democracy and security. That means repudiating 
torture which undermines America's values. That means reforming intelligence and 
its use by decision makers. That means rejecting the Administration's doctrine of 
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preemptive war and their preference to going it alone rather than building real 
international support (all emphases added).779 
Despite the apparently critical stance, this is a deliberative, rather than 
destabilising performance, as rather than dislodge, throughout §3, Clinton re-
produces and re-enforces the official narrative’s master nodal points of 
“freedom” and “threat/evil”. Unless these are fixed in alternative ways, their use 
will, in the broader public perceptions at least, hypertextually link the given 
performative action with the official, dominant narrative. Such hypertextuality will 
activate and re-enforce the meanings of these nodal points as and the way they 
had been fixed in the dominant narrative, and therefore activate the full 
normative chronotopicity of such narrative. In other words, as hyperlinks, these 
nodal points may re-activate the whole narrative of the dominant discourse for 
the audience. Therefore, despite her apparent demand for a possible early 
withdrawal, and despite her regrets for having voted for the authorisation of the 
war in Iraq in 2002 (§1 and §2), Clinton reifies the official narrative by failing to 
displace the master nodal points of “evil” and “freedom” with new signification. 
Moreover, despite her clear stance that she would not have voted for an 
invasion, had the facts known today been available to her back in 2002, thereby 
confirming that the war had been a “mistake”, Clinton demands for not just an 
exit plan, but an exit plan that would ensure ‘finishing this war with success and 
honor –…for winning…the war’ (emphasis added).780  
 Both practices, i.e. hinging an otherwise critical narrative on the same 
master nodal points as the narrative critiqued; as well as demanding for 
“success” and “victory” for a war that had been “ill-conceived” if not out-right 
“illegal and immoral”, develop into consistent trends in case of deliberative 
counter-narrative propositions. Indeed, by relying on uniting nodal points for 
their own, otherwise critical counter-narratives, active politicians may be trying 
to mitigate political risk involved in fundamentally undermining a dominant 
security discourse and with it a national identity discourse. Thus, hinging their 
narratives on the same master nodal points as the official narrative, and thereby 
choosing to remain partially within the reified discursive formation, these critics 
may hope to increase the perlocutionary effect of their utterances. In addition, 
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they may be trying to counter-silence those silencing efforts by the official 
circles that attempt to stigmatise any critique of the war as “non-patriotic” or as 
being “not concerned about our nation’s interests/security”. However, by 
reaffirming these uniting nodal points, moderate critics not only fortify the 
narrative the critique is addressed to by affirming the legitimacy of its master 
nodal points, but also, as we shall see in the next chapter, at the same time and 
perhaps unwittingly, open up dialogical routes for the addressee to engage in 
restorative performatives to answer the points of divergence, on which 
accountability is demanded (e.g., “plan to victory”, in the above case), and 
thereby further stabilise the dominant narrative.  
 
In Britain, the overwhelming discontent at the prospect of an Iraq war at the end 
of 2002 and beginning of 2003781 triggered claims of the government’s 
‘contempt of democracy…[and an overall] “democratic crisis” stemming from the 
fact that the views of the majority of citizens were very different from the views 
of those in power’.782 This in turn led some to adopt a responsive “contempt” 
towards the democratic/parliamentary politics, as they pointed to the difficulty 
for many citizens to vote when both major parties supported the war,783 and 
when no substantive space for debate was provided in the Parliament. In this 
context, there was more discursive subversion of the official narrative’s nodal 
point “freedom” by critics, who at the same time were attempting to draw 
attention to the demise of democratic accountability at home. This larger debate 
is condensed in the following passage from a 30th January 2003 Guardian 
editorial: 
Right now, this war is wrong because it weakens the very democracy for which we 
are summoned to fight. If democracy’s good health were the arbiter, Mr Blair would 
not be currently blocking out the roaring surge of opposition in Britain and around 
the globe. There would be a free, prior parliamentary vote on any proposal to send 
troops into combat.784 
In destabilising the official narrative’s nodal point “freedom”, this bares the 
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illocution that “Britain cannot be an advocate of democracy in the world, if 
democracy is not functioning at home”. However, it does not directly undermine 
moral grounds for using force to spread democracy if there were a 
parliamentary vote, therefore still qualifies as a deliberative rather than 
destabilising critique. 
Furthermore, similar to the articulations demanding for the realisation of the 
promises of a “mistaken” war cited in case of the US, in the UK, various 
statements by the then leader of the Liberal-Democratic party Charles Kennedy 
offer examples. Thus, during the Parliamentary debate following Blair’s 
presentation of the so-called “45-minute dossier”, despite his apparent in-
principle dissent to a regime change, Kennedy goes on to ask whether certain 
conditions (and not merely the UN authorisation, but post-regime rehabilitation) 
are being met before – quite paradoxically—such a regime change can be 
deemed legitimate. Thus, he asks: 
[§1] Those of us who have never subscribed to British unilateralism are not about 
to sign up to American unilateralism now, either. 
  
[§2] What we must be clear about…is the notion of regime change, which is ill-
defined, and remains so today. It would set a dangerous precedent in international 
affairs.  
[§3] We have to be clear about the possible consequences of a regime change. 
What will the reaction be in the rest of the Arab world? If Saddam’s regime falls, 
what kind of government system is envisaged as a replacement?…The Prime 
Minister, quite rightly...was able to point to the mobilisation of forces in 
Afghanistan, which could lead to an alternative, more acceptable Government 
there. Is there the capacity or potential for a similar mobilisation to take place 
within Iraq?...If we were not to walk away following the toppling of Saddam, who 
would provide the necessary presence to police and create the ongoing stability in 
Iraq that would be essential because of the shell-shocked nature of that 
country?...Should we not instead be talking about the longer-term need for a 
rehabilitation strategy for Iraq, not least for its innocent, oppressed people with 
whom none of us has any argument whatever? (emphases added)785  
Thus, despite express critique of the given policy of a possible unilateral action 
without the UN authorisation and a subsequent regime change (§1 and §2), 
Kennedy continues to deliberate on the realisation of the very same policy (§3).  
Such performative efforts may make certain political sense for individual 
actors (such as the desire to achieve if not the aversion of the war, then at least 
a more humane intervention). Individual agents’ intentionality to bring about 
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certain change in the limited political situation they find themselves is apparent. 
However, cumulatively, as it will be argued and demonstrated in the next 
chapter, such individual intentionality and performative practices may have 
unintended consequences for the longer-term discursive and hence political 
dynamics, due to unanticipated mechanisms that their actions set in motion. 
Thus, I contend that part of such mechanisms is that these deliberative speech-
acts carry the additional illocution, whether consciously intended or not, of 
inviting the interlocutor to restorative discursive performatives, i.e. performatives 
that effectively counter the purported critique by re-affirming the nodal points 
constructed in the official narrative, as well as by accommodating and 
neutralising some of the critical propositions offered by deliberative critique.  
 
6.4. Dislocating the Official Chronotope and the Making and Unmaking 
of National Identity: A Deficit of “Future”?  
As is implicit to the discussion in the previous section, both destabilising and 
deliberative counter-narratives, albeit variously, engage with, or affect, the 
narrative-normative chronotope of the official narratives, namely of the 
Chronotope of Cyclical Triumph in the US, and the Chronotope of Agent of 
Change in the UK (see chapter 4). However, while the emphasis in the previous 
section was on demonstrating the distinction between two types of counter-
narratives, i.e. destabilising as opposed to deliberative counter-narratives, and 
that in relation to how they challenge the official narrative, here in this section, 
the focus shifts to a more immediate investigation as to what alternative 
chronotopes the critical voices constructed and how these encountered 
(clashed and competed) with the official, i.e. the dominant, chronotope of “war 
on terror”. In doing so, this section is more immediately concerned with 
competing national identity discourses, and the temporality of “imagining the 
nation” in alternative ways. To be consistent with the normative focus of the 
official chronotope, I will specifically enquire into potential constructions of 
alternative “futures” for the US/UK “nation” and/or the “world/international 
community”, in the representations of critique.     
 
It was found that deliberative critique largely engages in the construction of 
“subjunctive futures” in a corrective manner, only by partially destabilising the 
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official national identity narrative. Thus, in her ‘Letter to Constituents’ – writing 
on the eve of the publication of the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq of 
November 2005 and the subsequent speech by Bush – Hilary Clinton states: 
We must deny terrorists the prize they are now seeking in Iraq. We must repair the 
damage done to our reputation. We must reform our intelligence system so we 
never go to war on false premises again. We must repair the breach with the 
Muslim world. And we must continue to fight terrorism wherever it exists.786 
  
Here, the “subjunctive future” will be bleak “if we do not take certain [suggested] 
actions”. However, the “future” of the nation is still imagined largely as it is 
constructed in the official narrative, thus reproducing the chronotope of that 
narrative, without critiquing/questioning it.  
 A slightly different situation is observed in a New York Times critical 
editorial reaction to Bush’s 28 June 2005 speech.787 Interestingly, the opening 
statement – ‘President Bush told the nation last night that the war in Iraq was 
difficult but winnable. Only the first is clearly true’ – in effect destabilises 
“triumph”, the outcome macro-narrative building block key to Bush’s narrative-
normative chronotope, thus leaving “future” hinged on “failure” rather than 
“triumph”. Nevertheless, the piece goes on to demand: 
We had hoped that he would seize the moment to tell the nation how he will define 
victory, and to give Americans a specific sense of how he intends to reach that 
goal...the nation was wondering whether American sacrifices could actually 
produce a stable and democratic Iraq (emphases added).788 
Here, the ‘the nation’ and ‘democratic Iraq’ both hinge on and thus help 
reproduce the master nodal point of “freedom” as in the official narrative. 
Despite the apparent critique of the mission’s performance in Iraq and 
scepticism towards its success, this statement re-inscribes the achievement of 
the promise of ‘a stable and democratic Iraq’ as the duty of the “nation”, and 
thus imagines the “future” conditioned on the same premises as the official 
narrative’s prescription of “future”. 
In contrast, simultaneous with undermining the official legitimation of the 
war, destabilising counter-narrative propositions tend to undermine the national 
identity narrative built into the dominant security narrative. Thus, 
characteristically, ahead of the Iraq war, in its Statement of Conscience, the 
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anti-war movement Not in Our Name asks: 
The government now openly prepares to wage all-out war on Iraq – a country 
which has no connection to the horror of September 11. What kind of world will this 
become if the US government has a blank check to drop commandos, assassins, 
and bombs wherever it wants (emphasis added)?789 
 
Here, the official American identity narrative of “a benevolent nation with a noble 
mission in the world liberating the underprivileged and spreading freedom” is 
displaced by an alternative image, where “America” presents itself as “an over-
ambitious bully in the world”. In other words, the nodal points “freedom” as well 
as “evil” are being dislodged, simultaneous with undermining the chronotopic 
building block of “future” and the outcome signifier “triumph” as they had been 
fixed in the official narrative. The subjunctive “future” is now linked to “failure” 
(i.e. failure of the purpose set out in the official narrative), rather than “triumph”. 
Importantly, the nodal point “freedom” (i.e., “the spreading of freedom as the 
paramount American mission”), is destabilised without offering a new and 
competing fixation for it.  
In a similar vein, a Guardian editorial already quoted earlier, states: 
This war is not primarily about democracy or freedom...it will most certainly not 
deliver justice for all.... Iraq will form an awesome precedent for what Gerhard 
Schröder calls the “law of the jungle”. Iraq is just the beginning (emphasis 
added).790 
In addition to undermining the nodal points “evil/threat” and “freedom”, this 
speech-act pictures a certain “future” (of the international community, but 
interlinked to it, also that of Britain), where the prospect of “triumph” of 
“freedom” and “justice” is not attained, and where “failure” is more certain. 
Characteristically for such critique, the “future” is constructed in negative terms, 
i.e. “what bleak prospect we are facing if we let Bush and Blair go ahead”; but 
do not construct an alternative positive “future”. Thus, such challenges to the 
dominant national identity narrative constitute subversion without the 
construction of an alternative positive “we” identity that could have been a new 
source for national pride.   
This failure to construct a positive “future” is often done by 
simultaneously undermining the “past” as a source of victories and inspiration 
as it is fixed in the official narrative. Thus, for example, Stop the War selectively 
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draws on oft-forgotten facts from the past few decades of British and American 
involvement in the Middle East to unmask the “truth” about oil, imperialism and 
military-industrial complex as the real motives behind the “war on terror”.791 In 
doing so, it builds a narrative of global politics and British foreign policy heavily 
relying on past historical facts that would potentially incite disillusion and 
shame, rather than national pride sustained in the official narrative, in other 
words, undermines the “past” as a source of national victories and pride, upon 
which the official narrative-normative chronotope relies. Thus, for instance, in 
enumerating ‘a few things which are not widely known about Iraq’,792 the 
authors claim: 
The first recorded use of chemical weapons against a civilian population was the 
bombing of mutinous Iraqi villages by the RAZF in 1920s, an event commended by 
Churchill.793       
Here, indeed, the invocation of this purportedly forgotten historical event is 
meant to hypertextually activate the official representations of Saddam’s use of 
chemical weapons against own civilians, and to effectively undermine the 
perlocutionary effect of such a claim as a justification for a “humanitarian” war. 
However, more crucially, the invocation of “Churchill” in this statement 
intertextually links with, and thus undermines, the narratives of British triumph in 
the World War II and through it the British national pride often associated with 
the character of Churchill himself.  In their version of a selective engagement 
with the historical “past” to imagine the nation, these critics destroy positive 
associations with one’s “past”, associations that would induce positive emotions 
of pride and belongingness, and instead construct negatively charged ones. In a 
similar vein, consider the following statement by Stop the War Coalition:  
[§1] The Halabja outrage met with the most muted response from Washington and 
London…Saddam and his dictatorship were still seen as a pillar of stability in the 
Middle East, not to mention a very lucrative business partner (for weapons, in 
particular). 
 
[§2]…Saddam’s reincarnation as the new “Hitler” was not caused by his massacre, 
his aggression against Iraq, his continuing oppression of all Iraqi democrats….The 
tipping point was his decision to invade Kuwait 
 
[§3]…The US and Britain, unwilling to see Iraq seize control of so much of the 
world’s oil…acted to restore their sort of order in the region…a project made easier 
by the fact that the invasion [of Kuwait] had been a fairly unambiguous breach of 
international law. 
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[§4]…Saddam was, however, left in power after his rapid defeat in Kuwait, since 
the US preferred a dictatorship in Iraq to any alternative scenario –…a democracy 
which might inspire the overturning of pro-US regimes elsewhere…the “new Hitler” 
was held to be a safer bet than rule by the Iraqi people themselves.794  
This passage is an “answer” to, and aims to destabilise, one of the recurring 
propositions in the official narrative, namely that portraying Saddam as “a tyrant 
from which his own people must be liberated”, and the oft-heard references to 
his massacre of Kurds in 1988 and oppression of own people. It dislodges and 
displaces the “virtuous past” of the official British and American chronotopes, 
with an alternative “past”, where Britain and America are depicted as historically 
having been indifferent to loss of human life (§1, §2); oppression (§2) and 
aspirations of democracy (§4)  and been, rather, motivated by the immoral 
urges for ‘lucrative business [of weapons]’ (§1) and oil (§3); and have in fact 
‘preferred a dictatorship in Iraq’ over a possible democracy and a ‘rule by the 
Iraqi people’ (§4). In addition, it exposes the opportunistic use of labels such as 
“new Hitler” for Saddam, not only to point out the hypocrisy of such labelling in 
the context of the exposed facts, but also intertextually linking this with another 
usage of the same label during the Suez Crisis of 1956, alluding to the latter as 
a shameful page of lowly motives of oil and imperialism in British history that is 
morally covalent with the present involvement in Iraq. Cumulatively, these 
speech-acts dislocate Blaire’s narrative of “pivotal power Britain” that makes a 
vital difference in the world as “a force for good” by “spreading democracy and 
better life for all”. 
Furthermore, often such dislocatory articulations directly undermine the 
nodal point of “values” as it was fixed in the official narrative, without effectively 
offering a commensurate discourse of alternative “values” upon which an 
alternative positive identity and foreign/security discourse could hinge. Thus, a 
Peace News editorial entitled ‘Still Time to Abolish War’ is illustrative, and 
needs to be quoted at length: 
[§1] With the re-election of George W and the seeming immovable presence of 
Tony Blair, the bizarre notion of a “values” based political system has become 
further entrenched. But what kind of “values” are they talking about? Values that 
state that while abortion is evil it is OK to drop bombs on kids in Fallujah, values 
which allow arms sales to Iraq while persecuting refugees escaping war zones. 
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[§2] The “values” concept – like “humanitarian intervention” is yet another 
smokescreen developed by the men in suits to try to explain away their atrocities. 
  
[§3] It’s established beyond doubt that the major powers don’t give a damn about 
ordinary people, indeed those major powers have knowingly added to all our 
misery and suffering through arms sales, the encouragement of punitive macro-
economic policies and all the little nasty things they do to keep themselves in 
power at our expense.  
 
[§4]…The global superpowers are not just attacking “others” - they are attacking 
and feeding off all of us. 
 
[§5]...The modern “humanitarian interventions” and the long established “Just War” 
theory have been disastrous for humankind…If we allow for military interventions 
and the “just” war, then we allow for…the continuation of an essentially patriarchal 
and vicious institution (all emphases added).795 
While the node “values” as it had been fixed in the US and UK official narratives 
is being powerfully deconstructed and dislodged by emotively charged rhetorical 
tropes (marked in italics) throughout §§1-4, overall constituting 619 words, i.e. 
roughly three quarters of a brief article; it offers no alternative narrative of 
“values” and a “future” imagined anew, apart from broad references to their 
pacifist philosophy on non-violence, in as little as 110 words, as below: 
The pacifist case is simple: no killing, no arming, no militarisation under any 
circumstances, for any cause. Instead, we need to invest -- economically, 
culturally, personally, collectively, educationally -- in the nonviolent, creative 
resolution of all conflicts.  
This doesn’t mean no-one will ever get hurt. But if we had been given a tenth of 
the financial and organisational resources so far spent on occupying bombing Iraq, 
we could not have done anywhere near as badly as the “coalition” has done. Even 
if we’d just dropped the money from the air -- at least the Iraqi “insurgents” would 
have been distracted for several weeks rummaging in the sand for bank notes.796 
My observation about disproportionality is not related to whether or not the 
pacifist movement, which Peace News represents, or any other anti-war 
movement, has alternative “values” and alternative imaginary of a future 
society. Such contention would have required a different type of study, and an 
extended project in its own right. Rather, my contention is about how much they 
are able to engage in performative action that communicates such alternative 
representations to the broader public. While, indeed, the ideological foundations 
of pacifist discourse are normative and are about imagining alternative politics 
and society, the analysed data point to the trend, that publicly communicated 
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critique of “war on terror”, such as the one above, is disproportionately devoted 
to deconstruction and dislocation, rather than to constructing a new foundational 
narrative that would allow imaging a different “future”.  
Another similar editorial, written at the time of the Iraq invasion in 2003, 
does the same, i.e. offers an emotively charged extended deconstruction of the 
official narrative, and then at the end offers only a bullet-point list of alternative 
goals and actions ‘to deal with’ Saddam’s Iraq.797 Again, it fails to build an 
alternative narrative chronotope drawing on an alternative positive “past” in 
order to build a new “future”, which would be commensurate with the official 
discourse, as well as commensurate and proportionate with the rhetorical value 
and performative power of their own deconstructive effort offered in the same 
piece and elsewhere.  
As it will further be demonstrated in a moment, in the absence of a 
positively imagined alternative “future”, such negatively constructed “past” 
produces a narrative lacking a full normative chronotope where the spatiality, as 
well as the temporality of the narrative, i.e. the master nodal points as well as 
constructions of “outcomes” (“success”/ “failure”) in the “past”, “present” and 
“future”, are imagined anew. Paradoxically, despite the subversive intent and 
the broader critical-emancipatory normative quest of anti-war movements, and 
“war on terror” critics, the analysis of the data of voices dissenting “war on 
terror” in the specified time frame reveals a huge gap/disproportionality between 
the performative efforts aimed at destabilising and dislodging the official 
narrative and  those aimed at filling in the dislocated/opened up ambivalent 
space by constructing an alternative positive “past” upon which to draw as a 
symbolic capital, and an alternative positive “future”. This disproportionality is 
manifest both in quantity, i.e. as per the volume of articulations, and in quality, 
i.e. how any (albeit limited) references to the “future” are constructed.  
Indeed, it must be recognised that implicit in any anti-war discourse is the 
construction, whether overtly or covertly, of alternative “values” the nation has 
nurtured in the “past”, subsequently of alternative normativity to the “future” it 
must  aspire to, and thereby an alternative “imagining” of a nation. For instance, 
the demand voiced by the movement Not in Our Name, through the very motto 
inherent in its name already articulates a different “we” identity, based on an 
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alternative value-system to the one embedded in the officially-promoted national 
identity narrative: a nation that must not wage war on false foundations and for 
imperial hubris. Others distance the “true” nation from the official narrative and 
construct an alternative national identity more directly and explicitly. Thus, in a 
speech fiercely condemning the Abu Ghraib tortures and demanding the 
resignations of top Bush administration officials,798 Al Gore, the former 
Democratic Vice-President and a staunch critic of Bush’s Iraq policies, 
structurally builds his narrative on selectively drawing on alternative sets of 
symbolic capital from America’s past in order to construct an alternative positive 
American identity: 
[§1]…it is important to focus specifically on what happened in the Abu Ghraib 
prison, and ask whether or not those actions were representative of who we are as 
Americans? Obviously the quick answer is no, but unfortunately it’s more 
complicated than that. There is good and evil in every person… Our founders were 
insightful students of human nature. They feared the abuse of power because they 
understood that every human being has not only “better angels” in his nature, but 
also an innate vulnerability to temptation - especially the temptation to abuse power 
over others. Our founders understood full well that a system of checks and 
balances is needed in our constitution. 
[§2]…And what makes the United States special in the history of nations is our 
commitment to the rule of law and our carefully constructed system of checks and 
balances. Our natural distrust of concentrated power and our devotion to openness 
and democracy are what have lead us as a people to consistently choose good 
over evil in our collective aspirations more than the people of any other nation 
(emphases added).799 
Here, not only the master nodal point of “evil” the way it had been fixed in the 
official narrative (as always located in the enemy Other) is being dislodged and 
then re-articulated as possibly located in the Self as much as in the Other (§1), 
but also this newly fixed reality is linked with an alternative set of American 
values (§2). Thus, the other master nodal point of the official narrative, namely 
that of “freedom” as being under threat by an absolute external Other, and 
defending that absolute teleological “freedom”, as well as “spreading of 
freedoms to other nations” at all costs as the ultimate value, is displaced by 
constructions of a different American identity, where “freedom” is threatened by 
an internal “evil” inherent in “us” – the evil of ‘concentrated power’ that may 
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result  from undermining ‘[our] carefully constructed system of checks and 
balances’.800 However, and importantly, this re-articulation of the “past” and the 
“present” is still not completed by the construction of an alternative positive 
“future”. It seems that the alternative positive values suggested are only there to 
serve the purpose of reinforcing the sense of “failure” of the nation in the 
“present”, at the hands of the current administration: 
What a terrible irony that our country, which was founded by refugees seeking 
religious freedom – coming to America to escape domineering leaders who tried to 
get them to renounce their religion – would now be responsible for this kind of 
abuse.801 
Moreover, the “future” is only envisioned either in terms of near-certain 
catastrophe, “if” the suggested route (of having senior Bush stuff resign, and 
electing John Kerry) is not taken (§1 in the quote below); or only in vague terms 
such as ‘getting our muddied good name back’, “if” it is (§2): 
[§1] And the worst still lies ahead…‘We are looking into the abyss’.802 
 
[§2]…Our nation’s best interest lies in having a new president who can turn a new 
page, sweep clean with a new broom, …with the ability to make a fresh 
assessment of exactly what our nation’s strategic position is as of the time the 
reigns of power are finally wrested from the group of incompetents that created 
this catastrophe.803  
Overall, although Al Gore does distance his “America” from the deeds of the 
administration by invoking a different set of positive values, he does not build an 
alternative narrative of a positive “future” for the nation. Therefore, dialogically 
read with the constructions of “past”, “present” and “triumphant future” present 
in the official chronotope, this critique still produces the (even if unintended) 
illocution that “our nation has failed”. Thus, it produces a deficient chronotope 
which is largely “future”-less (apart from the negative “future” of catastrophe and 
failure), thus potentially inducing a deficit of “future” among the listener.  
This is not an isolated case. While constructing bleak “futures” of “failure” 
“if” their suggested course of action is not followed, most destabilising counter-
narrative propositions, in contrast to the official narratives, fail to off-set that 
effect with the construction of an alternative positive “future”, where the 
meaning of “triumph” as fixed by the official narratives would gain new fixation 
though an alternative meaning-production. The unfulfilling “futures” they 
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construct cannot be the basis for any national identity as a unifying force and a 
reference point of self-identification for the majority of people. Moreover, and to 
repeat a point made above, these voices do not take on the role of 
circumscribing uncertainty in a new way and perform the late modern imperative 
of controlling risk, but neither do they subvert such meta-narrative as a the 
foundation of negotiating security in the late modern age.  
 
6.5. Conclusion  
In the overview of the very early post-9/11 dissent, I teased out some early 
patterns already emergent in the US and the UK. Overall, most of these 
counter-narratives were revelatory in nature, the principal speech-act intentions 
being a) to unmask/expose the purported real motivations behind the foreign 
policies; b) to challenge the official “temporal rupture” story by recognising a 
causal link between the US/UK past actions and 9/11; and c) to undermine the 
highly dichotomised official narratives, by deconstructing key binaries such as 
Self and Other, and to upset the narrative-normative chronotope of the official 
narrative. In addition, some attempted subverting key nodal points upon which 
the official narrative was structurally dependent. This latter trend was to become 
increasingly more significant for the overall discursive dynamics in the years to 
come.  
 The major counter-narratives already in the intermediate period were 
examined in the subsequent two sections, parallel with a cross-examination of 
the dominant/official narrative discussed in the previous chapter. By taking the 
identified master nodal points and macro-narrative building blocks as common 
points of departure, I observed certain configurations and relationships across 
the dominant and alternative narratives, which were argued to be potentially 
politically consequential. Thus, in particular, deliberative counter-propositions 
challenged the dominant narrative by partly refuting the earlier deliberative 
efforts behind the latter, or by demanding the fulfilment of the promises inherent 
in earlier persuasive-deliberative performatives. In doing so, they often relied on 
uniting nodal points and macro-narrative building block, by reinstating and 
fortifying the latter the way they had been fixed in the dominant (official) 
narrative. Moreover, they often re-articulated the threat construction of the 
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official narrative, despite express critique of a given policy: paradoxically, in 
politically important settings, such as parliamentary debates or Q&A, or press 
conferences with key officials, the speakers often went on to deliberate on the 
conditions for the realisation of the very same policy they had been expressly 
countering. As the next chapter demonstrates, this potentially has far-reaching 
consequences for the dynamics of the given foreign/security discourse, since 
such speech-acts, even if unwittingly, carry the additional illocution, of inviting 
restorative discursive performatives on the part of those representing the 
dominant narrative and thus enable the respondent to re-integrate/re-narrativise 
the critique. 
Ironically, destabilising counter-propositions, which put pressure on the 
core macro-propositions of the dominant narrative and undermine its main 
nodal points, may potentially have the effect of shifting the balance of 
performative answerability efforts towards more moderate, i.e. “deliberative” 
counter-propositions. This may be the case, due to the mere 
extremeness/radical forms of expression undermining of their own credibility 
with which many such propositions are characterised.  
Another hugely consequential pattern associated with destabilising 
counter-narrative propositions is that they tend to undermine the narrative-
normative chronotope of the official foreign/security discourse and with it, of the 
official national identity narrative. Importantly for long-term consequences, they 
do so without the construction of an alternative positive “we” identity that could 
have been a new source for national pride. Moreover, paradoxically, despite the 
subversive intent and the broader critical-emancipatory normative quest of anti-
war movements and “war on terror” critics, in most cases, the official 
chronotopic building block of “future” and the outcome building block of 
“triumph” were dislodged, without the construction of an alternative positive 
“future”, through which the nation and security could be imagined anew. Thus, 
there was a huge disproportionality between the destabilising articulatory efforts 
aimed at dislodging the official narrative, on the one hand, and those aimed at 
filling-in the opened-up ambivalent space, on the other. Whenever there were 
constructions of alternative “futures”, these were envisioned in terms of national 
and global catastrophe, if Bush and Blair governments were left to their own 
devices. Thereby, these destabilising voices produced a deficient, i.e. largely 
“future-less”, chronotope that would induce a deficit of “future” among the 
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listener. Such unfulfilling “futures” cannot be the symbolic basis for an 
alternative national identity and thereby effectively compete, in commensurate 
terms, with the official narrative. Indeed, while otherisation through defilement is 
a historically contingent form of identity construction,804 and does not have to be 
the basis for imagining a “nation”, it may be claimed that constructing a certain 
“future” cast in positive terms remains a requirement for imagining a collective, 
in this case, a “nation”, unless this very requirement is being challenged. And 
the analysis shows that these critical voices do not attempt to fundamentally 
shift the terms of negotiating security, from that intimately interlinked with 
nationhood and national imaginary to something fundamentally different.  
Moreover, such deficient chronotopes fail to accommodate the function 
of circumscribing uncertainty in new ways and thus perform the late modern 
imperative of controlling risk, but, again, neither do they subvert such meta-
narrative as a the basis for contesting security in the late modern age. Indeed, if 
we recall Laclau’s distinction between myths and social imaginaries,805 myths 
attempt to suture the dislocated space by constructing ‘new spaces of 
representation’,806 and may transform into a new imaginary, if successful in 
responding to significant social demands.807 In light of this, and drawing on the 
empirical data, I contend that the destabilising counter-narrative propositions of 
various anti-war and critical discourses did achieve certain dislocation of the 
hegemonic “war on terror” discourse; but the way they attempted to “suture” the 
dislocated structure was largely non-conducive to the emergence of a new 
imaginary. In other words, they failed to transform the anti-war “myth” into a new 
imaginary that would incorporate, among other ‘social demands’, the late 
modern societal need to control and manage risk, and provide for a linear 
progress. 
The next chapter shifts the analytical focus and takes a closer look at the 
different types of restorative performatives undertaken by the representatives of 
the official narrative, in a quest to test with further rigour, whether my argument 
about deliberative counter-propositions potentially inviting for such 
performatives has empirical grounding, and to understand what, if any, political 
implications this might have. 
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Chapter 7: Staying Committed? Answerability, Restorative 
Performatives and Silencing 
 
 
7.1. Introduction 
Amidst the unprecedented mass anti-war demonstrations of January-March 
2003, the Bush Administration, as well as the Blair government insisted that the 
movements would ‘not affect their determination to confront Saddam Hussein 
and help the Iraqi people’.808 Tony Blair charged the protesters with favouring 
the status quo that would have ‘consequences paid in blood’.809 Indeed, the 
demonstrations eventually did not affect the decision to go to war in Iraq. 
However, while it is an overstatement that anti-war movements were ‘the other 
superpower’ counterbalancing the US,810 as this chapter on restorative 
performatives demonstrates, neither was dissent as neglected as the officials in 
both Washington and London initially claimed it to be. 
In the environment of intensified critique in the intermediate period (2003-
2007), as explored in the previous chapter, the governments both in the US and 
the UK were being criticised and held accountable, being demanded 
explanations for the on-going war in Iraq; as well as for the lack of results they 
claimed the war had promised but not delivered. In addition, they were being 
probed about the initial justifications to go to war, and being accused of having 
lied to their publics. Amidst such pressure, both governments had to go to great 
length to restore the credibility of the narrative of the Iraq war and that of the 
“war on terror” in general, and thereby reclaim the credibility of their authority. 
As part of such restorative discourse, various techniques of silencing dissenting 
voices were utilised. The aim of this chapter is thus two-fold: a) building on the 
analysis of the patterns of critique offered in the previous chapter, to trace how 
destabilising and deliberative critique each have differently invited, or helped 
create discursive space for, restorative performatives by the proponents of the 
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official “war on terror” narrative; and to analyse patterns of the various ways the 
respective governments have responded to such critique; and b) to take a 
closer look at specifically silencing practices as an integral part of such 
restorative performatives. 
Thus, part of section 7.2 looks at how the “inviting”, as well as the “non-
inviting”, for what I call restorative performatives becomes performatively 
possible, in light of the dialogical speech-act perspective developed earlier in 
the theoretical part. Restorative performatives are performative attempts to 
restore the integrity and stability of a narrative that has been challenged 
variously by critique. Such narrative “restoration” may be achieved either overtly 
or more indirectly answering and addressing past and present critique 
circulating in the broader public realm or confronted with in a more immediate 
setting such a parliamentary Q&A, or else responding to anticipated such 
critique. Recalling the discussion of relational performatives in light of 
Bakhtinian dialogism, restorative performatives are another category (along with 
disestablishing, deliberative and silencing performatives), where the analytical 
focus is on “what is done to others’ words” and thereby to the capacity of one’s 
own word to perform. However, rather than identified and theorised in advance, 
this category emerged out of the empirical study, thanks to the dialogical-
relational approach. The analysis suggests that moderate critique tends to invite 
more restorative performatives, often shifting the balance away from 
“responses” to the destabilising/dislocating counter-narrative propositions found 
in more radical critique. 
This claim is further substantiated in the rest of section 7.2, as well as 
section 7.3, by analysing actual restorative performatives drawn from 
government officials’ pronouncements. Here the focus shifts from the discourse 
of the critique and how it “invites” response, to the responsive reactions by 
those representing, or acting from within, the dominant narrative. I seek to 
understand the implications of the dynamics of such “invitations” and the 
ensuing responsive performatives on the reification and endurance of the 
dominant discourse. I analyse data already from this shifted angle, to further 
support the key argument of the whole chapter, namely that critique often may 
have the unintended consequence of reifying the very same hegemonic 
discourse it had intended to challenge. 
242 
 
Towards this end, section 7.2 introduces various types of restorative 
performatives and any emerging patterns, while section 7.3 offers an analysis of 
the role various silencing techniques play in restorative performatives. In 
particular, the analysis shows that the intermediate period was marked by 
intensified silencing attempts, as integral part of the restorative performatives. 
The intended and unintended consequences of both trends, and specifically 
their implications for the long-term dynamics of the discourse, as well as for the 
continuity and/or change of policy, are discussed throughout, and re-capped in 
the concluding section. 
7.2. Restoratives in Action: Re-inscribing the “Future” 
What I call restorative, or re-integrative narrative propositions (hereafter, 
restorative performatives, or restoratives) constitute attempts to restore the 
integrity of, and fortify, a challenged narrative (in this case, the official dominant 
narrative), whether overtly or more indirectly in response to critique. There may 
be various semiotic routes through which critique activates the potential for 
inviting restorative performatives. Thus, for instance, resigning from his post of 
the Leader of the House of Commons on the eve of the parliamentary debate 
and vote on Iraq in March 2003, Robin Cook, in a letter to Prime Minister Blair, 
states: 
You and I have both made the case over the years for an international order based 
on multilateral decisions through the UN and other forums. In principle I believe it 
is wrong to embark on military action without broad international support. In 
practice I believe it is against Britain’s interests to create a precedent for unilateral 
military action (emphases added).811 
  
Cook’s intended illocution in the first sentence may well be to present strong 
principled grounds for his choice to resign by showing extended commitment to 
his beliefs, as well as a condemnation of Blair’s non-commitment to the New 
Labour principle of “multilateralism”. Indeed, in the Austinean terms of ‘doing 
things with words’,812 in this sentence, Cook intends to show that their joint 
commitment to international law and multilateralism was being undermined by 
Blair’s call for unilateral action, and thus present his own resignation as an act 
truer to that commitment. However, in addition to this illocutionary meaning, the 
first sentence has the potential of activating intertextual links with Blair’s own 
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articulations over his commitment to multilateralism. Once there is the potential 
for the receiving side, i.e. the broader audiences, to carry out such intertextual 
passage, this potential opens up a discursive opportunity for the addressee of 
the given critique to engage in restorative performatives.  
 In addition, critique may often be activated only intertextually, on the 
perception side of the communication, often without apparent locutionary basis. 
Thus, for instance, at the press conference following President Bush’s speech 
‘Struggle for Democracy in Iraq’, on 12 December, 2005, a journalist asks: 
Thank you for coming to the city where liberty was born. Central to your policy in 
Iraq is the role of the Iraqis. We hear widely different tales about how the Iraqis are 
doing in their own area of defense. Could you give us your perspective on how 
they’re doing, how well the military is doing, what you feel the capability is to do the 
task that you want them to do, to include some of the widely different impressions 
that we hear about (emphasis added).
813 
Despite the locutionary absence of any direct criticism, the question in this 
passage hypertextually activates the widespread Democratic criticism of the 
time about not having achieved the promise of preparing the Iraqis for their own 
security. These type of performatives indeed transcend individual intentionality 
of the speaker: whether intended or not, such speech-acts may invite for 
corrective and restorative performative to the criticisms they are intertextually 
invoking, rather than any direct criticism they themselves are articulating, and 
thus provide for one more opportunity for the representative of the official 
narrative to restoratively “answer” them. 
Similarly, in a 31 May 2005 press conference, Bush encounters the 
following question: 
[§1] Mr. President, since Iraq’s new government was announced on April 28th, 
more than 60 Americans and 760 Iraqis have been killed in attacks. 
 
[§2] Do you think that the insurgency is gaining strength and becoming more 
lethal? And do you think that Iraq’s government is up to the job of defeating the -- 
defeating the insurgents and guaranteeing security (emphases added).814  
Again, irrespective of the intentions of the person asking the question,815 for the 
audiences, the first part of the statement (§1) intertextually links this utterance 
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with the critique present at the time about increased violence in Iraq and a failed 
mission. Therefore, the subsequent questions (§2) gain the surplus illocution of 
inviting restorative performatives to those criticisms. The statement did indeed 
achieve such perlocution evidenced by the lengthy response given by Bush re-
affirming the official narrative. 
 Moreover, in such multi-speaker settings as press conferences, a 
question may invite restorative performatives, even when the person asking the 
question, at least declaratively, seems to endorse the dominant narrative. Thus, 
at the same appearance in Philadelphia, President Bush was asked the 
following:  
Mr. President, I’m...a supporter of yours....Well I have a question for you. Do you 
feel that since invading Iraq, the threat of terrorism on U.S. soil has been reduced 
significantly (emphasis added)?816 
Here, despite the declared support for Bush, the person asking the question 
helped activate intertextual links with certain critical discourses/counter-
narratives circulating in the day and in the past, and thus induced meanings 
constructed in them, specifically that the invasion had increased, rather than 
decreased terrorist threat on the US. By echoing such criticism, the question 
posed by the journalist unwittingly and despite the otherwise supportive posture 
of the speaker, invited restorative action to those very critical propositions. Bush 
did in fact engage in an extensive restorative performative in this case, which 
was a response to those critics, whose narratives were intertextually activated 
by the question. In fact, the performative was a substantial 54 lines long and 
also allowed him to sum up the conference and make a nice shift to his hitherto-
ritualised closing line ‘May God bless you all, and may God continue to bless 
America’.817 
 Finally, consider the following question asked at the 31 May 2005 Bush 
press conference:   
Would you acknowledge that the war did not deter Iran and North Korea from 
continuing to pursue their program?818 
 
Irrespective of the intentions of the journalist, the question contains the 
surplus illocution that “the war was expected to deter Iran and North Korea” and 
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that “such a war would have been legitimate”. Indeed, the journalist is referring 
to Bush’s earlier legitimation of the war in Iraq, and the strategic rationale 
behind his narrative of “Axis of Evil”, and might potentially have the intention to 
challenge or ridicule such a rationale. However, if we shift the angle of the 
analysis towards the public perceptions and how the broader audiences 
participate in the meaning creations through these utterances, we may claim 
that for them such a question speech-act carries the above-suggested surplus 
illocutions, even if, potentially, the intended illocution had been to critique the 
very legitimation of such claims. Such public perception, in a retrospective 
illocutionary reading, would be reinforced and encouraged by the fact that the 
question did in fact attract and result in a restorative performance from Bush, 
serving the purpose of re-legitimation. 
Similar discursive dynamics is found in types of propositions drawn from 
moderate critique exemplified in the previous chapter, the overall purpose of 
which was largely to demonstrate “failure” of the Administration in the mission in 
“Iraq as promised” and to call for a withdrawal timetable. By demanding 
‘benchmarks to measure the war’s progress’,819 these calls wittingly or 
unwittingly invited Bush and other officials to engage in restorative 
performatives constructing a narrative as to “why such a timetable would be a 
mistake”. They not only invited, but also facilitated such performatives by 
allowing for discursive efforts that would try and convince that “some progress 
has been made”, and that “we are not yet fully safe and a lot more needs to be 
done”. Thereby, they re-enforced the very promise of the official narrative. 
Interestingly, even some critique which is apparently less moderate, and 
has been described in the previous chapter as destabilising counter-narrative 
propositions, still may release surplus illocutions that could potentially result in 
re-affirmed elements of the dominant narrative, rather than produce the 
intended/more apparent effect of dislocating them. Thus, even the staunchest of 
critics of the official policy, such as the outspoken George Gallaway in the UK, 
have slipped into releasing the surplus illocution that “continued involvement is 
necessary, since the promise of Iraq has not been achieved yet”. Thus, during 
the Parliamentary debate on ‘Defence in the World’ on the day of the 7/7 
bombings in London, Gallaway states: 
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The Secretary of State talked about Iraq—as if Iraq were any kind of success 
story. I could not believe my ears as he described, in that complacent, orotund 
manner, progress over 12 months, 18 months or two years. Iraq is going 
backwards, not forwards. It is impossible for the Secretary of State to say we shall 
withdraw in any given time frame, because Iraq is getting worse, not better. There 
are more people being killed in Iraq now than there were before. More military 
operations are being conducted by the Iraqi resistance than before (emphasis 
added).820  
Although the intended illocution of this speech-act, judging from the speaker’s 
earlier articulations, is to continue his critique of the government decision to go 
to war in the first place, it releases the surplus illocution that withdrawal would 
be possible only when Iraq were a success, i.e. “got better, and not worse”. The 
speaker might just as well not have meant the illocution. However, establishing 
whether he did or not, as in the other similar cases, is not part of the 
problematic of this research; neither would such intentions, one way or another, 
change much in terms of the impact, the unintended effect, of the utterance and 
the relationally produced long-term consequences. As already explored, the 
surplus illocution, namely what a statement may be taken to mean by the 
audiences, travels with the speech-act irrespective of/despite, or in addition to, 
the intended illocution.  
The analysis does indeed show that moderate critique, as well 
articulations of no apparent critical intent which nonetheless intertextually 
activate narratives of such critique, attracted quantitatively significant restorative 
performatives. Thus, during the Q&A following the above-mentioned Bush 
speech, a journalist’s question alluding to the deliberative critique about the 
performance of Iraqis in the area of their own defence attracted a noteworthy 
859 words of restorative performative. In contrast, a question of more 
destabilising nature, dislodging the nodal point of “evil/threat” in the official Iraq 
war narrative, resulted in hesitation, perhaps even an attempt to avoid or 
postpone the question, and once this could not be done, the answer was only a 
brief one (259 words), and that extremely vague and thinly formulated:  
Q. Mr. President, I would like to know why it is that you and others in your 
administration keep linking 9/11 to the invasion of Iraq when no respected journalist 
or Middle Eastern expert confirmed that such a link existed.  
THE PRESIDENT: What did she --- I missed the question. Sorry. I didn’t --- I beg 
your pardon, I didn’t hear you. Seriously...  
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[question repeated] 
THE PRESIDENT: Yes --- I appreciate that. 9/11 changed my look on foreign 
policy. I mean, it said that oceans no longer protect us, that we can’t take threats 
for granted; that if we see a threat, we’ve got to deal with it. It doesn’t have to be 
militarily, necessarily, but we got to deal with it. We can’t --- can’t just hope for the 
best anymore. And so the first decision I made, as you know, was to --- was to deal 
with the Taliban in Afghanistan because they were harboring terrorists. This is 
where the terrorists planned and plotted. And the second decision, – which was a 
very difficult decision for me, by the way, and it’s one that I --- I didn’t take lightly – 
was that Saddam Hussein was a threat. He is a declared enemy of the United 
States; he had used weapons of mass destruction; the entire world thought he had 
weapons of mass destruction....I mean, there was a serious international effort to 
say to Saddam Hussein, you’re a threat. And the 9/11 attacks extenuated that 
threat, as far as I --- concerned.821  
This response was full of frequent stammering and hesitation in voice 
(represented by dotted lines); there was very little dialogical response to the 
critique itself (i.e. why Iraq was linked to 9/11, when there was no clear 
evidence); unlike responses to deliberative critique, where there was direct 
engagement with the propositions of the critiquing side. 
 In a similar vein, George Gallaway’s destabilising critique often 
articulated in extreme terms, in the above-mentioned Parliamentary debate 
received restorative performatives mostly of dismissive and/or accusatory 
nature, intertwined with silencing techniques, not least those of undermining the 
credibility of the critic. In contrast, more moderate critique, especially 
characteristically those about withdrawal timetables, received more direct 
responses, constructively engaging with the points raised by the critics 
themselves and using the critique as a facilitating discursive resource to 
achieve a restorative performance. Illustrative is, e.g. the then Defence Minister 
John Reid’s answer to Lembit Öpik MP, at the 7 July 2005 House of Commons 
Debate ‘Defence in the World’. 
 Another example of destabilising critique, e.g. Cindy Sheehan’s various 
addresses to President Bush, remained largely performatively not recognised.  
Sheehan was the mother of an army specialist killed in Iraq, and one of the 
founders of the civil society group Gold Star Families for Peace. She attracted 
media attention in August 2005, by camping in front of President Bush’s ranch 
in Texas, demanding a meeting and an explanation for the war in Iraq. Largely 
covered in the media, soon she became a symbol of the anti-war movement.  
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Known for her extreme vocabulary, such as calling Bush a ‘maniac’ and a ‘lying 
bastard’,822 Cindy’s oft-quoted and most known statement is as follows: 
I want him [Bush] to tell me...“just what was the noble cause...[my son] died for?” 
Was it freedom and democracy? Bullshit! He died for oil. He died to make your 
friends richer. He died to expand American imperialism in the Middle East 
(emphases added).823 
Not only did the questions posed by Cindy Sheen remain performatively 
unanswered by Bush and his administration, but they were largely drowned in 
the surmounting defilement of her in the mainstream media, through coverages 
concentrating on her personal motives, mental health, ideology and family, 
portraying her as treasonous and unpatriotic and exploiting her son’s death – all 
of which discredited the source and thus rendered the questions she asked as 
largely “illegitimate”.824 
Thus, more radical critique built on destabilising counter-narrative 
propositions often did not result in attracting a response, despite potentially 
intending to demand accountability. At a first glance, this contention may seem 
counter-intuitive, as supposedly these destabilising attempts, being potentially 
more threatening of the hegemonic project, would have resulted in more 
defensive responses from the latter’s advocates. However, based on the 
analysis, I contend, that the outright destruction of the critiqued narrative in the 
above and similar destabilising statements left very few semiotic resources for 
the official interlocutor to hinge on for a responsive performance without losing 
integrity and credibility. Perhaps therefore, especially when the non-/supra-
discursive developments accompanying the exchange (e.g. the revelations of 
no WMDs and the Downing Street memo) left little space for re-legitimation, the 
targeted officials largely chose to ignore the “invitation” for answerability, and 
instead concentrated on responding to moderate critique, as these gave ample 
discursive opportunity. And since deliberative critique, rather than seek to 
destabilise the official narrative in its entirety, was engaged with questioning its 
integrity and demanding the fulfilment of promises inherent in it, such 
answerability in fact further reified the official narrative. This latter effect is 
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analysed in more depth in the next two subsections.  
7.2.1. Colonising Critique; and Re-narrativisation/ Deflection 
 
Especially in multi-speaker settings in the Q&A format, deliberative critique 
inviting for restorative performatives created the opportunities to engage directly 
with the propositions made in the critique by a re-affirmation of the official 
stance. Thus, during the exchange between Charles Kennedy and Tony Blair at 
the Parliamentary debate following Blair’s statement on the “45-minute threat”, 
Blair made a lengthy restorative performance in response to Kennedy’s 
questions. He answered in the affirmative to every single concern raised: ‘Iraq’s 
present capacity, as well as its intent’; whether the House of Commons would 
be able to debate and vote on the use of force; the need to avoid ‘precipitate 
action’; not ‘walking away’ after the regime change; and whether the multilateral 
(UN) route would be followed. Interestingly, the latter question gave Blair the 
opportunity to first answer in the affirmative, but then use the discursive 
resource of the nodal point “multilateralism”/“international law” in order to 
intertextually activate additional meanings attached to the latter, not least 
through utilising the surplus illocutions of the critic’s own representations, and 
thus re-integrate, and thereby neutralise, them into the dominant narrative: 
Yes, it is very important that we mobilise international opinion through the United 
Nations. But, as President Bush rightly said to the UN General Assembly, this is a 
challenge for the United Nations too. Although there are many difficult questions 
that I have to answer, there is one difficult question that I think everyone has to 
answer: if the will of the UN continues to be ignored and flouted by Saddam, what 
then? Unless people have an answer to that question, we cannot really proceed in 
a way that fully reflects the reality of the situation with which we are dealing 
(emphasis added).825 
Thus, where Kennedy had utilised the node “international law” to articulate a 
British/American responsibility not to act unilaterally in using force against Iraq, 
Blair re-narrativised the node by activating the meaning of Iraqi responsibility 
towards international law. In doing so, he re-inscribed the meaning of 
“unilateralism” as a certain US/UK ‘responsibility towards international law’, 
rather than a violation thereof.  
 Such de-articulation and then re-articulation of certain meanings drawn 
from the discourses of critique was a repeated feature of the unilateralism-vs.-
multilateralism debate in Britain, which reached a momentum at the immediate 
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lead-up to the Iraq war in February-March 2003.  Thus, the whole of Tony 
Blair’s response to Cook’s resignation letter is built on such utilisation of critique 
as re-affirming resource through shifting/re-articulation of the meaning of the 
key propositions behind the critique. The following is only a brief segment 
encapsulating what the whole letter was trying to get through:  
I have always tried to resolve this crisis through the UN, as you recognise in your 
letter. But I was always clear that the UN must be the way of dealing with the issue, 
not avoiding dealing with it (emphasis added).826 
Another example of shifting of illocutions is from Blair’s 15 February 2003 
speech, where he directly addresses the anti-war demonstrators: 
Ridding the world of Saddam would be an act of humanity. It is leaving him there 
that is in truth inhumane.827 
 
Here, utilising the nodal point “humanity” key to the anti-war discourses, Blair 
was attempting to undermine its meaning the way it was fixed by them (i.e. as 
“valuing human life everywhere on equal basis” and “non-interference where 
there is no clear and immediate threat to Britain”) and shifts it to mean 
“responsibility to pre-empt/prevent a threat from becoming immanent”, as well 
as “responsibility to interfere for the security of other peoples”. 
Thus, internalising critique, or utilising critique as narrative building/re-
affirming is a type of restorative performance, where there is a direct or indirect 
allusion to certain points made by critics, in order to show, through de-
articulation and then re-articulation, their erroneousness and thus construct or 
re-affirm one’s own propositions. More dramatically, this could be called 
colonising of critique. Indeed, in the period under study, critique of “war on 
terror” and of the Iraq war in particular, was consistently used by the 
representatives of the official narratives both in the US and the UK, as an 
additional semiotic resource to neutralise critique via internalising it. This was 
often achieved via shifting of meanings created in the critique and activating 
illocutions often diametrically different to those intended by the critic by the 
same nodal point/proposition. The affective force of such shifting was at times 
increased by a partial assimilation of narrative, i.e. partial acceptance and use 
of macro-propositions from the critic’s narrative, followed by “but”-propositions 
showing their erroneousness. 
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In addition to colonising critique, the official “war on terror” narrative of 
the intermediate period characteristically responded to critique by re-
narrativisation (or deflection). In these restorative performances, the speaker 
replies to a destabilising question or proposition by deflecting and defaulting 
back to at least one of the master nodal points of the official narrative, thus 
refusing to engage with those critical questions or statements outside of the 
dominant narrative. Re-narrativising often hinges on at least one of the master 
nodal points of the dominant narrative, “threat/evil” or “freedom”; as well as on 
chronotopic propositions such as re-affirmation of past, present and future 
“triumph” of “freedom”, and thus makes them the only loci around which a 
resolution to the exchange must be sought, away from the issues raised by the 
question, and the multiplicity of critical voices it might intertextually activate 
among the listener. 
Thus, to illustrate, consider this question and answer exchange between 
a journalist and President Bush at a 19 December 2005 End of the Year press 
conference. Amidst heightened critique after the revelations of the “Dodgy 
Dossier” and the failure to find any WMDs in Iraq, Bush was confronted with an 
inconvenient question about the misleading intelligence used to legitimate the 
Iraq war, which he answered by deflection: 
Q. [Y]ou’ve carefully separated the intelligence from the decision, saying that it 
was the right decision to go to war despite the problems with the intelligence, sir. 
But, with respect, the intelligence helped you build public support for the war. And 
so I wonder if now, as you look back, if you look at that intelligence and feel that 
the intelligence and your use of it might bear some responsibility for the current 
divisions in the country over the war, and what can you do about it? 
[§1] PRESIDENT: I appreciate that...[H]aving said all that, what we did find after the 
war was that Saddam Hussein had the desire to --- or the liberation --- Saddam  
had the desire to reconstitute his weapons programs....America was still his 
enemy....he was just waiting for the world to turn its head, to look away, in order to 
reconstitute the programs. He was dangerous then. It’s the right decision to have 
removed Saddam....[Besides, Iraq is] a part of a broader strategy, to help what I 
call “lay the foundation of peace,” democracies don’t war; democracies are 
peaceful countries . 
[§2]…Now, I’ll tell you an amazing story...We had people – first-time  voters, or 
voters in the Iraqi election come in to see me in the Oval...And one person said, 
how come you’re giving Saddam Hussein a trial? I said, first of all, it’s your 
government, not ours. She said, he doesn’t deserve a trial; he deserves immediate 
death for what he did to my people. And it just struck me about how strongly she 
felt about the need to not have a rule of law, that there needed to be quick 
retribution, that he didn’t deserve it. And I said to her, don’t you see that the trial, 
itself, stands in such contrast to the tyrant that that in itself is a victory for freedom 
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and a defeat for tyranny – just the trial alone. And it’s important that there be rule of 
law.828 
Here in the first part of his answer (§1), the President deflected, i.e. refused to 
engage directly with the issues raised in the question about abusing public trust 
by building support for war on misguided premises. In the rest of his lengthy 
response illustrated by the excerpts in §2, Bush carefully structured his 
propositions around and through the same master nodal points as the already 
consolidated official narrative, i.e. “freedom” and “evil”, often by intertextually 
activating, rather than directly referring to them. Thus, references to ‘first-time 
[Iraqi] voters’, ‘Iraqi elections’, ‘a trial’, ‘victory of freedom’, and ‘rule of law’ were 
activating the already-familiar narrative of “liberating Iraq”, and “spreading 
democracy”, and more broadly, the chronotopicity of the narrative as already 
indicating a “triumph of freedom” and “prevailing” over the “evil” that Saddam 
‘the tyrant’ represented. The once-imagined “future” of the official chronotope  
aspired as a destination in terms of time as well as space was now being 
portrayed as achieved, as brought into the present, and thereby the chronotope 
fulfilled, and America having “prevailed” once again in the cycle of historical 
triumphs. Thus, by defaulting back to the master nodal points and the 
chronotopic structure of the official narrative, Bush not only deflected from 
directly responding to and engaging with the critical question, but also 
effectively rendered illegitimate any debate outside the official chronotope that 
had now achieved its “future”: “freedom” and “evil”, as well as the “triumph of 
democracy” and thereby, by extension, “prevailing” of the “American nation” 
were now the only loci around which a resolution to any issue raised could be 
reached.  
7.2.2. Reclaiming Positive Belongingness and “Future” 
 
The above example already shows how an attempt to deflect from a discrediting 
critique leads to re-affirming the existing official narrative and its structural 
peculiarities of master nodal points and the narrative-normative chronotope. Let 
us take a closer look at how this made possible reclaiming a positive 
belongingness for the “nation” and a “future” that is fulfilling, allowing the 
realisation of an already dominant identity that had not been fully contested by 
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critique in commensurate terms.  To remind, as we saw in the previous chapter, 
while some dissenting voices do invoke alternative positive values, they often 
fail to construct an alternative positive “future” commensurate with the official 
narrative, and thus produce a deficient narrative-normative chronotope. In doing 
so, they leave the dislocated space (opened up by their own, and others’ 
destabilising critique) open, i.e. not filled with an alternative signification, which 
would attempt a new “suture”. Thereby, these critical voices invite the 
representatives or advocates of the dominant narrative to re-affirm the “future” 
they had constructed through the official narrative. 
 Thus, illustratively, in a speech within the context of the 2004 US 
Presidential election campaign, Bush predominantly aimed at restoring the 
confidence about the righteousness of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and 
further legitimised continued involvement, by relying on the reaffirmation, with 
increased repetitiveness, of the national identity story constructed earlier, and 
the re-instatement of a certain “triumph” of American values and ideals in a 
bright “future”:  
And we can feel that same unity and pride whenever America acts for good, and 
the victims of disaster are given hope, and the unjust encounter justice, and the 
captives are set free. We go forward with complete confidence in the eventual 
triumph of freedom (emphases added).829 
Moreover, in his early 2007 Address to the Nation about the surge of troops in 
Iraq, Bush responded to anti-surge voices, and those demanding a troop 
withdrawal from Iraq, by reclaiming the discursive space opened-up by 
dislocating voices, who had failed to construct an alternative positive “future”, as 
follows: 
The challenge playing out across the broader Middle East…is the decisive 
ideological struggle of our time. On one side are those who believe in freedom and 
moderation. On the other side are extremists who kill the innocent, and have 
declared their intention to destroy our way of life. In the long run, the most realistic 
way to protect the American people is to provide a hopeful alternative to the hateful 
ideology of the enemy, by advancing liberty across a troubled region.…From 
Afghanistan to Lebanon to the Palestinian Territories, millions of ordinary people are 
sick of the violence, and want a future of peace and opportunity for their children. 
And they are looking at Iraq. They want to know: Will America withdraw and yield 
the future of that country to the extremists, or will we stand with the Iraqis who have 
made the choice for freedom (emphases added)?830 
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Here, the performative effort lapses back to the node “freedom” and 
derivatively, to the macro-narrative building blocks of “triumph” [of “freedom”] as 
the condition of “success” of the nation in the “future”: it equalises withdrawal of 
troops with failure of “freedom” and hence of the American identity, just as the 
negative imagining of the “future” was employed as a discursive device in the 
earlier narrative constructions analysed in chapter 5. Now this new “if”-
conditionality construction about the bleak consequences of withdrawal was 
being used as a response to critics, as well as narrative building for further-
legitimation. 
In a similar vein, speaking on the day of the largest mass demonstrations 
in London against the looming Iraq war on 15 February 2003, Blair reclaimed 
“Britain-as-promised” in his 1999 Doctrine, as well as in his “war on terror” 
discourse following 9/11, through the following lines concluding the speech:   
British values. Labour values. Values worth fighting for. Values to inspire our 
journey of change. Values to sustain us for the great challenges ahead. Values to 
drive us as we create the Britain that we promised and the Britain that today our 
world needs (emphases added).831  
Such re-claiming of positive distinctiveness for the nation and the re-affirmation 
of its global role became an indispensable ritual, a necessary condition for the 
speech to gain its fullness and perform its function as a genre. In a speech 
where he directly addressed the anti-war demonstrators and thus overtly 
engaged in a dialogue with them, Blair re-filled with signification the space 
opened up by the destabilising performances of the anti-war critique, which had 
produced a deficient chronotope unable to imagine a collective “future” for the 
“nation” in positive terms. 
 Moreover, in the US, not only was the positive national identity narrative 
re-instated in such official pronouncements directly and indirectly answering 
critique, but also the successful realisation of the nation in the “future” was 
envisaged through one route only – namely through continued waging of the 
wars and an eventual triumph conditioned on the global march of “freedom”: 
We live in freedom because every generation has produced patriots willing to 
serve a cause greater than themselves. Those who serve today are taking their 
rightful place among the greatest generations that have worn our nation’s uniform. 
When the history of this period is written, the liberation of Afghanistan and the 
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liberation of Iraq will be remembered as great turning points in the story of freedom 
(emphases added).832 
Here, the “war on terror” is overtly portrayed as part of the repetitive cycle of 
fighting and winning threats to “freedom”. 
 Thus, these and similar pronouncements re-affirming and re-claiming the 
positive temporal identity narrative constructed earlier became discursively 
possible as the result of the open space created by the de-articulation, and the 
subsequent lack of sufficient alternative re-articulation, of the national identity 
narrative by the critics. Furthermore, together with the need for re-narrativisation 
(or deflection from uncomfortable questions) explored above, the dislocated 
space created a good opportunity, which was taken by the respondents, 
through constructing a response that hinged on the macro-narrative building 
blocks of “future” and “triumph”.  
 Restoratives colonising critique and reclaiming the official narrative-
normative chronotope, were intertwined with, and often  heavily relied on, 
discursive silencing, whereby critique was stigmatised and dissent was 
rendered as a “jeopardy to triumph” and hence a threat to the very realisation of 
the identity of the “nation”. I now turn to exploring how silencing was 
discursively possible, and to what effect.  
 
7.3. Silencing and the Re-affirmation of “Threat”   
Silencing has been far from solely a responsive/restorative strategy, and has 
been exercised since the very emergence of the official narrative as part of 
narrative-building. To remind the relational conceptualisation proposed earlier, 
silencing is an inextricable part of dialogical performativity; and therefore, more 
broadly, it is part of any communicative exchange. However, in the intermediate 
period of 2003-2007, in anticipation of, and in response to, heightened critique 
by “war on terror” dissenting voices, silencing by representatives and 
proponents of the official discourse intensified and diversified. 
The suppression of the alternative voices through a mixture of discursive 
and non-discursive means began almost from the very first days of the post-
9/11 period, when the “hermeneutics of suspicion” exercised by a significant 
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number of academics, journalists and public figures needed to be vehemently 
silenced. Many of the means to silence were coercive in nature, i.e. aimed to 
intimidate by means of formal institutions/regulations and/or physical 
exclusion;833 airtime and press space limitations;834 shielding the public from 
alternative ideas that could potentially incite dissent emanating from external 
sources, such as bin Laden videos and the Qatar-based Al-Jazeera TV 
channel.835 Illustrations of early discursive, rather than coercive, silencing were 
pronouncements which were weaving of the official narrative, while at the same 
time silencing destabilising speech-act attempts. Thus, for example, in his 
address legitimising the war in Afghanistan in November 2001, President Bush 
categorically announced that ‘[t]his new enemy seeks to destroy our freedom 
and impose its views. We value life; the terrorists ruthlessly destroy it’;836 and 
also that ‘[w]e wage a war to save civilization itself’.837  Bush thereby effectively 
delimited the illocutionary potential of those who might question his policy, by 
indirectly rendering them as “people who do not value life and freedom like us”, 
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and “people who are against civilization itself”. These are examples of the 
silencing technique of exclusion via indirect stigmatisation. 
In this section, I focus on how this and other silencing techniques already 
in the intermediate stage (2005-2007) were used by the representatives of the 
official narrative, amidst heightened critique, as a crucial part of the restorative 
performances. I argue and demonstrate, that in contrast with the earlier more 
overt silencing techniques, such as exclusion via stigmatisation equalising 
critique with “lack of patriotism”, “betrayal”, or with such highly deplorable 
practices and ideology as “fascism”; at this intermediate stage of intensified 
need for restoratives, silencing became not only more subtle and sophisticated 
in rhetorical techniques, but also more dialogically engaging with the counter-
discourses and hence building more semiotic links with the discourses of 
dissent. Most importantly, I demonstrate how silencing was crucial for the 
official attempts to re-inscribe the space opened up by dislocatory critique, by 
re-claiming the official narrative-normative high ground while at the same time, 
through silencing, curtailing the illocutionary force of the critics to uphold their 
contesting representations.  
7.3.1. Silencing while Restoring 
 
Destabilising critique occasionally acquires public visibility so all-encompassing, 
that it must be engaged with, or else be left to induce a semiotic crisis. This was 
the case during the anti-war demonstrations in Washington, New York and 
London ahead of the Iraq war in 2003 – unprecedented in scale and in intensity 
of the counter-narratives produced; as well as after the revelations in 2005 that 
intelligence data had been fixed to allow constructing Saddam as linked to 9/11 
and as a major threat to the West and to global security. It would be politically 
suicidal for the representatives of official discourse to fail engaging with critique 
of such magnitude shattering the very foundations of the official narrative, and 
especially to fail re-filling/re-inscribing the dislocated space created as a result 
of the critique. In an effort to uphold the hegemonic status of the official 
narrative of “war on terror” and to maintain the credibility of the foreign/security 
policy, official representatives needed to overwrite alternative such (possible or 
actual) re-inscriptions. In addition, they needed to re-inscribe the semiotic space 
opened-up, as we already saw, as a result of dislocations of chronotopic “future” 
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of the “nation” rendered particularly lacking or under-constructed by 
destabilising critique. In this subsection, I explore how such re-inscriptions were 
performed specifically through discursive silencing techniques, as integral part 
of restorative performatives.  
Illustratively, in his Glasgow speech of February 2003, explicitly addressing 
the unprecedented number of anti-war demonstrators in the streets of London, 
as well as across the world, Tony Blair opted for a moderate tone towards the 
demonstrators, in contrast to the earlier harsh official reactions towards the 
critics of the Afghanistan war and “war on terror” in general. Thus, he stated:   
No-one seriously believes he [Saddam] is yet co-operating fully. In all honesty, 
most people don’t really believe he ever will. So what holds people back? What 
brings thousands of people out in protests across the world?...It is a right and 
entirely understandable hatred of war. It is moral purpose, and I respect that.838 
 
This moderate tone was itself a response to mounting discontent in the British 
society with the self-righteous posture of the government and especially with 
silencing of dissent by labelling it as “unpatriotic”, “appeasing” or outright 
equivalent of “fascism”. Specifically, the scandal around Paul Marsden MP and 
Blair Government Chief Whip Hilary Armstrong839 had been widely publicised in 
the media, and coupled with increasingly worrying news from Afghanistan about 
civilian deaths, had added to the public resentment about the war, as well as 
raised the tolerance threshold for exclusionary labels. Nonetheless, the speech 
went on to engage in more subtle silencing speech-acts and restorative 
performances, often directly drawing on anti-war discourse. Thus, clearly 
responding to the Stop the War Coalition, Blair stated: 
[T]here are also consequences of “stop the war”. If I took that advice, and did not 
insist on disarmament, yes, there would be no war. But there would still be 
Saddam. Many of the people marching will say they hate Saddam. But the 
consequences of taking their advice is that he stays in charge of Iraq, ruling the 
Iraqi people....A country where today, 135 out of every 1000 Iraqi children die 
before the age of five ... Where in the past 15 years over 150,000 Shia Moslems in 
Southern Iraq and Moslem Kurds in Northern Iraq have been butchered; with up to 
four million Iraqis in exile round the world...This isn’t a regime with Weapons of 
Mass Destruction that is otherwise benign. This is a regime that contravenes every 
single principle or value anyone of our politics believes in (emphases added).840 
 
In a typical “if”-conditionality statement, he constructed a bleak and unfortunate 
“future”, which, if not averted, would lie on the conscience of those who 
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opposed his policies. This constitutes discursive silencing through exclusion via 
indirect stigmatisation, however made more subtle through extending “if”-
conditionality statements to cover anti-war demonstrators and critics of the war. 
Through this technique, by anchoring the narrative on generally socially 
unquestionable humane norms, the speaker restricts possible dissent by 
indirectly accusing dissenters of not holding dear the named values:  
There will be no march for the victims of Saddam, no protests about the thousands 
of children that die needlessly every year under his rule, no righteous anger over 
the torture chambers which if he is left in power, will be left in being.... If there are 
500,000 on that march, that is still less than the number of people whose deaths 
Saddam has been responsible for. If there are one million, that is still less than the 
number of people who died in the wars he started (emphases added).841 
The segments marked in italics (‘children that die needlessly’; ‘torture 
chambers’, etc.) are all the appalling consequences of inaction that would lie on 
the conscience of the demonstrators, if Britain refused to go to war to remove 
Saddam; while references to numbers in the demonstration march of the day 
were part of the powerful speech-act a) equalising every anti-war or else 
undecided member of the public with the marching demonstrators who had 
“betrayed the suffering Iraqi children and people”; and b) constructing a higher 
moral-normative ground for those who would rather, metaphorically, “march” for 
the removal of Saddam and hence  for the rescuing of the suffering Iraqi people. 
 Moreover, in an effort to outsource the legitimation of the war, Blair 
quoted from the email of an Iraqi exile writing to him, but directly addressing the 
demonstrators: 
‘Saddam has murdered more than a million Iraqis over the past 30 years, are you 
willing to allow him to kill another million Iraqis? ....Why it is now that you deem it 
appropriate to voice your disillusions with America’s policy in Iraq, when it is right 
now that the Iraqi people are being given real hope, however slight and however 
precarious, that they can live in an Iraq that is free of its horrors’ (emphasis 
added)?842 
Through such externalising of the source as a silencing technique, the source of 
information or morale was being claimed to be located outside the speaker, 
thereby ascribing it higher credibility. As a result, this was effectively delimiting 
the illocutionary potential of a dissenter, as in such “outsourcing” of legitimation, 
the targeted dissenter would have to undertake the discursively more difficult 
task of questioning the external source, whose testimony was in turn often 
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heavily emotive and value-laden, due to direct involvement in the developments 
(e.g., as a victim).843  
 Overall, an impressive 50% (i.e., roughly an uninterrupted 1500 words in 
total) of the text devoted to foreign policy in Blair’s Glasgow speech on the day 
of the biggest anti-war demonstration constituted restorative performatives 
heavily reliant on silencing techniques, mostly directly engaging with the anti-
war demonstrators. 
 As for silencing in response to more moderate (deliberative) critique, an 
illustrative example is the US National Strategy for Victory in Iraq844 released in 
November 2005, as a response to the increased pressure and demand for a 
withdrawal timetable and a definition of “success” in the Iraq war.845 Re-
narrativising the Iraq war into the “war on terror”, and reconstructing “victory in 
Iraq” as “a vital US interest”, the document attempted to silence critique by 
stating: 
Failure in Iraq will embolden terrorists and expand their reach; success in Iraq will 
deal them a decisive and crippling blow ... [in case of ‘failure’] Iraq would become a 
safe haven from which terrorists could plan attacks against America, American 
interests abroad, and our allies. Middle East reformers would never again fully trust 
American assurances of support for democracy and human rights in the region – a 
historic opportunity lost. The resultant tribal and sectarian chaos would have major 
consequences for American security and interests in the region (emphases 
added).846 
After re-affirming the nodal point “evil” via the invocation of “terrorists”, this 
statement indirectly stigmatises those demanding withdrawal as indifferent to 
the plight and to the democratic aspirations of the Iraqi people, as well as 
disloyal to the “interests of the nation”, by equalising “withdrawal” with “failure” 
of both of these future goals. In constructing the “withdrawal = non-pursuance of 
our interests=failure” narrative, it re-affirms the well-trodden techniques of 
linking Iraq with terrorism, and the war with the protection of “our interests and 
our security”. Moreover, the middle sentence (‘Middle East reformers would 
never again…’) silences demands of withdrawal by intertextually linking such 
demands with a purported undermining/challenging of the key nodal points of 
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American identity, namely the quest of “spreading democracy and human 
rights”. Such intertextual linkage aims to silence dissent, as it reduces the 
illocutionary potential of the critics, making it harder for them to achieve desired 
perlocution in their own articulations about the necessity of a clear timetable for 
withdrawal. 
 Not surprisingly, such engagement – and hence potentially a successful 
silencing effect – is not only part of the restorative performances by the official 
representatives as seen above, but also is often present in the discourse of 
deliberative critique: perhaps as a result of the desire to appear more credible 
and to increase their chances of reaching more audiences, these critics often 
choose to re-instate the very same nodal points of the dominant discourse. 
Thus, part of the reason for the uniting nodal points explored earlier could have 
been this very silencing or fear/expectation of it. For instance, in her 29 
November 2005 ‘Letter to the Constituents’ discussed in the previous chapter, 
Hilary Clinton, perhaps in anticipation of such silencing, makes performative 
efforts to re-assure that the Democrats are not in favour of quick withdrawal and 
that “evil” must indeed be dealt with.847  
Moreover, it is characteristic of moderate critique to create the discursive 
opportunities for the re-integrative performance that would only fortify the 
dominant narrative through silencing. Thus, illustratively, in his speech of 12 
December 2005 disseminated under the heading “The Struggle for Democracy 
in Iraq”, President Bush overtly addresses and attempts to silence actual and 
potential sceptics of progress: 
[§1] I know some fear the possibility that Iraq could break apart and fall into a civil 
war. I don’t believe these fears are justified. They’re not justified so long as we do 
not abandon the Iraqi people in their hour of need. Encouraging reconciliation and 
human rights in a society scarred by decades of arbitrary violence and sectarian 
division is not going to be easy and it’s not going to happen overnight. 
[§2]...We’ve done this kind of work before; we must have confidence in our cause. 
In World War II, the free nations defeated fascism and helped our former 
adversaries, Germany and Japan, build strong democracies...In the Cold War, free 
nations defeated communism...(emphases added).848 
Here, in §1, the critics were being silenced once again through exclusion via 
indirect stigmatization. As a result, their demands of a withdrawal or at least a 
clear timetable and benchmarks for a withdrawal were re-constructed as equal 
to “abandonment of the Iraqi people”, and thus they were cast as complicit in 
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the purported civil war that would ensue in such possible “future”. Furthermore, 
by having historicised the situation earlier in the speech, Iraq was being 
compared with the nascent United States where success ‘took years of debate 
and compromise’,849 as well as with defeating of fascism and communism 
(throughout §2). In this context, the statement had the illocution that “asking for 
hasty results or disengagement from Iraq” amounted to not only “depriving Iraq 
of the certain success that our forefathers secured for us”, but also amounted to 
choosing to live with evils of such magnitude as fascism and communism. 
 
7.4. Conclusion 
In the theoretical discussion in chapter 5, I had referred to a characteristic late 
modern tension in relation to negotiating foreign/security policy in Western 
democracies. In light of the empirical analysis in this and the previous chapters, 
that proposition can be further advanced. Thus, on the one hand, 
foreign/security official representatives were operating from within the modernist 
mode of “doing security”, whereby “threats” were defined as external risks to be 
managed and resolved; responsibility to combat “evil” was reinstated; and 
where security was inextricably linked with narrating a particular positive “future” 
for the nation which could not otherwise be fulfilled, and thus the nation – 
imagined. On the other hand, those responsible for narrating and practicing 
security found themselves in great tension with the late modern self-reflexive 
society, who constantly destabilised such traditional narratives, including 
importantly by pointing to the manufactured nature of the security risks the 
policies claimed to address. Politically consequential in such self-reflexive 
voices were the post-modernist deconstructive tendencies which variously 
attempted to fragment and destabilise the fundamentals of the official security 
narratives, in case when moderate critique operating from within the dominant 
paradigm, was only deliberating on the effectiveness of the means and probing 
the measure of “success”, thus consistently demanding for the realisation of the 
promises inherent in the official narrative. In such heteroglot field of negotiating 
security, these voices were reacting and responding to each other, as well as 
variously acting upon developments on the ground (i.e. in Afghanistan and Iraq) 
and in the domestic political arena (e.g. revelations about the false premises of 
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the Iraq war; political resignations; anti-war rallies, etc.). These constituted the 
Bakhtinian “real-life” chronotope; while the various narrations and 
interpretations of these events in the discourses of dissent amounted to the 
“real-life” chronotope putting pressure on the narrative-normative, i.e. 
representational, chronotope of the official discourse, through a) dislodging 
articulations by destabilising critique; and b) probing/demanding articulations by 
deliberative critique.         
The official representatives could not escape engaging with/responding 
to such a heteroglot discursive field. This chapter largely demonstrated how 
such engagement took place in case of the contestations around the “war on 
terror” in the US and the UK in the intermediate period, roughly 2003-2007.  
Thus, tracing semiotic mechanisms through which certain speech-acts 
performed by critical voices “invited”, or indeed “failed to invite”, restorative 
performatives, I suggested that moderate critique may result in perhaps 
unintended, but politically hugely consequential, effects: moderate critique 
tended to invite more such restorative performatives, often shifting the balance 
away from responses to the destabilising/dislocating counter-narrative 
propositions found in more radical critique. Interestingly, even destabilising 
counter-narrative propositions having the strongest intent of dislodging the 
dominant narrative still at times released surplus illocutions that resulted in re-
affirmed elements of that narrative. Furthermore, the data analysis of actual 
restorative performatives drawn from government officials’ pronouncements 
suggested potentially far-reaching implications of the restorative performatives 
contributing to the reification and endurance of the dominant discourse. It 
provided more grounds to substantiate the argument put forward earlier, that 
critique often may have the unintended consequence of reifying the very same 
dominant discourse it had intended to challenge.  
Thus, through internalising/colonising of critique, official representatives 
consistently utilised anti-war and “war on terror” critique as narrative building/re-
affirming resource, by shifting of meanings and activating illocutions often 
diametrically different to those intended by the critic. Moreover, through circular 
re-narrativisation/deflection, government officials both in the US and the UK 
replied to destabilising critique, by resetting the terms of the debate away from 
the issues raised by the given critique, refusing to recognise the illocutions of 
the critical questions or statements outside of the dominant narrative. Finally, 
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the failure of dissenting voices to reconstruct alternative positive “future” 
commensurate in symbolic force with the “future” constructed in the official 
narrative, gave ample discursive opportunity for official interlocutors to engage 
in restorative performatives through re-claiming positive belongingness and 
“future” for the nation. The dislocated space resultant from the dislodging of the 
official narrative-normative chronotope of foreign/security discourse and 
national identity became effectively re-inscribed by the representatives of the 
dominant narrative through re-affirmations of pre-constructed positive 
belongingness of the nation and their version of “future”. 
 These restorative performances were often intertwined with silencing 
attempts. Thus, through one of the most prevalent silencing techniques, namely 
undermining credibility or moral disposition of the interlocutor, the official 
restorative responses rendered critique as less credible morally or logically, 
thereby reducing or muting the illocutionary effect of their pronouncements. In 
addition, through exclusion by indirect stigmatisation, another most frequently 
occurring silencing technique, official speakers were anchoring their restorative 
narrative on either socially unquestionable basic humane norms/values, or ones 
constructed and reified by the narrative itself; thereby indirectly accusing the 
actual/potential dissenters of not holding dear the named values. The latter was 
meant to stigmatise/exclude critical subjects from the dominant “we” identity.  
Thus, the consequence of the relational-dialogical “encounter” among the 
performative acts by official voices and voices of critique was that constructions 
of “evil” and “threat”, and therefore the need for continuation of war, were 
largely reaffirmed. However, it is important to stress that this was not hegemony 
subsuming or co-opting dissent in terms of the Gramsci’s concept of hegemony: 
while Gramscian and neo-Gramscian “hegemony” is based on consent and 
creating a “common sense”, the radical critique remained a distinct political and 
social collectivity systematically resisting and undermining such “common 
sense”. While the official discourse, through restorative performances was 
trying to achieve consent, radical critique was not subsumed and co-opted by 
them. Neither was radical critique “bound” or constrained by the official 
discourse to submit to such co-optation. Rather, they did remain radical critique 
at the given stage, which for lack of a powerful myth to suture the dislocation 
they had created, together with the deliberative critique asking for 
accountability, allowed the official discourse to reinstate and strengthen itself.  
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Chapter 8: Binding through the Case of Obama’s Failed Attempts to 
Close Guantánamo Bay Prison 
 
 
8.1. Introduction 
The analysis of the relational performativity in the intermediate period identified 
a number of patterns pointing to different routes of the reproduction and 
reification of the dominant “war on terror” discourses, and thereby pointed to the 
potentiality and plausibility of discursive constraints precluding or slowing down 
change in the intermediate period both in the US and the UK. This section 
seeks to come one step closer in exploring such potentiality by concentrating on 
one narrow policy/issue area, and hence one specific “within-case case”, 
already in the late period (2008-2012), in the US, namely President Obama’s 
pledge to close down the Guantánamo Bay prison and the difficulties he has 
since faced. In such a quest, a focus on the later period is important, given 
change of government/administration, and Obama’s expressed political agenda 
to demonstrate discontinuity from his predecessor. In other words, such focus 
makes the chosen case study a ‘least likely’ case, and thus constitutes a ‘tough’ 
test850 to the hypothesis. 
The pledge to close down Guantánamo and hand-over of terror suspects 
from the military to the judiciary, and thus his attempt to bring the process into 
the remit of US criminal law has been the defining part of Obama’s election 
campaign, as well as one of the areas of focus and enhanced public attention in 
his first term. The case was chosen, given Obama’s pronounced willingness to 
demonstrate discontinuity with the earlier Bush discourse and practices of “war 
on terror” in general, begging the question how much Obama has been 
constrained by the effects of performativity of his predecessor, when attempting 
to accomplish these promised changes. 
However, in this case study, rather than trying to locate patterns and 
mechanisms similar to the ones identified in the previous chapter (this would 
have been a selection-confirmation bias), I apply the relational-dialogical 
framework in an open analysis, interested in identifying patterns of relational 
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performances and their effects as they pertained to the given case in the new 
context of the late period. 
Obama’s efforts for change required performative moves legitimising the 
closure and specifically the transferal of the prisoners to be tried “on US soil”, as 
well as be granted the US constitutional right of habeas corpus. Albeit clear in 
their intended illocution (i.e. what they were doing in saying it), these 
performative moves were very restricted in their perlocution (i.e. how successful 
they were in being received as intended, and how they were actually received 
by certain segments of public and political audiences). This was due to a certain 
semiotic dissonance: on the one hand, Obama’s discourse was selectively re-
inscribing “freedom” and “American values” via the node “rule of law”; and on 
the other hand, it continued relying on the earlier master nodal point “threat/evil” 
constituted through the signifier “terrorist” and on the initial authorisation of use 
of force and the discourse of “terrorism as war”. This semiotic dissonance is 
shown to have been successfully appropriated by, and utilised to raise 
momentum for the discourses of political (primarily Congressional), as well as 
civil society opposition to the closure of Guantánamo, and thus contributed to 
constraining the Obama Administration’s policy options. 
These findings, only possible through a relational-dialogical analysis, 
point to an understanding of the resultant outcome of protracted change in 
relation to Guantánamo policies, that goes deeper than alternative, mostly 
popular, explanations, such as those claiming mere congressional politicking 
between Republicans and Democrats precluding change initiated by Obama; or 
Obama’s lack of political will advanced by civil rights groups and some critical 
media. Rather than alternative and competing explanation, some of such 
accounts will be shown to partly rely on a semiotic dynamics, which in itself 
requires exploring and explaining and which is done here through a dialogical-
relational analysis. 
Thus, section 8.2 offers a brief analysis of Obama’s “change” discourse 
in general; whereas sections 8.3 and 8.4 offer a detailed analysis of the case of 
the failed attempts to close the Guantánamo Bay prison. Finally section 8.5 
draws some conclusions from the case study and briefly addresses the question 
of alternative explanations, to show the advantages of a dialogical-relational 
analysis for the case.  
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8.2. “Freedom” as “Rule of Law” 
Soon after his inauguration as President in 2009, Barack Obama set out his 
“new approach” to counterterrorism, through criticism of Bush administration’s 
practices around “war on terror”. Characteristically, he shunned the term “war 
on terror”, instead opting for terms such as “overseas counter-insurgency 
operations”; pledged to close the notorious Guantánamo Bay prison and end 
the controversial interrogation techniques including torture.  
Commitments to such changes were received differently by various critics. 
John O. Brennan, the President’s Assistant for Homeland Security and 
Counterterrorism, summarised this critique in front of the Center for Strategic 
and International Studies, when delivering Obama’s ‘New Approach to 
Safeguarding Americans’:  
I have been deeply troubled by the inflammatory rhetoric [of critics]…Some like to 
claim that the President’s policies somehow represent a wholesale dismantling of 
counterterrorism policies and practices adopted by his predecessor. Others claim 
that the President’s policies constitute a wholesale retention of his predecessor’s 
policies. Well, they can’t both be right. In fact, both are wrong (emphases 
added).851 
 
Throughout his statement, on the one hand Brennan was at pains to narrate 
and “bring into being” a new President who was not to take up the task of 
“dismantling” foreign/security policies and interlinked with them a national 
identity already forged through his predecessor’s discourse and practice: 
‘dismantling’ of those policies would indeed for most amount to a challenge to 
identity/national consciousness. On the other hand, he was compelled to refute 
the blame for complete “continuation”, either, lest the President was cast as 
lacking credibility as a new leader and unable to keep his earlier promises on 
changing approach and policy. Wrestling between the two tasks, Obama’s 
administration went half step forward, demonstrating “change” and a step 
backwards, reaffirming the main elements of the earlier discourse that had by 
now become part of the national psyche, and thus demonstrating some 
continuity. 
Notably, as part of his attempts to differentiate himself from his 
predecessor, and demonstrate commitment to change, Obama performatively 
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attempted to dislocate and re-fix certain core signifiers in the official discourse 
of the Bush era. Thus, in his ‘Remarks on National Security’, he stated: 
Instead of strategically applying our power and our principles, too often we set 
those principles aside as luxuries that we could no longer afford…. the decisions 
that were made over the last eight years established an ad hoc legal approach for 
fighting terrorism that was neither effective nor sustainable – a framework that 
failed to rely on our legal traditions and time-tested institutions, and that failed to 
use our values as a compass (emphasis added).852 
While “values”, hinging on the master nodal point “freedom” in the Bush 
discourse, had been constituted as the target of the “ruthless enemy” (“they 
hate us for who we are”), and at the same time as something to be extended 
over other nations and thus “prevail” and “triumph”, here in Obama’s speech-
act, America had failed its own “values”, and done disservice to its “freedom” by 
setting aside “rule of law” as ‘luxuries’. Thus, respect for the “rule of law” now 
came to the forefront in fixing the meaning of “values”, and “freedom”.  In fact, 
numerous times in this speech, the “freedom” node was re-inscribed through 
the “rule of law”. This was in contrast to Bush discourse, where the “freedom” 
node was largely used to justify suspension or suppression of the rule of law 
under extraordinary circumstances (in other words, to securitise, in the name of 
“protecting our freedoms”), along with, building the narrative of “spreading our 
freedoms and values to other peoples around the world”. In this re-inscription, 
“freedom” as “rule of law” had failed in the “past”, i.e. in Bush era. 
Importantly, the reinstatement of the “rule of law” as the core of American 
values and aspirations for “freedom” became a trademark of Obama’s early 
discourse. In a discourse otherwise often paying tribute to Bush’s “war on terror” 
through important narrative continuities, this feature constituted one of the most 
important narrative differences with the Bush discourse. This, as demonstrated 
above, became possible by refuting, at least declaratively, that rule of law, as 
well as respect for civil liberties, must be sacrificed for purposes of national 
security. John Brennan made this explicit, by stating: ‘[Obama] rejects the false 
choice between ensuring our national security and upholding civil liberties. The 
United States of America has done both for centuries—and must do so 
again’.853 
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Other important novelties in Obama’s approach were the 
acknowledgement of the need ‘to address the underlying causes and conditions 
that fuel so many national security threats, including violent extremism’, at times 
relating such threats to US former policies and posture in the world; as well as a 
commitment to ‘take a multidimensional, multi-departmental, multi-national 
approach’ when tackling these threats.854 This was a departure from the Bush 
era, where 9/11 was presented in a rupture narrative, and in a temporal and 
causal discontinuity with American policies in the world. 
With all these “trademark” differences, the Obama Administration was 
still operating under the initial Authorization to Use Military Force adopted in the 
aftermath of 9/11, and despite his refusal to use the term “war on terror”, 
Obama’s early discourse failed to achieve a significant shift in narrative; one 
that would re-constitute both master nodal points of “evil” and “freedom” in new 
ways, as well as displace the normative chronotopicity of the national identity 
narrative underlying the earlier discourse, and thus offer a viable alternative that 
could compete with the still predominant identities constructed in the Bush era. 
Thus, even if he had resented the term “war on terror” from the very beginning, 
Obama was still frequently referring to “terrorists” in the “war” frame, which 
meant that every time signifiers such as “9/11”, “terror/terrorist/terrorism” or 
“war” were uttered, they were hypertextually re-activating the older narrative of 
“war on terror”. Thus, in his inauguration speech he reminded: 
Our nation is at war, against a far-reaching network of violence and hatred…We 
will not apologize for our way of life, nor will we waver in its defense, and for those 
who seek to advance their aims by inducing terror and slaughtering innocents, we 
say to you now that our spirit is stronger and cannot be broken; you cannot outlast 
us, and we will defeat you.855 
 
Here, the statement is structured upon the constructions of “war”, “evil terrorist 
enemy”, “our freedom” and ultimate triumph in the future (‘we will defeat you’), 
which amounts to nothing less than a narrative of “war on terror”, thus making 
his discarding of the term irrelevant and inconsequential. As we shall see in the 
next section, such hypertextual activation, as well as irreconcilable elements in 
Obama’s discourse, created a certain semiotic dissonance, with political 
consequences. I take a closer look at the irreconcilable elements within the 
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Obama discourse; as well as those between the Obama narrative of counter-
terrorism, on the one hand, and the earlier Bush narrative, specifically 
concentrating on the developments and contestations around Obama’s failed 
initiative to close the Guantánamo Bay prison, and bring the prosecution of 
terror suspects within the remit of US law. I then show how this semiotic 
dissonance had important political implications for the resistance to close 
Guantánamo: as the “war” analogy was still dominant in Obama’s narrative, the 
partial or selective introduction of elements of a potentially competing “crime” 
narrative was facing unrelenting resistance from various public and political 
segments of audiences and thus constraining change. 
 
8.3. Semiotic Dissonance, and the Failure to Close Guantánamo 
Since 2002, terror suspects had been incarcerated and tried at Guantánamo 
Bay for “war crimes” without the protections of civilian rights, and without the 
protections designated by international law for prisoners of war. The prison 
location had been chosen in Cuba for being outside US sovereign territory and 
thereby preventing the use of US criminal courts. In addition, the detainees 
were declared as “unlawful enemy combatants” and therefore outside the full 
protections offered by the Geneva Convention on the treatment of war 
prisoners. Taking advantage of the Convention, an international legal document 
designed in the post-World War II environment that was not considering non-
state actors as a category of detainees, and also the fact that it was providing 
protections only for “lawful” combatants, i.e. those who had waged war 
according to the laws of war inscribed in the very same Geneva Conventions, 
including refraining from targeting civilians, such designation of Guantánamo 
detainees as “unlawful” was technically possible. It allowed the US to hold the 
detainees indefinitely without trial, and also interrogate them – something 
prohibited by the Conventions.  
However, the practice had caused a lot of outcry raised by human rights 
organisations, as well as public court cases against the Bush Administration. As 
a result, after the court cases Rasul v. Bush, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, and Hamdan 
v. Rumsfeld, the US Supreme Court decided that the Geneva Conventions, and 
particularly Article 3 requiring fair trial, prohibiting torture and indefinite 
detention, did apply to all individuals found in conflict; and also that 
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constitutional habeas corpus protections must apply to them, too.856 This view 
was also advanced by key international bodies, such as the UN Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, and the Red Cross. Nonetheless, the 
practice of the Guantánamo trials was formalised in 2006 by the Bush 
Administration through the adoption of the Military Commissions Act, which 
authorised the trial of ‘any alien unlawful enemy combatant’ by military 
commissions. The Act defined “unlawful enemy combatant” as ‘a person who 
has engaged in hostilities or who has purposefully and materially supported 
hostilities against the United States or its co-belligerents who is not a lawful 
enemy combatant’.857 In addition, the Act affirmed that these persons did not 
have the constitutional right to habeas corpus. The legality of the Military 
Commissions Act was subsequently challenged by the court case of 
Boumediene v. Bush, gaining publicity in 2007-2008, where the Supreme Court 
held that the Guantánamo detainees had a right to the habeas corpus under the 
United States Constitution.858  
Within hours of assuming his post in January 2009, and as one of the 
first moves to fulfil his pre-election pledge, President Obama filed a motion to 
suspend the existing trials at the Guantánamo military commissions for 120 
days,859 to allow reviewing the legal bases of the controversial practice. The 
motion to suspend the practice so early into his presidency was hailed by 
human rights organisations as ‘an indication of the sense of urgency [Obama] 
feels about reversing the destructive course that the previous administration 
was taking in fighting terrorism’.860 This was quickly followed, on 22 January 
2009, by Obama issuing an Executive Order on the Closure of Guantánamo 
Detention Facilities within one year, where ‘the prompt and appropriate 
disposition of the [detainees]…and closure of the facilities’ were presented to be 
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‘in the interests of the United States and the interests of justice’.861 The order 
prohibited any new cases from being referred to a military commission under 
the Military Commissions Act of 2006. Consistent with his attempt to bring the 
“rule of law” back into the meaning of what constituted “freedom” as a value for 
Americans, and responding to years of legal and public controversy around the 
(un)lawfulness of detaining prisoners at Guantánamo, Obama, through the 
Executive Order, established that ‘[t]he individuals currently detained at 
Guantánamo have the constitutional privilege of the writ of habeas corpus’.862 
As part of the plan to close the prison, it was later decided that some 
prisoners, notably the suspected architect of 9/11 Khalid Sheikh Mohammed 
and four associates, would be transferred to the US for trial in federal courts. 
Thus, the task was effectively being taken away from the military, and more 
broadly from the executive, and handed over to the judiciary system, as part of 
the move to bring US counter-terrorism back into the remit of “the rule of law”. 
Attorney General Eric Holder now shouldering this responsibility, announcing 
the decision to bring the 9/11 suspects to the US for trial, stated:  
For over two hundred years our nation has relied upon a faithful adherence to the 
rule of law. Once again, we will ask our legal system…to answer that call.863 
 
Nonetheless, operating under the initial Authorization to Use Military Force, the 
Obama Administration retained the right of the Executive branch to detain 
indefinitely and without charge anyone suspected of harming or planning to 
harm the US: the Authorization for Use of Military Force against Terrorists 
passed on 14th September 2001 authorised the President ‘to use all necessary 
and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he 
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that 
occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or 
persons’.864 
The two moves, namely selectively bringing some of the counter-terrorist 
practices into the remit of the US rule of law and hand over to the Judiciary on 
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the one hand, and the continued reliance on the initial authorisation to wage 
“war” and hence retain the right to exceptional measures that came with 
securitising the terrorist threat, on the other, were producing a discrepancy that 
could result in a semiotic dissonance, to be seen in a moment. 
In May 2009, in a Statement on National Security, Obama announced 
several important decisions he had made. Thus, he announced a ban on 
“enhanced interrogation methods” (i.e., “torture”); re-affirmed his determination 
to close Guantánamo; and announced that the review process assessing all 
pending cases had resulted in distinguishing five different categories of 
detainees and five different methods of handling them, as the means making 
the eventual closure practically possible. In doing so, he once again attempted 
to re-inscribe “freedom” and hence “American-ness” through “rule of law”. Thus, 
commenting on his decision to ban “enhanced interrogation methods”, of 
prosecuting terror suspects, he stated:  
I categorically reject the assertion that these are the most effective means of 
interrogation. What’s more, they undermine the rule of law.  They alienate us in the 
world.  They serve as a recruitment tool for terrorists…[E]ven under President 
Bush, there was recognition among members of his own administration – including 
a Secretary of State, other senior officials, and many in the military and intelligence 
community – that those who argued for these tactics were on the wrong side of the 
debate, and the wrong side of history.  That’s why we must leave these methods 
where they belong – in the past.  They are not who we are, and they are not 
America.865 
 
 He did the same when elaborating on some of the categories of Guantánamo 
detainees: 
[§1] First, whenever feasible, we will try those who have violated American criminal 
laws in federal courts – courts provided for by the United States 
Constitution.  Some have derided our federal courts as incapable of handling the 
trials of terrorists.  They are wrong…   
[§2]…The third category of detainees includes those who have been ordered 
released by the courts…This has nothing to do with my decision to close 
Guantánamo.  It has to do with the rule of law.  The courts have spoken.  They 
have found that there’s no legitimate reason to hold 21 of the people currently held 
at Guantánamo.  Nineteen of these findings took place before I was sworn into 
office.  I cannot ignore these rulings because as President, I too am bound by the 
law.  The United States is a nation of laws and so we must abide by these 
rulings.866 
In this statement, through §2, Obama was intertextually relying on critique 
levelled against Bush in the previous several years condemning his disregard 
for the US Supreme Court rulings about the unconstitutionality of the practices 
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at Guantánamo. Indeed, Obama was setting himself apart from Bush policies by 
re-inscribing “rule of law” as “our values” and “freedom” to be protected. 
Nonetheless, the reference to “terrorists” (who were “at war with us”) in the 
same statement was causing the unintended hypertextual activation of the 
whole of earlier Bush narrative, which was in semiotic dissonance with the new 
discourse of “rule of law”. Thus, “terrorists” was in dissonance with ‘American 
criminal laws in federal courts – courts provided for by the United States 
Constitution’ (§1), as well as with ‘rule of law’ (§2).  
Similarly, announcing his decision to resume the practice of the military 
commissions to try some of the existing detainees, Obama stated:  
The second category of cases involves detainees who violate the laws of war and 
are therefore best tried through military commissions.  Military commissions have a 
history in the United States dating back to George Washington and the 
Revolutionary War….[But] [i]nstead of using the flawed commissions of the last 
seven years, my administration is bringing our commissions in line with the rule of 
law.  We will no longer permit…cruel, inhuman, or degrading interrogation 
methods. …we will give detainees greater latitude in selecting their own counsel, 
and more protections if they refuse to testify.867 
Here, the signifier ‘laws of war’ and the indirect analogy ‘Revolutionary War’ 
presuming that “America was at war” were again in dissonance with ‘the rule of 
law’ and the granting of ‘greater latitude in selecting their own counsel, and 
more protections’. Indeed, if these were people who had been at war with 
America and hated and wished to destroy “our values and freedoms”, how could 
they benefit from the same rights and privileges those “values and freedoms” 
provided? 
 Finally, referring to the fifth category of detainees, Obama stated: 
Now, finally, there remains the question of detainees at Guantánamo who cannot 
be prosecuted yet who pose a clear danger to the American people…[e.g.] people 
who’ve received extensive explosives training at al Qaeda training camps, or 
commanded Taliban troops in battle, or expressed their allegiance to Osama bin 
Laden, or otherwise made it clear that they want to kill Americans.  These are 
people who, in effect, remain at war with the United States. 
…Having said that, we must recognize that these detention policies cannot be 
unbounded.  They can’t be based simply on what I or the executive branch decide 
alone.  That’s why my administration has begun to reshape the standards that 
apply to ensure that they are in line with the rule of law. We must have clear, 
defensible, and lawful standards for those who fall into this category.  We must 
have fair procedures so that we don’t make mistakes.868  
Through these statements, as well as by granting the right of habeas corpus 
through his Executive Order earlier that year, Obama was effectively extending 
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the same “freedoms and privileges” as those enjoyed by Americans at home 
over the terror suspects. While different methods of handling were referring to 
different categories of detainees, they had one thing in common, namely one 
way or another, re-inscribing the counter-terrorism narrative as hinging on “the 
rule of law”. Perhaps, the architects of this new narrative had underestimated or 
not suspected how much only partial desecuritization of the detainees and the 
overall partial abdication of the Bush era “war on terror” narrative would create a 
dissonance with this new narrative nodal point of “rule of law”. Thus, the 
“freedom” node, that had previously been used only to constitute American 
exceptionalism, as well as “our way of life” that was the object of hatred for “the 
evil Other”, was now being re-inscribed in a narrative, where the terror suspects 
– constituted by Bush as the most vile and dangerous people on the planet – 
must now benefit individual freedoms and rights ensured for Americans through 
the “rule of law”. Such re-inscription, which diametrically shifted the relationship 
between “threat/evil” and “freedom” as they had been fixed in the Bush 
narrative, constituted a potential semiotic dissonance, i.e. a semiotic 
contradiction between competing fixations within the same narrative structure. 
Thus, while these detainees were “at war” with America, for broader audiences 
it was hard to comprehend why then they should enjoy the same rights as US 
citizens with whom they were effectively “at war”.  
 Moreover, for some of the detainees (category 1), the Obama narrative 
mandated that the constitutional privileges and rights be granted on the 
American soil itself:  
Where demanded by justice and national security, we will seek to transfer some 
detainees to the same type of facilities in which we hold all manner of dangerous 
and violent criminals within our borders – namely, highly secure prisons that 
ensure the public safety…we will try those who have violated American criminal 
laws in federal courts – courts provided for by the United States Constitution 
(emphases added).869  
Through surplus illocution, and in ways unintended by the speaker, this latter 
speech-act referring to the Constitution, at least for a segment of the audiences, 
would intertextually activate the earlier official narrative’s master nodal point of 
“freedom” (as “our values” that are under attack by the “evil terrorist Other”), 
and with it would activate the whole chronotopicity of the earlier narrative (“we 
aspire towards a future where we fulfil our American-ness by triumphing this 
                                                 
869
 Ibid. 
276 
 
evil”). Furthermore, the reference to ‘within our borders’ intertextually activated 
the Bush narrative’s proposition, whereby “freedom” [the way it had been fixed 
in the dominant narrative] defined what ‘within our borders’ meant: “freedom” 
was precisely what “evil” had attempted to take away from “us”. Such 
intertextual activation of the earlier fixations of the master nodal points of “evil” 
and “freedom”, and the earlier chronotope of assigning ultimate and absolute 
triumph over a transcendental “evil” would have created a further semiotic 
dissonance among an audience who had internalised this earlier narrative. As 
we shall see in the next section, Obama’s re-inscription of “freedom” as 
involving “constitutional rights”, and “rule of law” benefiting the “terrorist” was 
unsuccessful, if not outright blasphemous, for those in the audiences for whom 
“freedom” still belonged only to “us” and “within our the borders”, rather than to 
“them”, and therefore could not be granted to “them”.   
Finally, the following speech-act by Obama is of interest:  
Our courts and our juries, our citizens, are tough enough to convict terrorists.  The 
record makes that clear.  Ramzi Yousef tried to blow up the World Trade 
Center.  He was convicted in our courts and is serving a life sentence in U.S. 
prisons.  Zacarias Moussaoui has been identified as the 20th 9/11 hijacker.  He 
was convicted in our courts, and he too is serving a life sentence in prison.  If we 
can try those terrorists in our courts and hold them in our prisons, then we can do 
the same with detainees from Guantánamo (emphasis added).870 
The term “Guantánamo” itself had previously been constructed firmly hinging on 
both the master nodal points of “evil” and “freedom”, i.e. as the place where 
“evil” (as threat to “freedom”) was being effectively contained. In fact, 
statements pointing to the fact that more than 400 terrorist suspects had been 
tried and convicted in US civilian courts since 9/11,871 as evidence that these 
courts were fit for the purpose of fighting terrorism and that this was not 
something entirely new, were having little communicative effect when reminded: 
these trials had not attracted much public visibility in the sense of requiring elite 
legitimation performatives, in contrast to the case of those detained in 
Guantánamo, whose possible “transfer” itself and the subsequent “closure” of 
the prison were directly striking a nerve with parts of audiences (from the 
general public, as well as acting political and civil society agents, as seen in a 
moment) who remained constituted by the dominant “war on terror” narrative. 
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Not surprisingly then, a 2009 Gallup poll found that 65% of Americans were 
opposed to closing the Guantánamo Bay prison and to moving some of those 
prisoners to the United States; while 74% of Americans were opposed ‘to the 
idea of moving the prisoners to prisons in their own states if Guantánamo is 
closed’.872 Obama’s attempts to construct equivalence between terrorists within 
Guantánamo’s symbolic borders, and the ones (pre- as well as post-9/11) 
successfully tried at home were unsuccessful.  
 
On 7 March 2011, President Obama, despite his earlier promises to close 
Guantánamo Bay, lifted the suspension of trials by military commissions under 
the Commissions Act of 2006, and signed an executive order that would set into 
law the practice of holding detainees indefinitely without charge.873 Defense 
Secretary Robert Gates subsequently rescinded the suspension of filing new 
cases to military commissions.874 Thus, the camp was kept as the primary 
location, and one outside of the US. This outcome, i.e. the failure to fulfil a 
landmark election campaign pledge and more importantly an initial executive 
order, is in part causally traced to certain relational discursive processes 
involving government (agents in the executive and the judiciary), political 
opposition and civil society. In such process, the semiotic dissonance described 
above was appropriated by, and helped raise momentum for, the discourses of 
political and civil society opposition to the closure. The next section 
demonstrates how such semiotic dissonance contributed in galvanising further 
opposition, and thus potentially played a role in constraining the Obama 
Administration in its liberty to fulfil the promised policy changes. 
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8.3. Public and Political Opposition to Closure 
In November 2009, the Obama Administration and the judiciary faced a range of 
protests from across the political spectrum, the media and civil groups against 
the plans on transferring Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the suspected architect of 
9/11, and four other detainees, from Guantánamo into a criminal court in New 
York for trial. Thus, on 5 December 2009, there was a demonstration in New 
York, partly organised by a new political-advocacy group Keep America Safe.875 
Calling the Attorney General Eric Holder a “traitor” and “communist” for his 
decision,876 the protest had a narrative summarised in the following lines in the 
demonstration speech of Andrew McCarthy, the former Chief Assistant U.S. 
Attorney: ‘[the General Attorney doesn’t] understand what rule of law has 
always been in wartime...It’s military commissions. It’s not to wrap our enemies 
in our Bill of Rights’.877 Another protestor asked: ‘How can someone who is not 
an American have any right to our rights? Holder wants to help the terrorists?’878  
While at the time, this protest was relatively small and did not gain much 
media attention, the narrative line gained new momentum after the Christmas 
day failed terrorist act attempted by Abdulmutallab on the passenger plane to 
Detroit.879 When the suspect was arrested as a criminal, rather than an 
“unlawful enemy combatant”, and was allowed to have an attorney, 
conservative circles, and soon even some Democrats raised a bout of protests 
in a narrative line similar to the one above. Attorney General Holder’s reminders 
that what they did was ‘totally consistent with what has happened in every 
similar case [since 9/11], as every previous terrorist suspect apprehended 
inside the country had been handled as a civilian criminal’,880 were being 
illocutionarily unsuccessful. Such failed illocution was causing frustration to 
Holder and his supporters: they were dismayed at the accusations that Holder 
had ‘fail[ed] to send Abdulmutallab directly to Guantánamo’,881 calling such 
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possible scenario a ‘fantasy’ lacking any legal basis, and pointing to scores of 
terror suspects tried as criminals in civilian courts in the Bush era. They were 
expressing shock that such factual truth could be ignored or forgotten. The 
protesting voices were still advancing the “not-on-our-soil” and “not-the-same-
rights” narrative. Now that the official narrative had been constructed in the new 
terms of the “rule of law” as one of its master nodal points, it was easy for those 
actors opposing the civilian trials to expose, and perhaps politically manipulate, 
an inherent discrepancy between the earlier and still vital official proposition that 
“the terrorist enemy hates us for who we are, and wishes to destroy our 
freedoms” and the Obama proposition that “these same terrorists can also 
benefit from some of the same freedoms”. 
Similar narratives were present in the articulations of other civil society 
groups. Thus, along with the argument that trying terror suspects in federal 
courts would mean granting them all constitutional rights, including 
transparency of evidence collection, which would jeopardise security, the civil 
group 9/11 Families for a Safe and Strong America persistently re-produced the 
nodal points “evil” and “freedom”, whereby the signifier “our soil” fixed as the 
realm of constitutional freedoms and privileges was in semiotic dissonance with 
granting such privileges to the ‘evil that had attacked and still hated this very 
soil’.882  Furthermore, this was firmly located within the “terrorism as war”, rather 
than “terrorism as crime” narrative, and therefore posed additional constraints 
on any political attempt to introduce policy change without first having to 
dismantle such narrative. This was well demonstrated in the supportive article 
by Andrew C. McCarthy, legal affairs editor at The National Review, ahead of 
the campaign meeting organised by Move America Forward (with Gold Star 
family members, 9/11 family members, and former members of the military on 
10 February 2009)883. The following passage encapsulates the general 
predominant mood of civil society groups resisting the closure of Guantánamo: 
If we didn’t already have Gitmo, we’d have to invent it. There really is a war going 
on out there …It has never been possible, nor thought possible, to win a war in 
court.…And it bears keeping in mind that the purpose of an American trial is to 
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force the government to meet a very high burden of proof in a system developed 
for the benefit of American citizens enjoying the presumption of innocence…A war 
is fought – meaning that people are killed and prisoners taken — in order to 
achieve vital national objectives, particularly the protection of American lives…We 
need the government to prevail, or our lives and the rights we cherish are in 
jeopardy…Remember, we turned to military justice because the civilian system 
had shown itself inadequate for the purpose at hand – and the purpose, 
remember, is not to provide due process for our enemies. The purpose is to secure 
our citizens by neutralizing as many of our enemies as possible (emphases 
added).884 
 
The Attorney General, when announcing the decision about the trial of Khalid 
Sheikh Mohammed and his supporters in New York, had indeed attempted to 
use the symbolism the signifier “New York” had in the dominant 9/11 narrative, 
in favour of his own narrative legitimating the transfer. Thus, at the press 
conference announcing the decision about the location for the trials, he said:  
After eight years of delay, those allegedly responsible for the attacks of September 
the 11th will finally face justice. They will be brought to New York – to New York – 
to answer for their alleged crimes in a courthouse just blocks away from where the 
twin towers once stood.885 
 
Similarly, others pointed to the positive symbolic value of New York as a trial 
site, thus also trying to hinge the legitimation of the new measure on some old 
and familiar “war on terror” premises: 
By trying them in our federal courts, we demonstrate to the world that the most 
powerful nation on earth also trusts its judicial system – a system respected 
around the world.886 
  
Even New York’s mayor Michael Bloomberg, who was later to withdraw his 
support for the trials, initially agreed: ‘[i]t is fitting that 9/11 suspects face justice 
near the World Trade Center site, where so many New Yorkers were 
murdered’.887 
However, such performative acts were unsuccessful, as performative 
moves pointing to the semiotic dissonance, now exposed by opponents of the 
transfer and the closure of Guantánamo, had far greater performative force: 
                                                 
884
 Andrew C. McCarthy, ‘It’s not the Prison, It’s the Prisoners’, The National Review (10 
February 2009), at http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/226855/its-not-prison-its-
prisoners/andrew-c-mccarthy, accessed 13/07/2013. This was linked to his Campaign to Keep 
Gitmo Open note in the same issue, available at 
http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/177085/campaign-keep-gitmo-open-andrew-c-mccarthy, 
accessed on 12/07/13.  
885
 Holder (13 November 2012). 
886
 Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick Leahy, D-Vt., quoted in ‘9/11 Terror Suspects 
to Be Tried in New York’, Los Angeles Times (13 November 2009), at 
http://www.latimes.com/ktla-gitmo-trial-story.html#page=1, accessed 14/08/2014.  
887
 Mayer (15 February 2010).  
281 
 
they were hinging on a “war” narrative still dominant for the majority, and one 
which had not been fully dismantled by the Obama narrative.  
Eventually, the plan for the transfer was dropped and the suspected 
architect of 9/11 and his four associates were tried at Guantánamo by military 
commissions (still on-going at the time of writing). Moreover, the sequence of 
events that followed can be described as one compromise by the Obama 
Administration leading to another, and eventually creating institutional and legal 
barriers that would make the closure of Guantánamo implausible in the near 
future. 
 
Thus, in December 2010, the House of Representatives approved H.R. 6523 
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2011, by a vote of 
341 to 48. The Act was prohibiting the use of defence budget on transfer of 
Guantánamo detainees into the US, any third country, as well as on building 
any new facilities within the US for the purposes, thus effectively de-
capacitating the President in carrying out his pledge. The narrative building 
political resistance to the closure of Guantánamo is manifested in the House 
Debate on the Act. Most notably, similar to the narrative of the civil groups 
described above, the most outspoken proponents of the Bill were effectively 
building a “not-on-our-soil” and “not-the-same-privileges” narrative: 
[T]he American people know that the Gitmo detainees – which include terrorist 
trainees, terrorist financiers, bomb makers, Osama bin Laden’s body guards, 
terrorist recruiters, and would-be suicide bombers – are not minor offenders by any 
means…that the battlefield is not limited to our efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq… 
Those that seek to do us harm should never be transferred to our soil or tried in 
our Federal court system, where they would essentially be provided the same 
protections under our Constitution as the very U.S. citizens they would love to kill 
(emphasis added).888 
 
Similar propositions re-occurred during the debate, built on the master nodal 
points “evil” and “freedom” the way they had been fixed in the Bush discourse, 
and capitalising on the inner dissonance between these dominant constructions 
and Obama’s contention that this “evil” must be granted privileges that belong to 
the realm of “freedom”.  
Such dissonance, indeed, not the sole cause of resistance, was 
nonetheless making it performatively much easier to resist change initiated by 
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the new Administration and build public opinion for such resistance, and 
conversely much harder for the Obama administration to achieve a successful 
perlocutionary effect through change-initiating speech-acts. Statements by 
Obama and others in his Administration as well as the judiciary pointing to the 
benefits of closure and home trials, and pointing to factual evidence from the 
past in favour of such decisions, were being illocutionarily unsuccessful due to 
the silencing effect that the exposure of the dissonance was having on such 
statements. As we saw earlier, one of such facts the supporters of the closure 
and home trials were in anxiety to communicate was that US civilian courts had 
successfully tried terrorists before; and another was that anyone detained within 
the US had always been tried at home. In addition, such illocutionary failure 
applied to statements about the assessment that such trials would boost 
America’s international reputation, increase cooperation and thus make 
America safer, as there was evidence that many countries including Germany, 
France and the UK, ‘that had refused to cooperate with military commissions at 
Guantánamo were much more favorably disposed to criminal trials…[and were] 
willing to provide evidence and witnesses for court prosecutions’.889  
Performatives built around these pieces of factual evidence and assessment 
were being powerfully silenced, i.e. rendered less communicable, illocutionarily 
and perlocutionarily less successful.   
In these circumstances then, the Obama Administration’s move to sign 
the NDAA into law, rather than determined by non-commitment or lack of 
political will, was affected by a certain constraining force. The degree of this 
constraining force is demonstrated by Obama’s overt and strong criticism of 
some of the implications of the Act, on the one hand, and his compromise and 
eventual signing of the Act nonetheless. Thus, in his statement following his 
signing into law of the NDAA 2011, Obama lamented: 
Section 1032 [of the Act] represents a dangerous and unprecedented challenge to 
critical executive branch authority to determine when and where to prosecute 
Guantánamo detainees, based on the facts and the circumstances of each case 
and our national security interests.  The prosecution of terrorists in Federal court is 
a powerful tool in our efforts to protect the Nation…Any attempt to deprive the 
executive branch of that tool undermines our Nation’s counterterrorism efforts and 
has the potential to harm our national security…Despite my strong objection to 
these provisions,…I have signed this Act because of the importance of authorizing 
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appropriations for, among other things, our military activities in 2011 (emphases 
added). 890 
 
This was a very strong statement, indicting the Congress of undermining the 
traditional separation of power, as well as the effectiveness of the counter-
terrorist measures, and thus endangering national security. In other 
circumstances, this indictment alone by the President might have been 
sufficient to create a political crisis and spark a public debate about the very 
legitimacy of the Act, overshadowing other debates. Nonetheless, despite his 
fundamental objections to its key provisions of the Act, Obama signed it into 
law, by citing the urgency to approve the overall budget in order not to 
jeopardise military activities. He cited a similar justification the next year, when 
signing the NDAA for fiscal year 2012: 
I have signed this bill despite having serious reservations with certain provisions 
that regulate the detention, interrogation, and prosecution of suspected 
terrorists…[S]ome in Congress continue to insist upon restricting the options 
available to our counterterrorism professionals and interfering with the very 
operations that have kept us safe. My Administration has consistently opposed 
such measures. Ultimately, I decided to sign this bill…because of the critically 
important services it provides for our forces and their families and the national 
security programs it authorizes.891 
  
Interestingly, in contradiction to the above harsh criticism, the Administration 
later found ways to formulate such move of signing the Act in terms of 
consistency ‘with our [earlier] commitment to protect the American people and 
uphold our values’, and as ‘steps that broaden our ability to bring terrorists to 
justice’ (emphasis added).892 Even a failed attempt of change had to be justified 
through at least a certain level of narrative continuity, in order not to risk 
credibility and political integrity. 
The main proposition of the narrative advanced by the opponents of 
closure, namely “evil must not enter US soil and must not have the same rights 
and privileges as us”, persisted in the subsequent years, as part of the 
organised civil and political resistance to Obama’s continued efforts to press for 
changes ahead of the annual votes on NDAA 2012 and NDAA 2013. 
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Interestingly, it persisted despite the concerns repetitively expressed by the 
Attorney General, as well as civil liberty groups, that ‘those unwise and 
unwarranted restrictions undermine our counterterrorism efforts and could harm 
our national security’,893 and that the continued policy at Guantánamo was ‘rife 
with constitutional and procedural problems and undermines the fundamental 
American values that have made us a model throughout the world for 
centuries’.894 
Indeed, counter-advocacy cannot be overlooked: civil liberty groups, 
some media outlets, as well as local grass-roots campaigners were persistently 
pushing against these NDAAs. In fact, some of them, as the latter statement by 
the American Civil Liberties Union demonstrates, attempted an alternative 
fixation of the signifiers “American values” and “model democracy”. However, 
rather than trying to clear away the semiotic dissonance created by the tension 
between the dominant narrative and Obama’s performative efforts to legitimise 
a policy change while selectively hinging on the dominant “war” narrative, these 
advocacy groups predominantly attracted publicity and contributed to an outcry 
around the feared implications that the ‘detention without trial’ provision of the 
2012 NDAA could purportedly have on American citizens.895 These campaigns 
have been successful in helping pass resolutions in many US states and 
municipalities, including against the indefinite detention.896 Nonetheless, these 
efforts, however legitimate and justified in their cause, have made the debate 
predominantly about civil liberties within America, rather than about dismantling 
the “terrorism as war” narrative and displacing it with an alternative narrative 
that would have successfully accommodated their own, and President Obama’s 
declared cause for change. 
Eventually, the efforts of civil liberty groups predominantly focusing on 
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the issue of indefinite detention as unconstitutional for US citizens had 
overtaken the debate, overshadowing any potent debate about non-US citizens 
such as the Guantánamo terror suspects. It is little wonder then, that eventually 
the 2013 NDAA Bill passed by the Congress in December 2012 contained 
amendments to remove the indefinite detention clause, by affirming the right 
of habeas corpus and the Constitutional right of due process for American 
citizens;897 whereas the Obama administration is still struggling to fight against 
the provisions prohibiting the use of funds to transfer detainees or build new 
facilities within the US for trying them. In fact, the provisions were confirmed 
again in the NDAA for the Fiscal Year 2014.898 
In this context, Obama’s attempts to try Osama bin Laden’s son-in-law in 
New York, rather than in Guantánamo, following bin Laden’s killing in May 
2011, met a strong condemnation: once again, the main narrative line was that 
Abu Ghaith must not be treated ‘like a “common criminal” with full rights of the 
American system’,899 and instead must be held in Guantánamo. The “not on our 
soil” narrative had already become an almost organic/natural outgrowth of the 
earlier dominant official narrative. 
 
8.4. Conclusion 
The case study of Obama’s failed attempts to close Guantánamo helped further 
delineate potential routes of a binding effect. Thus, Obama’s performative 
attempts to project a “new approach” to counter-terrorism and to legitimise his 
pledge to close the Guantánamo prison contained a certain semiotic 
dissonance: while the “freedom” node had previously been fixed as “our way of 
life that was the object of hatred for the evil Other”, now it was being re-
inscribed as “rule of law” that must also extend to the terror suspects. The latter, 
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having been constituted by Bush as the most vile and dangerous people on the 
planet were now to benefit individual freedoms and rights to be granted on the 
American soil itself. Since this re-inscription was being attempted without much 
shift/re-inscription of the “threat/evil” node, and still operating from within the 
earlier “terrorism as war” frame, the move granting them the same rights as US 
citizens and on the American soil itself was perlocutionarily less successful 
among certain groups. This was evidenced by their anti-closure discourses.  
This semiotic dissonance was appropriated by, and helped galvanise 
political and civil society opposition to the closure. Thus, crucially, the reasoning 
behind the opposition to the closure of Guantánamo and transfer of some of the 
detainees to be tried at home, in simplified terms read as “evil must not enter 
the US soil”: if these alleged terrorists, including those detained without charge 
and those possibly innocent, had continuously been constructed as the ultimate 
“evil”, and the “US soil” as something sacrosanct to be protected at all costs, 
then this “evil” did not deserve to have the privilege of benefiting from American 
judiciary system – a higher value reserved for the Americans. Organised 
political and civil society opposition to the closure operating from within such a 
narrative launched actions which eventually constrained the Obama 
Administration in its liberty to fulfil the promised policy change. 
These findings, arrived at through a relational-dialogical analysis, provide 
an understanding of the resultant outcome of protracted change that goes 
further than alternative, mostly popular, explanations. Thus, one such 
explanation was advanced by human rights groups claiming Obama’s lack of 
political will.900 However, this explanation does not hold to scrutiny as a lot of 
evidence in Obama’s passing of an Executive Order bypassing the Congress at 
the very first days of his presidency, his sustained efforts towards closure, as 
well as his discourse of very strong condemnation of the Congress point to the 
opposite. The other popular explanation was the “pressure from the Congress” 
thesis circulating in the media, and also voiced by members of the Obama 
Administration,901 as well as constituting Obama’s own official justification for 
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his failure to fulfil his pledge. This claim provides only a superficial causal 
explanation, without unravelling the relational discursive dynamics behind such 
congressional opposition and purported constraint. In addition, this explanation 
is very limited, given the initial bi-partisan support for the closure, and the reality 
of later congressional opposition to Obama’s efforts, itself requiring an 
explanation. Furthermore, this cannot be an alternative explanation, as 
congressional deliberations are only part of the causal complex that have 
produced the final outcome, and are partly incorporated in the dialogical 
dynamics engaged with above.  
One of the very few scholarly explanations interested in constraints and 
asking why Obama failed to close Guantánamo is offered by Erin Corcoran.902 
The main argument advanced pertains to the legal and political choices Obama 
as President has made, miscalculating outcomes, in particular through choosing 
to sign an Executive Order about the closure, without detailing a course of 
action and without consulting the Congress first. Corcoran argues that had he 
instead initiated change by allowing the Congress to legislate the closure, 
something which he had done in other instances of major policy change (such 
as in the spheres of economics and health), the outcome would have been 
much different.903 While this explanation does not specifically inquire into the 
discursive dynamics around the relational field of contestations, it is illuminating 
as it provides an account of how structural peculiarities of US legislative and 
executive branches and political tradition, as well as an account of the inner 
workings of relations, interests and pragmatic motives of political actors, had an 
impact on the final outcome. However, a causally important but less explored 
and emphasised part of this account is the acknowledgement that Republicans 
and later Democrats were affected by, and then were able to communicate an 
opposition to the closure by capitalising on a certain public resentment of having 
detainees tried at home. Thus, rather than an alternative and competing 
explanation, this account is partly reliant on a semiotic dynamics, which in itself 
needs exploring and being accounted for, and which this case study unravelled, 
through a dialogical-relational analysis.  
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Chapter 9: Conclusions and Implications 
 
 
9.1. Introduction  
In this concluding chapter, having the empirical findings at hand, I wish to reflect 
back on the theoretical discussion and address the question as to whether and 
how much the new approach was advantageous in the effort to understand 
foreign/security negotiations and the particular case of “war on terror” 
contestations. On the other hand, to remind, the status of the hypothesis 
underlying the empirical part of this study was that of a working one, which 
would help explore some patterns and processes in order to re-articulate the 
hypothesis at the end of the study and delineate further questions for research, 
rather than to offer exhaustive explanations comprehensively affirming or 
refuting the hypothesis. Hence, more broadly, the empirical study in Part II of 
this thesis was to serve only as an illustration of how the Bakhtinian-inspired 
relational-dialogical framework may be applied, and aimed at elucidating what 
further questions may arise from it, both theoretical and substantive, in terms of 
contesting “security” in general and “war on terror” in particular.  
Therefore, in this brief chapter, in addition to summarising the main 
empirical findings, I attempt to re-articulate the hypothesis, and point to further 
questions that arise out of, rather than are fully answered in, this study. Thus, 
the summary of findings is provided in section 9.2; while section 9.3 re-
articulates the hypothesis and proposes some further reflections and questions 
arising from the research. I conclude in section 9.4, by outlining the limitations 
and contributions of this research, as well as pointing towards some future 
directions for research.  
9.2. Main Empirical Findings 
Demonstrative of Bakhtinian monologising forces of fixation and finalisation, the 
official discourses both in the US and the UK in early post-9/11 period were 
striving to produce an authoritative discourse on terrorism and security as the 
“final word”, intimately linked with national identity (re)constructions. The spatial 
structuring of such monologising narratives was around the master nodal points 
of “evil/threat” and “freedom” in both countries, whereas the temporalities and 
with them the full time-space matrices of each of the official narratives revealed 
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distinct narrative-normative chronotopes: change was inflicted upon the spatially 
organised constructions of “evil” and “freedom” differently in each of the 
narratives. To remind, chronotopes condense historically and culturally specific 
conceptions of the collective past, present and future, and hence stories of 
survival, transformation, renewal or else stasis and repetition. Thus, the official 
US discourse on “war on terror” was built around the Chronotope of Cyclical 
Triumph, where the national “present” was only one stage in the cycle of 
triumphs; America was perpetually triumphant over “evils” covalent across 
historical time; and where “freedom” as an absolute value was in jeopardy due 
to absolute, teleological and un-caused “evil”. In contrast, in the British 
Chronotope of Agent of Change, the “past” was also a source of faltering; “evil” 
was imagined as partly caused by globalisation and interdependence, thereby 
calling for changes in national and global norms, practices and institutions, and 
Britain was imagined as having a pivotal role in making such change possible, 
allowing more scope for the collective agency of the nation in determining the 
course of history in the future. 
However, monologising discourse, while striving for singularity, for an 
imposed word, does not exist as a final achievement, but is rather always an 
un-finalised attempt. Neither can it produce any policy outcomes, isolated from 
centrifugal, dialogising forces, i.e. forces of pluralisation. Indeed, in light of 
Bakhtinian Dialogism, society and history are shaped and changed by both 
centrifugal and centripetal forces, as causal outcomes emerge relationally, 
through tensions and in the intersection of these opposite forces. Dissenting 
voices variously challenged and undermined the official narrative structure, 
particularly attempting to dislocate the narrative-normative chronotope of the 
official authoritative and monologising discourse. Thus, voices critiquing the 
official narrative of 9/11 and the subsequent policy of intervention emerged 
already at the earliest stage, playing expository, historifying and de-
mystifying/de-constructive functions, as well as attempting to destabilise the key 
nodal points on which the official narrative was structurally hinging. Particularly, 
these were deconstructing the official narratives as imperialist war for oil and 
hubris, and de-mystifying Self-Other binaries as the vehicle behind the 
constructed threat and legitimated response. As a result, these voices had 
already started disturbing the chronotopic integrity of the official narratives: 
rather than a source of mere pride and moral victories, the national “past” was 
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constructed as the cause of present grievances, and therefore as a source for 
shame; whereas the “future”, rather than a triumph of “freedom” and a place of 
justice for all, was a looming disaster for “freedom” and for global justice, if the 
present policies were not averted. 
These emergent trends of critique became more salient in the 
intermediate post-9/11 period (2003-2007), especially gaining momentum 
ahead of and during the Iraq invasion. Two distinct forms of critique were 
entering into a dialogical encounter with the official discourses and requiring 
engagement. Thus, deliberative critique, largely practiced by acting politicians 
and moderately critical mainstream media, was mostly hinging on the same 
master nodal points as the official narrative, and thus reifying the latter. 
Moreover, despite expressed discontent with the legal basis of the Iraq war as 
the initial condition of legitimation, deliberative critique was variously 
deliberating on the progress of the war and post-war involvement. Ironically, 
deliberative critique was consistently demanding for “success” and “victory” for 
a war they had variously branded as “ill-conceived”, or outright “illegal and 
immoral”, e.g. by demanding not just an exit plan from an otherwise ‘mistaken’ 
war, but an exit plan that would ensure ‘finishing this war with success and 
honor –…for winning…the war’ (emphasis added).904 
On the other hand, destabilising counter-narratives were dislodging the 
master nodal points of “evil” and “freedom”, upon which the official narratives 
were hinging. Often the very nodal signification of “evil” was being displaced by 
constructions of a different “threat” to the nation, coming from policies that were 
“unjust, immoral and illegitimate”. Most importantly, destabilising counter-
narratives posed a major challenge to the narrative-normative chronotopes of 
the official narratives. This was shown to have been politically consequential: 
these critics were destabilising the national identity narrative built into the 
dominant security narrative, specifically by dislodging the national “past”, 
“present” and “future”, and the outcome signifiers “success” and “triumph”. 
Characteristically, the “future” was often being constructed in negative terms of 
“failure”: in particular, the “virtuous past” of the official chronotopes was being 
dislodged and replaced with a shameful “past”, depicting Britain and America as 
historically having been motivated by hubris and material self-interest, and been 
indifferent to loss of human life, oppression, and other nations’ democratic 
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aspirations.  
Cumulatively, these destabilising practices constituted subversion 
without the construction of an alternative positive “we” identity through a 
positively imagined alternative “past” and “future”, and thereby ended up 
producing a deficient chronotope inducing a deficit of “future”. Relatedly, often 
destabilising critique, having undermined the nodal point of “our values” as it 
was fixed in the official narrative, failed to offer a commensurate discourse of 
alternative “values” upon which an alternative national identity and 
foreign/security discourse could hinge. While, indeed, the ideological 
foundations of anti-war discourses were normative and are about imagining 
alternative politics and society, the publicly communicated critique of “war on 
terror” was disproportionately devoted to deconstruction and dislocation, rather 
than to constructing a new foundational narrative that would allow imagining a 
different “future”. Thus, despite the subversive intent and the broader critical-
emancipatory normative quest of anti-war movements, and “war on terror” 
critics, there was disproportionality between the performative efforts aimed at 
destabilising and dislodging the official narrative and those aimed at re-
inscribing/filling-in the dislocated ambivalent space.  
In the absence of positive alternatives, the national identity in these 
destabilising narratives remained hanging in the air. This can be politically 
consequential: to recall, the function of the modern state is to exterminate 
ambivalence, and circumscribe uncertainty. Hence, to be politically viable, and 
be able to compete with the official narrative and the functionality of such 
narrative for the modern state and nation, any dissenting de-articulation and re-
articulation of foreign/security discourse and interlinked with it, of national 
identity, must, to some extent, take on the function of exterminating 
ambivalence through the construction of commensurate positive closure and 
definable symbolic foundation for the nation to imagine itself; or else dislodge 
the requirement of “circumscribing uncertainty” as the basis for the modern 
state. The critical voices have largely fallen short of achieving either.   
Thus, overall, the destabilising counter-narrative propositions of various 
anti-war and critical discourses did achieve certain dislocation of the hegemonic 
“war on terror” discourse; but the way they attempted to ‘suture’ the dislocated 
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structure was largely non-conducive to the emergence of a new ‘imaginary’.905 
In other words, they failed to transform the anti-war “myth” into a new 
“imaginary” that would incorporate, the late modern societal need to 
circumscribe uncertainty in new ways and thus perform the late modern 
imperative of controlling risk; but neither did they subvert such meta-narrative 
as a the basis for contesting security. In case of leftist media and anti-war social 
movements especially, this failure to offer an alternative positive imaginary may 
be part, if not the result, of the much broader post-modernist tendencies for 
deconstruction, fragmentation and overall disbelief in meta-narratives, and 
therefore relinquishing of a search for an alternative foundational discourse for 
collective identity and for a foreign/security policy newly imagined. 
Thus, on the one hand, there were the deconstructive dissident voices, 
who failed to offer alternative representations, and on the other hand, there 
were the deliberative voices of the political opposition elite, or those contending 
to expert status, who were still representing the world through the 
metanarratives of liberal interventionism, demanding the realisation of the 
promises inherent in the “war on terror” official discourse, and demanding 
“winning” the (albeit “mistaken”) war. 
Nonetheless, the official narrative could not escape dialogical 
engagement with such heteroglot field of critique: in the intermediate period, 
both governments made intensified performative efforts to restore the credibility 
of the official narratives, and thereby to reclaim the credibility of the official 
foreign/security narrative. The analysis suggested that moderate critique invited 
more restorative performances, often shifting the balance away from 
“responses” to the dislocatory counter-narrative propositions found in more 
radical critique, and thus opened up dialogical routes for the addressee to 
engage in restorative performatives on the points of divergence, on which 
accountability was being demanded. In seeking to understand the implications 
of the dynamics of such “invitations” and the ensuing responsive performatives 
on the reification and endurance of the dominant discourse, it was found that, 
e.g. critique demonstrating “failure” of the Bush Administration in the mission in 
“Iraq as promised” and calling for a withdrawal timetable, and at the same time 
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demanding ‘benchmarks to measure the war’s progress’,906 not only invited, but 
also facilitated restorative performances by allowing for discursive efforts that 
would try and convince that “some progress has been made”, and that “we are 
not yet fully safe and a lot more needs to be done”. Thereby, they re-enforced 
the very promise of the official narrative. In contrast, destabilising critique, 
especially those articulated through extreme rhetorical means, tended to 
receive less dialogical answerability: restorative performances were mostly of 
dismissive and/or accusatory nature, intertwined with silencing techniques.  
In addition, restoration was often achieved through internalising 
(colonising) critique, i.e. through de-articulation and then re-articulation, 
showing the erroneousness of critical propositions and using critique as 
semiotic resource to (re)construct or re-affirm own propositions. Re-
narrativisation (or deflection) was another restorative means, where the speaker 
answered a destabilising question or proposition by deflecting and defaulting 
back to at least one of the master nodal points of the official narrative, as well 
as on chronotopic propositions such as re-affirmation of past, present and future 
“triumph” of “freedom”, and thus making these the only loci around which a 
resolution to the exchange must be sought, away from the issues raised by the 
question.  
Restorative performances also engaged in a powerful re-inscription of 
the space opened up as a result of the dislocatory discourses undermining the 
national identity narrative inherent in the official foreign/security discourses. In 
the circumstances of the deficient narrative-normative chronotope produced by 
destabilising critique, representatives or advocates of the dominant narrative 
found ample performative opportunities to re-affirm the “future” they had 
constructed through the official narrative. In such attempts to re-inscribe the 
opened up space, performative silencing became an important part of 
reclaiming the official narrative-normative chronotope: critique was often 
stigmatised and dissent was rendered as a “jeopardy to triumph”, and hence a 
threat to the very realisation of the identity of the “nation”. Thus, by curtailing the 
illocutionary force of the critics to uphold their contesting representations, the 
official narrative-normative high ground was re-claimed.  
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However, it is important to stress that this was not hegemony 
“subsuming” or “co-opting” dissent in terms of the Gramscian concept of 
hegemony: while Gramscian and neo-Gramscian “hegemony” is based on 
consent and creating a “common sense”, here we saw that the radical critique 
remained a distinct political and social collectivity systematically resisting and 
undermining such “common sense”. While the official discourse, through 
restorative performances was trying to achieve consent, radical critique was not 
subsumed and co-opted by them. Neither was radical critique “bound” or 
constrained by the official discourse to submit to such co-optation. Rather, they 
did remain radical critique at the given stage, which for lack of a powerful myth 
to suture the dislocation they had created, together with the deliberative critique 
asking for accountability, allowed the official discourse to reinstate and 
strengthen itself.  
Thus, these re-affirmations became possible relationally and non-linearly,  
produced through the interrelation of four processes: a) the late modern 
reflexive society, coupled with the institution of democratic accountability, 
increased the requirement to engage with critiquing voices destabilising or 
variously deliberating on the official discourse and practice of “war on terror”; b) 
the political anxiety to maintain credibility necessitated variously restoring the 
integrity of the official narrative built on the traditional security paradigm; c) 
deliberative critique, constantly looking for inherent (in)consistencies and 
probing the official representatives against supra-discursive and non-discursive 
developments (those on the ground, or those politically relevant to the practice 
of “war on terror”) were demanding the realisation of the “promise” inherent in 
the official narrative, thereby greatly constraining the official representatives; 
and d) the destabilising critique were largely shattering the foundations of the 
official narrative of “war on terror”, the national identity narrative attached to it, 
as well as more broadly the modernist security paradigm, without fully re-
inscribing the dislocated space with a new narrative-normative chronotope, 
especially without imagining an alternative positive collective “future”. This 
failure created ample discursive and political opportunity for the official 
representatives to re-claim the opened-up space and with it to reclaim official 
constructions of “threat”, “evil”, and the nation’s dependence on “triumphing” 
over such threat as the condition of imagining its “future”. 
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Overall, the implications of these empirical findings for our discourse-theoretical 
discussion are that meaning-production does escape intentionally and semiotic 
relations may produce unintended consequences. Thus, the discourse of most 
of the radical critique intending a mobilisation and a rupture in the hegemonic 
discourse ended up having unintended effects such as distancing certain 
audiences, due to their failure to construct an alternative positive national 
identity narrative, as well as the effect of shifting the balance of official 
responsive efforts towards more moderate critique. On the other hand, those 
engaged with more moderate, deliberative counter-narratives, who most 
probably intended to construct a genuine critique of some of the premises 
behind the overall “war on terror” narrative, ended up creating more discursive 
opportunities for the official interlocutors: through surplus illocutions, their 
utterances were demanding for more restorative performances from the 
interlocutors, which in turn may have served to fortify their narrative. In addition, 
deliberative counter-propositions, having relied on nodal points and chronotopic 
building blocks that unite them with the dominant narrative, ended up 
constraining their initiators: the official representatives become constrained by 
the imperative of the “success” as constructed in the dominant narrative and 
reproduced in the given critique, and therefore must now pursue its fulfilment. 
 
In a further effort to demonstrate discursive constraints actualised in a specific 
narrow policy area, I looked at the “within-case case” of Obama’s failed 
attempts to fulfil his pledge of closing down the Guantánamo Bay prison. Given 
Obama’s pronounced willingness to demonstrate discontinuity with the earlier 
Bush discourse and practices of “war on terror” in general, the case constitutes 
a ‘least likely’ one, and therefore a ‘tough’ test907 to the hypothesis. 
It was shown that Obama’s performative efforts to legitimise the closure 
and specifically the transferal of the Guantánamo prisoners to be tried “on US 
soil”, and be granted the US constitutional right of habeas corpus, were very 
restricted in their perlocutionary success: on the one hand, Obama’s discourse 
continued hinging on the master nodal point “threat/evil” constituted through the 
signifier “terrorist” in the earlier Bush discourse, as well as on the initial 
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authorisation of use of force and hence the discourse of “terrorism as war”; on 
the other hand, Obama’s discourse was selectively making claims about 
change of rhetoric and policy, by re-inscribing “freedom” and “American values” 
via the node “rule of law”. These proved to be irreconcilable semiotic elements – 
within the Obama discourse, as well as between the Obama narrative of 
counter-terrorism, on the one hand, and the earlier Bush narrative, on the other. 
In addition, Obama’s efforts to selectively bring some of the counter-terrorist 
practices into the remit of the US rule of law and hand over to the judiciary, 
while at the same time continuing to rely on the initial authorisation to wage 
“war” and hence retain the right to exceptional measures, was producing a 
discrepancy that would result in a certain semiotic dissonance: thus, the 
“freedom” node previously constituting American exceptionalism, as well as “our 
way of life” that was the object of hatred for “the evil Other”, was now being re-
inscribed in ways where the terror suspects must now benefit individual 
freedoms and rights ensured for Americans through the “rule of law”, thus 
creating a semiotic contradiction: while these detainees were “at war” with 
America, for broader audiences it was hard to comprehend why then they 
should enjoy the same rights as US citizens, as “freedom” was precisely what 
they had attempted to take away from them. 
This semiotic dissonance had important political consequences: it was 
successfully appropriated by, and helped galvanise political and civil society 
opposition to the closure of Guantánamo: performative moves pointing to the 
semiotic dissonance, now exposed by opponents of the closure, had far greater 
performative force, as they were hinging on a “war” narrative still dominant for 
the majority, and one which had not been fully dismantled by the Obama 
narrative. Indeed, the “war” analogy was still dominant in Obama’s narrative, 
and the partial or selective introduction of elements of a potentially competing 
“crime” narrative was facing resistance from various public and political 
segments of audiences. These processes eventually contributed to constraining 
the Obama Administration’s policy options and its liberty to fulfil the promised 
policy changes. 
An additional contributing factor to the ease with which the opposition to 
closure appropriated and utilised the semiotic dissonance inherent in Obama’s 
“change” narrative was the failure by critique to construct an alternative “future” 
for the nation in the intermediate period (as seen in the previous chapters): the 
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earlier dominant narrative had not been powerfully re-inscribed with a new 
commensurate narrative. Thus, when Obama came to power, he was 
attempting isolated re-inscriptions (such as “rule of law” as the highest value) at 
the backdrop of a still dominant Bush narrative constituting the majority’s 
identity. Had the destabilising critique achieved re-inscription of the national 
identity and an alternative vision of security in a full narrative-normative 
chronotope with an imagined positive “future” for the nation, Obama’s or indeed 
any new political leader’s efforts to re-inscribe individual master nodal points 
such as “evil” and “freedom” would have met less semiotic dissonance among 
the audiences, and would have had more chances of success. 
Thus, through the dialogical-relational framework, the case study was 
able to reveal certain dialogical-relation processes that may have contributed to 
the failure of closing the prison, potentially due to a certain constraining 
mechanism, emerging from a specific relationality of actors, voices, and forces. 
  
9.3. Re-articulated Hypothesis; Further Reflections and Questions 
In light of the theoretical exploration and the empirical study, the (still) 
hypothetical binding effect may be viewed as a relationally produced outcome, 
and therefore, the suggested constraints on change of policy and the 
protracted involvements in Afghanistan and Iraq as partly the result of the 
dialogical logic underlying the encounters among voices of critique, those of 
deliberation, and those of the official representatives. Rather than mere 
manipulation by the elite of rhetorical and political means, neither as mere co-
optation of the radical critique by such elites (co-optation in the neo-Gramscian 
or else in other terms), such endurance of the “war on terror” practice may be 
located in the domain of relationality, where the discursive strategies of the 
anti-war critique and their failure to offer new imaginings suturing the 
dislocated public space of “security” have played a role. To remind, from the 
outset of this thesis, I drew attention to the Laclau and Mouffean conception of 
hegemony intimately linked to resistance and dissent; i.e. ‘a type of political 
relation’, which cannot be conceived without the possibility of subversion.908 
Therefore, studying such articulations and performative attempts of subversion 
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must be integral, rather than tangential to, or a matter of choice for, studying 
any discourse.  
As a result, it was showed that, in the dialogical-relational conception of 
discourse, outcomes (in this case, constraints or the hypothetical binding effect) 
were deemed as resulting from relations among agents and among semiotic 
and social systems, and therefore, more often than not, constitute unintended 
consequences. The focus then was on emergent causal powers, or on the 
‘causal efficacy of patterns as emergence’,909 whereby the concern of the 
binding hypothesis becomes the emergent powers and properties of structures, 
including semiotic structures: binding is the unintended consequence of the 
relationality of various competing representations and their relative force in the 
given socio-political context and institutional structure, coupled with the effect of 
material developments around the subject of contestations. Thus, already 
informed by the study, we may further specify the hypothesis as follows:  
Official foreign/security policy discourses have the potential of “binding” (in 
the sense of constraining change) in contemporary Western societies, 
where state and national identity construction and mass information 
dissemination are inextricable parts of negotiating security. Durability is then 
an emergent property of official foreign/security policy discourses built on 
national identity narratives.  
The study suggested two possible mechanisms of binding: 
a) The identities and realities constructed by an official public discourse at 
an initial stage of a security narrative striving for legitimation, may at a 
later stage become the basis for certain political and civil groups who 
have internalised this narrative to exert pressure on official discourse 
attempting to divert from such narratives and thus slow down change, 
even when there is political willingness and declared opportunity for 
certain rhetorical and policy change. This may include demands for the 
realisation of the promise of a certain “future” for the nation inherent in 
the narrative-normative chronotope of the official dominant discourse; 
b) Working from within the paradigm of the official narrative, and largely 
operating through the institution of democratic accountability, deliberative 
critique may create further routes for demanding the realisation of the 
narrative-normative chronotope advanced by the official legitimation 
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narratives; as well as become one route through which the real-life 
chronotope puts pressure on the narrative/normative chronotope of the 
target narrative.   
Indeed, these mechanisms are not essential or deterministic to foreign/security 
contestations: they may actualise or else remain latent, given multiplicity of 
other causal factors; and most importantly are historically and culturally specific. 
Thus, the binding effect was found to be intimately linked with the late modern 
paradox of foreign/security policy being still caught up in, and dependent on, 
traditional monologising identity-building and projecting of certitude through the 
promise of a manageable future, on the one hand, and the unavoidable need to 
engage dialogically with multiplicity of other (including destabilising and 
deliberative) voices, on the other. Silencing some of these voices at an early 
stage may help the narrative-normative chronotope and its “promise” underlying 
the official legitimation narrative be further internalised, and ironically become a 
constraint for change at a later stage by inviting for demands for the realisation 
of the promise of a certain “future” for the nation inherent in such chronotope. In 
addition, deliberative critique, by constantly probing and weighing the supra-
discursive and non-discursive developments against the dominant narrative and 
looking for inherent consistency, may further reify and prolong the official 
discourse and policy by inviting for the eventual realisation of the “promise”. 
Indeed, these conclusions about the binding effect do ‘not treat causal 
forces as “separable” and independent’.910 As already emphasised before, 
without claiming to be a comprehensive multi-causal explanation for the overall 
phenomenon of a prolonged “war on terror”, it nonetheless attempts to integrate 
much more of such potential explanation into a discourse-analytical model, than 
traditional discourse analytical accounts would have been able to do, by 
allowing for a multi-dimensional (multi-actor and multi-textual) analysis, 
integration of the dimension of time, as well as for bringing in the non-discursive 
and the supra-discursive into the analysis, even if in the somewhat restricted 
sense of how changes in these realms constantly feed into/re-fertilise the 
discursive contestation through actors’ responses to and (re)interpretations of 
such changes. 
Moreover, the binding effect must not be seen deterministically as the 
property of (or in some way, the necessary outcome of) a dialogical-relationally 
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conceived foreign/security contestation. Instead, dialogicity may just as well 
create mechanisms to the opposite effect – of change, of transformation, of 
breaking from reification. The fact that this study zooms into one effect, that of 
binding, does not mean that the latter is a necessary or essential effect of 
dialogically conceived foreign/security policy contestation. Furthermore, 
Bakhtinian dialogism may in fact create possibility of breaking through the 
hypothetical binding effect: drawing on ‘multiple potentialities of meaning’,911 as 
well as his belief in the social situatedness of the utterance, we may allow for a 
lot of potential for such breakthroughs, including through contemporary 
societies learning to ‘think sociologically’,912 as well as the effect of second-
order articulatory practices (including, e.g. this very study) on first order 
contestations, in helping produce a new ‘imaginary’. 913  
Finally, the binding hypothesis may encounter the issue of 
generalisability as well as of actualisation. In this regard, it must be reminded 
that the hypothesis is developed having contemporary Western democratic 
polity in mind, where democratic accountability is a well-established political 
institution, and more broadly critique and dissent (in particular to war and 
intervention) have become a civic institution in their own right, and where the 
late modern social landscape discussed above is present. But even so, the 
mechanisms leading to binding are not claimed to be generalisable. 
Nonetheless, as Wight reminds, something not being generalizable does not 
mean it is not caused.914 On the other hand, the potential of binding, given 
varying circumstances, may remain non-actualised, since ‘mechanisms may 
interact and counteract each other, and mechanisms can exist without their 
power being exercised, in which case they are best understood as 
“potentialities”’.915 
 
Far from exhausting the exploration of the possible binding effect, this research 
animates the need to move beyond the question how “war on terror” was initially 
constructed and legitimised, and instead, especially in this later stage of 
developments, to shift the scholarly attention to a longitudinal inquiry that seeks 
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to understand why the “war on terror” endured. In this relation, constitutive 
“how” questions – claimed by constructivists/post-structuralists as superior to 
supposedly Positivistic “why” questions916 -- must be replaced with causal-
constitutive “how” questions, which is the same as to say, research must turn to 
“why” questions, the latter implying a non-Humean understanding of causes and 
mechanisms.  
Importantly, the fact that this research was not and does not claim to be 
a full explanation about why the “war on terror” endured gives even more 
reason to start to inquire into such “why” questions; however, with the ethos to 
bring the understanding of semiotic dynamics and logics into such multi-causal 
understanding rather than bring the old and well-rehearsed exclusionary divides 
such as “idealism vs realism”, “the ideational vs the material”, or “causal vs. 
constitutive logics” back into disciplinary discussions. In a possible development 
of a foreign policy/security analysis, where semiotic relations, as per critical-
realist views, would be acknowledged to have causal efficacy and be and be 
part of causal mechanisms,917 it would be pertinent to integrate the dialogical 
philosophy of language and the dialogical speech-act theory, as well as the 
dialogical-relational framework for foreign/security policy contestations, as more 
suited for such an endeavour. 
Subsequently, and especially given the protracted involvement in both 
Afghanistan and Iraq despite significant criticism and public discontent that has 
unfolded over the years, the question whether successive governments in the 
US and the UK have been constrained in their attempts to change policy 
direction due to certain contestation dynamics is still open for inquiry. 
 
A number of implications as well as further theoretical and empirical questions 
arise out of the research as follows (more may be pinpointed): 
1. To start, the question asked at the beginning of the thesis with regards to 
radical critique is still open for further exploration: what social and political 
consequences does the dismantling of a dominant national identity narrative 
underlying a national security discourse entail? Does such dismantling, 
especially without a commensurate attempt to provide an alternative suture 
for the dislocation go without significant effects on continuity and change of 
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security policy and practice? The research pointed to a certain deficit of 
constructions of positive “futures” discernible in the narratives of radical 
critique. Further exploration into this could involve, among others, asking 
social-psychological questions, and thus call for interdisciplicanry research.  
2. Relatedly and on the other hand, how much was the hesitation by radical 
critique to provide such alternative imaginings linked with the post-modern 
cultural and intellectual tendencies of deconstruction and fragmentation and 
overall disbelief in meta-narratives, and therefore relinquishing of a search 
for an alternative discourse for collective identity and for a foreign/security 
policy newly imagined?  
3. More specifically, in relation to securitisations broadly conceived, how much 
does subversion without alternative positive re-construction of national 
“futures” negatively affect attempts of de-securitisation of a threat intimately 
linked with the identity of the nation in the securitising discourse, and a 
political struggle against such dominant discourse? Had at least some of the 
anti-war critique on “war on terror” been able to construct alternative 
identities based on positive, rather than negative/rejectionist, distinctiveness 
for the nation, would the cumulative effect of the counter-narratives on “war 
on terror” have been more significant, perhaps resulting in an ultimate 
rupture in the discursive field? Coupled with other political factors, could this 
rupture eventually contribute to the elevation of a counter-narrative to a 
dominant status? 
4. Nonetheless, destabilising anti-Iraq war critique may be argued to have 
made it politically much harder to legitimise intervention at present. This is 
illustrated by the case of the failed Motion in the British Parliament submitted 
by Cameron’s government seeking authorisation to intervene in Syria in 
August 2013.918 There is further scope for inquiring into the modes and 
extent of such critique on enhanced accountability, and change in political 
practices, not least demonstrated by the change in the UK parliamentary 
tradition, whereby stronger parliamentary oversight, as well as the 
introduction of seeking parliamentary approval before an intervention have 
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now become stabilised.919 
5. More broadly, it is pertinent to explore how much the destabilising 
performances systematically aiming to undermine key “war on terror” 
propositions have added up incrementally to form now an already well-
familiar discourse of resistance; and importantly how much they have 
produced consequences beyond the confines of the “war on terror” 
contestations in further instances of securitisations. 
 
9.4. Limitations, Contributions and Future Research 
It must be acknowledged that the dialogical-relational framework, albeit 
enhanced and developed to be philosophically-realist, and relational, is still a 
discursive approach. It does not accommodate the whole of the causal complex 
that has been behind an outcome (continuity and change being such outcome). 
In particular, as already made clear, it does not fully accommodate the material 
realm and its causal effects. Nonetheless, it is a discourse theory that fully 
acknowledges the outside to discourse; and while not fully accounting for it, 
conceptualises such “outsideness” and its constant overflow into the dialogical 
process of contestation through actors’ answerability to supra-discursive and 
non-discursive changes and developments variously requiring discursive 
engagement.  
The framework does not and cannot account for the full (often publicly 
inaccessible) decision-making process behind a foreign/security policy 
(including factors such as bureaucratic inertia, groupthink, etc.), neither for how 
and how much economic pressures and considerations, as well as multiple 
overt or covert political lobbying, vested interests and influences domestically 
and internationally affect such process; therefore cannot and does not claim 
that the described outcomes, including lingered involvement in “war on terror”, 
and specifically Obama’s failure to fulfil his pledge to close the Guantanamo 
prison, were determined solely by a constraining force produced through public 
contestations and deliberations. However, rather than alternative explanations 
in their own right, these factors are seen as co-producing the final outcome in a 
multi-causal complex: the full study and determination of the place of just one 
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cause would have required a major multi-level research beyond the scope and 
capacities of this project. Thus, in relation to the Guantanamo case, the study is 
not a comprehensive assessment claiming to fully account for the failed change 
of policy under scrutiny: such comprehensive assessment would be the theme 
of a lengthy project in its own right and involve the study of a complete causal 
complex through detailed and voluminous process tracing. Nor does it claim to 
explain the described outcome as solely determined by the described dynamics 
of contestation. 
 
Despite such limitations, the proposed dialogical-relational framework has a 
number of advantages, which lies at the core of the thesis’ main contribution to 
the field.  
Thus, first, as we saw in chapter 2, despite relationality and contestation 
being implicit to most post-structuralist thought, the predominant concern of 
discourse-analytical studies has been with hegemonic or dominant discourses 
alone, where there has been very little immediate/explicit concern with 
discourses of resistance/dissent and, importantly, their relationship with the 
dominant discourses. The relational-dialogical framework helped conceptualise 
outcome as arising in a territory between the official voice and voices of dissent, 
thus enabling the accommodation of a relational analysis of conflicting 
performative moves and their causal effects on security policies and practices, 
allowing reconceiving performativity.  
Second, on the other hand, we saw that while indispensable and implicit 
to all conceptions of discourse and society; contestations have been little 
problematised in terms of a micro-theory of the utterance and of speech-act and 
performativity, specifically in IR and Security Studies. Hence, through the 
Bakhtinian philosophy of the act and of utterance conceived as answerability, 
the framework was able to offer a re-conceptualisation of the speech-act and 
developing a dialogical theory of the utterance. 
Third, the framework allowed going beyond the moment of legitimation 
and exploring (even if not fully explaining) the unintended longer-term effects of 
performativity on policy, by incorporating the relational analysis of multiple 
“security-contesting” speech-acts, rather than an overarching “securitising” 
speech-act. Hence, it is a model of analysis that allows accommodating a much 
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broader range of actors, actions and practices,920 than the traditional 
representational model, and studying the effects of the relationality of various 
narratives and performatives produced in various social loci (government, 
oppositional parties, the media, alternative media, and social movements). It 
also allows explicitly locating such contestations in their socio-historical and 
epochal context of late modernity. 
The fourth, already empirical, contribution of the thesis is the enhanced 
empirical understanding of the relational dynamics behind contesting “war on 
terror” and the effects of that on policy continuation/change. Through a 
dialogical-relational analysis, the study was able to point towards potential 
relations and processes, and dialogical logics of contestation, which would have 
otherwise been implausible to discern, if concentrating on the dominant 
narratives bracketed off from competing discourses. It demonstrated certain 
constraining force coming from relationally produced semiotic dynamics, which 
with reasonable plausibility, was claimed to have potentially played a role in the 
complex of factors bringing about the described policy outcomes. Such patterns 
were possible to discern only by integrating the study of the official narrative 
with that of major challenges, importantly including the destabilising 
performances to the dominant foreign/security policy narratives, as well as the 
performative demands for accountability in case of the official narrative. 
Finally, my broader aim, and hence contribution in this thesis has been 
not only to show how my current inquiry would benefit from a Bakhtinian 
Dialogical vision of discourse, but also through the latter to demonstrate how 
Western discourse-analytical approaches dominating IR studies could find a 
better ally in Bakhtin’s thought, and would benefit by a certain “dialogical turn”. 
As explored in Part I, the thought of Bakhtin and his circle, with the exception of 
Guillaume’s work,921  has occupied little more than a “footnote” or an 
intermediated status in IR, despite their thought having indirectly illuminated 
some key substantive claims and directions. Therefore, I hope my effort re-
introducing him directly and hopefully in less mediated fashion will bring 
Bakhtinian Dialogism out of such “footnote” status, and show its relevance for 
enriching theoretical and empirical discussion in discourse-analytical 
approaches in IR.   
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In relation to more empirical work directly derivative of the present thesis, 
further case studies may be conducted, however, more encompassing of other 
elements in the potential causal complex, and in detailed process tracing for 
more conclusive findings as to how certain foreign/security decisions were 
made and how much they were affected specifically by discursive constraints. 
Beyond the specific interest of this thesis, namely the constraining potentiality of 
foreign/security discourses, the dialogical-relational approach has broader 
applicability: the focus on constraints only happened to be the subject of interest 
for this particular study. The approach will be equally indispensable for inquiring 
into the enabling properties of discursive interactions, especially into how 
change is produced and how emancipatory practices do and can have an 
impact. To remind, in the Bakhtinian vision, dialogical interactions are in an 
open system: different from Derridean “unfinalisabilty”, in Dialogism, ‘[t]he 
unfinalizability of speech reflects the ‘open-endedness as possibility’,922 i.e. ‘an 
open program’ for change and emancipation.923 While here Dialogism was 
largely explored as elucidating the ontology of discursive interaction, and with 
an analytical focus on constraint and continuity, in further research, it would be 
pertinent to explore dialogism as a normative theory and apply dialogical 
analysis to understanding how, through what discursive processes, change is 
initiated and facilitated, i.e. through what mechanisms, the relationality of 
competing voices implicated in the social struggles of the given historical-
cultural and epochal context produces change of meanings, change of 
“imaginings” and practices and thus enables social and political change. 
However, since in Dialogism, monologising and dialogising forces operate in a 
co-dependent manner, and since unintended consequences ensue in the “inter-
individual territory” among speakers/actors and at the juncture of structure and 
agency, such a focus on change can only be meaningful giving a close 
consideration to constraining mechanisms.    
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Appendix A: List of Data Sources – US and UK Official 
Pronouncements, Documents, Parliamentary Debates 
 
United States 
 
1998-01-26: Open Letter to the President by a group of Neo-Conservatives (Rumsfeld, 
Warlfowitz et. al.) 
1998-01-27: President Clinton, State of the Union Address 
2001-06-21: Testimony of U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, Senate 
Armed Services Committee [on preemptive action] 
2001-09-01: President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation 
2001-09-11: President George W. Bush, Remarks at Barksdale Air Base 
2001-09-12: President George W. Bush, Address following Cabinet Meeting 
2001-09-13: President George W. Bush, on National Day of Prayer and Remembrance 
2001-09-14: President George W. Bush, Remarks at the National Day of Prayer and 
Remembrance 
2001-09-20: President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress 
2001-09-30: Quadrennial Defense Review 
2001-10-01: The US PATRIOT Act 
2001-10-07: President George W. Bush, Statement on the Initial Operations in 
Afghanistan 
2001-10-11: President George W. Bush, Press Conference 
2001-10-21: President George W. Bush, Press Conference 
2001-11-08: President George W. Bush, Address to America, Atlanta, Ga. 
2001-11-10: President George W. Bush, Address at the United Nations 
2001-11-13: President George W. Bush, Press Conference 
2002-01-29: President George W. Bush State of the Union Address [“Axis of Evil” 
speech] 
2002-05:  The US State Department, Patterns of Global Terrorism 
2002-06-01: President George W. Bush, Graduation Speech at West Point 
2002-06-06: Donald Rumsfeld, Press Conference in NATO 
2002-07:  The Freedom Promotion Act 
2002-07:  National Strategy for Homeland Security 
2002-09-12: President George W. Bush, Speech at the United Nations 
2002-09-21: National Security Strategy 
2002-10-01: House of Representatives Session on Iraq 
2002-10-02: House of Representatives Debate on Iraq Resolution 
2002-10-03: Senate Debate on Iraq 
2002-10-07: Remarks by President George W. Bush on Iraq 
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2002-10-10: Hillary Clinton's Statement on US Senate floor 
2003-01-28: President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address 
2003-02: National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 
2003-02-05: Colin Powell, Remarks at Security Council 
2003-03-17: President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation [“ultimatum to Saddam 
Hussain”] 
2003-05-01: President George W. Bush, Remarks from the USS Abraham Lincoln At 
Sea Off the Coast of San Diego, California [“Mission accomplished”] 
2004-01-20: President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address 
2004-04-13: President George W. Bush, prime time news conference 
2004-05-24: President George W. Bush, Address, Carlisle, Pennsylvania [“Outline for 
the Future of Iraq”] 
2004-07-09: President George W. Bush, Remarks at York, Pennsylvania Rally 
2004-08-02: President George W. Bush, Remarks on Intelligence Reform and the 9-11 
Commission 
2004-09-23: Transmittal message, DCI Special Advisor Report on Iraq’s WMDs 
(Duelfer Report) 
2004-09-23: President George W. Bush, Press Conference 
2004-11-06: President George W. Bush, Radio address after re-election 
2005-01-20: President George W. Bush, Second inaugural speech 
2005-02-02: President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address 
2005-04-28: President George W. Bush, Press Conference  
2005-05-03: President George W. Bush, Press Conference 
2005-05-05: Congressman John Conyers and 89 Congressmen, Letter from Congress 
regarding Downing Street memo 
2005-05-27: President George W. Bush, Commencement Address at the US Naval 
Academy, Annapolis, Maryland  
2005-06-09: President George W. Bush, Remarks on Renewing the PATRIOT Act, 
Columbus, Ohio 
2005-06-20: House Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi, Statement at the House floor, 
‘This War is a Grotesque Mistake’ 
2005-06-28: President George W. Bush, Speech at Fort Bragg, North Carolina 
2005-07-11: President George W. Bush Progress Report in the War on Terror: Address 
at the FBI Academy, Quantico, Virginia 
2005-07-20: President George W. Bush, The Future of the Patriot Act, Baltimore, 
Maryland 
2005-09-14: President George W. Bush, Address at a United Nations Plenary Meeting 
2005-10-04: Letter to President Bush from 39 Senators on Iraq 
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2005-11-29: Senator Hilary Clinton, Letter to the Constituents on Iraq 
2005-11-30: President George W. Bush, Iraq War Strategy: Speech at the U.S. Naval 
Academy  
Annapolis, Maryland  
2005-11-30: National Strategy for Victory in Iarq 
2005-12-07: President George W. Bush, Rebuilding Iraq: Speech to the Council on 
Foreign Relations, Washington, DC 
2005-12-12: President George W. Bush, The Struggle for Democracy in Iraq: Speech 
to the World Affairs Council of Philadelphia, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania  
2005-12-17: President George W. Bush, The Patriot Act & The National Security 
Agency  
Washington, DC 
2005-12-19: President George W. Bush, End of Year Press Conference 
2006-01-31: President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address 
2006-08-31: President George W. Bush, Address to American Legion National 
Convention 
2006-09-19: President George W. Bush, Address to United Nations General Assembly 
2007-01-05: Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid and Speaker of the House Nancy 
Pelosi, Letter to President Bush on behalf of Congressional Democrats  
2007-01-10: President George W. Bush, Address to Nation [“troop surge to Iraq”] 
2007-02-14: President George W. Bush, Speech on the Progress in Afghanistan, War 
on Terror, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC 
2007-11-01: President George W. Bush, Speech on Global War on Terror, Heritage 
Foundation, Washington, DC 
2007-11-01: President George W. Bush, Previews on War on Terror Speech 
2008-11-05: President Barack Obama, Victory Speech to Supporters after election 
2009-01-15: President George W. Bush, Farewell Address to the Nation 
2009-01-20: President Barack Obama, Inauguration Speech 
2009-01-22: Executive Order: Closure of Guantanamo Detention Facilities 
2009-02-27: President Barack Obama, Remarks on Responsibly Ending the War in 
Iraq, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina 
2009-05-21: President Barack Obama, Remarks on National Security 
2009-06-04: President Barack Obama, Speech on the Middle East, Cairo 
2009-08-06: John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and 
Counterterrorism, Remarks: “A New Approach to Safeguarding 
Americans”, Washington, DC 
2009-09-23: President Barack Obama, Speech at the United Nations 
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2009-12-28: President Barack Obama, Address to the Public on the Attempted 
Terrorist Attack 
2010-01-02: President Barack Obama, Weekly Address [on the Detroit flight] 
2010-01-07: President Barack Obama, Remarks on the release of the security review 
on failed Christmas day attack 
2010-01-28: President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address 
2010-12-17: Press Release, ‘House Approves National Defence Authorization Act’: 
Statement by House Armed Services Committee Chairman Ike Skelton 
(D-Mo.) on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, 
during House debate on H.R. 6523 
2011-01-07: President Barack Obama, Statement on the Defense Authorization Act 
2011-01-22: President Barack Obama, Remarks on the Way Forward in Afghanistan 
[on withdrawal from Afghanistan] 
2011-01-25: President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address 
2011-04-04: Statement of the Attorney General on the Prosecution of the 9/11 
Conspirators 
2011-05-02: President Barack Obama, Remarks on Osama bin Laden  
2011-12-31: President Barack Obama, Statement on signing the Defense Authorization 
Act 
2012-01-25: President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address 
2009-12- 01: President Barack Obama, Speech the future of the U.S. military 
engagement in Afghanistan, US Military Academy in West Point, New 
York 
2012-01- 05: President Barack Obama, Remarks on New Pentagon Budget Strategy 
 
 
United Kingdom 
 
1997-05-12: Robin Cook: Mission Statement for the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office’ 
1999-04-22: Prime-Minister Tony Blair, Doctrine of the International Community, 
Speech before the Chicago Economic Club 
2001-09-11: Prime-Minister Tony Blair, Statement at the Trade Union Conference on 
the 9/11 Attacks 
2001-09-20: Prime-Minister Tony Blair, Remarks at Press Conference with President 
Bush, Washington, DC 
2001-10-02: Prime-Minister Tony Blair, Speech at the Labour Party Conference 
2001-10-04: Prime-Minister Tony Blair, Speech to Parliament 
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2001-10-07: Prime-Minister Tony Blair, Statement after the start of the US and British 
military strikes on targets in Afghanistan 
2002-03-25: Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, Speech at the Third Anniversary of The 
Foreign Policy Centre, at the launch of the Report ‘Re-Ordering the World: 
The long-term implications of September 11th’ 
2002-04-08: Prime-Minister Tony Blair, Speech at College Station, Texas 
2002-09-24: Prime-Minister Tony Blair, Statement to Parliament on Iraq 
2002-09-24: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ‘Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: 
An Assessment of the British Government’, [“Iraq Dossier”] 
2002-09-24: Prime-Minister Tony Blair, Statement at the House of Commons Debate 
on Iraq [“45- minutes” claim] 
2002-11-04: Prime-Minister Tony Blair, Press Conference ahead of Queen’s Speech 
2003-01-13: Prime-Minister Tony Blair, Press Conference 
2003-02-11: Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, Address to the International Institute for 
Strategic Studies 
2003-02-15: Blair Glasgow speech -I want to solve the Iraq issue via the United 
Nations 
2003-02-18: Prime-Minister Tony Blair, Press Conference 
2003-02-25: Prime-Minister Tony Blair, Statement at the House of Commons Debate 
on Iraq 
2003-03-17: Robin Cook, Resignation Letter to Tony Blair 
2003-03-17: Prime-Minister Tony Blair, Response to Robin Cook’s Resignation Letter 
2003-03-18: Robin Cook, Resignation Speech in the House of Commons 
2003-03-18: House of Commons Debate on Iraq 
2003-03-18: Prime-Minister Tony Blair, Statement at the House of Commons Debate 
on Iraq 
2003-03-25: Prime-Minister Tony Blair, Press Conference 
2003-04-28: Prime-Minister Tony Blair, Press Conference 
2003-05-12: Clare Shorts, International Development Secretary, Resignation 
Statement 
2003-07-18: Prime-Minister Tony Blair, Speech at the US Congress 
2004-02-03: House of Commons Debate on Weapons of Mass Destruction and 
Intelligence 
2004-03-04: Prime-Minister Tony Blair, Speech by Prime Minister Tony Blair at 
Labour's local government, women's and youth conferences, SECC, 
Glasgow 
2004-03-04: Prime-Minister Tony Blair, Speech on terror threat facing the UK and 
defending the Iraq war 
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2005-06-07: Joint Press Conference with President Bush and Prime Minister Blair 
2005-06-27: Prime-Minister Tony Blair, Press Conference 
2005-07-07: House of Commons Debate on Defence in the World 
2005-07-26: Prime-Minister Tony Blair, Press Conference 
2005-08-05: Prime-Minister Tony Blair, Press Conference 
2006-01-26: Defence Secretary John Reid, Statement the House of Commons 
2006-01-26: House of Commons Debate on Afghanistan 
2006-02-13: Gordon Brown, Speech on Terrorism, to the Royal United Services 
Institute, London 
2006-07-03: House of Commons Debate on British forces in Afghanistan 
2006-09-26: Prime-Minister Tony Blair, Speech at Labour Party Conference 
2007-11-12: Prime-Minister Gordon Browns, Speech on UK Foreign Policy Priorities, at 
the Lord Mayor Banquet 
2007-11-12: House of Commons Debate on the Queens Speech 
2007-12-12: House of Commons Debate on Gordon Brown’s New Framework for 
Afghanistan 
2008-06-16: Des Brown, Secretary of Defence, Statement and Debate at the House of 
Commons on Afghanistan 
2009-06-25: General Sir David Richards, designate Chief of the General Staff, Speech 
at the Royal Unites Services Institute, ‘Twenty-first Century Armed 
Forces: Agile, Useable, Relevant 
2009-07-16: House of Commons Debate on Afghanistan and Pakistan 
2009-11-17: David Miliband, Foreign Secretary, Speech on Afghanistan, at the NATO 
Parliamentary Assembly 
2009-11-23: House of Commons Debate on the Queen’s Speech 
2010-04-22: Second Televised Election Campaign Debate 
2010-05-26: House of Commons Debate on the Queen's Speech 
2010-06-15: Prime-Minister David Cameron’s Statement to the House of Commons 
Debate on Afghanistan 
2010-09-28: Ed Miliband, First Speech as Labour leader, to the Party Conference, 
Manchester 
2010-10-19: Prime-Minister David Cameron’s Statement to the House of Commons on 
the Strategic Defence and Security Review 
2011-07-05: House of Commons, Debate on Afghanistan 
 
313 
 
Appendix B: Data Sources of Critique – Mass Media, Alternative E-
Media, Statements and Publications by Social Movements and 
Social Groups 
 
 
United States 
 
2001-09-14: Congresswoman Barbara Lee (D-CA), Statement in Opposition to H.J. 
Res. 64 
2001-09-18: Interview with Barbara Lee (D-CA) 
2002-03:  Not in Our Name movement, Pledge of Resistance 
2002-06-14: Not in Our Name movement, Statement of Conscience 
2002-10:  Senator Barack Obama Statement at the Chicago anti-war rally 
2002-10-10: Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi (D-CA, Statement on the House floor 
opposing the Congressional resolution authorizing military force against 
Iraq 
2003-01-05: Thomas L. Friedman, Opinion: ‘A War for Oil?’, New York Times 
2003-01-17: Joost R. Hiltermann , Opinion: ‘Halabja: America didn't seem to mind 
poison gas’, New York Times 
2003-01-23: PNAC Letter to Bush on the Defense Budget, NewAmericanCentury.org 
2003-01-29: Michael R. Gordon, ‘State of the Union: The Iraq Issue; Bush Enlarges 
Case For War by Linking Iraq With Terrorists’, New York Times 
2003-01-31: Robert Kagan, ‘Politicians with Guts’, Washington Post 
2003-03-07: Michael Walzer, ‘What a Little War in Iraq Could Do’, New York Times 
2003-03-09: Jimmy Carter, ‘Just War -- or a Just War?, New York Times 
2003-03-19: PNAC, ‘Statement on Post-War Iraq’, NewAmericanCentury.org 
2003-03-22: Jim Rutenberg and Robin Toner, ‘A Nation at War: The News Media, 
Critics of Iraq War Say Lack of Scrutiny Helped Administration to Press Its 
Case’, New York Times  
2003-03-24: Patrick J. Buchanan, ‘Who’s War’, The American Conservative 
2003-03-28: PNAC, ‘Second Statement on Post-War Iraq’, NewAmericanCentury.org 
2003-06-04: Christopher Marquis, ‘After the War: Opinion: World's View of U.S. Sours 
After Iraq War, Poll Finds’, New York Times 
2003-09-07: Michael Ignatieff, ‘Why Are We In Iraq?; (And Liberia? And Afghanistan?)’, 
New York Times 
2003-12:  Editorial, ‘Still time to abolish war’, Peace News, Issue 2457  
2003-12-05: Paul Krugman, Opinion: ‘Looting The Future’, New York Times 
2003-12-16: Paul Krugman, Opinion: ‘Patriots and Profits’, New York Times 
2004-01-01: Opinion, ‘Between the Years’, New York Times 
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2004-05-26: Remarks by Al Gore 
2004-06-14: David Brooks, ‘War of Ideology’, New York Times 
2004-08-11: Nickolas D. Kristof, ‘An American Hiroshima’, New York Times 
2004-08-12: Dahlia Lithwick, ‘Tyranny in the Name of Freedom, New York Times 
2004-08-26: ‘Holding the Pentagon Accountable’, New York Times 
2005-01-28: PNAC, ‘Letter to Congress on Increasing U.S. Ground Forces’, 
NewAmericanCentury.org 
2005-05-12: ‘Indignation Grows in US over Pre-War British Documents’, Los Angeles 
Times 
2005-05-13: Walter Pincus, ‘British Intelligence Warned of Iraq War’, Washington Post  
2005-05-17: Paul G. Roberts, ‘Impeach and Convict’, LewRockwell.com 
2005-06-07: Paul G. Roberts, ‘Orchestrating Terrorism’, CounterPunch.org 
2005-06-18: Paul G. Roberts, ‘Can Congressional Republicans Save Bush’, 
AntiWar.com 
2005-06-21: Paul G. Roberts, ‘What is Bush's Agenda in Iraq’, CounterPunch.org 
2005-06-28: Paul G. Roberts, ‘A Defeat Bred in Deceit’, AntiWar.com 
2005-06-29: Opinion: ‘Presidential Disconnect’, Los Angeles Times 
2005-06-29: Paul Brownfield, ‘Bush Hits Familiar Points against an Understated 
Background’, Los Angeles Times 
2005-06-29: Editorial, ‘President Bush's Speech About Iraq’, New York Times 
2005-08-17: Paul G. Roberts, ‘Get Ready for WWIII’, AntiWar.com 
2005-08-30: Paul G. Roberts, ‘What is the Noble Cause’, LewRockwell.com  
2005-09-03: Paul G. Roberts, ‘Impeach Bush Now’, CounterPunch.org 
2006-11-16: Senator Nancy Pelosi for Huffington Post, ‘Bringing the War to an End is 
My Highest Priority’, Huffington Post 
2007-01-05: ‘Report in Reaction to the Iraq Study Group Report, The American 
Enterprise Institute 
2009-11-13: ‘9/11 Terror Suspects to Be Tried in New York’, Los Angeles Times  
2011-05-10: Paul G. Roberts, ‘Americans are Living in 1984’, LewRockwell.com 
2011-08-05: Paul G. Roberts, ‘Creating Evidence Where There is None’, 
LewRockwell.com 
2011-10-01: Paul G. Roberts, ‘Is the War on Terror a Hoax?’ LewRockwell.com 
2011-12-12: Krulak, Charles and Joseph Hoar, ‘Guantánamo Forever?’ The New York 
Times 
2012-05-10: Ivan Eland, ‘What’s Behind the Second Underwear Bombing Attempt’, The 
Independent Institute 
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United Kingdom 
 
2002-01-03: George Gallaway, ‘The Flaws in Downing Street's Fatwa’, The Guardian 
2002-03-07: Brian Reade, ‘Stop Dancing to Bush’s Tune, Tony’, Mirror 
2002-04-30: Hugo Young, ‘The Terrifying Naivety of Blair the Great Intervener’, The 
Guardian 
2002-05-25: Robert Fisk, ‘There is Firestorm Coming’, The Independent 
2002-09-11: David Aaronovich, ‘Instead of Leadership, We Have been Offered Glib 
Solutions and Isolationism’, The Independent 
2002-12-19: ‘War in Iraq Will Make us Terror Target’, The Mirror 
2003-01-30: Editorial, ‘Speak for this Nation’, The Guardian 
2003-02-09: Editorial, ‘The Dossier That Shamed Britain, The Guardian 
2003-02-15: Charles Kennedy, Speech to Anti-War Rally, Hyde Park, London 
2003-02-22: Editorial, ‘Morality for Sale, The Guardian 
2003-02-26: Editorial, ‘Choice Moment’, The Guardian 
2003-03-18: Robin Cook, ‘Why I Had to Leave the Cabinet’, The Guardian 
2003-04-07: Geroge Gallaway, ‘My Views are Those of Millions’, The Guardian 
2003-04-08: Opinion, ‘Lies Will not Disguise the Ugly face of War’, Mirror 
2003-05:  Editorial, ‘No Note of Apology’, PeaceNews 
2003-08-12: David Clark, ‘Iraq Has Wrecked Our Case for Humanitarian Wars’, The 
Guardian 
2003-09-16: Hugo Young, ‘Under Blair Britain Ceased to Be’, The Guardian 
2004-02:  Editorial, ‘Still Time to Abolish War, PeaceNews 
2004-03-08: David Clark, ‘Blair's Vision of a New World Order, The Guardian 
2004-05-28: George Gallaway, ‘You Can Spin, but You Can’t Hide’, The Guardian 
2004-07-01: George Gallaway, ‘A Show Trial’, The Guardian 
2005-05-03: George Gallaway, ‘These are Blair’s Last Days’, The Guardian 
2005-06-08: George Gallaway, Interview on Al-Jazeera 
2005-06-09: David Clark, ‘This Terror Will Continue Until We Take Arab Grievances 
Seriously’, The Guardian 
2006-07-31: David Clark, ‘How Can Terrorism be Condemned While War Crimes Go 
Without Rebuke?’, The Guardian 
2006-08-25: David Clark, ‘Blair's Foreign Policy is Now a Threat to National Security’, 
The Guardian 
2006-10-12: Sarah Sand, ‘Sir Richard Dannatt: A Very Honest General’, The Daily Mail 
2008-10-09: Max Hastings, ‘Afghanistan is Operation Futility Unless We Talk to the 
Taliban’, Mail Online 
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2008-11-15-Robert Fisk, ‘There is No End to the Centuries of Savagery in Afghanistan, 
The Independent 
2009-07-10: Rory Stewart, ‘Afghanistan: A War We Cannot Win’, The Telegraph 
2009-11-03: Kim Howels MP, ‘It's Time to Pull Out of Afghanistan and Take the Fight to 
Bin Laden in Britain’, The Telegraph 
2009-11-04: Patrick Wintour and Mark Tran, ‘Afghanistan Divides Labour as Army 
Death Toll Rises’, The Guardian 
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